If a state statute, as interpreted by the highest court of the
state, is not violative of the federal Constitution, this Court
will accept the construction of the state court.
The statute of Minnesota, G.S., 1894, § 2701, providing that the
liability of railroad companies for damages to employees shall not
be diminished by reason of the accident occurring through the
negligence of fellow servants, and excepting from its provisions
damages sustained by employees engaged in construction of new and
unopened railroads, does not, as interpreted by the highest court
of that state, discriminate against any class of railroads or deny
to such class the equal protection of the laws; the exception
merely marks the time when the statute takes effect.
There is no objection under the Fourteenth Amendment to
legislation confined to a peculiar and well defined class of
perils, and it is not necessary that they are shared by the public
if they concern the body of citizens engaged in a particular
work.
Freedom of contract may be limited by a state statute where
there are visible reasons of public policy for the limitation.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
Page 199 U. S. 596
MR. JUSTICE Holmes delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an action for the loss of an arm by the plaintiff, the
defendant in error, while repairing an engine of the defendant,
through the negligence of a fellow servant. A statute of Minnesota
reads as follows:
"Every railroad corporation owning or operating a railroad in
this state shall be liable for all damages sustained by any agent
or servant thereof by reason of the negligence of any other agent
or servant thereof, without contributory negligence on his part,
when sustained within this state, and no contract, rule, or
regulation between such corporation and any agent or servant shall
impair or diminish such liability;
provided, that nothing
in this act shall be so construed as to render any railroad company
liable for damages sustained by any employee, agent, or servant
while engaged in the construction of a new road, or any part
thereof, not open to public travel or use."
Minn.Gen.Stat. 1894, § 2701. The track on which the accident
happened was a narrow gauge track, on which dump cars were run by
the defendant, a mining company, for the purpose of stripping the
earth from the surface of its mine. The plaintiff had a verdict
which afterwards was set aside by the trial court on the ground
that, if the statute were
Page 199 U. S. 597
construed to apply to this case, it would be contrary to the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. This
ruling was reversed by the supreme court of the state, and judgment
was entered on the verdict. 93 Minn. 63. The case then was brought
here.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota construed the act to apply to
this case, and held it constitutional when so construed. Of course,
if the statute as interpreted is not within the prohibitions of the
Fourteenth Amendment, we do not interfere with the construction
adopted by the state court. The state court held that the act was
confined to the dangers peculiar to railroads, and did not
discriminate against railroad companies merely as such. It read the
proviso as only exempting incomplete roads, marking the time when
the statute should take effect, and not as confining it to roads
intended for public travel. Before us it was argued that, when the
statute was passed, there were no private railroads in the state,
and that, if the proviso is taken to mean what the court said, the
discrimination is senseless and unjustified; whereas, if it be
taken to confine the statute to public roads after public travel
has begun, the distinction may be maintained. We are of a different
opinion. Some time must be fixed when the law shall begin to
operate, and the time when the road is finished is a natural and
proper time. There may be unavoidable and exceptional dangers
before the track is finished and while cars are being run over it
for construction purposes, and the legislature might think it
proper that the servant should take the risk of these even if the
negligence of a fellow servant cooperated, just as he takes the
risk of the known peculiar dangers when he sets about repairing the
effects of an accident. The fact that there may be also dangers
like those on the finished road does not prevent the legislature
from considering the situation as a whole and keeping the old rule
on practical grounds until the exceptional risks come to an end. It
was assumed in argument that the statute would not apply to a road
like the present if it were built in aid of the construction of a
public railroad which was not yet
Page 199 U. S. 598
completed. We see nothing in the decision or the statute to
warrant the assumption, and therefore need not discuss what the
effect of such an exception would be. Of course, there is no
objection to legislation being confined to a peculiar and well
defined class of perils, and it is not necessary that they should
be perils which are shared by the public if they concern the body
of citizens engaged in a particular work.
Holden v. Hardy,
169 U. S. 366.
It was not argued that the statute was bad as interfering unduly
with freedom of contract. There is no doubt that that freedom may
be limited where there are visible reasons of public policy for the
limitation.
Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.
S. 366,
169 U. S. 391.
The constitutionality of the law, so far as it merely does away
with the exception as to the negligence of fellow servants from the
general law of master and servant in the case of railroads, is not
disputed.
Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v. Mackey,
127 U. S. 205. The
whole case is put on the proviso, and the argument with regard to
that is merely one of the many attempts to impart an
overmathematical nicety to the prohibitions of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Judgment affirmed.