Words in the Constitution of the United States do not ordinarily
receive a narrow and contracted meaning, but are presumed to have
been used in a broad sense with a view of covering all
contingencies.
The word "charged" in Art. IV, § 2, Subd. 2, was used in its
broad signification to cover any proceeding which a state might see
fit to adopt for a formal accusation against an alleged
criminal.
Extradition, or rendition, is but one step in securing the
presence of the accused in the court in which he may be tried, and
in no manner determines the question of guilt, and while courts
will always endeavor to prevent any wrong in the extradition of a
person to answer a charge of crime ignorantly or wantonly made, the
possibility cannot always be guarded against, and the process of
extradition must not be so burdened as to make it practically
valueless.
The extradition of an alleged fugitive from justice against whom
a charge of the crime of securing property by false pretences has
been made and is pending before a justice of the peace of Ohio,
having jurisdiction conferred upon him by the laws of that state to
examine and bind over for trial in a superior court, is authorized
by Art. IV, 2, Subd. 2 of the Constitution of the United States,
and § 5278, Rev.Stat.
The petitioner was charged by affidavit before a justice of the
peace of Youngstown Township, Ohio, with the crime of obtaining
$400 worth of jewelry at Youngstown, Ohio, by false pretenses,
contrary to the law of that state. He was arrested as a fugitive
from justice and brought before a magistrate of the City of New
York, August 11, 1902. The Governor of New York, after a hearing at
which the accused was represented by counsel, issued his warrant,
dated August 22, 1902, directed to the Police Commissioner of New
York City, directing him to arrest the accused and deliver him to
the duly accredited agent of Ohio, to be taken to that state.
The warrant recites that it has been represented by the
Page 197 U. S. 325
Governor of Ohio that the accused stands charged in that State
of the crime of securing property by false pretenses, which is a
crime under its law, and that he has fled from that state. It also
recites that the requisition was accompanied by affidavits and
other papers, duly certified by the Governor of Ohio to be
authentic, charging the accused with having committed the said
crime, and with having fled from Ohio and taken refuge in the State
of New York.
On the August 29, after the arrest of the petitioner, a writ of
habeas corpus was allowed by the district court. The police
commissioner made return that he held the accused by virtue of the
governor's warrant. On September 16, 1902, the district court
discharged the writ and remanded the accused to the custody of the
police commissioner. This order was taken on appeal to the Circuit
Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit, which certified the
following questions:
"First. Whether the delivery up of an alleged fugitive from
justice against whom a complaint for the crime of securing property
by false pretenses has been sworn to and is pending before a
justice of the peace of Ohio, having the jurisdiction conferred
upon him by the laws of that state, is authorized in view of the
provisions of Article IV, section 2, subd. 2, of the
Constitution?"
"Second. Is section 5278 of the Revised Statutes, in as far as
it authorizes the delivery up of an alleged fugitive from justice
upon an affidavit of complaint pending before a justice of the
peace in Ohio for the crime of securing property by false
pretenses, which said justice of the peace has the jurisdiction
conferred upon him by the laws of the said state, violative of
Article IV, section 2, subd. 2, of the Constitution?"
Article IV, section 2, subd. 2, of the Constitution reads:
"A person charged in any state with treason, felony, or other
crime, who shall flee from justice and be found in another state,
shall, on demand of the executive authority of the state from which
he fled, be delivered up to be removed to the state having
jurisdiction of the crime. "
Page 197 U. S. 326
Revised Statutes, sec. 5278, so far as is material, is:
"Whenever the executive authority of any state or territory
demands any person as a fugitive from justice, of the executive
authority of any state or territory to which such person has fled,
and produces a copy of an indictment found or an affidavit made
before a magistrate of any state or territory, charging the person
demanded with having committed treason, felony, or other crime,
certified as authentic by the governor or chief magistrate of the
state or territory from whence the person so charged has fled, it
shall be the duty of the executive authority of the state or
territory to which such person has fled to cause him to be arrested
and secured, and to cause notice of the arrest to be given to the
executive authority making such demand, or to the agent of such
authority appointed to receive the fugitive, and to cause the
fugitive to be delivered to such agent when he shall appear. "
Page 197 U. S. 329
MR. JUSTICE BREWER delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Constitution provides for the surrender of a person charged
with treason, felony, or other crime. The statute prescribes the
evidence of the charge to be produced, to-wit: "A copy of an
indictment found or an affidavit made before a magistrate . . .
charging . . . treason, felony, or other crime." The offense for
which extradition was sought is, under the Ohio statute, a felony
(Bates' Annotated Ohio Stat. 4th ed. sec. 7076), and subject to
trial only upon an
Page 197 U. S. 330
indictment (Art. 1, sec. 10, Bill of Rights, Ohio Constitution),
the proceedings in such a case before a justice of the peace being
only preliminary and for the purpose of securing arrest and
detention. It is contended that the constitutional provision for
the extradition of persons "charged with treason, felony, or other
crime" requires that the charge must be pending in a court that can
try the defendant, and does not include one before a committing
magistrate, who can only discharge or hold for trial before another
tribunal.
But why should the word "charged" be given a restricted
interpretation? It is found in the Constitution, and ordinarily
words in such an instrument do not receive a narrow, contracted
meaning, but are presumed to have been used in a broad sense, with
a view of covering all contingencies. In
McCulloch
v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, one question discussed
was as to the meaning of the word "necessary," as found in the
clause of the Constitution giving to Congress power
"to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers
vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States,
or in any department or officer thereof."
Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for the Court, said (p.
