An absolute requirement that a railroad engaged in interstate
commerce shall furnish a certain number of cars on a specified day
to transport merchandise to another state, regardless of every
other consideration except strikes and other public calamities,
transcends the police power of the states and amounts to a burden
upon interstate commerce, and Articles 4497-5000, Rev.Stat. Texas,
being such a requirement, are, when applied to interstate commerce
shipments, void as a violation of the commerce clause of the
federal Constitution
Such a regulation cannot be sustained as to interstate commerce
shipment as an exercise of the police power of the state.
This was an action begun by Mayes in the District Court of Llano
County, Texas, against the Houston and Texas Central Railroad
Company to recover a penalty of $475, by reason of defendant's
failure to furnish seventeen stock cars, applied for in
Page 201 U. S. 322
writing by the plaintiff under the provisions of certain
statutes of Texas hereinafter referred to for the purpose of
shipping plaintiff's cattle from Llano, Texas, to Red Rock,
Oklahoma, and for damages occasioned by defendant's negligence.
The petitioner alleged that the defendant company formed with
two other railroad companies a continuous line from Llano to Red
Rock, and were engaged as common carriers in the business of
shipping livestock and other freight; that, on April 9, 1903,
plaintiff, being the owner of six hundred and twenty-five head of
cattle, made application in writing to the local agent of the road
for seventeen stock cars, to be delivered on April 20, and
deposited with the agent one-fourth of the freight on the same,
namely, $268.82, promising to pay the remainder on demand, and that
he afterwards paid the same; that, upon the day named, April 20, he
had cattle sufficient to load the cars, delivered them to the
defendant at its stock pens at Llano for shipment, but the
defendant failed to furnish the cars, and did not furnish the same
until the afternoon of the twenty-first of April, 1903.
The trial resulted in a judgment in favor of the plaintiff for
$425 penalty for delay, and $500 damages to the stock while in the
pens at Llano. This judgment was affirmed by the court of civil
appeals, and an application for a writ of error to the supreme
court of the state was overruled.
Page 201 U. S. 326
MR. JUSTICE BROWN delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case involves the constitutionality of certain articles of
the Revised Statutes of Texas, set forth in the margin,
* the
Page 201 U. S. 327
material requirement of which is that, when the shipper of
freight shall make a requisition in writing for a number of cars to
be furnished at any point indicated within a certain number of days
from the receipt of the application, and shall deposit one-fourth
of the freight with the agent of the company, the company failing
to furnish them shall forfeit $25 per day for each car failed to be
furnished, the only proviso being that the law "shall not apply in
cases of strikes or other public calamity."
The defense was that this statute was not applicable to demands
made for cars to be sent out of the state and to be used in
interstate commerce, and as the shipment was intended for Oklahoma,
the act did not apply, and the defendant was not liable. The
question is whether the statute, applied, as it is,
Page 201 U. S. 328
by the Texas court, to interstate shipments, is an infringement
upon the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce.
That, notwithstanding the exclusive nature of this power, the
states may, in the exercise of their police power, make reasonable
rules with regard to the methods of carrying on interstate
business, the precautions that shall be used to avoid danger, the
facilities for the comfort of passengers and the safety of freight
carried, and, to a certain extent, the stations at which stoppages
shall be made, is settled by repeated decisions of this Court. Of
course, such rules are inoperative if conflicting with regulations
upon the same subject enacted by Congress, and can be supported
only when consistent with the general requirement that interstate
commerce shall be free and unobstructed, and not amounting to a
regulation of such commerce. As the power to build and operate
railways and to acquire land by condemnation usually rests upon
state authority, the legislatures may annex such conditions as they
please with regard to intrastate transportation, and such other
rules regarding interstate commerce as are not inconsistent with
the general right of such commerce to be free and unobstructed.
The exact limit of lawful legislation upon this subject cannot,
in the nature of things, be defined. It can only be illustrated
from decided cases by applying the principles therein enunciated,
determining from these whether, in the particular case, the rule be
reasonable or otherwise.
