The general rule that courts of the United States have no
jurisdiction upon the subject of divorce or for allowance of
alimony, because diversity of citizenship does not exist and no
pecuniary value is involved, has no application to territorial
courts or to the appellate jurisdiction of this Court over those
courts.
The Territorial Practice Act of April 7, 1874, 18 Stat. 27,
under which the jurisdiction of this Court does not extend to
reexamining the facts, but is limited to determining whether the
findings support the judgment and to reviewing errors as to
admission or rejection of testimony on exceptions duly taken, has
no application to appeals from the Philippine Islands.
Under § 10 of the Act of July 1, 1902, 32 Stat. 691, appeals are
allowed from judgments of the Supreme Court of the Philippine
Islands where the amount exceeds $25,000 in the same manner as from
judgments of the circuit courts of the United States, and such
appeals extend to an examination of the facts as well as the law,
and where alimony or separation of conjugal property has been
awarded by the decree of divorce amounting
Page 201 U. S. 304
to over $25,000 and this Court takes jurisdiction of the appeal
by reason of the amount involved, it may, if necessary to determine
whether the decree was right in that respect, pass upon the
sufficiency of the testimony authorizing or refusing the
divorce.
For the purposes of the jurisdiction of this Court, it makes no
difference whether the amount claimed by the wife in a suit for
divorce in the Philippine Islands be termed alimony or her share of
community property.
Under § 10 of the Philippine Island Act of 1902, appeals are
allowed in all cases where the amount in controversy exceeds
$25,000, and this Court has no power to create an exception not
made in the statute -- it would be judicial legislation.
The abandonment by the husband of his wife, excluding her from
his house and forming open and illicit relations with other women
who bear him children, is sufficient to bring his adultery within
the rule of law in the Philippine Islands that adultery of the
husband must be accompanied by public scandal and disgrace to the
wife in order to entitle her to a divorce.
In this case, the Court of First Instance, on uncontradicted
evidence as to the husband's adultery and scandal ensuing
therefrom, found that the wife was entitled to a divorce and that
there was no adultery on her part; the Supreme Court of the
Philippine Islands found that the wife had committed adultery,
basing the finding on a letter written by her and construed to be
in the nature of a confession, and for that reason alone reversed
the judgment. On examining the record, this Court holds that such
letter does not amount to a confession, and that there is
insufficient evidence of her having committed adultery, and
therefore reverses the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands.
This was a suit brought in the Court of First Instance of the
Province of Iloilo by the appellant, as plaintiff, against her
husband, the defendant, for a judicial separation or divorce
a
mensa et thoro, an equal separation of the property of the
conjugal partnership, for an allowance to the plaintiff for her
support during the pendency of the action, and for counsel fees,
costs, and general relief, upon the ground of the husband's
adultery and the public scandal and disgrace thereby brought upon
the plaintiff.
In his answer, defendant alleged, by way of recrimination,
adultery on the part of the wife, denied the existence of any
community property, and prayed for a divorce without alimony.
Upon the trial, the court decreed a divorce to the plaintiff on
account of her husband's adultery, as well as the payment
Page 201 U. S. 305
of $81,042.76, Mexican money, due her as her unpaid share of the
property belonging to the conjugal partnership, as well as the sum
of $3,200, Mexican money, as an allowance for her support since the
date upon which the action was instituted, being at the rate of 400
pesos a month for eight months, with costs.
After motion for a new trial had been made and overruled,
defendant appealed to the supreme court, which reversed the decree
of the court below, incorporated in its opinion certain findings of
fact, and ordered judgment absolute that the complaint be
dismissed.
Whereupon plaintiff appealed to this Court under § 10 of the Act
of July 1, 1902, to provide a temporary civil government in the
Philippine Islands, 32 Stat. 691-695, a copy of which section is
given in the margin. [
Footnote
1]
Page 201 U. S. 307
MR. JUSTICE BROWN delivered the opinion of the Court.
An important question of jurisdiction is presented by the record
in this case. It has been a long established rule that the courts
of the United States have no jurisdiction upon the subject of
divorce, or for the allowance of alimony, either as an original
proceeding in chancery or an incident of a divorce or separation,
both by reason of the fact that the husband and wife cannot usually
be citizens of different states so long as the marriage relation
continues (a rule which has been somewhat relaxed in recent cases),
and for the further reason that a suit for divorce, in itself,
involves no pecuniary value.
