The city is the creature of the state. A municipal corporation
is simply a political subdivision of the state existing by virtue
of the exercise of the power of the state through its legislative
department.
While a municipal corporation may own property not of a public
or governmental nature which is entitled to constitutional
protection, the obligation of a railroad company to pave and repair
streets occupied by it based on accepted conditions of a municipal
ordinance granting rights of location is not private property
beyond legislative control.
Chapter 578, Laws of Massachusetts of 1898, providing for
taxation of street railway companies, is not void, as violating the
impairment of obligation clause of the federal Constitution, so far
as this case is concerned, because it relieved a railroad company
from the obligation to pave and repair streets under the terms and
conditions of certain municipal ordinances which the company had
duly accepted.
These five cases were brought here by writs of error, sued out
by the City of Worcester, for the purpose of reviewing the several
judgments of the supreme and superior courts of the commonwealth of
Massachusetts, respectively, affirming the judgments of the trial
courts in favor of the railroad company, the defendant in error.
The five cases involve the same questions, and were brought for the
purpose of answering any possible objection to the particular mode
adopted in any one case for the purpose of obtaining the relief
sought by the plaintiff in error. 182 Mass. 49. The first two cases
were petitions for writs of mandamus against the railroad
Page 196 U. S. 540
company, which petitions were demurred to, and the demurrers
sustained. Of the three other cases, two were suits in equity, and
were brought by the city against the railroad company, and were
heard upon the bills and demurrers thereto, the court sustaining
the demurrers; the fifth case was an action on contract originally
brought by the city against the railroad company, in the superior
court, and heard upon demurrer to the complaint, which was
sustained and judgment ordered for defendant, from which judgment
plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Judicial Court of the
commonwealth.
The defendant in error is a street railroad corporation,
organized and doing business under the laws of the State of
Massachusetts, and it owned and operated in the City of Worcester
and in numerous outlying cities and towns a street railway system
parts of which had previously belonged to other similar
corporations, and had been acquired by the consolidated company in
1901, by the purchase of the franchises and properties of such
other companies under the general provisions of the street railway
laws of the commonwealth. Under the general laws of the
commonwealth, as they existed from 1891 to 1893, it was provided
that a street railway company might apply to the board of aldermen
of a city, or the selectmen of a town, for the location of the
tracks of the railway company in the streets of the city or town,
and, after hearing, it was provided that the board might grant the
petition
"under such restrictions as they deem the interests of the
public may require, and the location thus granted shall be deemed
and taken to be the true location of the tracks of the railway, if
an acceptance thereof by said directors in writing is filed with
said mayor and aldermen or selectmen within thirty days after
receiving notice thereof."
Section 7 of chap. 113 of the Massachusetts Public Statutes.
The law also provided (section 21 of above act) that the board
of aldermen or the selectmen might, from time to time,
"under such restrictions as they deem the interests of the
public may require, upon petition, authorize a street railway
Page 196 U. S. 541
company whose charter has been duly accepted, and whose tracks
have been located and constructed, or its lessees and assigns, to
extend the location of its tracks within their city or town without
entering upon or using the tracks of another street railway
company, and such extended location shall be deemed to be the true
location of the tracks of the company, if its acceptance thereof in
writing is filed in the office of the clerk of the city or town
within thirty days after receiving notice thereof."
Section 32 of the act made it the duty of every street railway
company to keep in repair, to the satisfaction of the
superintendent of streets,
"the paving, upper planking, or other surface material of the
portions of streets, roads, and bridges occupied by its tracks, and
if such tracks occupy unpaved streets or roads [the company] shall,
in addition, so keep in repair eighteen inches on each side of the
portion occupied by its tracks,"
etc.
As the law then stood, the railroad company, on several
different occasions between 1891 and 1893, made applications for
and was granted the privilege of extending the location of its
tracks. On the eleventh day of May, 1891, the defendant in error,
upon application, was duly granted an extension of its location for
its tracks in certain streets in the City of Worcester, which
extension of location was stated in the order or decree of the
board of aldermen to be granted "upon the following conditions;"
eight different conditions then follow, among which is:
"Second. That block paving shall be laid and 'maintained between
the rails of its track, and for a distance of eighteen inches
outside of said rails, for the entire distance covered by this
location.'"
This order or decree was duly accepted in writing by the
defendant in error, and its acceptance filed with the clerk of the
City of Worcester. Other extensions of locations were applied for
and granted during this time, some of which were upon the condition
or restriction that the paving should be
Page 196 U. S. 542
between the rails and outside thereof to the street curb, and
these conditions were accepted and the acceptance duly filed in the
city clerk's office.
