Where suit is brought in the district of defendant's residence
by plaintiffs who are citizens of other states than that of
defendant, the Circuit Court has jurisdiction although plaintiffs
are not themselves citizens of the same state.
This was an action of assumpsit brought in the Circuit Court of
the United States for the Northern District of West Virginia by, as
described in the summons,
"Francis B. Sweeney, a resident in and citizen of the State of
New York, and Halbert J. Porterfield, a resident in and citizen of
the State of Pennsylvania, partners, doing business under the firm
name and style of Sweeney & Porterfield,"
against "Carter Oil Company, a corporation created, organized,
and existing under and by virtue of the laws of West Virginia, and
as such a citizen thereof," to recover damages in the sum of
$20,000.
The declaration, filed May 4, 1903, followed the summons
Page 199 U. S. 253
as to the citizenship of the parties, and contained ten special
counts, most of them laying the damages at $20,000, and the common
counts. An account stated was annexed, giving items, running from
1900 to 1901, aggregation $20,912.42.
The record discloses that, on February 3, 1904, the court
entered an order overruling a motion
"to dismiss this action for the want of jurisdiction, apparent
upon the face of the proceedings in this, that the plaintiffs are
residents of different states, seeking to sue a defendant of
another state."
On February 15, 1904, the court set aside that order, sustained
the motion to dismiss, and entered judgment for defendant. May 10,
1904, the judge holding the circuit court filed a certificate
"that the judgment of dismissal made in this cause on February
15, 1904 at the present term of this Court, is based solely on the
ground that the record does not show that the controversy is one,
in my opinion, between citizens of different states, but that it
appears from the record that one of the plaintiffs, to-wit, Francis
B. Sweeney, is a resident in and citizen of the State of New York,
and that Halbert J. Porterfield is a resident in and citizen of the
State of Pennsylvania, while the defendant is a corporation created
and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of West
Virginia, and domiciled in the Northern District of West Virginia,
and no other ground of jurisdiction appears from the record, and
the case is dismissed only for the reason above stated -- that is,
that the controversy is not between citizens of different states,
as is required by the federal statutes to confer jurisdiction on
this court, but one of the plaintiffs being a citizen of one state,
to-wit, the State of New York, and the other plaintiff being a
citizen of the State of Pennsylvania, cannot, in my judgment, be
joined as plaintiffs and sue in this court a defendant residing in
the Northern District of West Virginia, and consequently the proper
citizenship of different states does not exist, and that the
circuit court of the United States for the Northern District of
West Virginia has no jurisdiction."
This writ of error was granted the same day.
Page 199 U. S. 254
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER delivered the opinion of the Court.
The circuit court dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction in
that the controversy was not between citizens of different states
within the meaning of the statute because plaintiffs were citizens
of different states as between themselves, and could not be joined
in an action against a citizen of West
Page 199 U. S. 255
Virginia. That was the sole point determined below, and the
correctness of the conclusion is the sole question for
determination here.
Defendant does, indeed, argue that the judgment should be
affirmed because the declaration, though stating a sum of money to
be due plaintiffs in excess of $2,000, did not aver that this was
"exclusive of interest and costs," and did not aver that defendant
was "a resident or inhabitant of the Northern District of West
Virginia," nor was that fact "apparent from the record," and
because the citizenship of plaintiffs and defendant was not averred
with sufficient directness. None of these points was raised below,
and, as the record stands, they call for no consideration.
The judicial power under the Constitution extends to
"controversies between citizens of different states."
The first section of the Act of March 3, 1887, as corrected by
that of August 13, 1888, provides
"that the circuit courts of the United States shall have
original cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several
states, of all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity
where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of interest and
costs, the sum or value of two thousand dollars . . . or in which
there shall be a controversy between citizens of different states
in which the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of interest and
costs, the sum or value aforesaid, . . . and no civil suit shall be
brought before either of said courts against any person by any
original process or proceeding in any other district than that
whereof he is an inhabitant, but, where the jurisdiction is founded
only on the fact that the action is between citizens of different
states, suit shall be brought only in the district of the residence
of either the plaintiff or the defendant."
The controversy here was "between citizens of different states;"
the jurisdiction of the circuit court was founded on diversity of
citizenship, and the suit was brought in the district of the
residence of the defendant.
Page 199 U. S. 256
We do not feel warranted in construing the words "controversy
between citizens of different states" to mean "controversy between
citizens of the same state and citizens of another state," and,
unless that is done, this judgment must be reversed.
In our opinion, defendant, being a citizen of West Virginia and
a resident of the district in which it was sued, and plaintiffs
being citizens of other states than West Virginia, the circuit
court had jurisdiction.
The general subject was considered in
Smith v. Lyon,
133 U. S. 315, the
opinion of the court being delivered by Mr. Justice Miller. In that
opinion, it is pointed out that the first clause of the act of 1887
describes the jurisdiction common to all the circuit courts of the
United States as regards the subject matter of the suit, and, as
regards the character of the parties who, by reason of such
character, may, either as plaintiffs or defendants, sustain suits
in circuit courts, while the next sentence in the same section
undertakes to define the jurisdiction of each one of the several
circuit courts of the United States with reference to its
territorial limits, and, after quoting the latter clause in full,
Mr. Justice Miller said:
"In the case before us, one of the plaintiffs is a citizen of
the state where the suit is brought, namely, the State of Missouri,
and the defendant is a citizen of the State of Texas. But one of
the plaintiffs is a citizen of the State of Arkansas. The suit, so
far as he is concerned, is not brought in the state of which he is
a citizen. Neither as plaintiff nor as defendant is he a citizen of
the district where the suit is brought. The argument in support of
the error assigned is that it is sufficient if the suit is brought
in a state where one of the defendants or one of the plaintiffs is
a citizen. This would be true if there were but one plaintiff or
one defendant. But the statute makes no provision, in terms, for
the case of two defendants or two plaintiffs who are citizens of
different states. In the present case, there being two plaintiffs,
citizens of different states, there does not seem to be, in the
language of the statute,
Page 199 U. S. 257
any provision that both plaintiffs may unite in one suit in a
State of which either of them is a citizen."