Barber v.
Barber, 21 How. 582, and the analogous cases of
Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U. S. 487;
Durham v. Seymour, 161 U. S. 235, and
Perrine v. Slack, 164 U. S. 452.
Page 201 U. S. 308
But the general rule above stated has no application to the
jurisdiction of the territorial courts, or of the appellate
jurisdiction of this Court over those courts. Hence, we held in
Simms v. Simms, 175 U. S. 162,
that an appeal lies from a decree of the supreme court of a
territory dismissing the suit of a husband for a divorce and
awarding to a wife alimony and counsel fees, amounting in all to
more than $5,000, so far as the decree fixes the alimony. This was
an appeal from the Supreme Court of Arizona, and the court held
that the above considerations expressed in
Barber v.
Barber, 21 How. 582, had no application to the
appellate jurisdiction of this Court over the courts of a
territory; that Congress, having entire dominion and sovereignty
over territories,
"has full legislative power over all subjects upon which the
legislature of a state might legislate within the state, and may at
its discretion entrust that power to the legislative assembly of a
territory,"
citing
Cope v. Cope, 137 U. S. 682. It
was further held that, so far as the question of divorce was
concerned, the decree could not be reviewed by this Court,
"both because that was a matter the value of which could not be
estimated in money and because the refusal of the divorce involved
no matter of law, but mere questions of fact, depending on the
evidence, and which this Court is not authorized to reexamine."
It was further said:
"The decree for alimony and counsel fees, although in one sense
an incident to the suit for divorce, is a distinct and severable
final judgment in favor of the defendant for a sum of money of a
sufficient jurisdictional amount, and is therefore good ground of
appeal."
The appeal in that case did not involve the merits.
The intimation that this Court could not review the refusal of
the divorce because it could not reexamine questions of fact was
undoubtedly thrown out in view of the Territorial Practice Act of
April 7, 1874, 18 Stat. 27, providing that, "on appeal" (from a
territorial court),
"instead of the evidence at large, a statement of the facts of
the case in the nature of a special verdict, and also the rulings
of the court on the admission or
Page 201 U. S. 309
rejection of evidence, when excepted to, shall be made and
certified by the court below, and transmitted to the Supreme Court,
together with the transcript of the proceedings and judgment or
decree."
Since that act was passed, we have always held that the
jurisdiction of this Court on an appeal from the supreme court of a
territory did not extend to a reexamination of the facts, but was
limited to determining whether the findings of fact supported the
judgment, and to reviewing errors in the admission or rejection of
testimony, when exceptions have been duly taken to the action of
the court in this particular.
Stringfellow v. Cain,
99 U. S. 610;
Eilers v. Boatman, 111 U. S. 356;
Idaho &c. Land Co. v. Bradbury, 132 U.
S. 509;
Mammoth Mining Company v. Salt Lake Machine
Co., 151 U. S. 447;
Young v. Amy, 171 U. S. 179.
This act, however, has no application to the Philippine Islands,
appeals from the supreme court of which are regulated by section 10
of the Act of July 1, 1902, wherein it is declared that appeals
from the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands shall extend to
all actions, cases, causes, and proceedings "in which the value in
controversy exceeds $25,000." These are reviewable on appeal or
writ of error by the party aggrieved in the same manner as the
final judgments and decrees of the circuit courts of the United
States. There is no requirement that the facts shall be found.
Appeals from the final decrees in these (circuit) courts extend to
an examination of the facts as well as the law. While, upon such
review, this Court will generally accept the concurrent conclusions
of the trial and appellate courts, yet, as was said by MR. JUSTICE
BREWER in
Beyer v. Le Fevre, 186 U.
S. 114,
186 U. S.
119:
"There has always been recognized the right and the duty of this
Court to examine the record, and if it finds that the conclusions
are wholly unwarranted by the testimony, it will set the verdict or
report aside and direct a reexamination."
In this case, there was no finding of facts either by the Court
of First Instance, or by the Supreme Court of the Islands,
except
Page 201 U. S. 310
as they appear in the opinion. It is doubtful whether this is a
finding of facts within the statute,
Lehnen v. Dickson,
148 U. S. 71;
British Queen Mining Co. v. Baker Silver Mining Co.,
139 U. S. 222;
Dickinson v. Planters'
Bank, 16 Wall. 250;
Saltonstall v.
