The act of Congress of July 1, 1898, 30 Stat. 597, 620, c. 546,
relating to the land grant to the Northern Pacific Railroad
Company, construed.
Held,
1. That the act embraces land patented as well as unpatented, to
which the right of the grantee or its lawful successor is claimed
to have attached by definite location or selection, and which has
been purchased directly from the United States or settled upon or
claimed in good faith by any qualified settler under color of title
or claim of right under any law of the United States or any ruling
of the Interior Department.
2. The words in that act providing that the railroad grantee or
its successor in interest
"shall not be bound to relinquish lands sold or contracted by it
or lands it uses or needs for railroad purposes, or lands valuable
for stone, iron, or coal,"
do not apply to any lands sold or contracted by the railroad
grantee or its successor in interest after the acceptance of the
provisions of the act by the Northern Pacific Railway Company; no
sale or contracting away of any of the lands embraced by
Page 195 U. S. 481
the act, and in dispute, after the acceptance of the grant could
withdraw such lands from the operation of the act.
3. Whatever vested rights were acquired by the railroad company
in virtue of the definite location of its route, as to any lands in
dispute and embraced by the act of 1898, became subject to the
power conferred upon the Land Department by that act.
4. The general doctrine reaffirmed that the courts will not
interfere with the discharge of their duties by the officers of the
Land Department by mandamus or injunction in reference to any
lands, so long as the title thereto remains in the United
States.
5. The selection of lands in indemnity limits, after definite
location, to supply deficiencies in place or granted limits, does
not invest any title in the railroad grantee to such lands until
the selections are approved by the Secretary of the Interior. The
railroad grantee does not become entitled, by reason of such
unapproved selections, to ask a court of equity to intervene as
between it or its successors in interest and individual claimants,
so as to have the court declare that the latter could not, by any
entry or purchase, acquire an interest in the lands so selected
after the acceptance of the railroad's map of definite
location.
This case was brought before us upon questions certified by the
circuit court of appeals. Subsequently, the United States was
allowed to intervene upon the general ground that the case involved
important questions affecting the administration of the public land
laws, including the grant to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company
then in process of adjustment. And, on motion of the government,
the plaintiffs and defendants concurring, the whole record was
ordered to be sent up for our consideration.
The case involves the title to numerous tracts of land situated
on the line of the Northern Pacific Railway between Duluth and
Ashland. The lands are described in an exhibit attached to the
bill.
The plaintiffs, Humbird and Weyerhaeuser, sue as grantees of the
Northern Pacific Railway Company, a Wisconsin corporation, which,
it is claimed, succeeded, in respect of the lands in dispute, to
all the rights, interests, and ownership of the Northern Pacific
Railroad Company created by the Act of Congress of July 2, 1864, 13
Stat. 365, c. 217. They allege that the claims of the defendants
constitute clouds upon their title.
Page 195 U. S. 482
The defendants assert title under the land laws as settlers and
purchasers from the United States, or grantees of such settlers and
purchasers. But the bill alleges that the lands here in dispute are
part of the grant to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company, and
that the Land Department wrongfully and unlawfully permitted the
entries under which the defendants severally claim. The circuit
court dismissed the bill, but without prejudice, except as to all
lands here involved for which patents had been issued. 110 F.
465.
It seems both appropriate and necessary that the facts be fully
stated. That statement we now proceed to make, premising that the
present controversy had its origin, as will be presently shown, in
conflicting orders or rulings in the Land Department as to what was
the eastern terminus of the Northern Pacific Railroad.
By the above Act of July 2, 1864, c. 217, Congress made a grant
of lands to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company in aid of the
construction of a railroad and telegraph line from some point on
Lake Superior, in Minnesota or Wisconsin, to some point on Puget
sound, with a branch, via Columbia River, to a point at or near
Portland. The act established indemnity limits not more than ten
miles beyond the limits of the alternate sections granted. 13 Stat.
365.
By a joint resolution approved May 31, 1870, second indemnity
limits were established within ten miles on each side of the road,
beyond the limits prescribed in the company's charter. 16 Stat.
378, Res. 67. The effect of this resolution was to allow the
company, under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior, to
go into second indemnity limits in order to supply any deficiency
in lands on its main line or branch.
On the third day of July, 1882, the company transmitted to the
Secretary of the Interior a map of definite location covering the
proposed line from Thompson Junction, on the St. Paul & Duluth
Railroad, near Duluth, Minnesota, to Ashland, in Wisconsin. That
map was duly approved by the
Page 195 U. S. 483
Secretary of the Interior, and the lands embraced by it were
withdrawn from sale or entry.
By resolution of the board of directors of the company adopted
August 28, 1884, Ashland was declared to be the eastern terminus of
the road, and that resolution was accepted by the Secretary on
December 3, 1884, as establishing such terminus.
