Proceedings in interstate rendition are summary; strict common
law evidence is not necessary, and the person demanded has no
constitutional right to a hearing. The governor's warrant for
removal is sufficient until the presumption of its legality is
overthrown by contrary proof in a legal proceeding to review his
action.
The indictment found in the demanding state will not be presumed
to be void on habeas corpus proceedings in the state in which the
demand is made if it substantially charges an offense for which the
person demanded may be returned for trial.
Where there is no doubt that the person demanded was not in the
demanding state when the crime was committed, and the demand is
made on the ground of constructive presence only, he will be
discharged on habeas corpus, but he will not be discharged when
there is merely contradictory evidence as to his presence or
absence, for habeas corpus is not the proper proceeding to try the
question of alibi or any question as to the guilt or innocence of
the accused.
Page 196 U. S. 368
MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM delivered the opinion of the court:
This was a proceeding on habeas corpus in a state court of New
Hampshire to obtain the discharge of the plaintiff in error from
arrest under a warrant given by the governor of that state,
directing the return of the plaintiff in error to the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts, as a fugitive from justice.
Page 196 U. S. 369
Upon the hearing the state court refused to discharge the
plaintiff in error, the order of refusal was affirmed by the
supreme court, and she has brought the case here for review. On a
former proceeding in supreme court,
see 71 N.H. 594.
The proceedings before the Governor of New Hampshire to obtain
the warrant of arrest were taken under section 5278 of the Revised
Statutes of the United States, reenacting the statute approved
February 12, 1793, 1 Stat. 302, relating to the arrest of persons
as fugitives from justice, under clause 2 of section 2 of Article
IV of the Constitution of the United States.
The papers before the Governor of New Hampshire consisted of a
copy of an indictment of the plaintiff in error, found in
Massachusetts on the second Monday of February, 1902; it contained
three counts, and charged the plaintiff in error with uttering and
publishing as true a certain forged instrument, purporting to be a
will, well knowing the same to be forged. The first count alleged
that the crime was committed on the twenty-eighth of February, 1895
at Cambridge, in the County of Middlesex, in the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, and it also alleged that, since the commission of
the offense the plaintiff had not been usually or publicly a
resident in that commonwealth.
The second count averred the uttering, etc., to have been on the
seventeenth day of May, in the year 1895, in the same place, and
the indictment had the same averment as to the nonresidence of the
plaintiff in error as contained in the first count.
The third count averred the uttering at the same place as that
named in the other two counts, but laid the date as the twentieth
day of November, 1901. There was also before the Governor of New
Hampshire an application, dated the twenty-sixth of February, 1902,
signed by George A. Sanderson, District Attorney for the Northern
District of Middlesex, to the Governor of Massachusetts, requesting
a requisition from him upon the Governor of New Hampshire for the
extradition of
Page 196 U. S. 370
the plaintiff in error, who, as stated in the application, stood
charged by indictment with the crime of uttering forged wills,
committed in the County of Middlesex (on the days stated in the
indictment), and who, to avoid prosecution, had fled from the
jurisdiction of the commonwealth, and was a fugitive from justice,
and was within the jurisdiction of the State of New Hampshire. It
was also stated in the application that the indictment was not
found by the grand jury until the February sitting of the superior
court in the year 1902. There was also before the Governor of New
Hampshire a copy of what purported to be an affidavit of one
Whitney, the original of which was used before the Governor of
Massachusetts, to obtain the requisition. It is short, and is as
follows:
"Massachusetts"
"ss.:"
"Middlesex"
"I, Jophanus H. Whitney, of Medford, in the County of Middlesex
and said commonwealth, on oath depose and say that Martha S.
