Culley v. Marshall, 601 U.S. ___ (2024)
The case involves two petitioners, Halima Culley and Lena Sutton, who loaned their cars to others who were subsequently arrested for drug-related offenses. The cars were seized under Alabama's civil forfeiture law, which allowed for the seizure of a car "incident to an arrest" as long as the state promptly initiated a forfeiture case. The State of Alabama filed forfeiture complaints against the cars 10 and 13 days after their seizure, respectively. While the forfeiture proceedings were pending, Culley and Sutton each filed purported class-action complaints in federal court, claiming that state officials violated their due process rights by retaining their cars during the forfeiture process without holding preliminary hearings.
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the petitioners' claims, holding that a timely forfeiture hearing affords claimants due process and that no separate preliminary hearing is constitutionally required. The petitioners argued that the Due Process Clause requires a separate preliminary hearing before the forfeiture hearing.
The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the Eleventh Circuit's decision. The Court held that in civil forfeiture cases involving personal property, the Due Process Clause requires a timely forfeiture hearing but does not require a separate preliminary hearing. The Court's decision was based on its precedents, which established that a timely forfeiture hearing satisfies due process in civil forfeiture cases. The Court also noted that historical practice reinforces its conclusion that due process does not require preliminary hearings in civil forfeiture cases.
When police seize and seek civil forfeiture of a car used to commit a drug offense, the Constitution does not require a preliminary hearing to determine whether the police may retain the car pending the forfeiture hearing.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
CULLEY et al. v. MARSHALL, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ALABAMA, et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eleventh circuit
No. 22–585. Argued October 30, 2023—Decided May 9, 2024
Petitioner Halima Culley loaned her car to her son, who was later pulled over by Alabama police officers and arrested for possession of marijuana. Petitioner Lena Sutton loaned her car to a friend, who was stopped by Alabama police and arrested for trafficking methamphetamine. In both cases, petitioners’ cars were seized under an Alabama civil forfeiture law that permitted seizure of a car “incident to an arrest” so long as the State then “promptly” initiated a forfeiture case. Ala. Code §20–2–93(b)(1), (c). The State of Alabama filed forfeiture complaints against Culley’s and Sutton’s cars just 10 and 13 days, respectively, after their seizure. While their forfeiture proceedings were pending, Culley and Sutton each filed purported class-action complaints in federal court seeking money damages under 42 U. S. C. §1983, claiming that state officials violated their due process rights by retaining their cars during the forfeiture process without holding preliminary hearings. In a consolidated appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of petitioners’ claims, holding that a timely forfeiture hearing affords claimants due process and that no separate preliminary hearing is constitutionally required.
Held: In civil forfeiture cases involving personal property, the Due Process Clause requires a timely forfeiture hearing but does not require a separate preliminary hearing. Pp. 5–14.
(a) Due process ordinarily requires States to provide notice and a hearing before seizing real property. But States may immediately seize personal property subject to civil forfeiture when the property (for example, a car) otherwise could be removed, destroyed, or concealed before a forfeiture hearing. When a State seizes personal property, due process requires a timely post-seizure forfeiture hearing. See United States v. Von Neumann, 474 U.S. 242, 249–250; United States v. $8,850, 461 U.S. 555, 562–565.
The Court’s decisions in $8,850 and Von Neumann make crystal clear that due process does not require a separate preliminary hearing to determine whether seized personal property may be retained pending the ultimate forfeiture hearing. In $8,850, the Court addressed the process due when the Customs Service seized currency from an individual entering the United States but did not immediately file for civil forfeiture of the currency. The Court concluded that a post-seizure delay “may become so prolonged that the dispossessed property owner has been deprived of a meaningful hearing at a meaningful time,” 461 U. S., at 562–563, and prescribed factors for courts to consider in assessing whether a forfeiture hearing is timely. Id., at 564–565. In Von Neumann, a property owner failed to declare the purchase of his new car upon driving it into the United States, and a customs official seized the car after determining that it was subject to civil forfeiture. The plaintiff filed a petition for remission of the forfeiture—in essence, a request under federal law that the Government exercise its discretion to forgive the forfeiture—which the Government did not answer for 36 days. The plaintiff sued, arguing that the Government’s delay in answering the remission petition violated due process. The Court rejected that claim, broadly holding that due process did not require a pre-forfeiture-hearing remission procedure in the first place. See 474 U. S., at 249–250. Instead, Von Neumann held that a timely forfeiture hearing satisfies due process in civil forfeiture cases, and that $8,850 specifies the standard for when a forfeiture hearing is timely.