The part of the road delineated on the map of definite location
was constructed and was duly accepted, and, in conformity with the
directions of the Secretary the company, the circuit court states,
filed lists of selections of lands, some in the first and others in
the second indemnity limits, in lieu of lands lost to it in its
place limits, such lists
including all the lands in controversy
in this suit. But the bill avers that no final action has ever
been taken by the Land Department upon such lists, and they have
not yet been approved by the Department.
Subsequently, on August 12, 1896, the Secretary of the Interior
ruled that Duluth, not Ashland, was the eastern terminus of the
railroad, and therefore that the land grant of 1864 did not embrace
any lands between Duluth and Ashland. The company's lists of
selections were thereupon cancelled by order of the Secretary, and
the lands covered by them were thereafter treated by the Department
as unappropriated public lands, and were opened for sale and
entry.
This appears from an official communication addressed by the
Commissioner of the General Land Office, with the approval of the
Secretary of the Interior, to the Register and Receiver at Duluth.
In that communication, the Commissioner said:
"On August 27th, 1896, the Secretary of the Interior rendered a
decision wherein he held that the initial point on Lake Superior,
or the eastern terminus of the grant to the Northern Pacific
Railroad Company, was at Duluth, Minnesota, and on December 24,
1896, he approved a diagram prepared by this office showing the
eastern terminal of the grant. On January 23, 1897, a copy of so
much of said
Page 195 U. S. 484
diagram as related to or affected lands within your district was
transmitted to you for the use and guidance of your office. The
decision of the Secretary aforesaid had the effect of restoring to
the public domain all lands lying east of said terminal, which had
theretofore been withdrawn on account of the grant to said railroad
company. Therefore, to the end that all persons interested may have
an opportunity to present any claims they may have to any of these
lands, you will cause to be published for the period of thirty
days, in some newspaper of general circulation in their vicinity, a
notice referring to said Secretary's decision, which in effect
declared that all lands previously withdrawn on account of the
grant to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company, and lying east of
the terminal established at Duluth, are restored to the public
domain and are subject to disposal at your office."
Under the above ruling of the Secretary as to the eastern
terminus, the defendants were allowed to make entries and purchases
on the line of the railroad between Duluth and Ashland, despite the
company's map of definite location and the lists of selections
filed by it with the Secretary. In reference to the action of the
Interior Department, the circuit court said:
"By reason of the erroneous ruling of the Secretary of the
Interior as to the location of the eastern terminus of said
railroad, and his revocation of his prior approval of lawful
selections by the railroad company of indemnity lands, and
permitting sales and entries of such selected lands, as
unappropriated, he had introduced confusion and conflict in respect
to the right to such lands, which was beginning to be litigated in
the courts. . . . The fact that patents had issued in a few
instances would not end such disputes as to the lands so patented,
as courts would adjudge the patentee in any case to hold the title
in trust for the other party, wherever the other party had clearly
the right to the land."
110 F. 465, 469.
Such was the situation when Congress incorporated into the body
of the Sundry Civil Appropriation Act of July 1, 1898,
Page 195 U. S. 485
30 Stat. 597, 620, c. 546, subdivision, "Surveying the Public
Lands," certain provisions relating to the Northern Pacific land
grant. As these provisions disclose a scheme or plan for the
settlement of the disputes arising out of the conflicting rulings
in the Land Department in reference to the eastern terminus of the
railroad, and its action in reference to the public lands between
Duluth and Ashland, they should all be examined in order to
ascertain the intention of Congress. They are therefore here given
in full.
By that act -- dividing it, for convenience, into paragraphs --
it was provided:
"1. That where, prior to January first, eighteen hundred and
ninety-eight, the whole or any part of an odd-numbered section, in
either the granted or the indemnity limits of the land grant to the
Northern Pacific Railroad Company, to which the right of the
grantee or its lawful successor is claimed to have attached by
definite location or selection, has been purchased directly from
the United States, or settled upon or claimed in good faith by any
qualified settler under color of title or claim of right under any
law of the United States or any ruling of the Interior Department,
and where purchaser, settler, or claimant refuses to transfer his
entry as hereinafter provided, the railroad grantee or its
successor in interest, upon a proper relinquishment thereof, shall
be entitled to select in lieu of the land relinquished an equal
quantity of public lands, surveyed or unsurveyed, not mineral or
reserved, and not valuable for stone, iron, or coal, and free from
valid adverse claim, or not occupied by settlers at the time of
such selection, situated within any state or territory into which
such railroad grant extends, and patents shall issue for the land
so selected as though it had been originally granted; but all
selections of unsurveyed lands shall be of odd-numbered sections,
to be identified by the survey when made, and patent therefor shall
issue to and in the name of the corporation surrendering the lands
before mentioned, and such patents shall not issue until after the
survey: "
Page 195 U. S. 486
"2.