Birtwell, 150 U. S. 417;
Stone v. United States, 164 U. S. 380,
but, in any event, it is not binding upon us in the absence of an
authority to make it.
While, as indicated in
Simms v. Simms, the decree for
alimony, although in one sense an incident to the suit for divorce,
is a distinct and final judgment for a sum of money, and is
therefore a good ground for appeal from that part of the decree,
yet where the appeal is from the whole decree (as in this case), or
even from a part of the decree, and the denial of alimony or
separation of the conjugal property depends upon the evidence which
bears upon the right to a divorce, we cannot determine that
question without passing upon the sufficiency of the testimony
authorizing or refusing the divorce. An appeal from the decree for
alimony or other property right would be of no value whatever
unless the facts connected with the allowance or refusal of such
right were open to review in the appellate court. Although an
appeal from a part of a decree does not bring up the part not
appealed from, yet, if the whole decree must be reviewed in order
to decide the appeal, such appeal brings up the entire record.
Kelsey v. Western, 2 N.Y. 500;
Union Trust Co. v.
Trumbull, 137 Ill, 159;
Walker v. Pritchard, 121 Ill.
227. The case is even stronger where the appeal is taken from the
whole decree.
The hardship of denying an appeal in this case, as well as
review of the testimony upon the subject of divorce, is apparent
when the peculiar provisions of the Philippine Code are
considered.
By Article 1315:
"Persons who may be joined in matrimony may, before celebrating
it, execute contracts. . . . In the absence of contracts relating
to property, it shall be understood that the marriage has been
contracted under the system of legal conjugal partnership. "
Page 201 U. S. 311
Article 1401:
"To the conjugal partnership belong:"
"1. Property acquired for a valuable consideration during the
marriage at the expense of the partnership property, whether the
acquisition is made for the partnership or for one of the spouses
only."
"2. That obtained by the industry, salaries, or work of the
spouses, or of either of them."
"3. The fruits, income, or interest collected or accrued during
the marriage, coming from the partnership property, or from that
which belongs to either one of the spouses."
Article 1392:
"By virtue of the conjugal partnership the earnings or profits
indiscriminately obtained by either of the spouses during the
marriage shall belong to the husband and the wife, share and share
alike, upon the dissolution of the marriage."
Article 1407:
"All the property of the marriage shall be considered as
partnership property until it is proven that it belongs exclusively
to the husband or to the wife."
Article 73:
"A decree of divorce shall produce the following effects:"
"3. The guilty spouse shall lose all that may have been given or
promised him or her by the innocent one, or by any other person, in
consideration for the latter, and the innocent spouse shall keep
all that he or she has received from the guilty one, being
permitted besides to claim forthwith all that may have been
promised by the same."
In the opinion of the Court of First Instance, it is stated that
the plaintiff received from her mother 2,000 pesos, which, with
interest amounting to 345 pesos, must be regarded as the portion
contributed by the wife to the conjugal partnership. For the
purposes of jurisdiction, it makes no difference whether the amount
claimed be termed alimony or the wife's share of the community
property. It is sufficient that she claimed to be entitled to an
amount exceeding $25,000, and that the claim was not baseless is
shown by the decree of the Court of First Instance
Page 201 U. S. 312
allowing it. By the decree of the supreme court, she was denied
all recovery of any description, upon the ground of her adultery.
If, upon a review of the testimony, it were found that she was not
guilty of adultery, she would unquestionably be entitled to
one-half of the conjugal property.
As section 10 of the Philippine statute above cited allows an
appeal to this Court from
"judgments and decrees of the Supreme Court of the Philippine
Islands in all actions, cases, causes, and proceedings . . . in
which the value in controversy exceeds twenty-five thousand
dollars,"
we know of no power in this Court to create an exception where
the statute has made none. Such a decision would be a plain case of
judicial legislation.
Our conclusion upon this branch of the case is that the appeal
was properly taken, and that it calls for a reexamination of the
grounds upon which the petition for a separation of the conjugal
property and alimony
pendente lite was denied.