Subsequently, and in 1898 (chap. 578 of the Massachusetts Laws
of that year), provision was made for a somewhat different system
of taxation than that which prevailed at the time these several
extensions of locations were granted and accepted by the railroad
company. It was provided by section 11 of that act as follows:
"SEC. 11. Street railway companies shall not be required to keep
any portion of the surface material of streets, roads, and bridges
in repair, but they shall remain subject to all legal obligations
imposed in original grants of locations, and may, as an incident to
their corporate franchise, and without being subject to the payment
of any fee or other condition precedent, open any street, road, or
bridge, in which any part of their railway is located for the
purpose of making repairs or renewals of the railway, or any part
thereof, the superintendent of streets or other officer exercising
like authority, or the board of aldermen or selectmen, in any city
or town where such are required, issuing the necessary permits
therefor."
After the passage of this act of 1898, the railroad company
consented and conformed to its requirements, and thereafter omitted
to make the repairs in the streets which had been required of it at
the time when its extended locations were granted, during the
period from 1891 to 1893. The city thereafter sought by these
various actions or proceedings to compel the street railway company
to repair and maintain the surface of the streets as provided for
by the law in force when the extended locations were given and
accepted. During the time that the railroad company had, since the
passage of the act of 1898, omitted to make the repairs provided
for as a condition for the granting of its application for extended
locations, the city had incurred expenses in renewing and repairing
various portions of the pavements, because of the omission and
refusal
Page 196 U. S. 543
of the railroad company to do so, and one of these actions was
brought to recover the expenses thus incurred by the city in making
such repairs and renewing such pavement.
Page 196 U. S. 547
MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM, after making the foregoing statement of
facts, delivered the opinion of the Court.
The defendant in error makes no objection to the form in
Page 196 U. S. 548
which the question to be decided comes before us. Whether one or
the other action or proceeding is proper and appropriate need not,
therefore, be considered.
The contention on the part of the plaintiff in error is that, by
virtue of the restrictions or conditions placed by it upon granting
the various extensions of locations of the tracks of the railroad
company, and by the acceptance of the same by the company, a
contract was entered into between the city and the railroad company
which could not be altered without the consent of both parties, and
that as the city had never consented to any alteration of the
obligation of the railroad company to make the repairs in the
streets, as provided for in those restrictions or conditions, the
subsequent legislation contained in the act of 1898 impaired the
obligation of that contract, and was therefore void as a violation
of the Constitution of the United States.
In the view we take of this subject, it may be assumed, for the
purpose of argument, that the City of Worcester had power, under
the legislation of the state, to grant the right to extend the
location of the railroad company's tracks upon the restrictions or
conditions already mentioned. It may also be assumed, but only for
the purpose of the argument, that the restrictions or conditions
contained in the orders or decrees of the board of aldermen, upon
their acceptance by the company, became contracts between the city
and the company.
The question then arising is whether the legislature, in the
exercise of its general legislative power, could abrogate the
provisions of the contract between the city and the railroad
company with the assent of the latter, and provide another and a
different method for the paving and repairing of the streets
through which the tracks of the railroad company were laid under
the permit of their extended location. We have no doubt that the
legislature of the commonwealth had that power. A municipal
corporation is simply a political subdivision of the state, and
exists by virtue of the exercise of the power of the state through
its legislative department. The
Page 196 U. S. 549
legislature could at any time terminate the existence of the
corporation itself, and provide other and different means for the
government of the district comprised within the limits of the
former city. The city is the creature of the state.
East Hartford v. Hartford
Bridge Co., 10 How. 511,
51 U. S.
533-534.
As is stated in
United States v. Railroad
Company, 17 Wall. 322,
58 U. S. 329, a
municipal corporation is not only a part of the state, but is a
portion of its governmental power.
"It is one of its creatures, made for a specific purpose, to
exercise within a limited sphere the powers of the state. The state
may withdraw these local powers of government at pleasure, and may,
through its legislature or other appointed channels, govern the
local territory, as it governs the state at large. It may enlarge
or contract its powers, or destroy its existence. As a portion of
the state, in the exercise of a limited portion of the powers of
the state, its revenues, like those of the state, are not subject
to taxation."
In
New Orleans v. Clark, 95 U. S.
644,
95 U. S. 654,
it was stated by Mr. Justice Field, in delivering the opinion of
the Court, that:
"A city is only a political subdivision of the state, made for
the convenient administration of the government. It is an
instrumentality, with powers more or less enlarged according to the
requirements of the public, and which may be increased or repealed
at the will of the legislature. In directing, therefore, a
particular tax by such corporation, and the appropriation of the
proceeds to some special municipal purpose, the legislature only
exercises a power through its subordinate agent which it could
exercise directly, and it does this, only in another way, when it
directs such corporation to assume and pay a particular claim not
legally binding for want of some formality in its creation, but for
which the corporation has received an equivalent."
In
Laramie County v. Albany County, 92 U. S.
307, it was held that public or municipal corporations
were but parts of the machinery employed in carrying on the affairs
of the state, and that the
Page 196 U. S. 550
charters under which such corporations are created may be
changed, modified, or repealed as the exigencies of the public
service or the public welfare may demand; that such corporations
were composed of all the inhabitants of the territory included in
the political organization, and the attribute of individuality is
conferred on the entire mass of such residents, and it may be
modified or taken away at the mere will of the legislature,
according to its own views of public convenience, and without any
necessity for the consent of those composing the body politic.