Provided, however, That the Secretary of the
Interior shall from time to time ascertain, and, as soon as
conveniently may be done, cause to be prepared and delivered to the
said railroad grantee or its successor in interest a list or lists
of the several tracts which have been purchased or settled upon or
occupied as aforesaid, and are now claimed by said purchasers or
occupants, their heirs or assigns, according to the smallest
government subdivisions. And all right, title, and interest of the
said railroad grantee or its successor in interest, in and to any
of such tracts which the said railroad grantee or its successor in
interest may relinquish hereunder shall revert to the United
States, and such tracts shall be treated, under the laws thereof,
in the same manner as if no rights thereto had ever vested in the
said railroad grantee, and all qualified persons who have occupied
and may be on said lands as herein provided, or who have purchased
said lands in good faith as aforesaid, their heirs and assigns,
shall be permitted to prove their titles to said lands according to
law, as if said grant had never been made, and upon such
relinquishment said Northern Pacific Railroad Company or its lawful
successor in interest may proceed to select, in the manner
hereinbefore provided, lands in lieu of those relinquished, and
patents shall issue therefor:"
"3.
Provided further, That the railroad grantee or its
successor in interest shall accept the said list or lists so to be
made by the Secretary of the Interior as conclusive with respect to
the particular lands to be relinquished by it, but it shall not be
bound to relinquish lands sold or contracted by it, or lands which
it uses or needs for railroad purposes, or lands valuable for
stone, iron, or coal:"
"4.
And provided further, That whenever any qualified
settler shall in good faith make settlement in pursuance of
existing law upon any odd-numbered sections of unsurveyed public
lands within the said railroad grant to which the right of such
railroad grantee or its successor in interest has attached, then,
upon proof thereof satisfactory to the Secretary of the
Interior
Page 195 U. S. 487
and a due relinquishment of the prior railroad right, other
lands may be selected in lieu thereof by said railroad grantee or
its successor in interest, as hereinbefore provided, and patents
shall issue therefor:"
"5.
And provided further, That nothing herein contained
shall be construed as intended or having the effect to recognize
the Northern Pacific Railway Company as the lawful successor of the
Northern Pacific Railroad Company in the ownership of the lands
granted by the United States to the Northern Pacific Railroad
Company, under and by virtue of foreclosure proceedings against
said Northern Pacific Railroad Company in the courts of the United
States, but the legal question whether the said Northern Pacific
Railway Company is such lawful successor of the said Northern
Pacific Railroad Company, should the question be raised, shall be
determined wholly without reference to the provisions of this act,
and nothing in this act shall be construed as enlarging the
quantity of land which the said Northern Pacific Railroad Company
is entitled to under laws heretofore enacted:"
"6.
And provided further, That all qualified settlers,
their heirs or assigns, who, prior to January first, eighteen
hundred and ninety-eight, purchased, or settled upon or claimed in
good faith, under color of title or claim of right under any law of
the United States or any ruling of the Interior Department, any
part of an odd-numbered section in either the granted or indemnity
limits of the land grant to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company,
to which the right of such grantee or its lawful successor is
claimed to have attached by definite location or selection, may in
lieu thereof transfer their claims to an equal quantity of public
lands, surveyed or unsurveyed, not mineral or reserved, and not
valuable for stone, iron, or coal, and free from valid adverse
claim, or not occupied by a settler at the time of such entry,
situated in any state or territory into which such railroad grant
extends, and make proof therefor as in other cases provided, and in
making such proof, credit shall be given for the period of their
bona fide residence and
Page 195 U. S. 488
amount of their improvements upon their respective claims in the
said granted or indemnity limits of the land grant to the said
Northern Pacific Railroad Company, the same as if made upon the
tract to which the transfer is made, and before the Secretary of
the Interior shall cause to be prepared and delivered to said
railroad grantee or its successor in interest any list or lists of
the several tracts which have been purchased or settled upon or
occupied as hereinbefore provided, he shall notify the purchaser,
settler, or claimant, his heirs or assigns, claiming against said
railroad company, of his right to transfer his entry or claim, as
herein provided, and shall give him or them option to take lieu
lands for those claimed by him or them, or hold his claim and allow
the said railroad company to do so under the terms of this
act."
30 Stat. 597, 620.
The provisions of that act were formally accepted by the
Northern Pacific Railway Company on the thirteenth of July, 1898,
in writing, and such written acceptance was promptly transmitted by
the company to the Secretary of the Interior.
In a case in the Supreme Court of Wisconsin determined shortly
before the act of 1898, it was held, contrary to the ruling of the
Interior Department in 1896, that Ashland, and not Duluth, was the
eastern terminus of the Northern Pacific Railway.
Northern
Pacific Railway Co. v. Doherty, 100 Wis. 39. Upon writ of
error to this Court, that judgment was affirmed.
Doherty v.
Northern Pacific Railway Co., 177 U.
S. 421, and
United States v. Northern Pacific
Railroad Company, 177 U. S. 435.
