Where the jurisdiction of the circuit court is invoked on the
ground of diverse citizenship, it will not be held to rest also on
the ground that the suit arose under the Constitution of the United
States unless it really and substantially involves a dispute or
controversy as to the effect or construction of the Constitution
upon the determination of which the result depends, and which
appears on the record by a statement in legal and logical form such
as good pleading requires, and where the case is not brought within
this rule, the decree of the circuit court of appeals is final.
Where the jurisdiction of the circuit court has been invoked on the
ground of diverse citizenship and plaintiff asserts two causes of
action, only one of which involves a right under the Constitution,
and the circuit court of appeals decides against him on that cause
of action and in his favor on the other, the judgment of that court
is final, and defendant cannot make the alleged constitutional
question on which he has succeeded the basis of jurisdiction for an
appeal to this Court.
Hanley brought this bill in equity in the Circuit Court of the
United States for the District of Idaho, setting up diversity of
citizenship as the ground of jurisdiction, and asserted
ownership
Page 198 U. S. 293
of an undivided one-eighth interest, and of an undivided
one-third interest in the Skookum mining claim, Shoshone County,
Idaho. As to the one-third interest, Hanley claimed under certain
proceedings in the probate court of that county, which were,
without notice to him, as he said, set aside, and the interest
conveyed to the Chemung Company, and by the latter to the Empire
State &c. Mining Company. Hanley's title to the one-eighth
interest was derived through mesne conveyances from the original
grantee under a patent from the United States. This interest Hanley
had conveyed to Sweeny and Clark by a deed deposited in the
Exchange National Bank of Spokane, to be delivered on certain
specified conditions, and he averred that Sweeny and Clark obtained
possession of the deed wrongfully, and contrary to the escrow
agreement, and afterwards made a pretended deed of the interest to
the Empire State Company.
On hearing, the circuit court decreed against Hanley as to both
interests. Hanley carried the case to the circuit court of appeals,
which held that he was not entitled to relief as to the one-third
interest, but that he was as to the one-eighth interest. The decree
was therefore reversed, and the cause remanded for further
proceedings. 109 F. 712. The case went back and was referred to a
master for an accounting as to the eighth interest, who reported a
large amount of money as due to Hanley. The circuit court reduced
the amount by deducting the cost of working the property while
Hanley was excluded from the mine, and entered a decree quieting
Hanley's title to the one-eighth interest and giving him judgment
against the Empire State Company for the last-named amount.
Defendant appealed from this decree, and filed a supersedeas bond
with the American Bonding Company of Baltimore as surety, and
Hanley prosecuted a cross-appeal, questioning the deduction. The
circuit court of appeals sustained the cross-appeal, and held that
the circuit court erred in allowing defendants their working costs.
126 F. 97. The case was remanded with directions to modify the
decree. This was
Page 198 U. S. 294
done and recovery of the original amount decreed, and also
recovery on the bond of the amount it was given to secure, and
another appeal was taken by the companies to the court of appeals,
which affirmed the decree. The pending appeal having been
subsequently allowed, was submitted on motion to dismiss.
Page 198 U. S. 295
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE Fuller delivered the opinion of the Court.
We are of opinion that the jurisdiction of the circuit court was
dependent entirely upon diversity of citizenship, and that
Page 198 U. S. 297
this appeal must be dismissed. Appellants' contention is that
the allegations of Hanley's complaint as to the one-third interest
amounted to the assertion that he had been deprived of that
interest by the probate court without due process of law, and were
sufficient to support the jurisdiction of the circuit court on this
ground, irrespective of diversity of citizenship. We do not so
regard the allegations. What Hanley asserted was that his title to
the third interest was good because he had purchased it from the
administrator under the decree of the probate court, and that the
subsequent decree of that court, annulling the prior decree, was
invalid for want of jurisdiction to render it at a subsequent term,
for want of notice and for lack of evidence.
Granting that the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the action of
the courts as well as of the legislative and executive authorities
of the states, the averments of the complaint did not suggest that
the courts of Idaho would hold the later proceedings of the probate
court, if attacked by Hanley directly, effectual to overthrow his
purchase; or charge that in such action as had been taken they had
committed error so gross as to amount in law to a denial by the
state of due process of law. Hanley's contention was in effect that
the later proceedings were void for lack of jurisdiction, and he
did not pretend that he could not have obtained redress by direct
suit in the state courts.
The Constitution and laws of the United States were not
mentioned in the complaint, nor any dispute or controversy raised
as to the effect or construction of the Constitution or laws on the
determination of which the result depended; nor was any title,
right, privilege, or immunity specially set up or claimed under
Constitution or law.
If this had been a writ of error to a state court, the averments
would not have brought it within section 709 of the Revised
Statutes. If it had been a direct appeal from the circuit court
under section 5 of the Act of March 3, 1891, it could not have been
sustained, because the construction or
Page 198 U. S. 298
application of the Constitution of the United States was not
distinctly presented for decision in the court below.
And as an appeal from the circuit court of appeals under section
6 of the act of 1891, it cannot be sustained because it falls
within the settled rule that:
"Where the jurisdiction of the circuit court is invoked on the
ground of diverse citizenship, it will not be held to rest also on
the ground that the suit arose under the Constitution of the United
States unless it really and substantially involves a dispute or
controversy as to the effect or construction of the Constitution,
upon the determination of which the result depends, and which
appears on the record by a statement in legal and logical form,
such as good pleading requires, and where the case is not brought
within this rule the decree of the circuit court of appeals is
final."
Arbuckle v. Blackburn, 191 U.
S. 405;
Western Union Telegraph Company v. Ann Arbor
Railroad Company, 178 U. S.
238.
If the allegation of diversity of citizenship had been omitted
from the bill, the jurisdiction could not have been maintained.
The decisions of the courts below did not turn on any federal
question. The circuit court held that Hanley had no title to the
one-third interest because the Idaho statute relating to probate
sales had not been complied with; the court of appeals, that Hanley
was not entitled to the aid of a court of equity in respect of that
interest, because of his conduct at the time of the
transaction.
Appellants succeeded in their defense as to the one-third
interest, and Hanley accepted the result on the second appeal. They
now make a grievance of their own success, and ask that the
supposed constitutional question as to the third interest only be
made the basis of jurisdiction here, although, if the decree
disposed of any such question, it was in their favor. In our
opinion, this cannot be permitted.
Anglo-American Provision
Company v. Davis Provision Company, 191 U.
S. 376;
Lampasas v. Bell, 180 U.
S. 276.
Appeal dismissed.
