The statutes of 1892 of the Territory of Hawaii purporting to
confer upon the judges of the several courts at chambers, within
their respective jurisdictions, judicial power not incident or
ancillary to some cause pending before a court are not in conflict
with § 81 of the Organic Act of the Territory, approved April 30,
1900, 31 Stat. 141, 157, and the power of the judges to act at
chambers was expressly saved by the provision in § 81 continuing
the law of Hawaii theretofore in force concerning courts and their
jurisdiction until the legislature otherwise ordered, except as
otherwise provided in the Organic Act.
In construing the organic act of a territory, the whole act must
be considered in order to obtain a comprehensive view of the
intention of Congress, and no single section should be segregated
and given undue prominence where other sections bear upon the same
subject. Whether a petition in a probate proceeding to a court
acting as a probate court shall be addressed to, and passed upon by
the judge, while sitting in court or at chambers is more a matter
of form than of substance.
This was a writ of error to review a judgment of the Supreme
Court of the Territory of Hawaii denying a writ of prohibition.
The facts of the case are substantially as follows: on July 27,
1904, one Low, as next friend of Annie T. K. Parker, a minor, filed
a petition before the defendant, George D. Gear, judge of the First
Judicial Circuit, in probate at chambers, asking for the removal of
Alfred W. Carter, plaintiff in error, as guardian of the estate of
said minor. He had been originally
Page 197 U. S. 349
appointed such guardian September 29, 1899. The petition was
entitled "In the Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit,
Territory of Hawaii. In Probate. At Chambers," and was in fact
filed before the circuit judge sitting at chambers. A demurrer was
interposed to the petition upon the ground that the circuit judge
had no jurisdiction of the proceedings, for the reason that the
statute conferring judicial powers upon the judges at chambers was
in conflict with the organic act of the territory.
The demurrer was overruled, and the jurisdiction of the court
sustained, apparently with some doubt, by the circuit judge.
This petition for a writ of prohibition was then filed by Carter
in the supreme court of the territory against the defendant, Gear,
as circuit judge, and Low, the next friend of Annie T. K. Parker,
praying that the said circuit judge be prohibited from taking
further cognizance of the petition for the removal of Carter or
proceeding therein until the further order of the supreme court.
After a full hearing, the supreme court affirmed the judgment of
the circuit court, and dismissed the petition.
Page 197 U. S. 352
MR. JUSTICE BROWN delivered the opinion of the Court.
The writ of prohibition was demanded upon the ground that there
was no cause pending in the Circuit Court of the First Circuit, to
which the motion and petition of Low, as next friend, was
incidental or ancillary, and that Judge Gear, sitting at chambers,
was hearing questions of a judicial nature entirely independent of
any cause pending in that court.
The single question presented by the record is whether the
statutes of the Territory of Hawaii purporting to confer upon the
judges of the several courts at chambers, within their respective
jurisdictions, judicial power not incident or ancillary to some
cause pending before a court were in conflict with § 81 of the Act
of Congress approved April 30, 1900,
Page 197 U. S. 353
31 Stat. 141, commonly known as the Organic Act of the
territory. This section, page 157, enacts that
"the judicial power of the territory shall be vested in one
supreme court, circuit courts, and in such inferior courts as the
legislature may from time to time establish. And, until the
legislature shall otherwise provide, the laws of Hawaii heretofore
in force concerning the several courts and their jurisdiction and
procedure shall continue in force, except as herein otherwise
provided."
At the time the act of Congress was passed, there was in force
in the Territory of Hawaii an act known as Chapter 57 of the Laws
of 1892, the thirty-seventh section of which gave to the judges of
the several circuit courts at chambers, very ample powers in
admiralty, equity, bankruptcy, and probate causes, among which were
proceedings "to remove any executor, administrator, or guardian."
This act was conceded to be sufficient to justify the action of
Judge Gear in removing the guardian in this case. It was
substantially reenacted with amendments in 1903.
