Where the appellant's contention is that the circuit court, by
giving unwarranted effect to a judgment of a state court and
accepting that judgment, which contained no finding of one of the
fundamental facts as a conclusive determination of that fact,
deprived him of his property without due process of law, and that
contention is made in good faith, and under the circumstances, upon
reasonable grounds, the application of the Constitution is involved
and this Court has jurisdiction of a direct appeal from the Circuit
Court.
Where it appears that a question was distinctly put in issue and
the parties presented, or had an opportunity to present, their
evidence, and the question was decided by a court of competent
jurisdiction, private right and public welfare both demand that the
question so adjudicated shall, except in direct proceedings for
review be considered as finally settled and conclusive upon the
parties.
The ordinary rule in cases tried by the court without a jury is
that a judgment entered without any special findings is, like a
general verdict in a jury case, tantamount to a finding in favor of
the successful party of all the facts necessary to sustain the
judgment.
While in some cases on a plea of
res judicata evidence
aliunde the record is proper to show what particular
questions were tried and determined
Page 195 U. S. 277
in the former case, it is not competent to introduce the
testimony of the trial judge as to the matters then considered and
passed on by him.
Where, in an action in a court of competent jurisdiction, the
validity of certain releases is put in issue by the pleadings and
no judgment can properly be rendered without determining that
question, and judgment is rendered against the parties executing
the releases and who were before the trial court, the judgment in
effect determines that the releases are valid and the question of
their validity is
res judicata notwithstanding no special
findings in regard thereto were made by the trial judge.
The controlling question in these cases arises on pleas of
res judicata. The essential facts are as follows:
On October 6, 1884, Daniel B. Fayerweather, a citizen and
resident of the State of New York, made a will, by the ninth
article of which he gave to twenty colleges bequests amounting in
the aggregate to $2,100,000. By the tenth article, he gave the
residuary estate to his executors, as trustees, directing them to
divide it equally among the twenty colleges named in the ninth
article. On the same day, he signed the following statement:
"This certifies that I have executed my will of this date,
having been advised by my counsel of the provision and restrictions
of the law of this state relative to benevolent corporations. I
trust my heirs will permit the provision of this my will to be
carried into effect."
At that time, by c. 360, Laws of 1860, of the State of New York,
a testator having husband, wife, child, or parent was forbidden to
give to literary or benevolent institutions more than one-half of
his estate. On December 13, 1884, the testator made a first codicil
to his will, by which he revoked the tenth article, and gave the
residuary of his estate absolutely to his executors. In other
respects, the will was ratified. At or about the same time, a
paper, bearing date December 11, 1884, headed "Private Memorandum,"
was signed by him, which reads as follows:
"I have made Messrs. Bulkley and Ritch my residuary legatees in
the confidence that thereby my intentions as expressed in my will
shall be carried into effect, and without
Page 195 U. S. 278
litigations on the part of any person or persons interested. In
case of my death, I trust that they will take such steps, by will
or otherwise, as will protect my estate against the contingency of
the death of either before my estate is settled and
distributed."
By subsequent codicils, minor changes were made and Henry B.
Vaughan was added as executor. The testator died on November 15,
1890, leaving a widow and three nieces, his only heirs at law and
next of kin. On the day of his death, he executed a codicil, which
was mainly a confirmation of the provisions of the will and prior
codicils.
Mr. Fayerweather's estate amounted at the date of the will to
about three millions of dollars, and at the time of his death to
from five to six millions of dollars, mainly in personal
property.
