Thornell v. Jones, 602 U.S. ___ (2024)
The case involves Danny Lee Jones, who was convicted of three murders committed with the intent to steal a gun collection. Jones brutally killed a man, his 7-year-old daughter, and his grandmother. After being found guilty, the trial court proceeded to sentencing. Under Arizona law, the court was required to impose a death sentence if it found one or more aggravating circumstances and no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. The court found three aggravating circumstances and sentenced Jones to death. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the decision.
Jones sought postconviction review, arguing that his attorney was ineffective. He claimed that his attorney should have retained an independent neuropsychologist, rather than relying on a court-appointed psychiatrist. The state court denied this claim. Jones then filed a habeas petition in Federal District Court, reasserting his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. The District Court held an evidentiary hearing but concluded that Jones could not show prejudice because the additional information he presented barely altered the sentencing profile presented to the sentencing judge. The Ninth Circuit reversed, but the Supreme Court vacated that judgment and remanded for the Ninth Circuit to determine whether it had been proper to consider the new evidence presented at the federal evidentiary hearing.
On reconsideration, the Ninth Circuit again granted habeas relief. The panel held that it was permissible to consider the new evidence and concluded that there was a reasonable probability that Jones would not have received a death sentence if that evidence had been presented at sentencing. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation and application of Strickland.
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision, stating that it had departed from the well-established rules in at least three ways. The Supreme Court found that the Ninth Circuit failed to adequately take into account the weighty aggravating circumstances in this case, applied a strange Circuit rule that prohibits a court in a Strickland case from assessing the relative strength of expert witness testimony, and held that the District Court erred by attaching diminished persuasive value to Jones’s mental health conditions because it saw no link between those conditions and Jones’s conduct when he committed the three murders. The Supreme Court concluded that there was no reasonable probability that the evidence on which Jones relies would have altered the outcome at sentencing.
When a capital defendant claims that he was prejudiced at sentencing because counsel failed to present available mitigating evidence, a court must decide whether it is reasonably likely that the additional evidence would have avoided a death sentence. This requires considering the strength of all the evidence and comparing the weight of aggravating and mitigating factors.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
THORNELL, DIRECTOR, ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS v. JONES
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit
No. 22–982. Argued April 17, 2024—Decided May 30, 2024
Respondent Danny Lee Jones was convicted of the premeditated first-degree murders of Robert and Tisha Weaver and the attempted premeditated murder of Robert’s grandmother Katherine Gumina. Arizona law at the time required the trial court to “impose a sentence of death” if it found “one or more” statutorily enumerated “aggravating circumstances” and “no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §13–703(E). The trial court found three aggravating circumstances that applied to both Robert’s and Tisha’s murders: Jones committed multiple homicides, §13–703(F)(8); he was motivated by “pecuniary” gain, §13–703(F)(5); and the murders were “especially heinous, cruel or depraved,” §13–703(F)(6). The trial court found an additional aggravating circumstance with respect to Tisha’s murder: she was a young child, §13–703(F)(9). The trial court also concluded that Jones had established four mitigating circumstances: long-term substance abuse, drug and alcohol impairment at the time of the murders, head trauma, and childhood abuse. 9 Record 2465. The court concluded that these mitigating circumstances were “not sufficiently substantial to outweigh the aggravating circumstances,” so it sentenced Jones to death. Ibid. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed after “review[ing] the entire record” and “independently weighing all of the aggravating and mitigating evidence presented.” 185 Ariz. 471, 492, 917 P.2d 200, 221.
Jones later sought state postconviction review on the theory that defense counsel was ineffective, but the Arizona courts rejected Jones’s claims. Jones next filed a federal habeas petition in District Court and reasserted his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. The District Court held an evidentiary hearing but ultimately concluded that Jones could not show prejudice because the additional information he presented “ ‘barely. . . alter[ed] the sentencing profile presented to the sentencing judge.’ ” Jones v. Schriro, 450 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1043 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 700). The Ninth Circuit reversed, but this Court vacated that judgment and remanded for the Ninth Circuit to determine whether, in light of Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, it had been proper to consider the new evidence presented at the federal evidentiary hearing. See Ryan v. Jones, 563 U.S. 932. On reconsideration, the Ninth Circuit again granted habeas relief. The panel held that it was permissible to consider the new evidence and concluded that there was a “ ‘reasonable probability’ ” that “Jones would not have received a death sentence” if that evidence had been presented at sentencing. Jones v. Ryan, 52 F. 4th 1104, 1137. Ten judges dissented from the denial of en banc review. One dissent, joined by eight judges, asserted that the Ninth Circuit panel flouted Strickland by crediting “questionable, weak, and cumulative mitigation evidence” as “enough to overcome . . . weight[y] . . . aggravating circumstances.” Id., at 1155.
