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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 22–888
_________________
JAMES R. RUDISILL, PETITIONER
v. DENIS
R. McDONOUGH, SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS
on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the federal circuit
[April 16, 2024]
Justice Jackson delivered the opinion of the
Court.
Petitioner James Rudisill first enlisted in the
United States Army in the year 2000. Over the next decade, he
reenlisted twice, serving a total of eight years on active duty. As
a result of his first period of military service, Rudisill was
entitled to 36 months of educational benefits under the Montgomery
GI Bill, to be paid by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA).
Rudisill’s subsequent periods of service separately entitled him to
36 months of educational benefits under the Post-9/11 GI Bill. Both
of Rudisill’s entitlements were subject to a 48-month
aggregate-benefits cap.
Rudisill used 25 months and 14 days of his
Montgomery benefits to help fund his undergraduate degree. Then,
after serving his third tour of duty, Rudisill sought to use his
Post-9/11 benefits to attend divinity school.
The VA informed Rudisill that his Post-9/11
benefits were limited to the duration of his unused Montgomery
benefits, pursuant to a provision of the Post-9/11 GI Bill, 38
U. S. C. §3327(d)(2). In other words, according to the VA, by
requesting Post-9/11 benefits before exhausting all of his
Montgomery benefits, Rudisill could receive only 36 months of
benefits in total, not the 48 months to which he would otherwise be
entitled.
The question before us is whether Rudisill can
access his Post-9/11 benefits entitlement without being subject to
§3327(d)(2)’s durational limit. We hold that he can. Because he
simply seeks to use one of his two separate entitlements,
§3327(d)(2) does not apply.
I
A
“The United States has a proud history of
offering educational assistance to millions of veterans, as
demonstrated by the many ‘G. I. Bills’ enacted since World War II.”
Post-9/11 Veterans Educational Assistance Act of 2008, §5002(3),
122Stat. 2358, 38 U. S. C. §3301
et seq. GI
bills honor the sacrifices of those who have served in the
military, and as such, “ha[ve] a positive effect on recruitment for
the Armed Forces.”
Ibid. These education benefits have also
helped to “reduce the costs of war, assist veterans in readjusting
to civilian life after wartime service, and boost the United States
economy.”
Ibid.
In the more than 75 years since Congress passed
the first GI Bill in response to World War II, it has enacted
additional GI bills, most of which share two relevant features.
First, an individual with the requisite period of military service
becomes “entitled to” educational benefits, typically in the form
of a stipend or tuition payments, which the VA is then required to
provide once the veteran enrolls in an eligible education program.
Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944, 58Stat. 288, 289; see also,
e.g., Veterans’ Readjustment Assistance Act of 1952, 66Stat.
664–666; Veterans’ Readjustment Benefits Act of 1966, 80Stat. 13,
15. Second, with one brief exception,[
1] GI bills from the Korean War onward have provided
education benefits to fully qualified servicemembers for a fixed
duration: 36 months of benefits per GI bill, up to a total of 48
months of benefits for those servicemembers who become eligible for
educational benefits under multiple GI bills. See 66Stat. 665;
82Stat. 1331; 90Stat. 2396.[
2]
This case relates to the overlap between two
recent GI bills. The first is the Montgomery GI Bill Act of 1984,
38 U. S. C. §3001
et seq. The Montgomery GI
Bill provides “[b]asic educational assistance” to servicemembers
who first enter active duty between 1985 and 2030. §3011(a).
Montgomery benefits give veterans a “basic educational assistance
allowance” that “help[s] meet, in part, the expenses of such
individual’s subsistence, tuition, fees, supplies, books,
equipment, and other educational costs.” §3014(a); see also §3015
(setting forth amount of assistance). This limited stipend
ordinarily does not pay the full costs of a veteran’s
education.