Petitioners’ argument for a separate preliminary hearing appears to be a backdoor argument for a more timely forfeiture hearing to allow a property owner with a good defense to recover her property quickly. But the Court’s precedents already require a timely hearing, and a property owner can raise $8,850-based arguments to ensure a timely hearing. Petitioners’ efforts to distinguish Von Neumann on the ground that the statutory remission procedure in that case was discretionary fail because that fact played no role in the Court’s constitutional analysis. Petitioners also cannot distinguish the relevant language in Von Neumann as dicta, as the Court ruled for the Government on the ground that a timely “forfeiture proceeding, without more, provides the postseizure hearing required by due process” in civil forfeiture cases. 474 U. S., at 249. Similarly, petitioners’ contention that Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, should govern petitioners’ request for a preliminary hearing fails given that this Court decided $8,850 and Von Neumann after Mathews.
In addition, petitioners point to the Court’s Fourth Amendment decisions in the criminal context to support their contention that a preliminary hearing is required in the civil forfeiture context. That analogy fails. Fourth Amendment hearings are not adversarial, and address only whether probable cause supports the arrestee’s detention. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119–122. Here, petitioners argue that the immediate seizure of personal property requires adversarial preliminary hearings, and they assert that those hearings must address their affirmative defense of innocent ownership. But the Due Process Clause does not require more extensive preliminary procedures for the temporary retention of property than for the temporary restraint of persons. Pp. 5–10.
(b) Historical practice reinforces the Court’s conclusions in $8,850 and Von Neumann that due process does not require preliminary hearings in civil forfeiture cases. Since the Founding era, many federal and state statutes have authorized the Government to seize personal property and hold it pending a forfeiture hearing, without a separate preliminary hearing. Petitioners and their amici do not identify any federal or state statutes that, before the late 20th century, required preliminary hearings in civil forfeiture cases. Some States have recently enacted laws requiring preliminary hearings in civil forfeiture cases, but those recent laws do not support a constitutional mandate for preliminary hearings in every State. History demonstrates that both Congress and the States have long authorized law enforcement to seize personal property and hold it until a forfeiture hearing. The absence of separate preliminary hearings in civil forfeiture proceedings—from the Founding until the late 20th century—is weighty evidence that due process does not require such hearings. Pp. 11–13.
Affirmed.
Kavanaugh, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Barrett, JJ., joined. Gorsuch, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Thomas, J., joined. Sotomayor, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Kagan and Jackson, JJ., joined.