2. In her complaint, the plaintiff charges abandonment by her
husband without cause, and also adultery with three women, by each
of whom he had children, and which resulted in public scandal and
the disgrace of the plaintiff. In his answer, defendant denies that
he abandoned the plaintiff without sufficient cause, and avers that
"he ejected her from his house on account of indignation" created
by her adultery with a Spanish corporal; he denies the various
allegations of a adultery charged against him, and says that, even
if they are true, they are nothing more than the "necessary
consequences of the indescribable conduct of the plaintiff."
The parties were married in July, 1891, she being then fourteen
years of age and he twenty-three, and lived happily together for
about thirteen months, when in August, 1892, a separation
ensued.
Upon the trial the defendant made no denial of his adulteries,
but simply declined to answer any questions on the subject. His
adultery, however, with three separate women and the birth of a
child by each was proven to the satisfaction of both
Page 201 U. S. 313
courts below, and was not attempted to be disproved by evidence
on the part of the defendant. Under the Spanish law, the adultery
of the husband, to be a good ground for separation, must be
accompanied by public scandal and disgrace of the wife. Although
there is no evidence that the husband "ejected her from his house
on account of indignation," as set up in his answer, the fact that
he abandoned his wife, excluded her from his house, and formed open
and illicit relations with three other women, who bore him a family
of children, is quite sufficient evidence that his adultery was
accompanied by public scandal and disgrace to the wife.
There was a difference of opinion between the trial court and
the supreme court as to the adultery of the plaintiff. This is the
principal contested fact in the case. The question really is
whether the finding of the Court of First Instance that the
plaintiff had not committed adultery was so manifestly against the
weight of evidence that the supreme court was justified in
reversing it.
By section 497 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is enacted
that
"the supreme court shall not review the evidence taken in the
court below, nor retry the question of fact, except"
"
* * * *"
"3. If the excepting party filed a motion in the Court of First
Instance for a new trial, upon the ground that the
findings of
fact were plainly and manifestly against the weight of
evidence, and the judge overruled said motion, and due
exception was taken to his overruling the same, the supreme court
may review the evidence,"
etc.
The defendant did move for a new trial in the Court of First
Instance on the ground that the "conclusions which in said decision
have been deducted from the facts are contradictory to what the
evidence filed in this case have shown."
This is not a literal compliance with section 497, above cited,
as it is not stated that the findings of fact are plainly and
manifestly against the weight of the evidence. It seems rather to
fall within the terms of section 145 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, by the terms of which the Court of First Instance may,
at
Page 201 U. S. 314
any time during the term at which the action has been tried, set
aside the judgment and grant a new trial on the ground that "the
evidence was insufficient to justify the decision, or that it is
against the law." But in this connection it is also provided by
section 146 that the
"overruling or granting of a motion for a new trial shall not be
a ground of exception, but shall be deemed to have been an act of
discretion on the part of the judge."
Defendant also prepared a bill of exceptions containing the
evidence upon which the hearing was had in the supreme court.
Under the circumstances, and waiving the question whether there
was such a motion for a new trial as is contemplated by section
497, we are of the opinion that the judgment of the Court of First
Instance should not have been reversed unless the findings of that
court were plainly and manifestly against the weight of the
evidence.
The adultery charged upon the plaintiff is said to have been
committed with one Corporal Zabal of the civil guard at Talisay,
where the parties then lived. The principal testimony establishing
that fact is that of Apolonia Aurelio, a confidential servant, who
swears she entered the services of the plaintiff in
1891,
that the corporal used to frequent the plaintiff's house during the
absence of the husband, who was wont to leave home to inspect his
haciendas; that plaintiff habitually visited the quarters of the
civil guard for the purpose of meeting Zabal, and that Zabal was
also in the habit of going to the plaintiff's house at ten o'clock
at night and remaining until morning; that defendant became
acquainted with these facts from a letter written by plaintiff to
be sent to Zabal at the quarters of the civil guard, but purloined
by the witness and given to defendant. This letter, which, upon the
theory of the defendant, would have furnished conclusive evidence
of the plaintiff's adultery, was destroyed. The letter, if written
at all, was written in May, yet her husband continued to live with
her until August, when he carried her to her parents in the Town of
Valladolid, apparently for a visit, cohabited with her there,
Page 201 U. S. 315
and then abandoned her. His version is that he took her to her
mother on the same or the next day after he discovered the letter,
and that he did not cohabit with her there, although he occupied
the same room, in which there was but one bed. Little reliance was
placed upon the testimony of Apolonia by either of the courts
below, as it appeared that she did not enter the service of the
plaintiff until the year
1893, after the couple had
separated, and that she was then sent by the husband to the wife as
a servant. She also told a most improbable story of always sleeping
in the room of the plaintiff during her husband's absence, and even
while the corporal was there. The Court of First Instance found
that the attitude of the witness was apparently hostile to the
plaintiff by reason of the fact that Apolonia was about to marry a
man whom the plaintiff disliked, and the plaintiff had punished
her.
