Corner Post, Inc. v. Board of Governors, 603 U.S. ___ (2024)
The case involves Corner Post, a merchant that accepts debit cards as a form of payment. Debit card transactions require merchants to pay an "interchange fee" to the bank that issued the card. The fee amount is set by the payment networks (such as Visa and MasterCard) that process the transaction. In 2010, Congress tasked the Federal Reserve Board with ensuring that interchange fees were "reasonable and proportional to the cost incurred by the issuer with respect to the transaction." In 2011, the Board published Regulation II, which sets a maximum interchange fee of $0.21 per transaction plus .05% of the transaction’s value.
In 2021, Corner Post joined a suit against the Board under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), challenging Regulation II on the ground that it allows higher interchange fees than the statute permits. The District Court dismissed the suit as time-barred under 28 U. S. C. §2401(a), the default six-year statute of limitations applicable to suits against the United States. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the decision.
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the decision of the Eighth Circuit. The Court held that an APA claim does not accrue for purposes of §2401(a)’s 6-year statute of limitations until the plaintiff is injured by final agency action. The Court disagreed with the Board's argument that an APA claim “accrues” under §2401(a) when agency action is “final” for purposes of §704; the claim can accrue for purposes of the statute of limitations even before the plaintiff suffers an injury. The Court held that a right of action “accrues” when the plaintiff has a “complete and present cause of action,” which is when she has the right to “file suit and obtain relief.” Because an APA plaintiff may not file suit and obtain relief until she suffers an injury from final agency action, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until she is injured.
An Administrative Procedure Act claim does not accrue for the purposes of the six-year statute of limitations that applies to suits against the United States until the plaintiff is injured by final agency action.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
CORNER POST, INC. v. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eighth circuit
No. 22–1008. Argued February 20, 2024—Decided July 1, 2024
Since it opened for business in 2018, petitioner Corner Post, like most merchants, has accepted debit cards as a form of payment. Debit card transactions require merchants to pay an “interchange fee” to the bank that issued the card. The fee amount is set by the payment networks (such as Visa and MasterCard) that process the transaction. In 2010 Congress tasked the Federal Reserve Board with making sure that interchange fees were “reasonable and proportional to the cost incurred by the issuer with respect to the transaction.” 15 U. S. C. §1693o–2(a)(3)(A). Discharging this duty, in 2011 the Board published Regulation II, which sets a maximum interchange fee of $0.21 per transaction plus .05% of the transaction’s value.
In 2021, Corner Post joined a suit brought against the Board under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The complaint challenged Regulation II on the ground that it allows higher interchange fees than the statute permits. The District Court dismissed the suit as time-barred under 28 U. S. C. §2401(a), the default six-year statute of limitations applicable to suits against the United States. The Eighth Circuit affirmed.
Held: An APA claim does not accrue for purposes of §2401(a)’s 6-year statute of limitations until the plaintiff is injured by final agency action. Pp. 4–23.
(a) The APA grants Corner Post a cause of action subject to certain conditions, see 5 U. S. C. §702 and §704, and 28 U. S. C. §2401(a) delineates the time period in which Corner Post may assert its claim. Section 702 authorizes persons injured by agency action to obtain judicial review by suing the United States or one of its agencies, officers, or employees. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140–141. The Court has explained that §702 “requir[es] a litigant to show, at the outset of the case, that he is injured in fact by agency action.” Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 514 U.S. 122, 127. A litigant therefore cannot bring an APA claim unless and until she suffers an injury. While §702 equips injured parties with a cause of action, §704 provides that judicial review is available in most cases only for “final agency action.” Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177–178. Reading §702 and §704 together, a plaintiff may bring an APA claim only after she is injured by final agency action.
To determine whether Corner Post’s APA claim is timely, the Court must interpret §2401(a), which provides that civil actions against the United States “shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within six years after the right of action first accrues.” The Board says an APA claim “accrues” under §2401(a) when agency action is “final” for purposes of §704; the claim can accrue for purposes of the statute of limitations even before the plaintiff suffers an injury. The Court disagrees. A right of action “accrues” when the plaintiff has a “complete and present cause of action,” which is when she has the right to “file suit and obtain relief.” Green v. Brennan, 578 U.S. 547, 554. Because an APA plaintiff may not file suit and obtain relief until she suffers an injury from final agency action, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until she is injured. Pp. 4–6.