Held: The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation and application of Strickland was in error. Pp. 7–16.
(a) To succeed on his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, Jones must show that counsel provided a “deficient” performance that “prejudiced” him. Strickland, 466 U. S., at 687. Jones can show prejudice only if “there is a reasonable probability that, absent [counsel’s] errors, the sentencer . . . would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.” Id., at 695. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. That requires a substantial, not just conceivable, likelihood of a different result.” Pinholster, 563 U. S., at 189 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). To determine whether a prisoner satisfies this standard, a court must “consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury”—both mitigating and aggravating. Strickland, 466 U. S., at 695.
The Ninth Circuit departed from these well-established rules in at least three ways. First, it failed adequately to take into account the weighty aggravating circumstances. Second, it applied a strange Circuit rule that prohibits a court in a Strickland case from assessing the relative strength of expert witness testimony. Third, it held that the District Court erred by attaching diminished persuasive value to Jones’s mental health conditions. See 52 F. 4th, at 1129. Contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s suggestion, Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, permits a sentencer to find mitigating evidence unpersuasive.
Jones argues that a habeas petitioner is entitled to relief whenever he or she “presents substantial evidence of the kind that a reasonable sentencer might deem relevant to the defendant’s moral culpability.” Brief for Respondent 14. This rule is squarely at odds with the established understanding of prejudice under Strickland, which requires a “reasonable probability” of a different result. Where aggravating factors greatly outweigh mitigating evidence, there may be no “reasonable probability” of a different result. Pp. 7–9.
(b) Turning to the issue of prejudice in this case, the mitigating evidence Jones presented at the federal evidentiary hearing “would barely have altered the sentencing profile presented to the sentencing judge,” and it is insufficient to show prejudice. Strickland, 466 U. S., at 700. Pp. 9–13.
(1) Jones presented evidence that, he claims, shows he suffers from various mental illnesses. But Arizona courts had already heard testimony that Jones “suffers from a major mental illness,” likely a “form of Bipolar Affective Disorder.” 4 Record 1070; 10 id., at 2567. And they declined to give this evidence much weight because Jones did not “establish a causal connection between his alleged mental illness and his conduct on the night of the murders.” 185 Ariz., at 492, 917 P. 2d, at 221. Jones’s new evidence did not fix that problem because Jones’s experts provided no real link between Jones’s disorders and the murders. Pp. 9–10.
(2) Next, Jones introduced evidence that he suffers from cognitive impairment caused by physical trauma that he suffered during his mother’s pregnancy, at birth, and later in life. But Arizona courts had already heard extensive evidence about Jones’s head trauma and cognitive impairment and did not find this evidence sufficient to warrant leniency. Ibid. The little evidence Jones added at his evidentiary hearing at most corroborates the testimony that the Arizona courts already credited, and it would thus provide little benefit. Pp. 11.
(3) In federal court, Jones also alleged sexual abuse by his grandfather and physical abuse by his second stepfather. But this evidence would not help either. Again, the Arizona courts had heard about many other instances of childhood abuse but concluded they did not warrant leniency, primarily because the abuse appeared unconnected to the murders. 185 Ariz., at 490–491, 917 P. 2d, at 219–220; 9 Record 2465. The new allegations are likewise not causally connected and, at any rate, are uncorroborated. Arizona courts would give such self-reported and uncorroborated evidence “little . . . mitigating weight.” State v. Sharp, 193 Ariz. 414, 425, 973 P.2d 1171, 1182. Pp. 12–13.
(4) Finally, Jones produced evidence of substance abuse, but his history of substance abuse was “well-documented” at the time of sentencing, and the Arizona Supreme Court gave this fact “some mitigating weight,” 185 Ariz., at 491, 917 P. 2d, at 220. There is no reasonable chance Arizona courts would reach a different result on essentially the same evidence. P. 13.