As with other GI bills, the Montgomery GI Bill
consists of a detailed series of statutory provisions that include
an entitlement and also durational limits. To be “entitled to basic
educational assistance” under the Montgomery benefits program, a
servicemember must satisfy certain military service
requirements—typically two or three years of continuous active
duty. §3011(a). The servicemember is then “entitled to 36 months”
of Montgomery benefits. §§3013(a)(1), (c)(1). An eligible
servicemember “may make an election
not to receive
[Montgomery benefits],” §3011(c)(1) (emphasis added), but unless he
opts out, he contributes $1,200 into the program, usually through a
series of pay reductions. §§3011(b)(1)–(2). The Montgomery Bill’s
36-month entitlement is also “[s]ubject to section 3695,”
§3013(a)(1), a provision that predates Montgomery and limits “[t]he
aggregate period for which any person may receive assistance under
two or more [GI bills]” to 48 months, §3695(a).
The second GI bill at issue in this case is the
Post-9/11 Veterans Educational Assistance Act of 2008, 122Stat.
2357, 38 U. S. C. §3301
et seq. When it
enacted this bill, Congress expressly recognized that “[s]ervice on
active duty in the Armed Forces has been especially arduous
. . . since September 11, 2001,” and that the Montgomery
GI Bill’s modest educational benefits, which were “designed for
peacetime service,” had become “outmoded.” §§5002(2), (4), 122Stat.
2358. Therefore, the Post-9/11 GI Bill gives servicemembers
“enhanced educational assistance benefits” that “are commensurate
with the educational assistance benefits provided by a grateful
Nation to veterans of World War II.” §5002(6),
ibid. A
servicemember entitled to Post-9/11 benefits ordinarily receives
the actual net cost of in-state tuition, additional public-private
cost sharing to cover the cost at private institutions, a monthly
housing stipend, a lump sum for books and supplies, and additional
amounts for other specified expenses. 38 U. S. C.
§§3313(c), 3315–3318.
As with the Montgomery GI Bill, the Post-9/11 GI
Bill establishes an entitlement and also prescribes durational
limits. To be entitled to Post-9/11 benefits, servicemembers must
typically serve on active duty in the Armed Forces for at least
three years starting on or after September 11, 2001. §3311(b).
“[A]n individual entitled to educational assistance under [the
Post-9/11 GI Bill] is entitled to . . . 36 months” of
enhanced educational benefits. §3312(a). And as with Montgomery
benefits, this entitlement is “[s]ubject to section 3695,”
ibid., meaning that a servicemember’s aggregate benefits
from the Post-9/11 GI Bill and other GI bills are capped at 48
months, see §3695(a).
Because the Montgomery and Post-9/11 bills cover
overlapping service periods, eligibility for benefits under these
two bills overlaps as well. Consequently, the Post-9/11 GI Bill
contains a provision titled “[b]ar to duplication of educational
assistance benefits.” §3322. This bar clarifies that an individual
with entitlements to both Montgomery and Post-9/11 benefits “may
not receive assistance under two or more such programs
concurrently, but shall elect . . . under which chapter
or provisions to receive educational assistance.” §3322(a). A later
enacted provision further ensures that an individual may not
receive double credit for a single period of service; rather, he
“shall elect . . . under which authority such service is
to be credited.” §3322(h)(1).
Thus, to summarize: Per §3322, servicemembers
who are eligible for educational benefits under either the
Montgomery GI Bill or the Post-9/11 GI Bill—from a period of
service that could qualify for either program—can opt to credit
that service toward one educational benefits program or the other.
If servicemembers serve for long enough, they may be entitled to
both. But such servicemembers cannot receive disbursements from
both entitlement programs at the same time, nor may they receive
any combination of benefits for longer than 48 months. Outside of
those limitations, their service “entitle[s]” them to the benefits
that they have earned, and the VA “shall pay” them these benefits.
§§3011(a), 3014(a), 3311(a), 3313(a).
B
When it enacted the Post-9/11 GI Bill,
Congress addressed one immediate problem that arose due to the lag
time between the start of the Post-9/11 GI Bill’s entitlement
period and the bill’s effective date. The case before us concerns
the scope of that solution.
As we have explained, the Post-9/11 GI Bill
created an educational benefits entitlement for veterans who serve
on or after September 11, 2001. But the legislation granting that
entitlement was not passed until 2008 and did not take effect until
August 1, 2009. See 122Stat. 2378. Thus, servicemembers who were
entitled to Post-9/11 benefits but had been funneled through the
Montgomery program until the Post-9/11 GI Bill went into effect
needed a way to access the more generous Post-9/11 benefits
program.
