The relief afforded by § 3 of the Harter Act, 27 Stat. 445, to
shipowners is purely statutory, and in order for a shipowner to
avail of the exemptions from liability for errors of management or
navigation, the burden is on him to prove affirmatively, in all
cases, and not only in those where there is conflicting testimony,
that the vessel was seaworthy at the beginning of the voyage or
that due diligence had been used to make her so. The discharge of
the duty of the shipowner in this respect is not left in the
absence of proof to any presumption.
Findings of fact by both the district court and the circuit
court of appeals as to seaworthiness of a vessel at, and due
diligence used prior to, the commencement of the voyage will not
ordinarily be disturbed by this Court, and so held in this
case.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
Page 201 U. S. 384
MR. JUSTICE DAY delivered the opinion of the Court.
The original action was begun by the filing of a libel in the
District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania to recover damages alleged to have been sustained by
the petitioner with respect to a cargo of sugar of which it was the
consignee, shipped upon the steamship
Wildcroft from ports
in Cuba to Philadelphia. The evidence showed that, in the month of
April, 1901, the
Wildcroft, having discharged a cargo of
coal at the port of Havana, proceeded to Cardenas and Matanzas,
where she took on the load of sugar, to be delivered to the
petitioner in Philadelphia. This sugar was stored in bags in holds
Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4 of the ship. On the voyage, a severe storm was
encountered and some damage was done by salt water finding its way
into hold No. 3 because of the tearing away of the tarpaulins over
the hatches and the washing off of the starboard ventilator cover.
At the
Page 201 U. S. 385
hearing in the district court, the claim for damage, because of
injury alleged to have been caused to the sugar in holds Nos. 1 and
2, was held to be waived by the libellant, who disclaimed damage on
that account. And the district judge added, we think correctly, as
to the surface damage in hold No. 3, "This damage was concededly
caused by a peril of the seas." There is nothing in the testimony
to show that the injury to the cargo of sugar in holds Nos. 3 and 4
of the vessel by means of fresh water was occasioned until the ship
arrived at Philadelphia.
A more distinct understanding of the construction of the vessel
and the manner in which fresh water could be communicated to hold
No. 3, and from thence into hold No. 4, may be had by a perusal of
the full finding of the facts made in the case in the district
court, 124 F. 631, 126 F. 229, approved by the circuit court of
appeals, 130 F. 521, which findings fully explain the situation and
the method by which the injury was inflicted. It is enough for us
to say that both courts unite in the conclusion that the cargo was
injured on Monday, April 29, after the ship arrived at the dock in
Philadelphia, when, because of the letting in of fresh water for
the purpose of filling the engine room tank, which was accomplished
by opening a valve on the ship's side which admits water from the
river, and because of an open cock to a valve in the connection
from the tank-filling pipe to the service or feed donkey,
connecting with the distribution box, water was permitted to flow
from the tank-filling pipe through this open cock to the
distribution chest and down a pipe and through a valve, which must
have also been held open in some way so that water flowed into this
suction pipe leading into No. 3 hold, and flowing thence into No. 4
hold, damaged the cargo of sugar therein contained. It is evident
from the testimony that, if these cocks, and more particularly the
one marked "D," had been properly closed, the water could not have
found its way into the holds and inflicted the damage. Of these
findings, the circuit court of
Page 201 U. S. 386
appeals, adopting the conclusions of the court below, said:
"All of the testimony in this respect is uncontradicted, and no
facts are shown from which any other conclusion can be drawn than
that the water which came into the bottom of these holds, to the
depth of several feet, doing the damage in question, came in after
the early morning of the twenty-ninth of April, and before the
close of that day, while the cargo was being discharged at the
wharf in Philadelphia. It is not disputed that the water was fresh
water, such as was the water in the Delaware River, in which she
was lying. In connection with these facts, it was shown by the
testimony that the sea cock for filling the engine room tank was
open at 10 o'clock that morning, and kept open for a period of
three hours, and that, if two certain cocks, fully described in the
evidence and pointed out by the learned judge of the court below,
were left open by accident or design, there would be a free flow of
water from the open sea cock into the bilges of hold No. 3.
Directly after the filling of the tank and the closing of the sea
cock, water to a considerable depth was reported in holds No. 3 and
No. 4. This sea cock had not been open from the time the cargo was
put on board in Cuba until, as just stated, on the morning of the
twenty-ninth of April at Philadelphia. We think the court below was
fully justified in its finding, that the damage here in question
was due to 'the water that flowed into the hold through the
pipeline on April twenty-ninth, in the manner just described,' and
that 'it is impossible that the damage could have occurred in any
other way.'"
In order to have the benefit of the exemptions provided in the
Harter Act, 27 Stat. 445 against errors of management or
navigation, by reason of the third section, which was relied upon
in the case, it was incumbent upon the shipowner to prove that the
vessel was seaworthy at the time of beginning the voyage or that
due diligence had been used to make her so.