It was said in that case that
"public duties are required of counties as well as of towns, as
a part of the machinery of the state; and, in order that they may
be able to perform those duties, they are vested with certain
corporate powers; but their functions are wholly of a public
nature, and they are at all times as much subject to the will of
the legislature as incorporated towns, as appears by the best text
writers upon the subject, and the great weight of judicial
authority."
In
Tippecanoe County v. Lucas, 93 U. S.
108,
93 U. S. 114,
the question of the validity of an act of the legislature was
presented, and Mr. Justice Field, in delivering the opinion of the
Court, said:
"Were the transaction one between the state and a private
individual, the invalidity of the act would not be a matter of
serious doubt. Private property cannot be taken from individuals by
the state except for public purposes, and then only upon
compensation or by way of taxation, and any enactments to that end
would be regarded as an illegitimate and unwarranted exercise of
legislative power. . . . But, between the state and municipal
corporations, such as cities, counties, and towns, the relation is
different from that between the state and the individual. Municipal
corporations are mere instrumentalities of the state, for the
convenient administration of government, and their powers may be
qualified, enlarged, or withdrawn at the pleasure of the
legislature."
In
Mt. Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100 U.
S. 514, it was held
Page 196 U. S. 551
that, where no constitutional restriction is imposed, the
corporate existence and powers of counties, cities, and towns are
subject to the legislative control of the state creating them.
In
New Orleans v. New Orleans Water Works Co.,
142 U. S. 79, it
was also held that a municipal corporation was the mere agent of
the state in its governmental character, and was in no contract
relations with its sovereign at whose pleasure its charter may be
amended, changed, or revoked without the impairment of any
constitutional obligation. It was also therein held that such a
corporation, in respect of its private or proprietary rights and
interests, might be entitled to constitutional protection. The
Massachusetts courts take the same view of such a corporation.
Browne v. Turner, 176 Mass. 9.
Enough cases have been cited to show the nature of a municipal
corporation as stated by this Court. In general, it may be conceded
that it can own private property, not of a public or governmental
nature, and that such property may be entitled, as is said, "to
constitutional protection." Property which is held by these
corporations upon conditions or terms contained in a grant, and for
a special use, may not be diverted by the legislature. This is
asserted in
Tippecanoe County v. Lucas, 93 U.
S. 115, and in
Mount Hope Cemetery v. Boston,
158 Mass. 509, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts held that cities
might have a private ownership of property which could not be
wholly controlled by the state government.
It seems, however, plain to us that the asserted right to demand
the continuance of the obligation to pave and repair the streets,
as contained in the orders or decrees of the board of aldermen
granting to the defendant the right to extend the locations of its
tracks on the conditions named, does not amount to property held by
the corporation, which the legislature is unable to touch either by
way of limitation or extinguishment. If these restrictions or
conditions are to be regarded as a contract, we think the
legislature would have the same right to
Page 196 U. S. 552
terminate it, with the consent of the railroad company, that the
city itself would have. These restrictions and conditions were of a
public nature, imposed as a means of collecting from the railroad
company part, or possibly the whole, of the expenses of paving or
repaving the streets in which the tracks were laid, and that method
of collection did not become an absolute property right in favor of
the city, as against the right of the legislature to alter of
abolish it, or substitute some other method with the consent of the
company, even though, as to the company itself, there might be a
contract not alterable except with its consent. If this contention
of the city were held valid, it would very largely diminish the
right of the legislature to deal with its creature in public
matters in a manner which the legislature might regard as for the
public welfare. In
Springfield v. Springfield Street
Railway, 182 Mass. 41, this question was before the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts, and the contention of the city to
the same effect as the plaintiff in error contends in this case was
overruled. It was therein held that the city acted in behalf of the
public in regard to these extensions of locations, and that the
legislature had the right to modify or abrogate the conditions on
which the locations in the streets and public ways had been
granted, after such conditions had been originally imposed by it.
The case at bar was decided at the same time as the
Springfield case (182 Mass. 49), and the proposition that
the legislature had the power to free the company from obligations
imposed upon it by the conditions in the grant of the extended
locations was adhered to, and the
Springfield case cited
as authority for the same. We concur in that view.
There is no force in the contention that the City of Worcester
has a proprietary right in the property of the defendant in error,
reserved to it under the original statute incorporating the
Worcester Horse Railroad Company. (Chap. 148, Mass.Laws of 1861.)
These sections simply give the City of Worcester the right, during
the continuance of the charter of the corporation, and after the
expiration of ten years from the opening of
Page 196 U. S. 553
any part of said road for use, to purchase all its franchises,
property, rights, etc. That right is not affected by the
legislation in question, even assuming (which we do not for a
moment intimate) that the act of 1898 affected the right of the
city to make the purchase under the sections above cited.
We see no reason to doubt the validity of the act of 1898, and
the judgments of the Supreme Judicial Court and the Superior Court
of Massachusetts are, respectively,
Affirmed.