While, by the articles in the will, prior to the ninth, he had
made provision for his widow and also bequests to his three nieces,
yet obviously his purpose was to give the bulk of his estate to the
several colleges named, and to avoid the restraining effect of the
New York statute. After the death of Mr. Fayerweather the will and
codicils were propounded for probate, to which the widow and nieces
filed objections. A hearing was had before the surrogate, and on
February 25, 1891, he entered an order admitting the will to
probate, and leaving the contest of the codicils to continue. On
February 24, 1891, the three executors, residuary legatees, made a
deed of gift, which reads:
"Know all men by these presents, That we, Justus L. Bulkley,
Thomas G. Ritch, and Henry B. Vaughan, residuary devisees and
legatees under the will, meaning thereby the original will and the
subsequent codicils of Daniel B. Fayerweather, late of the City of
New York, deceased, prompted by our determination that we will not
retain for our own use any part of the residuary estate left to us
by his will, and by the desire to make such disposition of his said
residuary estate as in our judgment will best honor his memory, do
dispose of so much
Page 195 U. S. 279
of the same as shall remain after the payment of all lawful
fees, expenses, and charges as follows:"
"First, we reserve the power to make, and we retain the right to
assent to, any enlargement of the $15,000 a year by the will left
to Mrs. Fayerweather, which she may desire."
"Second, we reserve the power to make, and we retain the right
to assent to, any enlargement of the provisions made by the will
for Mrs. Mary W. Achter and Mrs. Emma S. Drury, in case we shall be
satisfied that such enlargement would not be against the wishes of
Mr. Fayerweather."
"Third, we give to Lucy J. Beardsley, wife of Morris B.
Beardsley, $100,000."
"We do this because of Mr. Fayerweather's letter written to Mr.
Vaughan and Mr. F. B. Myrick. If accepted, this gift is in
discharge of any claim under that letter."
Then, after making gifts of several sums to individuals,
hospitals, and colleges (some being those named in the will of Mr.
Fayerweather, and others not so mentioned), the deed closes with
these words:
"We execute this instrument, recognizing that there is pending a
contest in proceedings for the probate of Mr. Fayerweather's will,
and recognizing further that, if such contest shall not prevail, a
question may be made about our legal rights as devisees and
legatees. . . . Our object is each for himself to give away
whatever may come to us as residuary devisees and legatees under
Mr. Fayerweather's will."
Subsequently, and on March 5, the executors, as residuary
legatees, entered into an agreement with the contestants by which
the amounts coming to them were increased, and thereupon the
contestants executed the following paper:
"In consideration of the instrument of even date herewith
executed by Justus L. Bulkley, Thomas G. Ritch, and Henry B.
Vaughan, residuary devisees and legatees under the will, meaning
thereby the original will and subsequent codicils of Daniel B.
Fayerweather, . . . we, the undersigned, being
Page 195 U. S. 280
the widow and all of the next of kin of the said Daniel B.
Fayerweather, do hereby severally agree for ourselves, our, and
each of our heirs, executors, and administrators, as follows:"
"1. All objections to the probate of the will and four codicils
of the late Daniel B. Fayerweather, offered for probate to the
surrogate of the County of New York, are hereby withdrawn, and we
consent to the probate of the same."
"2. No suit shall hereafter be brought for the construction of
the said will and codicils or either of them, or to set aside the
will and codicils or either of them, and we further agree not to
make any claim upon the said Justus L. Bulkley, Thomas G. Ritch,
and Henry B. Vaughan or either of them, or against their heirs or
personal representatives, or either against them, the said Bulkley,
Ritch, and Vaughan, as executors, or as residuary legatees, other
than for amounts left to us by the will and codicils aforesaid, and
the deed of gift executed by the said Bulkley, Ritch, and Vaughan
on the 24th day of February, 1891, and the instrument dated on the
5th day of March, 1891."
"3. Upon the payment to the undersigned, respectively, of the
several amounts mentioned in said deed of gift and said instrument,
we will severally execute a general release of all claims, except
those arising under the will and codicils, both to the executors
and to the donees mentioned in the deed of gift on the 24th day of
February, 1891, and to the said Bulkley, Ritch, and Vaughan
individually."
On March 24, 1891, the codicils were admitted to probate on
written consent, signed by the attorneys for the parties to the
contest. On June 12, 1891, the widow executed the following
release:
"Know ye, that I, Lucy Fayerweather, widow of Daniel B.