Section 3322(d) informs these servicemembers
that “coordination of entitlement to educational assistance under
[the Post-9/11 GI Bill], on the one hand, and [the Montgomery GI
Bill] on the other, shall be governed by [§3327].” Then, under
§3327, an individual who meets the criteria for Montgomery benefits
and Post-9/11 benefits based on the same (overlapping) period of
service can elect to exchange the Montgomery benefits he has
received for the Post-9/11 benefits that he wants. Section 3327(a)
states that “[a]n individual may elect to receive educational
assistance under [the Post-9/11 GI Bill]” if they meet two
criteria. First, they must fall into one of six categories “as of
August 1, 2009,” including, as relevant here, individuals who are
“entitled to [Montgomery benefits].” §§3327(a)(1)(A), (C). Second,
they must “mee[t] the requirements for entitlement to [Post-9/11
benefits]” “as of the date of the” §3327(a) election.
§3327(a)(2).
Making a §3327(a) election effects a swap by
operation of §3327(d): “[A]n individual making an election under
[§3327(a)] shall be entitled to [Post-9/11 benefits], instead of
[Montgomery benefits].” §3327(d)(1). And, notably, the statute
further clarifies that, if the individual has already used some
Montgomery benefits when he makes that swap, the new entitlement is
not a full 36 months of Post-9/11 benefits. Instead, his new
entitlement capped at “the number of months of unused entitlement
. . . under [the Montgomery GI Bill], as of the date of
the election.” §3327(d)(2)(A). Once a servicemember elects to swap
his Montgomery benefits entitlement for a Post-9/11 benefits
entitlement, that “election . . . is irrevocable.”
§3327(i).
II
Petitioner James Rudisill spent nearly eight
years on active duty in the U. S. Army, providing three
distinct periods of military service.[
3] He was deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan, experienced
combat, and sustained multiple injuries. He reached the rank of
captain and earned several medals and commendations, including a
Bronze Star. After each period of service, Rudisill received an
honorable discharge.
In between his second and third periods of
military service, Rudisill earned an undergraduate degree. To help
finance this education, he used 25 months and 14 days of the
Montgomery benefits he was entitled to receive due to his first
period of service. After graduating in 2007, he reenrolled in the
Army for a third period. By 2015, Rudisill successfully sought
admission to Yale Divinity School; he intended to earn and use that
degree to become a chaplain in the Army.
To fund his graduate school education, Rudisill
applied to the VA for Post-9/11 benefits, relying on the
entitlement that he had earned with respect to his second and third
periods of service. But the VA issued a certificate of eligibility
stating that Rudisill was only eligible for 10 months and 16 days
of Post-9/11 benefits—the length of his unused Montgomery benefits.
This response did not accord with Rudisill’s understanding of the
scope of his entitlement: In his view, he had earned an entitlement
to 36 months of Post-9/11 benefits based on his second and third
periods of service, and he could use 22 months and 16 days of that
Post-9/11 entitlement due to §3695’s 48-month aggregate-benefits
cap. Rudisill filed a notice of disagreement with the VA, which
eventually denied his claim for the additional entitlement.
The Board of Veterans’ Appeals affirmed the VA’s
decision, but the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims reversed. It
reasoned that although the statutory scheme was ambiguous, the
statutory structure, regulatory framework, congressional purpose,
and pro-veteran canon supported Rudisill’s interpretation of the
statute.
BO v.
Wilkie, 31 Vet. App. 321 (2019).
Over a dissent, a panel of the Federal Circuit
agreed, holding that veterans with multiple periods of qualifying
service are not subject to §3327(d)(2). 4 F. 4th 1297 (2021).
The en banc Federal Circuit then considered the matter, and,
overruling the panel in a 10-to-2 decision, it reversed. 55 F. 4th
879 (2022). It explained that, when Rudisill sought to use his
Post-9/11 benefits, he had made an “election” under §3327(a)(1),
making his benefits subject to §3327(d)(2)’s limit.
