Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. ___ (2024)
Sergeant Jatonya Clayborn Muldrow, a police officer in the St. Louis Police Department, alleged that she was transferred from her position in the Intelligence Division to a uniformed job in another department because of her gender. Despite maintaining her rank and pay, Muldrow's responsibilities, perks, and schedule were significantly altered. She filed a Title VII suit against the City of St. Louis, claiming that the transfer constituted sex discrimination with respect to her employment terms and conditions.
The District Court granted the City summary judgment, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that Muldrow had to show that the transfer caused her a "materially significant disadvantage." The courts ruled that since the transfer did not result in a reduction to her title, salary, or benefits and only caused minor changes in working conditions, Muldrow's lawsuit could not proceed.
The Supreme Court of the United States disagreed with the lower courts' interpretation of Title VII. The Court held that an employee challenging a job transfer under Title VII must show that the transfer brought about some harm with respect to an identifiable term or condition of employment, but that harm need not be significant. The Court rejected the City's arguments based on statutory text, precedent, and policy, and vacated the judgment of the Eighth Circuit, remanding the case for further proceedings under the correct Title VII standard. The Court clarified that Muldrow only needed to show some injury respecting her employment terms or conditions, not that the harm was significant.
Although an employee must show some harm from a forced job transfer to prevail in a Title VII claim, they do not need to show that the injury satisfies a significance test.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
MULDROW v. CITY OF ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI, et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eighth circuit
No. 22–193. Argued December 6, 2023—Decided April 17, 2024
Sergeant Jatonya Clayborn Muldrow maintains that her employer, the St. Louis Police Department, transferred her from one job to another because she is a woman. From 2008 through 2017, Muldrow worked as a plainclothes officer in the Department’s specialized Intelligence Division. In 2017, the new Intelligence Division commander asked to transfer Muldrow out of the unit so he could replace her with a male police officer. Against Muldrow’s wishes, the Department approved the request and reassigned Muldrow to a uniformed job elsewhere in the Department. While Muldrow’s rank and pay remained the same in the new position, her responsibilities, perks, and schedule did not. After the transfer, Muldrow no longer worked with high-ranking officials on the departmental priorities lodged in the Intelligence Division, instead supervising the day-to-day activities of neighborhood patrol officers. She also lost access to an unmarked take-home vehicle and had a less regular schedule involving weekend shifts.
Muldrow brought this Title VII suit to challenge the transfer. She alleged that the City, in ousting her from the Intelligence Division, had “discriminate[d] against” her based on sex “with respect to” the “terms [or] conditions” of her employment. 42 U. S. C. §2000e–2(a)(1). The District Court granted the City summary judgment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that Muldrow had to—but could not—show that the transfer caused her a “materially significant disadvantage.” 30 F. 4th 680, 688. Muldrow’s lawsuit could not proceed, the court said, because the transfer “did not result in a diminution to her title, salary, or benefits” and had caused “only minor changes in working conditions.”
Held: An employee challenging a job transfer under Title VII must show that the transfer brought about some harm with respect to an identifiable term or condition of employment, but that harm need not be significant. Pp. 5–11.
(a) Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s . . . sex.” §2000e–2(a)(1). Both parties agree that Muldrow’s transfer implicated “terms” and “conditions” of Muldrow’s employment. The applicable statutory language thus prohibits “discriminat[ing] against” an individual “with respect to” the “terms [or] conditions” of employment because of that individual’s sex.
That language requires Muldrow to show that her transfer brought about some “disadvantageous” change in an employment term or condition. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80. The words “discriminate against,” the Court has explained, refer to “differences in treatment that injure” employees. Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U.S. 644, 681. In the typical transfer case, that worse treatment must be “with respect to” employment “terms [or] conditions.” §2000e–2(a)(1). The “terms [or] conditions” phrase is not used “in the narrow contractual sense”; it covers more than the “economic or tangible.” Oncale, 523 U. S., at 78; Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64. Still, the phrase circumscribes the injuries that can give rise to a suit like this one. To make out a Title VII discrimination claim, a transferee must show some harm respecting an identifiable term or condition of employment.