After the above decisions by this Court,which were rendered
April 16, 1900, the Secretary of the Interior revoked the order
cancelling the company's above lists of selections, and reinstated
them. Shortly before those cases were argued here -- namely, on
January 19, 1900 -- and apparently to meet the contingency of a
reversal by this Court of the judgment of the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin, the Northern Pacific Railway Company made conveyances
with warranty to the
Page 195 U. S. 489
plaintiffs, Humbird and Weyerhaeuser, of all the lands
aggregating more than 10,000 acres the title to which is here in
dispute. As appears from the record, these conveyances were made
after the Land Department had issued regulations to facilitate the
adjustment of claims under the Act of July 1, 1898. It should be
recalled here that the lands covered by those conveyances were
placed on the above list of selections filed by the railroad
company, but those lists had not then, nor have they since,
received the approval of the Secretary.
It is contended by the plaintiffs that the result of the above
decisions in this Court, adjudging the eastern terminus of the
Northern Pacific Railroad to be at Ashland, Wisconsin, and not at
Duluth, Minnesota, was that the odd-numbered alternate sections
between Duluth and Ashland, on either side of the railroad, as
definitely located, to the extent and within the limits prescribed,
and not excluded from the grant of July 2, 1864, were to be deemed
public lands from which that grant could be supplied, and to which
neither the defendants nor their grantors after the definite
location of the road as shown by the company's accepted map of
location could have acquired any valid title by entry or
settlement, or by purchase, except from the railroad grantee, and
that the defense cannot be maintained without violating the rights
that were vested in the company
in virtue of such definite
location.
The defendants, of course, combat this view of the rights of the
parties, and insist that they are fully protected in their claims
by the act of 1898, all the provisions of which, as we have seen,
were accepted by the railroad company.
In the statement accompanying the certified questions, it is set
forth that, prior to the passage of the Act of July 1, 1898, the
Secretary of the Interior had, pursuant to his original ruling as
to the eastern terminus of the railroad, caused patents to be
delivered to defendant settlers or their grantors for about 3,400
acres of the lands involved in this suit; that at the time of the
passage of that act, about 2,800 acres of the lands in question had
been entered by defendant settlers or their
Page 195 U. S. 490
grantors prior to January 1, 1898, but no patents therefor had
been issued; that, after January 1, 1898, the settlers or their
grantors were permitted to enter about 5,000 acres of the lands
here in controversy. The situation is thus described in the
statement sent up by the circuit court of appeals: of the lands
claimed by the plaintiffs as successors in interest of the Northern
Pacific Railroad Company, about 3,400 acres thereof were held by
the appellees under patents issued by the government prior to July
1, 1898; for the residue of the lands, the settlers held final
receipts and final certificates, such final receipts and final
certificates, as respects about 5,000 acres, being for tracts
entered subsequent to January 1, 1898. In reference to the lands
for which final receipts and certificates have been issued,
nothing, so far as appears, remains to be done by the Land
Department except the issuing of patents.
The relief sought is a decree declaring, among other things,
that the lands described in the exhibit attached to the bill, and
all the timber standing or lying thereon, belong to the plaintiffs;
that the entries, locations, final certificates, Land Office
receipts, and patents under which the several defendants claim be
adjudged to be void and removed as clouds from the titles of the
plaintiffs, and the defendants severally enjoined from asserting
any title by virtue thereof, and that such of the defendants as
hold patents may be declared to hold as trustees for the plaintiffs
in respect of any title conveyed by such patents, or any timber,
cut or uncut, on such lands.
The questions propounded to this Court by the circuit court of
appeals are these:
"Is the Act of July 1, 1898, applicable to the determination of
the rights of the parties to the 3,400 acres of land which were
patented to the appellees or their predecessors in interest prior
to the adoption of the Act of July 1, 1898?"
"Has the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of
Minnesota, or any court, jurisdiction as respects the lands in
controversy entered subsequent to January 1, 1898, and for which
the settlers hold final receipts or certificates,
Page 195 U. S. 491
to adjudicate the rights of the parties to this action in
respect to said lands in advance of the issuance of patents
therefor by the executive branch of the government, or should the
courts decline jurisdiction until the government has divested
itself of the legal title to the lands by the issuance and delivery
of patents? "
Page 195 U. S. 498
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
It is appropriate at the outset to refer to certain allegations
of the bill which bring the determination of the case within a very
narrow compass and make it unnecessary to consider some matters
referred to by counsel. After setting out in detail the various
steps taken by the railroad company to acquire a right to the lands
in dispute, the bill alleges that "but for the vested rights" of
the Northern Pacific Railroad Company and its grantees, the several
tracts of land in question would have been unappropriated public
lands open to the several kinds of entries or location made with
respect to them severally; also, that
"the several applications and proceedings with respect to the
said several entries were in due form, and regularly conducted, as
required by law, and, in the absence of the vested rights of the
said Northern Pacific Railroad Company and its grantees in the said
premises, would have been operative and effectual to invest the
several entrymen of said lands with complete equitable title
thereto, each of such entries and locations having been finally
receipted for, allowed, and approved by the proper land officers of
the United States, the only act
Page 195 U. S. 499
remaining for the United States or its officers to perform with
respect to such entries being the issuance of the patent in cases
where the patent has not already issued,"
and that all of the said entries and locations of lands referred
to in the exhibit filed with the bill were allowed, and the final
certificates (and, so far as issued, the patents) issued
therefor,
"under a mistake of law founded upon a certain erroneous ruling
by the Secretary of the Interior, to the effect that the said
Northern Pacific Railroad Company, and their successors in
interest, were not entitled to any lands by virtue of said act of
Congress approved July 2, 1864, and said joint resolution, approved
May 31, 1870, granting lands to said Northern Pacific Railroad
Company, east of that point on the line of said Northern Pacific
Railroad where the same crosses the line of the St. Paul &
Duluth Railroad, known as Thompson Junction."