We granted certiorari and now reverse the
judgment of the Federal Circuit. 599 U. S. ___ (2023).
III
The question before us is this: When
servicemembers have separate entitlements to both Montgomery and
Post-9/11 benefits, can they use their benefits, in any order, up
to §3695’s aggregate 48-month cap? In the Government’s telling, a
veteran in this position is subject to §3322(d)’s mandatory
coordination clause; to receive
any Post-9/11 benefits, he
must make an election under §3327(a), which subjects him to
§3327(d)(2). By contrast, Rudisill argues that he already has two
separate entitlements to benefits—36 months under each program—so
§3322(d) does not apply to him. And, even if it did, Rudisill says,
§3327(a)’s election mechanism is optional, and he does not forfeit
any entitlement by declining to make a §3327(a) election.
As explained below, the pertinent statutory text
resolves this dispute in Rudisill’s favor. Section 3327(d)(2)’s
limit applies only to an individual who makes a §3327(a) election.
But Rudisill never made an election under §3327(a), nor must he
have done so, because §3327 is triggered only if a servicemember is
“coordinat[ing]” an entitlement per §3322(d). Someone in Rudisill’s
situation—who just uses one of his two entitlements—is not
coordinating anything. This view is further reinforced by our
reading of §3327(a). That provision’s election mechanism is
optional, and Rudisill does not forfeit his entitlements by
declining to make a §3327(a) election.
A
We start by examining Rudisill’s benefits
entitlements generally. It is undisputed that Rudisill earned two
separate entitlements to educational benefits due to the length of
his military service. Based on his first period of service, he
became “entitled to” Montgomery benefits, as the statute clearly
states. §3011(a). Equally clear is that his second and third
periods of service “entitled” him to Post-9/11 benefits.
§3311(a).
So, from the outset, we know that Rudisill
earned two separate benefits entitlements, one per the Montgomery
GI Bill and the other per the Post-9/11 GI Bill, by serving in the
military for nearly eight years over three separate periods.
Notably, our analysis does not focus on his periods of service.
Contra,
post, at 7–8 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Rather, what
matters is that his lengthy service conferred two separate
entitlements.
Recognizing Rudisill’s separate entitlements
leads us to two observations. First, the statute establishes a
baseline rule that, absent some other limitation, the VA must pay a
veteran’s benefits. The Montgomery GI Bill requires that “[t]he
Secretary
shall pay to each individual entitled to
[Montgomery benefits] who is pursuing an approved program of
education a basic educational assistance allowance.” §3014(a)
(emphasis added). Likewise, the Post-9/11 GI Bill states that
“[t]he Secretary
shall pay to each individual entitled to
[Post-9/11 benefits] who is pursuing an approved program of
education . . . the amounts specified.” §3313(a)
(emphasis added).
Second, Congress has clearly and plainly
delineated certain durational limits on these benefits
entitlements. Montgomery and Post-9/11 entitlements have specified
outer limits: Each program entitles the recipient to up to 36
months of benefits, and both are “[s]ubject to section 3695,” which
imposes a 48-month aggregate-benefits cap. §§3013(a)(1), 3312(a).
The benefits entitlements are likewise qualified by certain
enumerated exceptions.
Ibid.
Thus, even before turning to the statutory
provisions that are most directly implicated here, it is clear that
(1) Rudisill is separately entitled to each of two educational
benefits; and (2) absent specified limits, the VA is statutorily
obligated to pay him 48 months of benefits. As explained below, no
statutory constraint prevents Rudisill from accessing his benefits,
up to 48 months, in whichever order he chooses.
B
Section 3322(d) is the first of two statutory
provisions that are at the heart of this dispute. That subsection,
titled “Additional coordination matters,” states:
“In the case of an individual entitled to
educational assistance under [the Montgomery GI Bill or other
specified programs], or making contributions toward [the Montgomery
Program], as of August 1, 2009, coordination of entitlement to
educational assistance under [the Post-9/11 GI Bill], on the one
hand, and such chapters or provisions, on the other, shall be
governed by [ 38 U. S. C. §3327].”