Fayerweather, of the City of New York, for and in consideration of
the sum of $225,000, lawful money of the United States, to me in
hand paid
Page 195 U. S. 281
by Justus L. Bulkley, Thomas G. Ritch, and Henry B. Vaughan, as
executors and trustees under the last will and testament of Daniel
B. Fayerweather, deceased, and individually, and as the
representatives of the persons or corporations hereinafter named,
forming a class known as donees, under the deed of gift executed by
the said Bulkley, Ritch, and Vaughan, on February 24th, 1891, which
sum is in compromise and full settlement of any and all contests on
my part of the will of said Daniel B. Fayerweather, deceased, or
concerning his estate, have remised, released, and forever
discharged, and by these presents do, for myself and for my heirs,
administrators, and executors, remise, release, and discharge the
said Justus L. Bulkley, Thomas G. Ritch, and Henry B. Vaughan, as
executors and trustees aforesaid, as individuals and as
representatives of the said donees constituting a class, and also
the said donees, to-wit, the persons and corporations mentioned in
a certain deed of gift duly delivered, made by Justus L. Bulkley,
Thomas G. Ritch, and Henry B. Vaughan on the 24th day of February,
1891, which deed of gift was introduced in evidence in the probate
proceedings of the last will and testament of Daniel B.
Fayerweather, deceased, and marked 'Exhibit No. 7, contestants,'
and which said deed of gift is hereby made a part of this release,
in order that the persons constituting said class of donees and to
whom this release runs may be more fully known, and also the legal
successors, assigns, heirs, executors, and administrators of all
the aforesaid persons and corporations, of and from all and all
manner of action and actions, cause and causes of action, suits,
debts, dues, sums of money, claims and demands whatsoever in law or
in equity, which against the said persons or corporations, or any
of them, I ever had or now have, or which I or my heirs, executors,
or administrators hereinafter shall, can, or may have for, upon, or
by reason of any matter, cause, or thing whatsoever, except my
claim for the annuity given me by the will and codicils thereto of
said Daniel B. Fayerweather, deceased, and also my claim for the
increased annuity mentioned
Page 195 U. S. 282
in the agreement dated March 5th, 1891, and made pursuant to the
deed of gift above referred to."
Releases similar in form were executed by the other three
contestants, the nieces and next of kin.
In January, 1893, five of the colleges named in article 9 of the
will brought suit in the Supreme Court of the State of New York
against the executors of Mr. Fayerweather's will, the executors of
the will of Mrs. Fayerweather (who had died since the release), the
nieces, the donees in the deed of gift, and all the colleges not
joined as plaintiffs. The contention of the plaintiffs was that the
codicil which gave the residue of the estate to the three executors
absolutely was made in pursuance of an agreement that they should
take that residue in trust for the colleges mentioned in the will,
and distribute it among them. The complaint set forth the will and
codicils, their admission to probate, and the issue of letters
testamentary, and averred that the value of the estate left by the
testator was upwards of $6,000,000 and the residuary estate more
than $3,000,000. It alleged that the intention of the testator was
to devote the principal part of his estate to the several
institutions mentioned, and that the proceedings taken by him were
under the advice of counsel and for the purpose of carrying into
effect that intention, and upon a promise and assurance from the
executors that they would dispose of the residuary estate
accordingly; it averred also the fact of a contest in respect to
the probate of the will and codicils, a settlement with the
contestants in consideration of the payment of $310,000 and the
execution of releases by them. The prayer was that it be adjudged
and decreed that the residuary estate was devised by the testator
and received by the executors in trust for the purposes set forth,
that they be required to apply that estate to those purposes, and,
also,
"that the ultimate rights of the plaintiffs as between them and
each of them and every of the other defendants herein be determined
by the judgment in this action in accordance with the allegations
of this complaint and the prayer hereinbefore contained. "
Page 195 U. S. 283
The donees in the deed of gift answered, asserting the validity
of that deed, and praying that its provisions be carried out.