17 U. S.
415):
"This word, then, like others, is used in various senses, and,
in its construction, the subject, the context, the intention of the
person using them are all to be taken into view."
"Let this be done in the case under consideration. The subject
is the execution of those great powers on which the welfare of a
nation essentially depends. It must have been the intention of
those who gave these powers, to insure, as far as human prudence
could insure, their beneficial execution. This could not be done by
confining the choice of means to such narrow limits as not to leave
it in the power of Congress to adopt any which might be
appropriate, and which were conducive to the end. This provision is
made in a Constitution intended to endure for ages to come, and
consequently
Page 197 U. S. 331
to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs. To have
prescribed the means by which government should, in all future
time, execute its powers would have been to change entirely the
character of the instrument and give it the properties of a legal
code. It would have been an unwise attempt to provide, by immutable
rules, for exigencies which, if foreseen at all, must have been
seen dimly, and which can be best provided for as they occur. To
have declared that the best means shall not be used, but those
alone without which the power given would be nugatory, would have
been to deprive the legislature of the capacity to avail itself of
experience, to exercise its reason, and to accommodate its
legislation to circumstances."
Under the Constitution, each state was left with full control
over its criminal procedure. No one could have anticipated what
changes any state might make therein, and doubtless the word
"charged" was used in its broad signification, to cover any
proceeding which a state might see fit to adopt by which a formal
accusation was made against an alleged criminal. In the strictest
sense of the term, a party is charged with crime when an affidavit
is filed alleging the commission of the offense and a warrant is
issued for his arrest, and this is true whether a final trial may
or may not be had upon such charge. It may be and is true that, in
many of the states, some further proceeding is, in the higher grade
of offenses at least, necessary before the party can be put upon
trial, and that the proceedings before an examining magistrate are
preliminary, and only with a view to the arrest and detention of
the alleged criminal; but extradition is a mere proceeding in
securing arrest and detention. An extradited defendant is not put
on trial upon any writ which is issued for the purposes of
extradition, any more than he is upon the warrant which is issued
by the justice of the peace directing his arrest.
Cases are referred to, such as
Virginia v. Paul,
148 U. S. 107, in
which a distinction is made between the preliminary proceedings
looking to the arrest and detention of the
Page 197 U. S. 332
defendant and those final proceedings upon which the trial is
had. That was a removal case, and, discussing the question, Mr.
Justice Gray, speaking for the Court, said (p.
148 U. S.
119):
"By the terms of section 643, it is only after 'any civil suit
or criminal prosecution is commenced in any court of a state,' and
'before the trial or final hearing thereof,' that it can 'be
removed for trial into the circuit court next to be holden in the
district where the same is pending,' and 'shall proceed as a cause
originally commenced in that court.'"
"Proceedings before a magistrate to commit a person to jail, or
to hold him to bail, in order to secure his appearance to answer
for a crime or offense, which the magistrate has no jurisdiction
himself to try, before the court in which he may be prosecuted and
tried, are but preliminary to the prosecution, and are no more a
commencement of the prosecution than is an arrest by an officer
without a warrant for a felony committed in his presence."
But such decisions, instead of making against the use in this
constitutional section of the word "charged" in its broad sense,
make in its favor, because, as we have noticed, an extradition is
simply one step in securing the arrest and detention of the
defendant. And these preliminary proceedings are not completed
until the party is brought before the court in which the trial may
be had. Why should the state be put to the expense of a grand jury
and an indictment before securing possession of the party to be
tried? It may be true, as counsel urge, that persons are sometimes
wrongfully extradited, particularly in cases like the present; that
a creditor may wantonly swear to an affidavit charging a debtor
with obtaining goods under false pretenses. But it is also true
that a prosecuting officer may either wantonly or ignorantly file
an information charging a like offense. But who would doubt that an
information, where that is the statutory pleading for purposes of
trial, is sufficient to justify an extradition? Such
Page 197 U. S. 333
possibilities as these cannot be guarded against. While courts
will always endeavor to see that no such attempted wrong is
successful, on the other hand, care must be taken that the process
of extradition be not so burdened as to make it practically
valueless. It is but one step in securing the presence of the
defendant in the court in which he may be tried, and in no manner
determines the question of guilt.
While perhaps more pertinent as illustration than argument, the
practice which obtains in extradition cases between this and other
nations is worthy of notice. Sections 5270 to 5277, Rev.Stat.,
inclusive, provide for this matter. In none of these sections or in
subsequent amendments or additions thereto is there any stipulation
for an indictment as a prerequisite to extradition. On the
contrary, the proceedings assimilate very closely those commenced
in any state for the arrest and detention of an alleged criminal.
They go upon the theory that extradition is but a mere step in
securing the presence of the defendant in the court in which he may
lawfully be tried. In the memorandum issued by the Department of
State in May, 1890, in reference to the extradition of fugitives
from the United States in British jurisdiction, is this statement
(1 Moore on Extradition, p. 335):
"It is stipulated in the treaties with Great Britain that
extradition shall only be granted on such evidence of criminality
as, according to the laws of the place where the fugitive or person
charged shall be found, would justify his apprehension and
commitment for trial if the crime or offense had there been
committed."
"It is admissible, as constituting such evidence, to produce a
properly certified copy of an indictment found against the fugitive
by a grand jury, or of any information made before an examining
magistrate, accompanied by one or more depositions setting forth as
fully as possible the circumstances of the crime."
And this is in general harmony with the thought underlying
extradition.
Page 197 U. S. 334
Entertaining these views, we answer the first question in the
affirmative and the second in the negative.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN did not hear the argument, and took no part
in the decision of this case.