There is no dispute that subsection (d) applies
to a servicemember who is entitled to Montgomery benefits but has
become eligible for Post-9/11 benefits for his period of qualifying
service as of August 1, 2009, given the overlap of those two
entitlement programs. See Part I–B,
supra. But in the
context of the instant dispute, the Government argues, and the
dissent echoes, that an individual who has two separate benefits
entitlements under the Montgomery and Post-9/11 bills must also
“coordinate” those two entitlements under §3322(d) in order to
access his Post-9/11 benefits. We conclude that the plain text of
§3322(d) does not support that assertion.
First, nothing in the statute imposes a duty for
any veteran to “coordinate” entitlements in order to receive
benefits. Sections 3011 through 3014, which outline the Montgomery
entitlement, do not refer to coordination. Nor do §§3311 through
3313, which establish the Post-9/11 benefits entitlement. And
§3695—the provision that specifically addresses veterans with more
than one entitlement—does not require, or even mention,
coordination.
For the person covered by §3322(d)’s
coordination requirement, the provision does discuss “coordination
of entitlement” to benefits. But the statute distinguishes between
“entitlement to” and “receipt of ” benefits. For example,
§§3322(e), (f ), and (g) bar duplicative
receipt of
benefits. Similarly, §3322(a) says that a servicemember “may not
receive” two benefits at the same time. But §3322(d) does not
concern the
receipt of benefits—that term appears nowhere in
that subsection. Instead, subsection (d) addresses “coordination of
entitlement.” Rudisill has no need to coordinate any entitlement:
He is
already entitled to two separate benefits. Section
3322(d) says that “coordination of entitlement . . .
shall be governed by” §3327, but, as Rudisill correctly observes,
with nothing to coordinate, §3327 does not govern.
Both the Government and the dissent argue that
this view misconstrues the meaning of the term “coordination.” In
their view, “coordinat[ing]” an entitlement is not converting or
exchanging entitlements. But what, then, does it mean to coordinate
an entitlement under this statutory scheme? They contend that
coordination “refers to a veteran choosing which ‘entitlement’
. . . he would like to use.”
Post, at 5 (opinion
of Thomas, J.). But choosing an entitlement is an election, not
coordination. And the statute uses the word “elect” repeatedly to
say that veterans should choose between two different entitlements.
Here, §3322(d) speaks of “coordination,” not “election,” and we
generally “presume differences in language like this convey
differences in meaning.”
Henson v.
Santander Consumer USA
Inc., 582 U.S. 79, 86 (2017).
Nor does the reference to “coordination” in
subsection (d) exist in isolation. Rather, subsection (d) points to
§3327, which—as we explain below, see Part III–C–2,
infra—tells us what coordination means: making an election
that permits the individual to get Post-9/11 benefits “instead
of ” Montgomery benefits. §3327(d)(1). In ordinary parlance,
if a person who is directed to “coordinate,” receives one thing
“instead of ” another, that “coordination” is understood to
effect a swap.
If we were left with any doubt that §3322(d)
simply does not speak to a veteran who just wants to use one of his
two separate entitlements, two additional clues would tip the
balance. First, §3322 is titled “Bar to duplication” of benefits.
There is no duplication for someone in Rudisill’s situation. He
earned each benefit separately, and he is asking to receive each
benefit separately. “[S]ection headings . . . ‘supply
cues’ as to what Congress intended,”
Merit Management Group,
LP v.
FTI Consulting, Inc., 583 U.S. 366, 380 (2018),
and §3322’s heading tells us that its provisions prevent double
dipping, something that Rudisill is not doing.
Second, §3322(d) applies to individuals with
Montgomery entitlements “as of August 1, 2009.” The Government says
that this language just references the bill’s effective date. See
Brief for Respondent 16, and n. But, in the entire Post-9/11 GI
Bill, only two statutory provisions—§3322(d) and
§3327(a)(1)—specifically reference this date. Why would Congress
refer to the effective date of the Post-9/11 GI Bill in only these
two places and nowhere else?