Obviously the first inquiry should be as to the object and scope
of the act of 1898. Upon that point we do not think any doubt can
be entertained if the words of the act be interpreted in the light
of the situation as it actually was at the date of its passage.
Here were vast bodies of land the right and title to which was in
dispute between a railroad company holding a grant of public lands
and occupants and purchasers, both sides claiming under the United
States. The disputes had arisen out of conflicting orders or
rulings of the Land Department, and it became the duty of the
government to remove the difficulties which had come upon the
parties in consequence of such orders. The settlement of those
disputes was, therefore, as the circuit court said, a matter of
public concern. If the disputes were not accommodated, the
litigation in relation to the lands would become vexatious,
extending over many years and causing great embarrassment. In the
light of that situation, Congress passed the act of 1898, which
opened up a way for an adjustment upon principles that it deemed
just and consistent with the rights of all concerned -- the
government, the railroad grantee, and individual claimants. The
railroad company evinced its approval of this
Page 195 U. S. 500
action of the legislative department by a prompt acceptance of
the act in its entirety. By such unqualified acceptance, the
railroad company agreed that, so far as it had any claim to the
lands in dispute, whatever the act of Congress required to be done
might be done.
Promptly after the passage of that act, the Land Department set
about to administer its provisions, and, to that end, as we have
said, issued regulations for the guidance of all concerned.
During the progress of this work of administration, the railroad
company, by conveyances to the present plaintiffs, assumed to pass
such interest as it had in the lands here in question, with the
effect -- it is now claimed by the plaintiffs -- to withdraw or
exempt all the lands so sold from the operation of the act. The
plaintiffs rest this claim upon that part of the act providing that
the railroad grantee or its successor in interest
"shall not be bound to relinquish lands sold or contracted by
it, or lands which it uses or needs for railroad purposes, or lands
valuable for stone, iron, or coal."
(
See Par. 3,
ante, p.
195 U. S.
486.)
We have seen that the act (par. 1 above) made it the duty of the
Secretary of the Interior to ascertain from time to time, and cause
to be prepared and delivered to the railroad grantee or its
successor in interest, a list or lists of the several tracts
purchased, settled upon, or occupied, and claimed at the date of
the act, by such settlers, purchasers, or occupants, their heirs
and assigns, according to the smallest government subdivisions. And
the act provided that the railroad grantee or its successor should
accept said list or lists "as conclusive, with respect to the
particular lands to be relinquished by it." The contention of the
plaintiffs, stated more fully, is, in effect, that it was competent
for the company, notwithstanding its acceptance of the act, to take
out of its operation any lands embraced by its terms, by simply
selling or contracting to sell them before the delivery to it, or
to its successor in interest, of the lists above mentioned. In
other
Page 195 U. S. 501
words -- for the contention comes to that -- the railroad
company, so far as the act of 1898 was concerned, could,
notwithstanding the acceptance of its provisions, and on the day
after such acceptance, have sold or contracted to sell its right,
title, and interest in and to all the lands embraced by those
provisions. This would have left no lands whatever to which the act
could apply. Such a result would have left unsettled all the
disputes relating to any lands which the company chose, in its own
interest, to sell while the Land Department was proceeding under
the statute. We do not believe that Congress intended that it
should be in the power of the railroad company in any such mode to
defeat the operation of the act. Congress manifestly had reference
to the situation as it was when the act of 1898 was passed.