Referring to the language of § 11 of the Judiciary Act of 1789,
giving jurisdiction to the circuit courts, where "the suit is
between a citizen of the state where the suit is brought and a
citizen of another state," the following from the opinion of Chief
Justice Marshall in
Strawbridge v.
Curtiss, 3 Cranch 267:
"The Court understands these expressions to mean that each
distinct interest should be represented by persons, all of whom are
entitled to sue, or may be sued, in the federal courts. That is
that, where the interest is joint, each of the persons concerned in
that interest must be competent to sue, or liable to be sued, in
those courts;"
which construction, it was said, has been adhered to from that
day to this, notwithstanding the statute has been reenacted and
recast several times since that decision.
New Orleans
v. Winter, 1 Wheat. 91;
Coal
Company v. Blatchford, 11 Wall. 172;
Sewing Machine
Companies, 18 Wall. 553, and
Peninsular Iron
Company v. Stone, 121 U. S. 631,
were cited in reiteration of the rule that,
"if there are several co-plaintiffs, the intention of the act is
that each plaintiff must be competent to sue, and if there are
several codefendants, each defendant must be liable to be sued, or
the jurisdiction cannot be entertained."
And the rule was held applicable under the act of 1887,
especially in view of the fact that that act was mainly designed to
restrict the jurisdiction of the circuit courts.
But if these citizens of Missouri and Arkansas had sued the
defendant, a citizen of Texas, in the circuit court of the United
States for the district of his residence in Texas, we perceive no
reason why that court would not have had jurisdiction.
And this would be so if that defendant had sued those plaintiffs
in his district in Texas, if he there obtained service of process
upon them.
In
McCormick Harvesting Machine Company v. Walthers,
134 U. S. 41,
134 U. S. 44, we
said:
"The Judiciary Act of 1789 provided
Page 199 U. S. 258
that no civil suit should be brought before the circuit or
district courts against an inhabitant of the United States by any
original process in any other district than that whereof he was an
inhabitant or in which he should be found at the time of serving
the writ, 1 Stat. 79, c. 20, § 12, and the act of 1875, 18 Stat.
470, c. 137, § 1, contained a similar provision. This liability of
the defendant to be sued in a district where he might be found at
the time of serving process was omitted in the act of 1887, but he
still remained liable to suit in the district of the residence of
the plaintiff as well as in his own district, and as he could not
be sued anywhere else, we held in
Smith v. Lyon,
133 U. S.
315, that, where there were two plaintiffs, citizens of
different states, the defendant, being a citizen of another state,
could not be sued in the state of either of the plaintiffs. Mr.
Justice Miller points out, in delivering the opinion of the Court,
that the evident purpose of Congress in the act of 1887 was to
restrict, rather than enlarge, the jurisdiction of the circuit
court, 'while,' he says, 'at the same time, a suit is permitted to
be brought in any district where either plaintiff or defendant
resides.' In that case, plaintiff was a citizen of Nebraska and
brought suit in the circuit court of the district of Nebraska
against an Illinois corporation, service being made on defendant's
managing agent in Nebraska, as provided by the state statute.
Defendant answered and then on leave withdrew the answer, and filed
a plea to the jurisdiction. The plea was overruled, and thereupon
defendant went to trial on the merits upon issue joined on that
answer. It was held that the objection to the jurisdiction, if it
could be urged at all, must be confined to want of power to
entertain the suit outside of defendant's own district, and that it
was without merit."
Many decisions in respect of removal of cases of diverse
citizenship are to the same effect. Thus, in
Removal
Cases, 100 U. S. 457, the
provision of the act of 1875 that as to suits
"in which there shall be a controversy between citizens of
different states, . . . either party may remove said suit
Page 199 U. S. 259
into the circuit court of the United States for the proper
district,"
was construed to mean
"that, when the controversy about which a suit in the state
court is brought is between citizens of one or more states on one
side, and citizens of other states on the other side, either party
to the controversy may remove the suit to the circuit court without
regard to the position they occupy in the pleadings as plaintiffs
or defendants. For the purposes of a removal, the matter in dispute
may be ascertained, and, according to the facts, the parties to the
suit arranged on opposite sides of that dispute. If, in such an
arrangement, it appears that those on one side, being all citizens
of different states from those on the other, desire a removal, the
suit may be removed."
Young v. Parker, 132 U. S. 267;
Ballin v. Lehr, 24 Fed.193;
Pitkin County Mining
Company v. Markell, 33 F. 386;
Roberts v. Pacific & A.
Railway & Nav. Co., 104 F. 577.
The contention in the present case seems to be that, because
defendant could not sue plaintiffs in the circuit court of New York
or that of Pennsylvania, therefore plaintiffs could not sue
defendant in the Circuit Court for the Northern District of West
Virginia. But this does not follow from the terms of the statute by
which jurisdiction is conferred generally where plaintiffs are
residents and citizens of states different from that of the
residence and citizenship of defendant; and, moreover, defendant
could, if it had a cause of action, have sued plaintiffs in the
Circuit Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, and
proceeded with the action if they were served with process in such
district. The clause vesting jurisdiction should not be confounded
with the clause determining the particular courts in which the
jurisdiction must be exercised.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded, to be proceeded in
according to law.