The most logical inference is that this date is
material to the work of those particular provisions. And under the
interpretation we adopt today, August 1, 2009, is highly relevant,
because before then, individuals could have been accruing Post-9/11
benefits (ever since September 11, 2001) but would have had no way
to opt into that benefits program. The swap Congress devised in
§3327 gives such individuals a mechanism for accessing these
benefits. The invocation of the bill’s effective date in §3322(d)
thus provides another clue that these provisions are not relevant
to someone, like Rudisill, who has no need to make a swap.[
4]
Adding all this up, we come to the conclusion
that §3322(d) serves a specific function: to allow individuals with
Montgomery benefits who would prefer to swap them for Post-9/11
benefits to “coordinate” these entitlements via §3327. But when a
person already has two separate entitlements and simply
uses
one after the other, he is not coordinating anything. Because that
is Rudisill’s situation, §3322(d) does not speak to him.
C
Based on the analysis we have already laid
out, Rudisill never reaches §3327 when using his benefits because
he is not coordinating his entitlements. And the contention that
Rudisill can only use his Post-9/11 benefits by invoking §3327 is
contradicted by the text of §3327 itself.
1
We cannot agree that, to receive Post-9/11
benefits, a servicemember in Rudisill’s situation must elect them
via §3327. The statute simply does not say that a servicemember
with more than one entitlement receives Post-9/11 benefits only by
making a §3327(a) election.
To start, a §3327(a) election is optional: An
eligible individual “
may elect to receive” Post-9/11
benefits. “ ‘[T]he “word ‘may’
clearly connotes
discretion.” ’ ”
Opati v.
Republic of
Sudan, 590 U.S. 418, 428 (2020). So a veteran can opt for a
§3327(a) election, but he does not have to.
If he decides not to opt for a §3327(a)
election, nothing in §3327, §3322, or anywhere else purports to
alter his entitlement. Instead, the veteran remains in the exact
same position as before. A veteran who had only Montgomery benefits
is left with only Montgomery benefits. Likewise, for the veteran
(like Rudisill) who started out with both Montgomery and Post-9/11
benefits, both sets of benefits remain.
To argue that Rudisill may receive Post-9/11
benefits only by making a §3327(a) election, the dissent
invokes—and misreads—§3322(a). See
post, at 5 (opinion of
Thomas, J.). To repeat, as relevant here, §3322(a) provides: “An
individual entitled to [Post-9/11 benefits] who is also eligible
for [Montgomery benefits] may not receive assistance under [both]
programs concurrently, but shall elect . . . under which
chapter or provisions to receive educational assistance.” As is
clear from its text, §3322(a) just says, and means, that a veteran
cannot use Montgomery and Post-9/11 benefits at the same time to
fund his education. Section 3322(a) bars double dipping—it does not
impose a substantive requirement to elect benefits via
§3327(a).
So, while Rudisill must make an election per
§3322(a) when he wants to have a particular aspect of his education
funded, it does not follow that he must also make an election under
§3327(a). The two elections are completely different, and making
one is not the same as making the other. By blurring all elections
into one, instead of recognizing that the statute contemplates
multiple distinct elections, the Government—and the dissent—make a
crucial misstep.
In this regard, it is noteworthy that §3322(a)
does not mention, much less cross-reference,
either §3322(d)
or §3327. Even though §3322(a) and §3327(a) both use the
word “elect,” nothing in the text of either provision suggests that
these two elections are one and the same. Rather, to “elect” just
means to choose. See New Oxford American Dictionary 545 (2d ed.
2005) (“elect” means to “opt for or choose to do something”). And
that says nothing about the substance of any option.
Other parts of the statute confirm that not all
elections are the same. For example, §3322(a) requires a person
with two or more entitlements to “elect” which to receive at any
given time, while §3322(h) bars “duplication of eligibility based
on a single event or period of service,” and thus requires certain
individuals to “elect” under which benefits programs their service
is to be credited.[
5] Turning
to §3327, subsection (a) similarly allows a person who is entitled
to Montgomery benefits to “elect” to receive Post-9/11 benefits
under certain circumstances, and subsection (c)(1) lets a person
“elect” to revoke an entitlement that he previously transferred.