If any rights had become vested in the Northern Pacific Railroad
Company which could not, against or without its consent, be
affected by an enactment like that of 1898, then the objection to
legislation on the ground that it interfered with vested rights,
was waived by the acceptance of the act by its successor in
interest, for it was entirely competent for the latter company, if
it succeeded to all the rights of the railroad grantee, to agree to
such a settlement as that devised by Congress. The rights acquired
by the definite location of the road, and any selection of lands
based thereon, became, upon the acceptance of the act, and so far
as that company was concerned, subject to such settlement as the
Land Department might legally make under that act. It could not, by
any sale or contract made after the acceptance of the act,
interfere with the full execution of its provisions. And the
plaintiffs, who claim to have purchased from the successor in
interest of the railroad grantee, can occupy no better position
than the company from which they purchased. They were in a sense
purchasers
pendente lite; for the Secretary of the
Interior was at the time, as he is now, engaged in administering
the act of Congress. By him or under his direction must be
ascertained the facts upon which depend the inquiry whether
Page 195 U. S. 502
lands in question are within the indemnity limits of the land
grant to the railroad company, and so situated that a right to them
attached by reason of the definite location of the road. He must
also inquire whether such lands were purchased, by the respective
defendants, directly from the United States, or were settled upon
or claimed in good faith by qualified settlers under color of title
or claim of right under a law of the United States or ruling of the
Interior Department, and whether the purchaser, settler, or
claimant refuses to transfer his entry. Upon these facts also
depends the right of the railroad grantee or its successor in
interest (its rights being relinquished as provided in the act) to
select, in lieu of the lands relinquished, an equal quantity of
surveyed or unsurveyed public lands, not mineral or reserved, and
not valuable for stone, iron, or coal, and free from any adverse
claim, or not occupied by settlers at the time of such selection,
situated within any state or territory into which the railroad
grant extends.
Now it is sought, in advance of final action by the Land
Department in execution of the act, to have it adjudged, as between
the parties to this suit, that the lands in dispute, claimed by the
defendants, cannot properly be placed on the lists which the
Secretary may deliver to the railroad grantee or its successor in
interest. But that is a question the solution of which depends, in
part at least, on facts within the province, primarily, of the
Secretary of the Interior to find. In short, he and he alone must
ascertain the facts which enter into the question as to what lands
are to go on the lists to be delivered to the railroad grantee or
its successor in interest. The court should not, by any decree, as
between parties who have no contract relations with each other,
attempt indirectly to control the authority and discretion of that
officer to determine what lands shall be what lands shall not be
included in the lists to be prepared under his direction. The
plaintiffs cannot invoke the aid of the court to have these
questions concluded, even as between them and the defendants, by an
admission, made in their bill for the purposes of this case, that
the final
Page 195 U. S. 503
certificates and final receipts held by the respective
defendants will entitle them to the lands they claim but for the
"vested" rights acquired by the railroad company in virtue of the
definite location of its road. The court should not assume that
they are embraced by the act in order simply that it may have an
opportunity, as between the present parties, to decide a question
of law which cannot appropriately arise until at least all the
facts are ascertained by the Land Department, and final action is
taken under the statute of 1898. Although it may be true, as
alleged in the bill, that the defendants, not holding patents, have
received and hold final certificates or final receipts, and that,
so far as they are concerned, nothing more remains to be done in
the Department except to issue patents, yet it is in the power of
the Department, even after decree here, in this suit, to reopen the
case as to each defendant of that class, and, sufficient grounds
existing therefor, recall or cancel such certificates or receipts.
The whole matter, in respect of the lands in dispute, is yet in the
hands of the Department, undisposed of finally under the act of
1898. Congress intended that the Department should, within the
limit and according to the rules prescribed by the act of 1898,
settle the disputes that had arisen between the railroad grantee
and settlers, although, after the matter has passed beyond the
jurisdiction of the Department, such settlements may become the
subject of judicial inquiry for the protection of the rights of
parties against any error of law committed by the Department.
Those views are in entire accord with the former decisions of
this Court. In
Johnson v.
Towsley, 13 Wall. 72,
80 U. S. 87:
"This Court has at all times been careful to guard itself
against an invasion of the functions confided by law to other
departments of the government, and in reference to the proceedings
before the officers entrusted with the charge of selling the public
lands it has frequently and firmly refused to interfere with them
in the discharge of their duties, either by mandamus or injunction,
so long as the title remained in the
Page 195 U. S. 504
United States and the matter was rightfully before those
officers for decision. On the other hand, it has constantly
asserted the right of the proper courts to inquire, after the title
had passed from the government, and the question became one of
private right, whether, according to the established rules of
equity and the acts of Congress concerning the public lands, the
party holding that title should hold absolutely as his own, or as
trustee for another."
So, in
Marquez v. Frisbie, 101 U.
S. 473,
101 U. S.
475:
"We have repeatedly held that the courts will not interfere with
the officers of the government while in the discharge of their
duties in disposing of the public lands, either by injunction or
mandamus. . . . After the United States has parted with its title
and the individual has become vested with it, the equities subject
to which he holds it may be enforced, but not before. . . . We did
not deny the right of the courts to deal with the possession of the
land prior to the issue of the patent, or to enforce contracts
between the parties concerning the land. But it is impossible thus
to transfer a title which is yet in the United States."
What was said in the case just cited, as to the power of the
court to interfere, in certain cases, in advance of the issuing of
the patent, was no doubt in the mind of the circuit court when, in
its opinion in this case, it said:
"It is unnecessary to decide whether a case may not arise, when,
even while the disputed question as to the rights of contesting
parties to a tract of public land is pending or cognizable before
the Land Department, a court of equity may properly interfere by
injunction at the suit of one of the claimants, to prevent the
other claimant from despoiling the land by waste, and appropriating
its substantial value, by denuding it of all its merchantable
timber, before any final decision upon the disputed claims by the
Land Department, which is only rendered by issuing the patent."