Oral Argument - October 30, 2023 |
Oral Argument - October 30, 2023 - 1 |
Oral Argument - October 30, 2023 - original |
Argued. For petitioners: Shay Dvoretzky, Washington, D. C. For respondents: Edmund G. LaCour, Jr., Solicitor General, Montgomery, Ala.; and Nicole F. Reaves, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) |
Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument GRANTED. |
Record from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama received electronically and available with the Clerk. |
Reply of Halima Tariffa Culley submitted. |
Reply of petitioner Halima Tariffa Culley filed. (Distributed) |
Record from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit available on PACER. |
SET FOR ARGUMENT on Monday, October 30, 2023 |
CIRCULATED. |
Record requested from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. |
Amicus brief of United States submitted. |
Amicus brief of State of Georgia, et al. submitted. |
Amicus brief of International Municipal Lawyers Association and National League of Cities submitted. |
Motion of United States for leave to participate in oral argument and for divided argument submitted. |
Brief amicus curiae of United States filed. |
Brief amici curiae of International Municipal Lawyers Association and National League of Cities filed. |
Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument filed. |
Brief amici curiae of Georgia, et al. filed. |
Brief amicus curiae of Wayne County, Michigan filed. |
Amicus brief of Wayne County, Michigan submitted. |
Brief of Town of Leesburg, Alabama submitted. |
Brief of City of Satsuma submitted. |
Brief of Steven T. Marshall, et al. submitted. |
Brief of respondents City of Satsuma, et al. filed. |
Brief of Town of Leesburg, Alabama not accepted for filing.(Dupilicate submission) (August 16, 2023) |
Brief of respondents Steven T. Marshall, et al. filed. |
Amicus brief of American Civil Liberties Union, American Civil Liberties Union of Alabama, Cato Institute, and Rutherford Institute submitted. |
Amicus brief of Restore the Fourth, Inc. submitted. |
Amicus brief of The Buckeye Institute submitted. |
Amicus brief of Goldwater Institute; Pacific Legal Foundation; Manhattan Institute submitted. |
Amicus brief of Constitutional Accountability Center submitted. |
Amicus brief of National Federation of Independent Business Small Business Legal Center, Inc. submitted. |
Brief amici curiae of Institute for Justice, Stephanie Wilson and Gerardo Serrano filed. |
Brief amici curiae of American Civil Liberties Union, American Civil Liberties Union of Alabama, Cato Institute, and Rutherford Institute filed. |
Brief amicus curiae of Restore the Fourth, Inc. filed.(July 6, 2023) |
Brief amicus curiae of Restore the Fourth, Inc. filed. (July 6, 2023) |
Amicus brief of Institute for Justice, Stephanie Wilson and Gerardo Serrano submitted. |
Brief amicus curiae of Goldwater Institute; Pacific Legal Foundation; Manhattan Institute filed. |
Brief amicus curiae of Constitutional Accountability Center filed. |
Brief amicus curiae of National Federation of Independent Business Small Business Legal Center, Inc. filed. |
Brief amicus curiae of The Buckeye Institute filed. |
Amicus brief of The Legal Aid Society submitted. |
Brief amicus curiae of The Legal Aid Society filed. |
Brief of Halima Tariffa Culley submitted. |
Joint Appendix submitted. |
Brief of petitioner Halima Tariffa Culley filed. |
Joint appendix filed. (Statement of costs filed) |
Motion to extend the time to file the briefs on the merits granted. The time to file the joint appendix and petitioners' brief on the merits is extended to and including June 22, 2023. The time to file respondents' brief on the merits is extended to and including granted and the time is extended to and including August 14, 2023. |
Motion of Halima Tariffa Culley for an extension of time submitted. |
Motion of the parties for an extension of time to file the briefs on the merits filed. |
Petition GRANTED. |
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 4/14/2023. |
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 3/31/2023. |
Reply of petitioners Halima Tariffa Culley, et al. filed. (Distributed) |
Brief of respondents Steven T. Marshall, Attorney General of Alabama, et al. in opposition filed. |
Brief amicus curiae of The Rutherford Institute filed. |
Brief amicus curiae of Restore the Fourth, Inc. filed. |
Motion to extend the time to file a response is granted and the time is extended to and including March 2, 2023. |
Motion to extend the time to file a response from February 16, 2023 to March 2, 2023, submitted to The Clerk. |
Brief amicus curiae of Pacific Legal Foundation filed. |
Response Requested. (Due February 16, 2023) |
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 2/17/2023. |
Waiver of right of respondents Steven T. Marshall, et al. to respond filed. |
Waiver of right of respondent Town of Leesburg, Alabama to respond filed. |
Waiver of right of respondent City of Satsuma to respond filed. |
Petition for a writ of certiorari filed. (Response due January 23, 2023) |
Application (22A428) granted by Justice Thomas extending the time to file until December 28, 2022. |
Application (22A428) to extend the time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari from November 28, 2022 to January 12, 2023, submitted to Justice Thomas. |