That states may not burden instruments of interstate commerce,
whether railways or telegraphs, by taxation, by forbidding the
introduction into the state of articles of commerce generally
recognized as lawful, or by prohibiting their sale after
introduction, has been so frequently settled that a citation of
authorities is unnecessary. Upon the other hand, the validity of
local laws designed to protect passengers or employees, or persons
crossing the railroad tracks, as well as other regulations intended
for the public good, are generally recognized. An analysis of all
the prior important cases upon this point will be found in the
opinion of the court in
Cleveland, C.C. &c. R.
Co. v.
Page 201 U. S. 329
Illinois, 177 U. S. 514,
wherein a requirement that express trains intended only for through
passengers should stop at every county seat, when ample
accommodations were provided by local trains, was held to be an
unreasonable burden. Other similar cases regulating the stoppage of
trains are
Illinois Central R. Co. v. Illinois,
163 U. S. 142;
Gladson v. Minnesota, 166 U. S. 427;
Lake Shore &c. Ry. Co. v. Ohio, 173 U.
S. 285. In the same line is the more recent case of
Wisconsin &c. R. Co. v. Jacobson, 179 U.
S. 287.
While there is much to be said in favor of laws compelling
railroads to furnish adequate facilities for the transportation of
both freight and passengers, and to regulate the general subject of
speed, length, and frequency of stops, for the heating, lighting,
and ventilation of passenger cars, the furnishing of food and water
to cattle and other livestock, we think an absolute requirement
that a railroad shall furnish a certain number of cars at a
specified day, regardless of every other consideration except
strikes and other public calamities, transcends the police power of
the state, and amounts to a burden upon interstate commerce. It
makes no exception in cases of a sudden congestion of traffic, an
actual inability to furnish cars by reason of their temporary and
unavoidable detention in other states, or in other places within
the same state. It makes no allowance for interference of traffic
occasioned by wrecks or other accidents upon the same or other
roads, involving a detention of traffic, the breaking of bridges,
accidental fires, washouts, or other unavoidable consequences of
heavy weather.
A dereliction of the road in this particular, which may have
occurred from circumstances wholly beyond the control of its
officers, is made punishable not only by damages actually incurred
by the shipper in the detention of his stock, but, in addition
thereto, by an arbitrary penalty of $25 per car for each day of
detention. The penalty which was assessed in this case, though the
detention was only for one day, amounted to nearly as much as the
damages, and might, in another case, amount to far more.
Page 201 U. S. 330
While perhaps the road may have no right to complain of that
portion of the statute which assumes to provide for its own
protection, it is illustrative of its general spirit that, if the
shipper does not fully load his cars within forty-eight hours after
their arrival, he shall forfeit $25 for each car, or if the
consignee shall fail to unload them within forty-eight hours after
their delivery at the place of consignment, which, in the case of
interstate shipments, would be in another state, he shall also
forfeit $25 per day for each car unloaded.
In this connection, the recent case of
Central &c. R.
Co. v. Murphy, 196 U. S. 194, is
instructive. In that case, we held that the imposition by a state
statute, upon the initial or any connecting carrier, of the duty of
tracing the freight and informing the shipper, in writing, when,
where, or how, and by which carrier, the freight was lost, damaged,
or destroyed, and of giving the names of the parties and their
official position, if any, by whom the truth of the facts set out
in the information could be established is, when applied to
interstate commerce, a violation of the commerce clause of the
federal Constitution, and an act of the Legislature of Georgia
imposing such a duty on common carriers was held void as to
shipments made from points in Georgia to other states.
Although the statute in question may have been dictated by a due
regard for the public interest of the cattle raisers of the state,
and may have been intended merely to secure promptness on the part
of the railroad companies in providing facilities for speedy
transportation, we think that, in its practical operation, it is
likely to work a great injustice to the roads, and to impose heavy
penalties for trivial, unintentional, and accidental violations of
its provisions when no damages could actually have resulted to the
shippers.