So again, in
United States v. Schurz, 102 U.
S. 378,
102 U. S.
395:
"The Constitution of the United States declares that Congress
shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules
Page 195 U. S. 505
and regulations respecting the territory and other property
belonging to the United States. Under this provision, the sale of
the public lands was placed by statute under the control of the
Secretary of the Interior. To aid him in the performance of this
duty, a bureau was created at the head of which is the Commissioner
of the General Land Office, with many subordinates. To them, as a
special tribunal, Congress confided the execution of the laws which
regulate the surveying, the selling, and the general care of these
lands. Congress has also enacted a system of laws, by which rights
to these lands may be acquired and the title of the government
conveyed to the citizen. This Court has with a strong hand upheld
the doctrine that, so long as the legal title to these lands
remained in the United States, and the proceedings for acquiring it
were as yet
in fieri, the courts would not interfere to
control the exercise of the power thus vested in that tribunal. To
that doctrine we still adhere."
As late as
Bockfinger v. Foster, 190 U.
S. 116,
190 U. S. 126,
we reaffirmed the principle
"that the courts will not interfere with the Land Department in
its control and disposal of the public lands, under the legislation
of Congress, so long as the title in any essential sense remains in
the United States."
These principles are applicable to the particular scheme devised
by the act of 1898 in reference to the lands in dispute. When the
Land Department shall have done all that it can do in execution of
the act of Congress, as to any particular lands in dispute, it will
be time enough for interested private parties claiming an interest
in them to invoke the aid of the courts for the determination of
such questions of law as may arise out of the action of the
Department. It is true that no order is asked here that will,
directly or in terms, operate upon the Land Department. But a
decree is asked, as between the parties now before the court, which
must necessarily control or affect the action of the Department in
respect of matters committed to it by Congress. Such interference
by the court, although between private claimants only, would be
inappropriate,
Page 195 U. S. 506
especially as to lands covered by the act of 1898.
What has been said is peculiarly applicable to the unpatented
lands in dispute. It is equally applicable to lands patented both
before and after the passage of the act, if such lands are
in
dispute and
belong to either of the classes described in
the act of 1898. We agree with the circuit court that the
act
"gives the option to keep or relinquish the disputed land, to
the individual claimant in every instance. If he elects to retain
that land, it is to be listed by the Secretary in lists to be
furnished to the railroad claimant, who must relinquish, and whose
consent to this was given by its acceptance of the act."
In case of such relinquishment by the railroad company, it
acquires a right to select other lands in place of those retained
by the individual claimant. If the individual claimant, having a
patent, elects to surrender his right, then he must reconvey to the
United States, and will then be entitled to select other lands in
lieu of those surrendered. So that the statute embraces both
patented and unpatented lands, in respect of which the railroad
company or its successor in interest claims that a right thereto
attached by the definite location of its road or by selection,
provided they are also such lands as were originally
"purchased directly from the United States, or settled upon or
claimed in good faith by any qualified settler under color of title
or claim of right under any law of the United States or any ruling
of the Interior Department."
The duty of a court of equity not to interfere with parties in
the prosecution of their rights under the act, whereby the
execution of its provisions in advance of final action by the
Department would be embarrassed by judicial decision, is quite as
imperative in cases of the patented lands in dispute as in the
cases of unpatented lands. This view is not at all in conflict with
those cases in which it has been held that, after a patent issued
for public lands, the only remedy for one who claims the land as
against the patentee is to bring a suit against the person holding
the patent, and obtain a decree declaring
Page 195 U. S. 507
the patentee a trustee for the party suing. This general
principle does not apply to cases embraced by the act of 1898. That
act is peculiar in its provisions, and contemplates that the
individual claimant of one of the classes described in it may hold
the land patented to him, if he elects to retain it, and that the
railroad grantee or its successor in interest can be made whole by
taking lieu lands in place of those claimed in virtue of definite
location or selection.
For the reasons stated, neither the claim of vested rights in
behalf of the railroad grantee nor the contention that the lands in
dispute, having been sold to the plaintiffs, were not for that
reason embraced by the act of 1898 furnishes any ground for
interference by a court of equity, or for the granting of the
relief asked.
This conclusion is fortified, if not absolutely demanded, by
another consideration -- namely, that no title to indemnity lands
is vested until a selection be made by which they are definitely
ascertained, and the selection made
approved by the Secretary
of the Interior. This principle is firmly established. A full
statement of it is found in
Wisconsin Central R. Co. v. Price
County, 133 U. S. 496,
133 U. S. 511.
The Court there said:
"He [the Secretary] was required to determine, in the first
place, whether there were any deficiencies in the land granted to
the company, which were to be supplied from indemnity lands; and,
in the second place, whether the particular indemnity lands
selected could be properly taken for those deficiencies. In order
to reach a proper conclusion on these two questions, he had also to
inquire and determine whether any lands in the place limits had
been previously disposed of by the government, or whether any
preemption or homestead rights had attached before the line of the
road was definitely fixed. . . .