The widow's executors and the nieces also appeared and filed an
answer and counterclaim, in which they alleged that the agreement
which the suit was brought to enforce was a secret trust to evade
the New York statute by giving more than half to the several
institutions, that the releases were obtained from them by
concealment and fraud, and therefore of no obligation, and prayed
for judgment, among other things --
"3d. That it be adjudged that the said settlements and releases
made with or obtained from the said Lucy Fayerweather, Mary W.
Achter, and Emma S. Fayerweather, respectively, were and are each
fraudulent and void, and that the same be set aside, upon such
terms as may be just and equitable, and that the sums paid for the
same to said releasors or their attorneys, respectively, with the
interest thereon, including the increased payments to said Lucy
Fayerweather on her annuity, be charged against or allowed upon the
sums payable to them respectively under the judgment herein, or be
otherwise provided or accounted for as may be according to
equity."
"4th. That it be adjudged that the said deed of gift, dated
February 24th, 1891 (Exhibit F), was and is fraudulent and void,
and that the said Thomas G. Ritch, Justus L. Bulkley, and Henry B.
Vaughan be enjoined and restrained from further distributing the
said residuary estate, or any part thereof, under the same, except
to continue the payment of the said annuity to said Anner Amelia
Reynolds, as aforesaid."
"5th. That the said defendants Ritch, Bulkley, and Vaughan may
be required to account for the moneys and property received by them
from the estate of the said Daniel B. Fayerweather under said last
will and testament and codicils or otherwise, and for the
application thereof, and to pay over the said moneys and property
remaining in their hands among the parties to this action according
to their several and respective
Page 195 U. S. 284
rights thereto, as the same may be adjudged in this action."
"6th. That the ultimate rights of the parties to this action in
the estate of the said Daniel B. Fayerweather be determined and
enforced by the judgment in this action, in accordance with the
allegations of this answer and the foregoing prayers for relief
therein."
"7th. That these defendants may have such other and further
relief herein as may be just and equitable, with their costs
herein, to be paid as the court may direct."
The decree of the supreme court at special term, entered on
December 28, 1894, adjudged and decreed that the residuary estate
passed to the executors in trust for the colleges named in the
ninth paragraph of the will; that the executors and trustees be
restrained and enjoined from distributing the residuary estate, or
any part thereof under the deed of gift, and that the plaintiffs
and certain of the defendants (including therein the executors of
the will of Mrs. Fayerweather and two of the nieces) recover from
the trustees their costs, together with extra allowances to be paid
out of the trust funds. There was no formal finding of facts and no
mention made in the decree of the specific claim of the executors
of Mrs. Fayerweather's will and the nieces, that the releases were
fraudulently obtained. An appeal was taken by the defendants to the
general term of the supreme court, which, on December 18, 1895,
affirmed the judgment. A further appeal was taken to the Court of
Appeals, which, on January 19, 1897, affirmed the judgment of the
general term. 151 N.Y. 282. On January 28, 1897, a motion was made
in the Court of Appeals to amend the remittitur so as to direct the
justice of the supreme court before whom the action was tried at
special term to consider the evidence given before him at the trial
concerning the releases, and to determine whether the said releases
were valid and binding or invalid and void, which motion was on
March 9, 1897, denied.
After these proceedings in the state court, two of the
nieces
Page 195 U. S. 285
and next of kin, being citizens of the State of Iowa, instituted
this suit in the circuit court of the United States, making
defendants substantially all the parties to the suit in the state
court, the one or two omissions in no way affecting the question
before us. Subsequently the remaining executor, one having
resigned, of the will of Mrs. Fayerweather, filed a cross-bill, the
allegations and the relief asked being similar to those in the
original bill.