Munsey, who stands charged by indictment with the crime of uttering
forged wills, as is more fully set forth in the papers hereto
annexed, has fled from the limits of said commonwealth, and is a
fugitive from justice. And I further depose that at the time of the
commission of said crime, she was in the State of Massachusetts, in
the County of Middlesex of said commonwealth, and that at the same
time and previous thereto she was a resident of Cambridge in the
said County of Middlesex; that she fled from said Commonwealth of
Massachusetts on or about the fourth day of November, A.D. 1901;
that she is not now within the limits of the commonwealth, but, as
I have reason to believe, is now in Pittsfield, in the State of New
Hampshire. The grounds of my knowledge are that I have interviewed
her since the fourth of November last in Pittsfield, New Hampshire,
where she was living with her husband during the last week January
last."
"Jophanus H. Whitney"
There was also a certificate of the District Attorney for
the
Page 196 U. S. 371
Northern District of Middlesex, that the offense charged against
the plaintiff in error is a felony within that commonwealth, and
that application for the arrest and return of the fugitive had not
been sooner made because the indictment was not found by the grand
jury until February, 1902.
The Governor of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts having given
the requisition applied for, the papers above mentioned were
presented to the Governor of New Hampshire, and a request made that
he should issue his warrant of arrest to take the plaintiff in
error back to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts as a fugitive from
justice, and for the purpose of being tried on the indictment
referred to. The counsel for the plaintiff in error appeared before
the governor and stated they desired a hearing before him before
the warrant of arrest should be granted. This hearing was refused,
and the governor then granted the warrant for the arrest and return
of the plaintiff in error to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts as a
fugitive from justice. In that warrant it was provided that the
plaintiff in error should be afforded an opportunity to sue out a
writ of habeas corpus before being delivered over to the
authorities of Massachusetts. She availed herself of that right and
sued out such writ, and upon its return the plaintiff in error made
several objections to the execution of the governor's warrant, and
alleged the insufficiency of the papers to authorize the granting
of the same. At the close of the hearing, the counsel for plaintiff
in error moved that she be discharged for the reasons stated in the
motion; the motion was denied, subject to the objection and
exception of the plaintiff in error. The record then shows the
following:
"The court thereupon ordered that the relator proceed to
introduce evidence upon the question whether she was in fact a
fugitive from justice. This the relator's counsel declined to do,
upon the ground that such action, on their part, would constitute a
waiver of their right to object to the refusal of the governor to
grant a hearing upon this question of fact."
"The court then directed that the counsel for the relator
Page 196 U. S. 372
state whether the relator waived the right to then, or at any
future time, introduce further evidence upon this, or any question
of fact, and counsel for relator declared that she did waive that
right."
"No evidence was offered by the relator either upon the question
whether the relator was a fugitive from justice, or upon any other
question of fact, other than as above stated."
The question of the legality of the detention of the plaintiff
in error is thus brought before the court. The proceedings in
matters of this kind before the governor are summary in their
nature. The questions before the governor, under the section of the
Revised Statutes above cited, are whether the person demanded has
been substantially charged with a crime, and whether he is a
fugitive from justice. The first is a question of law, and the
latter is a question of fact which the governor, upon whom the
demand is made, must decide upon such evidence as is satisfactory
to him. Strict common law evidence is not necessary. The statute
does not provide for the particular kind of evidence to be produced
before him, nor how it shall be authenticated, but it must at least
be evidence which is satisfactory to the mind of the governor.
Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U. S. 80,
116 U. S. 95.
The person demanded has no constitutional right to be heard before
the governor on either question, and the statute provides for none.
To hold otherwise would, in many cases, render the constitutional
provision, as well as the statute passed to carry it out, wholly
useless. The governor therefore committed no error in refusing a
hearing. The issuing of the warrant by him, with or without a
recital therein that the person demanded is a fugitive from
justice, must be regarded as sufficient to justify the removal
until the presumption in favor of the legality and regularity of
the warrant is overthrown by contrary proof in a legal proceeding
to review the action of the governor.
Roberts v. Reilly, supra;
Hyatt v. Cochran, 188 U. S. 691.