Until the selections were
approved, there were no selections in fact only preliminary
proceedings taken for that purpose,
and the indemnity lands
remained unaffected in their title. Until then, the lands
which might be taken as indemnity were incapable of identification;
the proposed selections remained the
Page 195 U. S. 508
property of the United States. The government was, indeed, under
a promise to give the company indemnity lands in lieu of what might
be lost by the causes mentioned. But such promise passed no title,
and, until it was executed, created no legal interest which could
be enforced in the courts."
In
New Orleans Pacific Railway v. Parker, 143 U. S.
42,
143 U. S. 57, it
was said:
"As to lands within the indemnity limits, it has always been
held that no title is acquired until the specific parcels have been
selected by the grantee and approved by the Secretary of the
Interior."
And in
Michigan Land & Lumber Co. v. Rust,
168 U. S. 589,
168 U. S.
592-593, the Court said:
"Generally speaking, while the legal title remains in the United
States, the grant is in process of administration and the land is
subject to the jurisdiction of the Land Department of the
government."
To the same effect are
Sioux City &c. Railroad v.
Chicago, Milwaukee &c. Railway, 117 U.
S. 406,
117 U. S. 408;
United States v. Missouri &c. Railway, 141 U.
S. 358,
141 U. S. 374;
Brown v. Hitchcock, 173 U. S. 473,
173 U. S. 479;
Kansas Pacific Railroad v. Atchison &c. Railroad,
112 U. S. 414,
112 U. S. 421;
Barney v. Winona & St. Peter Railroad, 117 U.
S. 228,
117 U. S. 232;
Grinnell v. Railroad Co., 103 U.
S. 739;
St. Paul &c. Railroad v. Winona &
St. Peter Railroad, 112 U. S. 720,
112 U. S. 731;
Cedar Rapids & Missouri River Railroad v. Herring,
110 U. S. 27.
Now the lands here in dispute and claimed by the plaintiffs as
grantees of the Northern Pacific Railway Company (the alleged
successor in interest of the Northern Pacific Railroad Company) are
lands admittedly within indemnity, as distinguished from granted or
place, limits. The mere filing of lists of selections, after the
acceptance of the map of definite location of the railroad line
between Duluth and Ashland, gave the company no such title as could
be enforced by the courts in a suit between private parties. It is
true the government was under a promise to give the railroad
company lands in the indemnity limits to supply losses in place
limits. But, as adjudged in the above cases, that promise passed no
title. The promise will no doubt be fulfilled by the government
Page 195 U. S. 509
in due time and in its own way. The selections not having been
approved by the Secretary, the title remains in the government. So
that the plaintiffs, having no greater rights than those of the
railroad grantee or its successor, have no such interest in the
particular lands specified in the railroad company's lists of
unapproved selection as entitles it, while the title remains in the
United States, and while these lands are being administered by the
Land Department, to ask a court of equity to decide, as between
them and the defendants, that the latter could not by any entry or
purchase acquire an interest after the acceptance by the Secretary
of the railroad's map of definite location.
But it is suggested that the final action of the Department may
be indefinitely postponed, to the great injury of the railroad
grantee and those claiming under it. Delay in such matters was a
contingency which the alleged successor in interest of the railroad
grantee must have taken into account when accepting the act and
assenting to the plan of settlement embodied in it. The Land
Department was not required to complete its administration of the
statute within any designated time. The act, upon its face, directs
that the required lists be prepared and delivered to the railroad
company "as soon as conveniently may be done." It cannot be assumed
upon this record that the Department has not progressed with the
work of administration as rapidly as all the circumstances and its
convenience permitted. Even if the fact be otherwise, it is not for
a court of equity by its decree to decide, in the first instance,
that the selections made by the railroad company of lieu lands
shall be approved by the Secretary, or to decide what lands should
be on the lists required to be furnished to the railroad, granted
under the act of 1898, or to control directly or indirectly the
work which Congress, with the assent of the railroad grantee, has
committed to one of the Departments of the government, or by an
order interfere with the prosecution by the defendants of their
claims under the act of 1898.
Page 195 U. S. 510
We are of opinion that the bill should have been dismissed upon
the ground that a court of equity should not, in advance of the
final action by the Secretary of the Interior in respect of lands
embraced by the act of 1898, interfere with the regular and orderly
administration of its provisions by means of a decree directed
against claimants under that act. And without now expressing any
opinion as to what questions may be raised by a claimant after such
final action by the Land Department under that act, we adjudge that
such dismissal must be without prejudice to any suit that may,
according to established principles, be rightfully instituted by a
claimant after the jurisdiction of the Department in respect of any
particular lands has ceased. Thus modified, the decree of the
Circuit Court must be affirmed.
It is so ordered.
MR. JUSTICE BREWER took no part in the decision of this
case.