What the transferee does not have to show is that the harm incurred was “significant” or otherwise exceeded some heightened bar. “Discriminate against” means treat worse, here based on sex. See, e.g., Bostock, 590 U. S., at 657. Neither that phrase nor any other establishes an elevated threshold of harm. To demand “significance” is to add words to the statute Congress enacted. It is to impose a new requirement on a Title VII claimant, so that the law as applied demands something more than the law as written. That difference can make a real difference for complaining transferees. By asking whether the harm to the transferee is significant, appellate courts have disregarded varied kinds of disadvantage. Pp. 5–7.
(b) The City’s three main arguments—based on statutory text, precedent, and policy—do not justify the use of a “significance” standard.
The Court rejects the City’s textual claim, which invokes the ejusdem generis canon—the idea that a general phrase following an enumeration of things should be read to encompass only things of the same basic kind. Applying that canon to the text of Title VII’s anti-discrimination provision, the City claims that because refusing to hire or discharging a person causes a significant disadvantage, the “otherwise to discriminate against” phrase can apply only to things causing an equal level of harm. But the statutory text itself provides a different shared trait: Each kind of prohibited discrimination occurs by way of an employment action—whether pertaining to hiring, or firing, or compensating, or (as here) altering terms or conditions through a transfer. That is a more than sufficient basis to unite the provision’s several parts and avoid ejusdem generis problems.
Contrary to the City’s view, there is also no reason to import a significant-harm requirement from this Court’s decision in Burlington N. & S. F. R. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53. The Court there held that Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision—which prohibits an employer from taking action against an employee for bringing or aiding a Title VII charge—applies only when the retaliatory action is “materially adverse,” meaning that it causes “significant” harm. Id., at 68. White adopted that standard for reasons peculiar to the retaliation context. The test was meant to capture those employer actions serious enough to “dissuade[ ] a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Ibid. An action causing less serious harm will not deter Title VII enforcement and so falls outside the purposes of the ban on retaliation. But that reasoning does not apply to the anti-discrimination provision, which flatly “prevent[s] injury to individuals based on” protected status, id., at 63, without distinguishing between significant and less significant harms.
Finally, there is reason to doubt the City’s prediction that employees will flood courts with litigation in the absence of a significant-injury requirement. Courts retain multiple ways to dispose of meritless Title VII claims challenging transfer decisions. But even supposing the City’s worst predictions come true, that would be the result of the statute Congress drafted. This Court will not add words to the statute to achieve what the City thinks a desirable result. Pp. 8–10.
(c) The courts below applied the wrong standard to Muldrow’s suit. Muldrow need show only some injury respecting her employment terms or conditions. Her allegations, if properly preserved and supported, meet that test with room to spare. The Court recognizes, however, that the decisions below may have rested in part on issues of forfeiture and proof. The Court leaves such matters for the courts below to address on remand under the proper Title VII standard. Pp. 10–11.
30 F. 4th 680, vacated and remanded.
Kagan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Sotomayor, Gorsuch, Barrett, and Jackson, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., Alito, J., and Kavanaugh, J., each filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.
Judgment VACATED and case REMANDED. Kagan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Sotomayor, Gorsuch, Barrett, and Jackson, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., Alito, J., and Kavanaugh, J., each filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. |
Argued. For petitioner: Brian Wolfman, Washington, D. C.; and Aimee W. Brown, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For respondents: Robert M. Loeb, Washington, D. C. |
Record received from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. The record is available with the Clerk. |
Record received from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. The record is available with the Clerk (one box). |
Reply of petitioner Jatonya Clayborn Muldrow filed. (Distributed) |
Reply of Jatonya Clayborn Muldrow submitted. |
Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument GRANTED. |
CIRCULATED |
Amicus brief of The Society for Human Resource Management submitted. |
Amicus brief of National School Boards Association, AASA, The Superintendents Association, and Association of School Business Officials International submitted. |
Amicus brief of Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, National Federation of Independent Business Small Business Legal Center, Inc., Restaurant Law Center, Inc., and National Retail Federation submitted. |