Furthermore and importantly, subsection (i) refers to these two
elections separately. See §3327(i) (“An election under subsection
(a) or (c)(1) is irrevocable”). In the context of a statute that
establishes multiple distinct elections, attempts to equate a
§3322(a) election with a §3327(a) election are unpersuasive.
2
Undeterred, the Government turns to §3327(d),
which details the consequences of making an election under
§3327(a). But the plain text of §3327(d) makes clear that the
provision does not limit a servicemember in Rudisill’s
situation.
From its start, §3327(d) contradicts the
Government’s reading of the statute. Section 3327(d)(1) tells us
that “an individual making an election under [§3327(a)] shall be
entitled to [Post-9/11 benefits]
instead of basic
[Montgomery benefits].” §3327(d)(1) (emphasis added). In other
words, he swaps out his entitlement to Montgomery benefits for an
entitlement to Post-9/11 benefits. Rudisill had no need to get
Post-9/11 benefits “instead of ” Montgomery benefits, because
he was already entitled to both benefits.
For veterans who have used some but not all of
their Montgomery benefits, §3327(d)(2)(A) lays out one further
consequence of making a §3327 election: When these veterans “mak[e]
an election under [§3327(a)], the number of months of [Post-9/11
benefits] shall be . . . the number of months of unused
[Montgomery benefits], as of the date of the election.” Two aspects
of this provision stand out.
First, like subsection (d)(1), this limitation
only applies to “an individual making an election under subsection
(a).” So, if a person does not make a §3327(a) election,
§3327(d)(2) does not limit his entitlement.
Second, this provision makes perfect sense under
Rudisill’s interpretation of the statute. If a veteran served for
three years, he earned 36 months of benefits. If he received
Montgomery benefits for this service but should have been able to
get Post-9/11 benefits, due to the overlap in the eligibility for
these programs, §3327 lets him opt for Post-9/11 benefits instead.
But if he has already used some benefits at the time he elects the
swap, a §3327(a) election does not entitle him to a full 36-month
period of Post-9/11 benefits in addition to the Montgomery benefits
he has already used. Instead, §3327(d)(2) ensures that his one
period of service entitles him to 36 months of educational benefits
in total—no more, and no less.
By contrast, §3327(d)(2) is nonsensical under
the Government’s view of the statute. It would impose an
exhaust-or-forfeit requirement for veterans with two separate
entitlements: Either use up all of your Montgomery benefits (so
that you can get your full 48 months of benefits), or lose any
entitlement in excess of 36 months.[
6] At the very least, this would be an odd way to create
an exhaustion requirement, and the Government has not pointed us to
any comparable one in this statutory scheme or elsewhere. Again,
the more sensible view—and the view that the statutory text best
supports—is that §3327(d)(2) is a limit on exceeding one’s
entitlement through the swapping mechanism §3327 creates, and is
thus not an exhaustion requirement at all.
In sum, §3327(a)’s election mechanism is an
optional means of trading an existing benefits entitlement for
Post-9/11 benefits. Although §3327 details the consequences of
making that election, those consequences—by their own terms—apply
only to an individual who makes a §3327(a) election. On the other
hand, the entitlements of a person who does not make a §3327(a)
election are not altered. In Rudisill’s case, that leaves him with
two different entitlements (one under the Montgomery GI Bill and
the other under the Post-9/11 GI Bill) that the VA “shall pay” to
him, subject only to §3695’s 48-month cap. §§3014(a), 3313(a).
* * *
The bottom line is this: Veterans who
separately accrue benefits under both the Montgomery and Post-9/11
GI Bills are entitled to both benefits. Neither §3322(d) nor §3327
restrict veterans with two separate entitlements who simply seek to
use either one. Thus, Rudisill may use his benefits, in any order,
up to §3695’s 48-month aggregate-benefits cap. If the statute were
ambiguous, the pro- veteran canon would favor Rudisill, but the
statute is clear, so we resolve this case based on statutory text
alone. Because the Federal Circuit incorrectly limited Rudisill’s
benefits, we reverse its judgment and remand the case for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered
.