A husband owes the duty of supporting his wife and children not
because of contractual relations with the wife, but because of the
policy of the law which will enforce the duty if necessary, and the
Bankruptcy Act was not intended to be a means of avoiding this
obligation.
Arrears of alimony awarded to a wife against her husband for the
support of herself and their minor children, under a final decree
of absolute divorce, is not a provable debt barred by a discharge
in bankruptcy, nor does the fact that there is no reservation in
the decree of the right to alter or modify it deprive the debt of
its character of being for the support of the bankrupt's wife and
children.
The amendment of February 5, 1903, excepting decrees of alimony
from the discharge in bankruptcy was not new legislation creating a
presumption that such decrees were not excepted prior thereto, but
was merely declaratory of the true meaning and sense of the statute
as originally enacted.
On June 12, 1890, an action for divorce and alimony was begun by
Annette B. W. Wetmore, wife of the plaintiff in error, in the
Supreme Court of the State of New York, and on April 1, 1892 at
special term, the plaintiff in error was found guilty of adultery
as charged in the complaint, and a divorce was granted upon that
ground to the defendant in error. The divorce was absolute, and
awarded to the wife the custody and care of the three minor
children of the marriage, and also, as alimony, the sum of $3,000
per annum so long as she should live, to be paid in quarterly
installments of $750 each on the first day of the months of July,
October, January, and April of each year. There was also granted to
the wife the sum of $3,000 annually, being $1,000 for the education
and maintenance of each of the three minor children, to be paid in
quarterly installments, until such children should arrive at the
age of twenty-one years respectively. Plaintiff in error was also
required
Page 196 U. S. 69
to give security for the payment of the alimony awarded. The
decree did not reserve any right of subsequent modification or
amendment. On January 13, 1899, there was due to the wife from the
plaintiff in error, for arrears in alimony and allowance under the
decree, the sum of $19,221.60. Upon that day, upon application to
the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, the plaintiff in error was adjudicated a bankrupt.
The defendant in error made no proof of her claim for alimony in
the bankrupt proceedings. On June 21, 1900, the plaintiff in error
was granted a discharge from all debts and claims provable under
the Bankruptcy Act. On December 12, 1901, plaintiff in error sued
out a writ in the Supreme Court of the State of New York for an
order enjoining and restraining all proceedings on behalf of the
defendant in error for the collection of the arrears of alimony and
allowance aforesaid. This application was denied, upon the ground,
as it appears from the memorandum of the judge who rendered the
decision, that the arrears of alimony were not discharged in
bankruptcy. From the order denying the application, an appeal was
taken by the plaintiff in error to the appellate division of the
supreme court of the State of New York, where the order below was
affirmed. The plaintiff in error thereupon appealed to the Court of
Appeals of the State of New York, and on June 27, 1902, the appeal
was dismissed for want of jurisdiction, without any judgment of
affirmance or reversal upon the merits. A writ of error was sued
out seeking in this Court a reversal of the judgment of the Supreme
Court of the State of New York.
Page 196 U. S. 71
MR. JUSTICE DAY delivered the opinion of the Court.
It is conceded in argument by counsel for the plaintiff in error
that this case would be within the decision of this Court in
Audubon v. Shufeldt, 181 U. S. 577,
if the judgment for alimony had been rendered in a court having
control over the decree with power to amend or alter the same. It
is insisted, however, that, there being in this case no reservation
of the right to change or modify the decree, it has become an
absolute judgment, beyond the power of the court to alter or amend,
and is therefore discharged by the bankruptcy proceedings.
Page 196 U. S. 72
Walker v. Walker, 155 N.Y. 77;
Livingston v.
Livingston, 173 N.Y. 377. It may be admitted to be the effect
of these decisions of the New York Court of Appeals that, in the
absence of any reservation of the right to modify or amend, the
judgment for alimony becomes absolute. The question presented for
decision, in view of this state of the law, is has the decree
become a fixed liability evidenced by a judgment, and therefore
provable against the estate of the bankrupt, within the protection
of the discharge in bankruptcy? Section 63 of the act of 1898
provides:
"SEC. 63. Debts which may be proved. --"
"Debts of the bankrupt may be proved and allowed against his
estate which are (1) a fixed liability as evidenced by a judgment
or an instrument in writing, absolutely owing at the time of the
filing of the petition against him, whether then payable or not,
with any interest thereon which would have been recoverable at that
date, or with a rebate of interest upon such as were not then
payable and did not bear interest."