Upon the other hand, the Court of First Instance did not
hesitate to say that the attitude of the plaintiff during the trial
of the case was such as to impress the court very favorably in her
behalf. "Her entire bearing was that of a modest, retiring,
self-respecting, and conscientious woman." There was testimony
tending to show that Apolonia did not want to testify, but was
given two packages of paper money in order to induce her to do so,
and that another witness was also paid for his testimony. The
testimony of Apolonia is to a certain extent bolstered up by that
of three or four men, whose intelligence was evidently of such a
low order that they can scarcely deserve to be called corroborating
witnesses. The judge of the court came to the conclusion that
"the testimony of this woman is too uncertain and too suspicious
to justify any court in declaring the plaintiff guilty of adultery,
especially when the worthlessness and the dubious character of the
testimony of the other witnesses for the defendant on this subject
increase the probability of the existence of something in the
nature of a conspiracy to destroy the case of the plaintiff, and to
support that of the defendant in the present action."
As already stated, these parties were married in July, 1891,
Page 201 U. S. 316
the plaintiff then being but fourteen years of age. The intrigue
with Zabal, if it occurred at all, took place within thirteen
months thereafter, as the parties separated in August, 1892. The
story that a bride of fourteen, happily married and living in
comfort, if not in luxury, should immediately after her marriage
enter into liaison with a common soldier, should receive him at her
house in the presence of her servants, without an attempt at
concealment, spend the night with him with her confidential maid
apparently sleeping in the same room, should openly visit his
quarters at night, taking her maid with her, is so improbable that
it should only be accepted upon evidence leaving no other
legitimate conclusion to be drawn from it except that of adultery.
The inference that this testimony was fabricated was so strong that
the courts below were fully justified in disregarding it. The Court
of First Instance discarded it entirely. The supreme court
evidently placed no reliance upon it, but found conclusive evidence
of adultery in a letter written in March, 1899, by the plaintiff to
her husband.
This letter, which was written seven years after their
separation, is printed in the margin. [
Footnote 2] We do not regard it as by any
Page 201 U. S. 317
means conclusive. While it is perhaps susceptible of the
construction put upon it by the husband, it is entirely consistent
with the theory that she had been abandoned by her husband without
cause, was left in a desperate state of mind, was anxious to regain
his favor, and to make any sacrifice to induce him to take her back
and resume their former relations. She hints at no misconduct of
her own, but intimates that he is disgusted with her, and for just
reason -- for having claimed her pension. She says that, when he
went to Spain, her pain was unbearable, that she had become
completely desperate, and was advised to demand her pension because
of the fact that he was going to reside abroad permanently, and she
finally commenced proceedings in view of her desperate situation.
So far from confessing adultery, she says that, if those who wished
her ill "have told you more, they have made a mistake, for the
truth about my comportment is that it cannot be complained of."
There is nothing indicating that, after their separation her
conduct had not been irreproachable.
The paragraph much relied upon is as follows:
"I keep yet on my face the shame of what has happened,
notwithstanding that it has been already many years since we
parted.
Page 201 U. S. 318
Therefore, my husband, forgive me; erase what has happened;
remember me for God's love; behold our dark fate. In you I trust my
future."
This is by no means necessarily a confession of guilt.
The letter is that of a broken-hearted woman who is willing to
make any sacrifice necessary to be restored to her husband's favor,
and to submit to any humiliation necessary to regain his affection.
She makes no confession of adultery, points to her "comportment"
since their separation as showing nothing that could be complained
of, but, in her frequent repetition of the claim she had made for
her pension, points to that as the source of her husband's disgust.