Amicus brief of State of Arkansas, et al. submitted. |
Amicus brief of National School Boards Association submitted. |
Amicus brief of Local Government Legal Center, National Association of Counties, National League of Cities, and International Municipal Lawyers Association submitted. |
Brief amici curiae of Local Government Legal Center, National Association of Counties, National League of Cities, and International Municipal Lawyers Association filed. (Distributed) |
Brief amicus curiae of The Society for Human Resource Management filed. (Distributed) |
Brief amici curiae of State of Arkansas, et al. filed. (Distributed) |
Brief amici curiae of Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, National Federation of Independent Business Small Business Legal Center, Inc., Restaurant Law Center, Inc., and National Retail Federation filed. (Distributed) |
Brief amici curiae of National School Boards Association, AASA, The Superintendents Association, and Association of School Business Officials International filed. (Distributed) |
Record requested from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. |
SET FOR ARGUMENT on Wednesday, December 6, 2023. |
Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument filed. |
Motion of United States for leave to participate in oral argument and for divided argument submitted. |
Motion of United States for leave to participate in oral argument and for divided argument submitted. |
Brief of City of St. Louis, Missouri, et al. submitted. |
Brief of respondent City of St. Louis filed. |
Brief of respondents City of St. Louis, Missouri, et al. filed. |
Amicus brief of United States submitted. |
Amicus brief of Constitutional Accountability Center, American Civil Liberties Union, and American Civil Liberties Union of Missouri submitted. |
Amicus brief of National Treasury Employees Union submitted. |
Brief amicus curiae of United States filed. |
Amicus brief of District of Columbia, et al. submitted. |
Brief amici curiae of Constitutional Accountability Center, American Civil Liberties Union, and American Civil Liberties Union of Missouri filed. |
Brief amici curiae of Constitutional Accountability Center, et al. filed. |
Brief amicus curiae of National Treasury Employees Union filed. |
Brief amici curiae of District of Columbia, et al. in support of neither party filed. |
Amicus brief of The Legal Aid Society and The National Employment Law Project submitted. |
Brief amici curiae of The National Employment Lawyers Association, et al. filed. |
Amicus brief of The National Employment Lawyers Association, The NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., and The National Women’s Law Center submitted. |
Brief amici curiae of The Legal Aid Society and The National Employment Law Project filed. |
Amicus brief of Jatonya Clayborn Muldrow submitted. |
Amicus brief of Professor Suja A. Thomas, et al. submitted. |
Brief amici curiae of Professor Suja A. Thomas, et al. filed. |
Joint Appendix submitted. |
Brief of Jatonya Clayborn Muldrow submitted. |
Brief of petitioner Jatonya Clayborn Muldrow filed. |
Joint appendix filed. (Statement of costs filed) |
Motion to extend the time to file the briefs on the merits granted. The time to file the joint appendix and petitioner's brief on the merits is extended to and including August 28, 2023. The time to file respondents' brief on the merits is extended to and including October 11, 2023. |
Motion of Jatonya Clayborn Muldrow for an extension of time submitted. |
Motion for an extension of time within which to file the briefs on the merits filed. |
Petition GRANTED limited to the following question: Does Title VII prohibit discrimination in transfer decisions absent a separate court determination that the transfer decision caused a significant disadvantage? |
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 6/29/2023. |
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 6/22/2023. |
Supplemental brief of respondents City of St. Louis, Missouri, et al. filed. |
Brief amicus curiae of United States filed. |
The Solicitor General is invited to file a brief in this case expressing the views of the United States. |
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 1/6/2023. |
Reply of petitioner Jatonya Clayborn Muldrow filed. (Distributed) |
Waiver of the 14-day waiting period for the distribution of the petition pursuant to Rule 15.5 filed by petitioner. |
Brief of respondents City of St. Louis, Missouri, et al. in opposition filed. |
Motion to extend the time to file a response is granted and the time is extended to and including December 12, 2022. |
Motion to extend the time to file a response from November 10, 2022 to December 12, 2022, submitted to The Clerk. |
Response Requested. (Due November 10, 2022) |
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 10/28/2022. |
Brief amicus curiae of Constitutional Accountability Center filed. |
Brief amicus curiae of National Employment Lawyers Association filed. |
Waiver of right of respondent City of St. Louis, et al. to respond filed. |
Petition for a writ of certiorari filed. (Response due September 30, 2022) |
Application (21A835) granted by Justice Kavanaugh extending the time to file until September 1, 2022. |
Application (21A835) to extend the time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari from July 3, 2022 to September 1, 2022, submitted to Justice Kavanaugh. |