International
Navigation Company v. Farr & Bailey Manufacturing Company,
181 U. S. 218;
The Southwark,
191
Page 201 U. S. 387
U.S. 1. It therefore became incumbent upon the shipowner to show
that a due and proper inspection had been had and the vessel
ascertained to be in all respects seaworthy and fit to carry the
cargo which she had undertaken to transport, or that due diligence
to that end had been used. As we understand the findings of both
the district court and the court of appeals, the testimony in this
regard introduced by the shipowner was sufficient in the judgment
of those courts, to establish that the vessel was seaworthy in the
respects involved, and that an inspection had been had, and the
valves and connections, the negligent use of which was productive
of this injury, found in due order at the beginning of the voyage.
This finding of two courts will ordinarily not be disturbed, and is
usually accepted by this Court as conclusive.
The Carib
Prince, 170 U. S. 655,
170 U. S. 658.
The only testimony directly upon the subject at the hearing was
that of the master and the engineer, taken upon deposition in
England, upon interrogatories filed. The charge in the libel was
very broad and general, and the interrogatories were not as
specific as they might have been, and no cross-interrogatories were
filed. While the testimony is not as specific as it might be, we
still think it was sufficient to show that an inspection was had,
and everything found in order at the beginning as well as during
the voyage, and from the record we reach the conclusion, sustained
by the findings of the courts below, that the ship was seaworthy in
all respects at the beginning of the voyage, and it was a careless
and recent opening of the valve or valves, shortly before the fresh
water was let in, which resulted in the damage complained of. We
are very clear that this is not a case where the findings of the
court below can be disturbed, as was our conclusion in the case of
The Southwark, supra, relied upon by the petitioner, where
it was shown that the damage inflicted was the result of
unseaworthiness in respect to a condition which a proper inspection
of the vessel at the beginning of the voyage would have discovered
and remedied. We therefore reach the conclusion that the decree of
the
Page 201 U. S. 388
circuit court of appeals should be affirmed, and, but for its
construction of the rule of evidence in cases of this kind, this
opinion might well end here. But we are unable to agree with the
views expressed in the opinion of the learned circuit court of
appeals to the effect that, where a shipowner seeks the protection
of the immunity afforded by the Harter Act under § 3, reliance may
be had upon the presumption of law that the vessel was seaworthy at
the beginning of the voyage, and that it is only in cases of
conflicting proof that the burden is imposed upon the shipowner of
establishing by testimony the seaworthiness of the vessel, or due
diligence in that behalf, in order to have the benefit of the act.
We think this construction of the law is opposed to the terms and
policy of the act, and contrary to the decisions of this Court
heretofore announced, from which we see no occasion to depart. The
relief afforded by the third section of the Harter Act to the owner
of a vessel transporting property is purely statutory. In the case
at bar, there could be no question as to the liability of the
vessel owner from the established facts of the case but for the
immunity afforded by that act. To permit a cargo of sugar to be
injured by the introduction of fresh water in the manner shown, but
for the provisions of this act, would have made a case of clear
liability against the owner, and where the statute has given
immunity against such loss by reason of error in navigation or
management, it does so upon the distinct condition that the owner
shall show that the vessel was in all respects seaworthy and
properly manned, equipped, and supplied for the voyage, or, if this
cannot be established, that he has used due diligence to obtain
this end. The discharge of this duty is not left to any presumption
in the absence of proof. It is the condition precedent, compliance
with which is required of the vessel owner in order to give him the
benefit of the immunity afforded by the act. The reason for
requiring this proof by the owner is apparent. He is bound to
furnish a seaworthy and properly equipped ship for the purpose of
the voyage. Whether he has done so is a matter
Page 201 U. S. 389
peculiarly within his own knowledge. The inspection which he can
give, but which the shipper cannot give, for lack of opportunity,
will establish whether this duty has been complied with. The whole
matter is in the control of the owner. The law says, in substance,
that when the owner can show that he has discharged this duty, he
shall be relieved from errors of navigation and management on the
voyage, over which he has not such direct control. It is not a case
where there is either the necessity or propriety of resorting to
presumptions. It is only when he has discharged the burden which
the law imposes upon him, and shown that he has furnished a vessel
fit and seaworthy or has used due diligence to that end, that the
law relieves him of the liability which he would otherwise incur.
This construction of the statute has been more than once announced
in the decisions of this Court -- recently in
International
Navigation Company v. Farr & Bailey Mfg. Co., 181 U.
S. 218,
181 U. S. 226,
in which this Court, speaking through MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER,
said:
"We repeat, that, even if the loss occur through fault or error
in management, the exemption cannot be availed of unless the vessel
was seaworthy when she sailed, or due diligence to make her so had
been exercised, and it is for the owner to establish the existence
of one or the other of these conditions."
This case was quoted and followed in the still later case of
The Southwark, 191 U. S. 1, in
which it was reiterated that the burden was upon the vessel owner
to show by reasonable and proper tests that the vessel was
seaworthy and in a fit condition to receive and transport the cargo
undertaken to be carried, and that, if, by failure to adopt such
tests and furnish the required proof, the question of the ship's
seaworthiness was left in doubt, that doubt must be resolved in
favor of the shipper, because the vessel owner had not sustained
the burden cast upon him by the law to establish that he had used
due diligence to furnish a seaworthy vessel.
While we therefore accept the decision of the learned circuit
court of appeals as to the facts in this case, we do not
Page 201 U. S. 390
wish to be regarded as sanctioning any relaxation of the rule
above stated, already laid down in the prior decisions of this
Court.
Decree affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE BROWN concurs in the result.