It should be borne in mind that the act does not apply to cattle
alone, but to all cases "when the owner, manager, or shipper of any
freight of any kind shall make application in writing," etc. The
duty of the railroad company to furnish the cars within the time
limited is peremptory, and admits of
Page 201 U. S. 331
no excuses except such as arise from strikes and other public
calamities. If, for instance, the owner of a large quantity of
cotton should make a requisition under the act for a number of
cars, the railways company would be bound to furnish them upon the
day named or incur a penalty of $25 for each car, though the
detention of the cotton involved no expense to the owner or may
even have resulted in a benefit to him through a rise in the
market.
While railroad companies may be bound to furnish sufficient cars
for their usual and ordinary traffic, cases will inevitably arise
where, by reason of an unexpected turn in the market, a great
public gathering, or an unforeseen rush of travel, a pressure upon
the road for transportation facilities may arise which good
management and a desire to fulfill all its legal requirements
cannot provide for, and against which the statute in question makes
no allowance.
Although it may be admitted that the statute is not far from the
line of proper police regulation, we think that sufficient
allowance is not made for the practical difficulties in the
administration of the law, and that, as applied to interstate
commerce, it transcends the legitimate powers of the
legislature.
The judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals is therefore
reversed, and the cause remanded to that court for further
proceedings.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE, not having heard the argument, took no part
in the decision of this case.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, and MR. JUSTICE McKENNA
dissented.
*
"Art. 4497. When the owner, manager, or shipper of any freight
of any kind shall make application in writing to any
superintendent, agent, or person in charge of transportation, to
any railway company, receiver, or trustee operating a line of
railway at the point the cars are desired upon which to ship any
freight, it shall be the duty of such railway company, receiver,
trustee, or other person in charge thereof to supply the number of
cars so required at the point indicated in the application within a
reasonable time thereafter, not to exceed six days from the receipt
of such application, and shall supply such cars to the persons so
applying therefor in the order in which such applications are made,
without giving preference to any person; provided, if the
application be for ten cars or less, the same shall be furnished in
three days, and provided further that, if the application be for
fifty cars or more, the railway company may have ten full days in
which to supply the cars. [As amended by the act of 1899, page
67.]"
"Art. 4498. Said application shall state the number of cars
desired, the place at which they are desired, and the time they are
desired; provided, that the place designated shall be at some
station or switch on the railroad."
"Art. 4499. When cars are applied for under the provisions of
this chapter, if they are not furnished, the railway company so
failing to furnish them shall forfeit to the party or parties so
applying for them the sum of $25 per day for each car failed to be
furnished, to be recovered in any court of competent jurisdiction,
and all actual damages such applicant may sustain."
"Art. 4500. Such applicant shall, at the time of applying for
such car or cars, deposit with the agent of such company one-fourth
of the amount of the freight charge for the use of such cars,
unless the said road shall agree to deliver said cars without such
deposit. And such applicant shall, within forty-eight hours after
such car or cars have been delivered and placed as hereinbefore
provided, fully load the same, and upon failure to do so, he shall
forfeit and pay to the company the sum of $25 for each car not
used; provided, that, where applications are made on several days,
all of which are filed upon the same day, the applicant shall have
forty-eight hours to load the car or cars furnished on the first
application, and the next forty-eight hours to load the car or cars
furnished on the next application, and so on, and the penalty
prescribed shall not accrue as to any car or lot of cars applied
for on any one day until the period within which they may be loaded
has expired. And if the said applicant shall not use such cars so
ordered by him, and shall notify the said company or its agent, he
shall forfeit and pay to said railroad company, in addition to the
penalty herein prescribed, the actual damages that such company may
sustain by the said failure of the applicant to use said cars. [As
amended by the act of 1899, page 67.]"
Act 4502 contains the following proviso: "That the provisions of
this law shall not apply in cases of strikes or other public
calamity."