After the decision of the governor, and the issuing of the
warrant, the plaintiff in error sued out this writ of habeas
corpus
Page 196 U. S. 373
for the purpose of reviewing his action. The position taken by
the plaintiff in error upon the hearing on the return of the writ,
in refusing to introduce evidence upon the question whether she was
in fact a fugitive from justice, left the case for decision upon
the papers before the governor upon which he acted in issuing the
warrant of arrest. We have no doubt that a
prima facie
case was made out, and as the plaintiff in error waived any right
to give further evidence, she is concluded by that
prima
facie case. The indictment undoubtedly set forth a substantial
charge against the plaintiff in error, and the facts therein set
forth constituted a felony in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, as
certified by the district attorney. The sufficiency of the
indictment, as a matter of technical pleading, will not be inquired
into on habeas corpus.
Ex Parte Reggel, 114 U.
S. 642;
Pearce v. Texas, 155 U.
S. 311;
Ex Parte Hart, 59 F. 894.
If the indictment be for three distinct offenses (although of
the same nature) set out in the three different counts, as is
argued by plaintiff in error, it will not be presumed that such an
indictment is void under the laws of Massachusetts, and the
question of procedure under the indictment is one for the courts of
the state where it was found. The courts of that state would
undoubtedly protect her in the enjoyment of all her constitutional
rights. These are matters for the trial court of the demanding
state, and are not to be inquired of on this writ. If it appear
that the indictment substantially charges an offense for which the
person may be returned to the state for trial, it is enough for
this proceeding.
Upon the question of fact, whether the plaintiff was a fugitive
from justice, her counsel, in the argument before this Court, set
up several objections of a technical nature, which, he argued,
showed that the plaintiff in error was not present in Massachusetts
at the time when one of the crimes at least, was alleged to have
been committed. As the indictment sets up in the first two counts
that the plaintiff in error had not been usually or publicly a
resident of Massachusetts at any
Page 196 U. S. 374
time since the commission of the offense set forth in those
counts, it is argued that the indictment shows that she was not
present in the state at the time when the third count charges a
crime to have been committed, and the Whitney affidavit shows she
fled from the state before the alleged commission of the crime set
forth in the third count. There is no impossibility in the
plaintiff in error having returned and been present in the state at
the time of the alleged commission of the offense set forth in the
third count, even though she had not been "usually or publicly a
resident of that state" since the time when it is alleged that she
committed the offenses set forth in the first two counts, and had
fled therefrom before the commission of the last offense set forth
in the third count. The affidavit of Mr. Whitney is to the effect
that at the time of the commission of the crimes she was in the
State of Massachusetts, and that at the same time, and previous
thereto, she was a resident of Cambridge, in the County of
Middlesex. Whether she was a resident or not is not important, as
to the third count, if she were present in the state and committed
the crime therein. The statement in the affidavit that she fled on
or about the fourth day of November, 1901, while the third count of
the indictment avers the commission of the crime on the twentieth
November of that year, is sufficiently exact, considering the facts
in the case, as the affiant states that she was in the commonwealth
at the time of the commission of the crime. Reasonably construed,
the affidavit of Whitney shows the presence of the plaintiff in
error in the state, and is sufficient, unexplained and
uncontradicted, for that purpose.
When it is conceded, or when it is so conclusively proved that
no question can be made, that the person was not within the
demanding state when the crime is said to have been committed, and
his arrest is sought on the ground only of a constructive presence
at that time, in the demanding state, then the court will discharge
the defendant.
Hyatt v. New York, 188 U.
S. 691, affirming the judgment of the New York Court
Page 196 U. S. 375
of Appeals, 172 N.Y. 176. But the court will not discharge a
defendant arrested under the governor's warrant where there is
merely contradictory evidence on the subject of presence in or
absence from the state, as habeas corpus is not the proper
proceeding to try the question of alibi, or any question as to the
guilt or innocence of the accused. As a
prima facie case
existed for the return of the plaintiff in error and she refused to
give any evidence upon the return of the writ which she had herself
sued out, other than the papers before the governor, no case was
made out for her discharge, and the judgment of the Supreme Court
of New Hampshire, refusing to grant it, must therefore be
Affirmed.