(b) Congress enacted §2401(a) in 1948, two years after it enacted the APA. Section 2401(a)’s predecessor was the statute-of-limitations provision for the Little Tucker Act, which provided for district court jurisdiction over certain claims against the United States. When Congress revised and recodified the Judicial Code in 1948, it converted the Little Tucker Act’s statute of limitations into §2401(a)’s general statute of limitations for all suits against the Government. But Congress continued to start the statute of limitations period when the right “accrues.” Compare 36 Stat. 1093 (“after the right accrued for which the claim is made”) with §2401(a) (“after the right of action first accrues”).
“Accrue” had a well-settled meaning in 1948, as it does now: A “right accrues when it comes into existence,” United States v. Lindsay, 346 U.S. 568, 569—i.e., “when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action,” Gabelli v. SEC, 568 U.S. 442, 448. This definition has appeared “in dictionaries from the 19th century up until today,” which explain that a cause of action accrues when a suit may be maintained thereon. 568 U. S., at 448. Thus, a cause of action does not become complete and present—it does not accrue—“until the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief.” Bay Area Laundry and Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., 522 U.S. 192, 201. Contemporaneous legal dictionaries explained that a claim does not “accrue” as soon as the defendant acts, but only after the plaintiff suffers the injury required to press her claim in court.
The Court’s precedent treats this definition of accrual as the “standard rule for limitations periods,” Green, 578 U. S., at 554, and the Court has “repeatedly recognized that Congress legislates against” this standard rule, Graham County Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson, 545 U.S. 409, 418. Conversely, the Court has “reject[ed]” the possibility that a “limitations period commences at a time when the [plaintiff] could not yet file suit” as “inconsistent with basic limitations principles.” Bay Area Laundry, 522 U. S., at 200. The Court will not reach such a conclusion “in the absence of any such indication in the text of the limitations period.” Green, 578 U. S., at 554. Departing from the traditional rule is particularly inappropriate here because contemporaneous statutes demonstrate that Congress in 1948 knew how to create a limitations period that begins with the defendant’s action instead of the plaintiff’s injury.
The Board would have this Court interpret §2401(a) as a defendant-protective statute of repose that begins to run when agency action becomes final. A statute of repose “puts an outer limit on the right to bring a civil action” that is “measured. . . from the date of the last culpable act or omission of the defendant.” CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 573 U.S. 1, 8. But §2401(a)’s plaintiff-focused language makes it a “statute of limitations,” which—in contradistinction to statutes of repose—are “based on the date when the claim accrued.” Id., at 7–8. Pp. 6–10.
(c) The Board’s arguments to the contrary lack merit. Pp. 10–23.
(1) The Board points to the many specific statutory review provisions that start the clock at finality, contending that such statutes reflect a standard administrative-law practice of starting the limitations period when “any proper plaintiff ” can challenge the final agency action. But unlike the specific review provisions that the Board cites, §2401(a) does not refer to the date of the agency action’s “entry” or “promulgat[ion]”; it says “right of action first accrues.” That textual difference matters. The latter language reflects a statute of limitations and the former a statute of repose. Moreover, the specific review provisions illustrate that Congress has sometimes employed the Board’s preferred final-agency-action rule—but did not do so in §2401(a). As the Court observed in Rotkiske v. Klemm, it is “particularly inappropriate” to read language into a statute of limitations “when, as here, Congress has shown that it knows how to adopt the omitted language or provision.” 589 U.S. 8, 14. Moreover, most of the finality-focused statutes that the Board cites came after §2401(a) was enacted in 1948. These other, textually distinct statutes therefore do not establish a background presumption that the limitations period for facial challenges to agency rules begins when the rule is final. Given the settled, plaintiff-centric meaning of “right of action first accrues” in 1948—not to mention in the Little Tucker Act before it—the Board cannot “displace” this “standard rule” for limitations periods. Green, 578 U. S., at 554.