The argument is made that section 81 of the Organic Act is
identical with the constitutional provisions of many states, under
which similar statutes purporting to confer judicial powers upon
circuit judges at chambers not incident to or ancillary to any
cause pending in any court, have usually been declared
unconstitutional, citing
Spencer Creek Water Co. v.
Vallejo, 48 Cal. 70;
Risser v. Hoyt, 53 Mich. 185;
Toledo Ry. Co. v. Dunlap, 47 Mich. 456;
Rowe v.
Rowe, 28 Mich. 353;
Pittsburg &c. R. Co. v. Hurd,
17 Ohio St. 144, 146;
State v. Woodson, 161 Mo. 444. We
are also referred to
McKnight v. James, 155 U.
S. 685, in which we held that a writ of error could not
go to an order of a judge of a circuit court made at chambers.
But, conceding the correctness of these decisions under the
constitutions of the several states, and also conceding that the
Organic Act stands in the place of a constitution for the Territory
of Hawaii, to which its laws must conform, does it follow that the
laws respecting proceedings at chambers
Page 197 U. S. 354
are in excess of the powers conferred under the Organic Act?
Bearing in mind that section 81 of the Organic Act is but one of
a hundred sections, all of which are entitled to equal respect, it
is evident that to obtain a comprehensive view of the intention of
Congress we are bound to consider the whole act so far as it
relates to the disposition of judicial power. To segregate section
81 from all the other provisions of the act must necessarily result
in giving it undue prominence.
By section 6,
"the laws of Hawaii not inconsistent with the Constitution or
laws of the United States, or the provisions of this act, shall
continue in force, subject to repeal or amendment by the
Legislature of Hawaii or the Congress of the United States."
By section 7, the Constitution of the Republic of Hawaii and a
large number of its laws, specially enumerated, are repealed, but
the statutes giving probate and equity jurisdiction to the circuit
courts are not mentioned.
By section 10, all actions at law, suits in equity, and other
proceedings then pending in the courts of the Republic of Hawaii
shall be carried on to final judgment and execution in the
corresponding courts of the Territory of Hawaii. As petitioner,
Carter, was appointed guardian of the minor's estate in 1899 by the
then judge of the First Circuit, and was still proceeding to wind
up the estate, we think the petition for his removal was filed in a
pending proceeding within the meaning of this section.
Now, as it appears that the powers of judges at chambers had
been fixed since 1892, eight years before the Organic Act was
passed, that, by section 6 and the final clause of section 81 the
laws of Hawaii theretofore in force concerning the several courts
and their jurisdiction and procedure were continued in force,
except as therein otherwise provided, it would seem that these
provisions were especially intended to apply to cases like the
present, where a system of procedure which had previously existed
was recognized as valid and still existing. In
Hawaii v.
Mankichi, 190 U. S. 197, a
similar provision in the resolution
Page 197 U. S. 355
of annexation was held not to abrogate a system of trials by
information and convictions by a nonunanimous jury as applied to
cases prior to the Organic Act of April 30, 1900.
But we do not think it necessary to go further than section 81
itself to find authority for a recognition of the laws previously
existing in Hawaii concerning the constitution of its courts and
their method of procedure. Whether a petition to a circuit court
acting as a court of probate shall be addressed to and passed upon
by the judge while sitting in court at chambers is, after all, much
more a matter of form than of substance.
Commonwealth v.
McLaughlin, 122 Mass. 449. The petition for the removal of the
guardian in this case is entitled: "In the Circuit Court of the
First Judicial Circuit, Territory of Hawaii. In Probate. At
Chambers." It appears to have been heard by the circuit judge
without a jury, his decision being entitled "Before a Judge of the
Circuit Court, of the First Circuit, Territory of Hawaii." It must
doubtless be treated as a proceeding at chambers, but, for reasons
already given, we think the power to act of chambers was saved by
section 81 continuing in force the previous laws of Hawaii
concerning the courts and their procedure. It would be too narrow a
construction to hold that this did not include the procedure before
judges of those courts sitting at chambers.
The decree dismissing the writ is
Affirmed.