(c) The weakness of Jones’s mitigating evidence contrasts sharply with the strength of the aggravating circumstances. These circumstances—multiple homicides, cruelty, pecuniary motivation, and murder of a child—are given great weight in Arizona. The Arizona Supreme Court has repeatedly held that one or more of these aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigation evidence—even evidence that was “not insubstantial.” State v. Hampton, 213 Ariz. 167, 185, 140 P.3d 950, 968. Conversely, Jones and his amici identify no cases in which the Arizona Supreme Court has vacated the judgment of death in a case involving multiple murders—let alone all of the aggravating circumstances present here. The absence of such a case strongly suggests that Jones has no reasonable probability of escaping the death penalty. Pp. 13–14.
(d) Contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion, “the Strickland prejudice analysis conducted by the Supreme Court” in other cases, 52 F. 4th, at 1131, does not support resentencing here. In those cases, defense counsel introduced little, if any, mitigating evidence at the original sentencing, and the aggravating circumstances were weaker. By contrast, Jones started with much more mitigation evidence, and the aggravating circumstances present here are weightier. Had the Ninth Circuit engaged in the analysis required by Strickland, it would have affirmed the decision of the District Court denying habeas relief. Pp. 14–16.
52 F. 4th 1104, reversed and remanded.
Alito, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Thomas, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, JJ., joined. Sotomayor, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Kagan, J., joined. Jackson, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
Record returned to the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona (Phoenix Division) (3 boxes). |
Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED. Alito, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Thomas, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, JJ., joined. Sotomayor, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Kagan, J., joined. Jackson, J., filed a dissenting opinion. |
Argued. For petitioner: Jason D. Lewis, Deputy Solicitor General, Phoenix, Ariz. For respondent: Jean-Claude Andre, Santa Monica, Cal. |
Reply of Ryan Thornell, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections submitted. |
Reply of petitioner Ryan Thornell, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections filed. (Distributed) |
CIRCULATED |
Amicus brief of Equal Justice U.S.A. submitted. |
Amicus brief of The Arizona Capital Representation Project submitted. |
Brief amicus curiae of Equal Justice U.S.A. filed. (Distributed) |
Brief amici curiae of The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, et al. filed. (Distributed) |
Brief amicus curiae of The Arizona Capital Representation Project filed. (Distributed) |
Amicus brief of The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and The American Civil Liberties Union submitted. |
Brief of Danny Lee Jones submitted. |
Brief of respondent Danny Lee Jones filed. |
Record requested from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. |
SET FOR ARGUMENT on Wednesday, April 17, 2024. |
Motion to extend the time to file respondent's brief on the merits granted and the time is extended to and including March 13, 2024. |
Amicus brief of State of South Dakota submitted. |
Brief amici curiae of South Dakota, et al. filed. |
Motion of Danny Lee Jones for an extension of time submitted. |
Motion for an extension of time to file respondent's brief on the merits filed. |
Brief of Ryan Thornell, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections submitted. |
Joint Appendix submitted. |
Brief of petitioner Ryan Thornell, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections filed. |
Joint appendix filed. |
Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis filed by respondent GRANTED. |
Petition GRANTED. |
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 12/8/2023. |
Rescheduled. |
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 12/1/2023. |
Record received from the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona (Phoenix Division) (3 boxes). |
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 11/17/2023. |
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 11/9/2023. |
Record Requested. |
Record received from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The record is electronic and available on PACER. |
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 11/3/2023. |
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 10/27/2023. |
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 10/13/2023. |
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 10/6/2023. |
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 9/26/2023. |
Reply of petitioner Ryan Thornell, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections filed. |
Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis filed by respondent Danny Lee Jones. |
Brief of respondent Danny Lee Jones in opposition filed. |
Motion to extend the time to file a response is granted and the time is further extended to and including August 23, 2023. |
Motion to extend the time to file a response from August 9, 2023 to August 23, 2023, submitted to The Clerk. |
Motion to extend the time to file a response is granted and the time is further extended to and including August 9, 2023. |
Motion to extend the time to file a response from July 10, 2023 to August 9, 2023, submitted to The Clerk. |
Motion to extend the time to file a response is granted and the time is extended to and including July 10, 2023. See Rule 30.1. |
Motion to extend the time to file a response from May 10, 2023 to July 9, 2023, submitted to The Clerk. |
Petition for a writ of certiorari filed. (Response due May 10, 2023) |
Application (22A685) granted by Justice Kagan extending the time to file until April 6, 2023. |
Application (22A685) to extend the time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari from February 5, 2023 to April 6, 2023, submitted to Justice Kagan. |