While the Board argues that §2401(a) should not be interpreted to adopt a “challenger-by-challenger” approach, the standard accrual rule that §2401(a) exemplifies is plaintiff specific. The Board reads §2401(a) as if it says “the complaint is filed within six years after a right of action [i.e., anyone’s right of action] first accrues”—which it does not say. Rather, §2401(a)’s text focuses on when the specific plaintiff had the right to sue: It says “the complaint is filed within six years after the right of action first accrues.” (Emphasis added). And the Court has explained that the traditional accrual rule looks to when the plaintiff—this particular plaintiff—has a complete and present cause of action. See Green, 578 U. S., at 554. No precedent supports the Board’s hypothetical “when could someone else have sued” sort of inquiry.
Importing the Board’s special administrative-law rule into §2401(a) would create a defendant-focused rule for agency suits while retaining the traditional challenger-specific accrual rule for other suits against the United States. That would give the same statutory text—“right of action first accrues”—different meanings in different contexts, even though those words had a single, well-settled meaning when Congress enacted §2401(a). The Court “will not infer such an odd result in the absence of any such indication in the text of the limitations period.” Green, 578 U. S., at 554. Pp. 10–16.
(2) The Board maintains that §2401(a)’s tolling provision—which provides that “[t]he action of any person under legal disability or beyond the seas at the time the claim accrues may be commenced within three years after the disability ceases”—“reflects Congress’s understanding that a claim can ‘accrue[ ]’ for purposes of Section 2401(a)” even when a person is unable to sue. Brief for Respondent 24. While true, the tolling exception applies when the plaintiff had a complete and present cause of action after he was injured but his legal disability or absence from the country prevented him from bringing a timely suit. The exception sheds no light on when the clock started for Corner Post. P. 16.
(3) The Court’s precedents in Reading Co. v. Koons, 271 U.S. 58, and Crown Coat Front Co. v. United States, 386 U.S. 503, do not support the Board’s unusual interpretation of “accrual.” In Koons, the Court held that a statutory wrongful-death claim accrued upon the death of the employee, not on the appointment of an estate administrator, even though the latter was the “only person authorized by the statute to maintain the action.” Koons, 271 U. S., at 60. The Board interprets Koons to hold that a claim accrued at a time when no plaintiff could sue, just as it says Corner Post’s claim “accrued” before it could sue. But in Koons, the beneficiaries on whose behalf any administrator would seek relief—the “real parties in interest”—had the right to “procure the action” after the employee died. Given this unique context, Koons does not contradict the proposition that a claim generally accrues when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action. Next, the Board relies on dicta in Crown Coat to support its contention that the word “accrues” can take on different meanings in different contexts. But the Board misreads Crown Coat, which did not suggest that the words “right of action first accrues” in a single statute should mean different things in different contexts. Instead, the Court interpreted §2401(a)—the very statute at issue here—to embody the traditional rule that a claim accrues when the plaintiff has the right to bring suit in court. Pp. 16–20.
(4) Finally, the Board raises policy concerns. It emphasizes that agencies and regulated parties need the finality of a 6-year cut off, and that successful facial challenges filed after six years upset the reliance interests of those that have long operated under existing rules. But “pleas of administrative inconvenience . . . never ‘justify departing from the statute’s clear text.’ ” Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 593 U.S. 155, 169 (quoting Pereira v. Sessions, 585 U.S. 198, 217). Congress could have chosen different language in §2401(a) or created a general statute of repose for agencies, but it did not. In any event, the Board’s policy concerns are overstated because regulated parties may always challenge a regulation as exceeding the agency’s statutory authority in enforcement proceedings against them. Moreover, there are significant interests supporting the plaintiff-centric accrual rule, including the APA’s “basic presumption” of judicial review, Abbott Labs., 387 U. S., at 140, and our “deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in court,” Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793, 798. Pp. 20–23.