It is not contended that this section includes installments of
alimony becoming due after the adjudication, but the contention is
that prior installments have become an existing liability,
evidenced by the judgment, and therefore a provable debt. While
this section enumerates under separate paragraphs the kind and
character of claims to be proved and allowed in bankruptcy, the
classification is only a means of describing "debts" of the
bankrupt which may be proved and allowed against his estate.
The precise question, therefore, is is such a judgment as the
one here under consideration a
debt within the meaning of
the act? The mere fact that a judgment has been rendered does not
prevent the court from looking into the proceedings with a view of
determining the nature of the liability which has been reduced to
judgment.
Boynton v. Ball, 121 U.
S. 457,
121 U. S. 466.
The question presented is not altogether new in this Court. In the
case of
Audubon v. Shufeldt, 181
U. S. 577, Mr. Justice Gray, delivering the opinion of
the Court, said:
Page 196 U. S. 73
"Alimony does not arise from any business transaction, but from
the relation of marriage. It is not founded on contract, express or
implied, but on the natural and legal duty of the husband to
support the wife. The general obligation to support is made
specific by the decree of the court of appropriate jurisdiction.
Generally speaking, alimony may be altered by that court at any
time, as the circumstances of the parties may require. The decree
of a court of one state, indeed, for the present payment of a
definite sum of money as alimony, is a record which is entitled to
full faith and credit in another state, and may therefore be there
enforced by suit.
Barber v. Barber, (1858) 21
How. 582;
Lynde v. Lynde, (1901)
181 U. S.
183. But its obligation in that respect does not affect
its nature. In other respects, alimony cannot ordinarily be
enforced by action at law, but only by application to the court
which granted it, and subject to the discretion of that court.
Permanent alimony is regarded rather as a portion of the husband's
estate to which the wife is equitably entitled than as strictly a
debt; alimony from time to time may be regarded as a portion of his
current income or earnings, and the considerations which affect
either can be better weighed by the court having jurisdiction over
the relation of husband and wife than by a court of a different
jurisdiction."
In the same opinion, Mr. Justice Gray quoted from
Barclay v.
Barclay, 184 Ill. 375, in which case it was adjudged that
alimony could not be regarded as a debt owing from husband to wife,
which might be discharged by an order in bankruptcy, whether the
alimony accrued before or after the proceedings in bankruptcy:
"The liability to pay alimony is not founded upon a contract,
but is a penalty imposed for a failure to perform a duty. It is not
to be enforced by an action at law in the state where the decree is
entered, but is to be enforced by such proceedings as the
chancellor may determine and adopt for its enforcement. It may be
enforced by imprisonment for contempt, without violating the
constitutional provision prohibiting
Page 196 U. S. 74
imprisonment for debt. The decree for alimony may be changed
from time to time by the chancellor, and there may be such
circumstances as would authorize the chancellor to even change the
amount to be paid by the husband, where he is in arrears in
payments required under the decree. Hence, such alimony cannot be
regarded as a debt owing from husband to the wife, and, not being
so, cannot be discharged by an order in the bankruptcy court."
It is true that, in the cases referred to, the decrees were
rendered in courts having continuing control over them, with power
to alter or amend them upon application; but this fact does not
change the essential character of the liability, nor determine
whether a claim for alimony is, in its nature, contractual so as to
make it a debt. The court having power to look behind the judgment,
to determine the nature and extent of the liability, the obligation
enforced is still of the same character notwithstanding the
judgment. We think the reasoning of the
Audubon case
recognizes the doctrine that a decree awarding alimony to the wife
or children, or both, is not a debt which has been put in the form
of a judgment, but is rather a legal means of enforcing the
obligation of the husband and father to support and maintain his
wife and children. He owes this duty not because of any contractual
obligation or as a debt due from him to the wife, but because of
the policy of the law which imposes the obligation upon the
husband. The law interferes when the husband neglects or refuses to
discharge this duty, and enforces it against him by means of legal
proceedings.
It is true that, in the State of New York at the time this
decree was rendered, there was no power to modify or alter the
decree for alimony and allowance in the absence of special
reservation. But this does not change the grounds upon which the
courts of the state proceeded in awarding the alimony and
allowances. In the case of
Romaine v. Chauncey, 129 N.Y.
566, it was held that alimony was awarded not in the payment of a
debt, but in the performance of the general duty of the
Page 196 U. S. 75
husband to support the wife. This case was quoted with approval
by Mr. Justice Gray in
Audubon v. Shufeldt, supra.
In
Walker v. Walker, 155 N.Y. 77, and
Livingston v.
Livingston, 173 N.Y. 377, the effect of the holdings is that a
judgment for alimony, in the absence of reservation, is a fixed and
unalterable determination of the amount to be contributed to the
wife's support after the decree, and is beyond the power of the
court to change even under the authority of subsequent legislation.