Bearing in mind that her husband had seduced her when she was only
thirteen years of age, and that, since their separation, and for
nearly a decade, he had not only repudiated her, but had maintained
unlawful relations with at least three other women, all of whom had
borne him children, we think that, even if two constructions were
possible, the Court of First Instance was right in putting that
construction upon the letter which was most favorable to the
plaintiff.
We have reached the conclusion that there is no such
preponderance of evidence in favor of the theory of plaintiff's
guilt as authorized the supreme court to set aside the conclusions
of the court below upon the ground that these findings were plainly
and manifestly against the weight of the evidence. In this
connection, it is proper to bear in mind that the trial judge had
all these witnesses before him, and doubtless formed his
conclusions largely from their appearance on the stand, their
manner of giving testimony and their apparent credibility. Under
the circumstances, we think the supreme court should have affirmed,
rather than reversed, the action of the lower court.
While the right of the plaintiff to her proportion of the
conjugal property, to alimony pending suit, and to other allowances
claimed is the basis of our jurisdiction, the decree of the supreme
court in dismissing plaintiff's petition renders it unnecessary to
review the action of the Court of First Instance in fixing the
amount that it held plaintiff was entitled to recover.
Page 201 U. S. 319
We are therefore of opinion that the decree of the supreme court
dismissing the petition must be reversed, and the cause remanded to
that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.
Reversed.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE, MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM, MR. JUSTICE HOLMES, and
MR. JUSTICE DAY dissented upon the question of jurisdiction.
[
Footnote 1]
" SEC. 10. That the Supreme Court of the United States shall
have jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm the
final judgments and decrees of the Supreme Court of the Philippine
Islands in all actions, cases, causes, and proceedings now pending
therein, or hereafter determined thereby, in which the Constitution
or any statute, treaty, title, right, or privilege of the United
States is involved, or in causes in which the value in controversy
exceeds twenty-five thousand dollars, or in which the title or
possession of real estate exceeding in value the sum of twenty-five
thousand dollars, to be ascertained by the oath of either party or
of other competent witnesses, is involved or brought in question,
and such final judgments or decrees may and can be reviewed,
revised, reversed, modified, or affirmed by said Supreme Court of
the United States on appeal or writ of error by the party
aggrieved, in the same manner, under the same regulations, and by
the same procedure, as far as applicable, as the final judgments
and decrees of the circuit courts of the United States."
[
Footnote 2]
The letter of March 6, 1899, addressed by the plaintiff to the
defendant reads as follows:
"My respected and unforgetable Esteban:"
"Pardon that I disturb your tranquillity E., that in the midst
of a profound sentiment that afflicts me I find consolation for my
profound grief in addressing the man who loved me in the time of my
good fortune, and who led me to the altar before the eyes of the
being whom we most love, God. Remember me; let fall a drop of
compassion from your soul; look at me back again with your cheerful
eyes at the woman who is watching for you. I know well that you are
very disgusted with me, and for just reason -- for having claimed
my pension. Be calm, quiet yourself, reflect a moment for my
situation, which I will explain to you."
"When you went to Europe, mother went to see you to explain our
situation to you, and you answered that it had nothing to do with
you. She insulted you, Esteban; you had reason to be offended."
"Now, regarding my having demanded my pension, you are also in
the right, but pardon my impudence in stating what I have to
say:"
"I swear to you, E., and call God to witness that when you went
to Spain, my pain was unbearable thinking of my fatal misfortune. I
had become completely desperate, and Orozco wrote and advised me to
demand my pension in view of the fact that you were going to reside
permanently in Spain; then I finally did commence proceedings in
view of my desperate situation, and nothing further came of the
matter during your absence."
"If the Lacsons, who wish me ill, have told you more, they have
made a mistake, for the truth about my comportment is that it
cannot be complained of; you can secure information regarding my
conduct during our separation here in Valladolid."
"I keep yet on my face the shame of what has happened,
notwithstanding that it has been already many years since we
parted. Therefore, my husband, forgive me; erase what has happened,
remember me for God's love; behold our dark fate. In you I trust my
future."
"E., I have heard that you have had some misfortunes. I send my
sympathy, although I am unworthy of your presence."
"I also learn from Modesto that you do not wish to have my
pension sent. Do as you wish."
"Good-by, E., take good care of yourself, and command,"
"Your faithful servant Q.B.S.P."
"March 6, 1899 Agueda Benedicto"