55 F. 4th 634, reversed and remanded.
Barrett, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which in which Roberts, C. J., and Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh, JJ., joined. Kavanaugh, J., filed a concurring opinion. Jackson, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Sotomayor, J., and Kagan, J., joined.
Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED. Barrett, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh, JJ., joined. Kavanaugh, J., filed a concurring opinion. Jackson, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Sotomayor, J., and Kagan, J., joined. |
Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED. Barrett, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh, JJ., joined. Kavanaugh, J., filed a concurring opinion. Jackson, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Sotomayor, J., and Kagan, J., joined. |
Argued. For petitioner: Bryan K. Weir, Arlington, Va. For respondent: Benjamin W. Snyder, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. |
Record received from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit (one box) and available with the Clerk. |
Reply of petitioner Corner Post, Inc. filed. (Distributed) |
Reply of Corner Post, Inc. submitted. |
CIRCULATED. |
SET FOR ARGUMENT on Tuesday, February 20, 2024. |
Record requested from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. |
Brief amici curiae of Small Business Associations filed. |
Amicus brief of SMALL BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS submitted. |
Amicus brief of Public Citizen submitted. |
Brief amicus curiae of Public Citizen filed. |
Brief of Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sytem submitted. |
Brief of Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sytem submitted. |
Brief of respondent Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sytem filed. |
Amicus brief of New Civil Liberties Alliance submitted. |
Amicus brief of Cato Institute submitted. |
Amicus brief of Little Tucker Act Scholars submitted. |
Amicus brief of Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America submitted. |
Amicus brief of Governor Henry McMaster and The South Carolina Department of Labor, Licensing & Regulation submitted. |
Amicus brief of State of West Virginia and 17 Other States submitted. |
Amicus brief of National Federation of Independent Business Small Business Legal Center, Inc. submitted. |
Brief amici curiae of National Federation of Independent Business Small Business Legal Center, Inc., et al. filed. |
Amicus brief of Americans for Prosperity Foundation submitted. |
Amicus brief of Professors Aditya Bamzai and John Duffy submitted. |
Brief amici curiae of Little Tucker Act Scholars filed. |
Brief amicus curiae of New Civil Liberties Alliance filed. |
Brief amicus curiae of Americans for Prosperity Foundation filed. |
Amicus brief of Cato Institute submitted. |
Brief amicus curiae of Cato Institute (Dec.12, 2023) filed. |
Brief amici curiae of Professors Aditya Bamzai, et al. filed. |
Brief amicus curiae of Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America filed. |
Brief amici curiae of Governor Henry McMaster, et al. filed. |
Brief amici curiae of State of West Virginia, et al. filed. |
Amicus brief of Pacific Legal Foundation submitted. |
Brief amicus curiae of Pacific Legal Foundation filed. |
Brief of Corner Post, Inc. submitted. |
Brief of petitioner Corner Post, Inc. filed. |
Motion to dispense with printing the joint appendix filed by petitioner GRANTED. |
Motion of Corner Post, Inc. to dispense with joint appendix submitted. |
Motion to dispense with printing the joint appendix filed by petitioner Corner Post, Inc. |
Petition GRANTED. |
Reply of petitioner Corner Post, Inc. filed. (Distributed) |
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 9/26/2023. |
Brief of respondent Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sytem in opposition filed. |
Waiver of the 14-day waiting period for the distribution of the petition pursuant to Rule 15.5 received. |
Brief amicus curiae of Cato Institute filed. |
Brief amicus curiae of National Federation of Independent Business Small Business Legal Center, Inc. filed. |
Brief amicus curiae of John Kendrick filed. |
Motion to extend the time to file a response is granted and the time is extended to and including June 16, 2023. |
Motion to extend the time to file a response from May 17, 2023 to June 16, 2023, submitted to The Clerk. |
Petition for a writ of certiorari filed. (Response due May 17, 2023) |
Application (22A783) granted by Justice Kavanaugh extending the time to file until April 13, 2023. |
Application (22A783) to extend the time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari from March 14, 2023 to April 13, 2023, submitted to Justice Kavanaugh. |