These cases do not modify the grounds upon which alimony is
awarded, and recognize that an alimony decree is a provision for
the support of the wife, settled and determined by the judgment of
the court.
In the case of
Dunbar v.
Dunbar, decided by this Court at the October term,
1902,
190 U. S. 340, it
was held that a contract made after divorce between husband and
wife, by which the former agreed to pay the latter a certain sum of
money annually for her support during her life, or so long as she
remained unmarried, and also to pay a certain sum of money to her
annually for the support of the minor children of the marriage,
whose custody was awarded to the mother, was not discharged by a
subsequent proceeding and discharge in bankruptcy. It was further
held that the sum agreed to be paid for the support of the minor
children was but a recognition of the liability of the father for
their support, and that the fact that the annual installments were
made payable to the wife made no difference in the character of the
obligation. Of this feature of the contract, the Court, speaking by
MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM, said:
"In relation to that part of the husband's contract to pay for
the support of his minor children until they respectively become of
age, we also think that it was not of a nature to be proved in
bankruptcy. At common law, a father is bound to support his
legitimate children, and the obligation continues during their
minority. We may assume this obligation to exist in all the states.
In this case, the decree of the court provided that the children
should remain in the custody of
Page 196 U. S. 76
the wife, and the contract to contribute a certain sum yearly
for the support of each child during his minority was simply a
contract to do that which the law obliged him to do -- that is, to
support his minor children. . . . We think it was not the intention
of Congress, in passing a Bankruptcy Act, to provide for the
release of the father from his obligation to support his children
by his discharge in bankruptcy, and if not, then we see no reason
why his contract to do that which the law obliged him to do should
be discharged in that way. As his discharge would not in any event
terminate his obligation to support his children during their
minority, we see no reason why his written contract acknowledging
such obligation and agreeing to pay a certain sum (which may be
presumed to have been a reasonable one) in fulfillment thereof
should be so discharged. It is true his promise is to pay to the
mother, but on this branch of the contract, it is for the purpose
of supporting his two minor children, and he simply makes her his
agent for that purpose."
We think this language is equally applicable to the present case
in that aspect of the decree which provides for the support of the
minor children. The obligation continues after the discharge in
bankruptcy as well as before, and is no more than the duty devolved
by the law upon the husband to support his children, and is not a
debt in any just sense.
It is urged that the amendment of the law made by the Act of
February 5, 1903, excepting from the operation of a discharge in
bankruptcy a decree for alimony due or to become due, or for the
maintenance and support of the wife and minor children, is a
legislative recognition of the fact that, prior to the passage of
the amendment, judgments for alimony would be discharged. In
Dunbar v. Dunbar, 190 U. S. 340, it
was said that this amendment, while it did not apply to prior
cases, may be referred to for the purpose of showing the
legislative trend in the direction of not discharging an obligation
of the bankrupt for the support and maintenance of wife and
children. The amendment may also have been passed
Page 196 U. S. 77
with a view to settling the law upon this subject, and to put at
rest the controversies which had arisen from the conflicting
decisions of the courts, both state and federal, upon this
question. Indeed, in view of the construction of the act in this
Court in
Audubon v. Shufeldt, supra, it may be said to be
merely declaratory of the true meaning and sense of the statute.
United States v.
Freeman, 3 How. 556;
Bailey v.
Clark, 21 Wall. 284,
88 U. S. 288;
Cope v. Cope, 137 U. S. 682,
137 U. S. 688.
The bankruptcy law should receive such an interpretation as will
effectuate its beneficent purposes, and not make it an instrument
to deprive dependent wife and children of the support and
maintenance due them from the husband and father, which it has ever
been the purpose of the law to enforce. Systems of bankruptcy are
designed to relieve the honest debtor from the weight of
indebtedness which has become oppressive, and to permit him to have
a fresh start in business or commercial life, freed from the
obligation and responsibilities which may have resulted from
business misfortunes. Unless positively required by direct
enactment, the courts should not presume a design upon the part of
Congress, in relieving the unfortunate debtor, to make the law a
means of avoiding enforcement of the obligation, moral and legal,
devolved upon the husband to support his wife and to maintain and
educate his children. While it is true in this case the obligation
has become fixed by an unalterable decree so far as the amount to
be contributed by the husband for the support is concerned, looking
beneath the judgment for the foundation upon which it rests, we
find it was not decreed for any debt of the bankrupt, but was only
a means designed by the law for carrying into effect, and making
available to the wife and children, the right which the law gives
them as against the husband and father.
We find no error in the judgment of the Supreme Court of the New
York, and the same is
Affirmed.