These bills -- in addition to setting forth the will and
codicils executed by Mr. Fayerweather, the probate proceedings, and
the releases by the widow and nieces, and alleging that these
letters were fraudulently obtained, and not binding -- averred the
bringing of the suit hereinbefore referred to in the supreme court
of the state by the five colleges, annexing copies of the
pleadings, and alleged
"thereupon the issues so joined, as well as others duly raised
by the answers of the several defendants, came on to be tried
before said court, and these complainants gave evidence tending to
prove the allegations in their said answer, and all of the said
allegations, and thereupon it became and was the duty of said court
to adjudge and determine whether the releases therein described
were invalid, and whether these complainants were entitled to the
affirmative relief prayed in respect thereto;"
and further, that the defendants --
"Confederating and combining together and between themselves to
prevent the entry of any judgment upon an actual determination of
the invalidity of said releases so in issue, requested and induced
the court to hold and decide that the right of the respective
parties to said property and residuary estate did not require any
consideration or decision of said issues, and said court thereupon
made and rendered its decision without considering, passing upon,
or including in judgment the said issues, and omitted to decide
upon these complainants' right to the affirmative relief by said
answer prayed in respect to said releases."
"And thereupon there was filed and entered in said action
Page 195 U. S. 286
a decision and judgment, a copy of which is hereto annexed,
which complainants pray may be referred to and taken as part of
this bill as if the same were herein set forth at length."
"Thereupon, by appeals taken from said judgment, in which
appeals these complainants were respondents as well as appellants,
said judgment was reviewed by the general term of said supreme
court, sitting as a court for the correction of errors, and not
exercising any original jurisdiction, and thereupon said court held
and determined that the right of the respective parties to said
property and residuary estate did require the consideration and
decision of said issues, and thereupon, being duly informed by the
record that said issues had not been in fact considered, passed
upon, or included in said judgment, it became and was the duty of
said court, pursuant to due process of law, the law of the land,
and the provisions of the Constitutions of the State of New York
and of the United States, to require and order that said issues
should be in fact considered, passed upon, and included in judgment
by the trial court, and until that should be done said court could
not duly adjudge or determine whether any error had been committed
in such determination upon said issues."
"Nevertheless, said court at said general term did not so
require or order, but by various fictions of law imputed to said
trial term and court below that it had determined said issues and
had decided in favor of the plaintiffs in said action upon such
determination, contrary to the truth and fact, and thereupon
pretended to adjudge and determine, as such court for the
correction of errors, that there was not sufficient preponderance
of evidence to support the asserted invalidity of said releases to
render such imputed determination of said trial court erroneous as
matter of law, but that such imputed determination was supported by
evidence sufficient to relieve the same from the assignment of
error in so deciding."
"It was not competent for said general term to have exercised an
original jurisdiction, and to have adjudged said issues,
Page 195 U. S. 287
and thereupon to have modified said judgment so as to include
the actual determination thereof, and said general term did not
exercise such power, but confined its action wholly to the
consideration of errors in the record."
"Thereupon said judgment was by appeals taken from the judgment
of affirmance so rendered, in which appeals these complainants were
respondents as well as appellants, and reviewed by the Court of
Appeals of the State of New York."
"Said court determined that these complainants had no standing
to be heard or to have their rights determined by said Court of
Appeals, because the limitations imposed by statute upon the
jurisdiction of said court precluded any inquiry into the facts,
the proof, or the merits of the said issues, but the said court was
bound by the formal record procured as aforesaid, and by the
fictions thereby adjudged as aforesaid, and had no power to review
the same."
"During the pendency of the appeals aforesaid, the control of
the several courts below over said action, and the trial thereof,
and the correction of any injustice arising as aforesaid, was
suspended, and upon the affirmance of said judgment of affirmance,
by the statutes of the State of New York any correction of the
injustice arising as aforesaid was placed beyond the power of any
court of said state, except as the Court of Appeals should, by its
remittitur, confer power upon said subordinate courts to entertain
and try the said issues."
"Thereupon these complainants duly made application to said
Court of Appeals so to frame its said remittitur as to permit said
subordinate courts to entertain and try the said issues, which
application said court denied."
To these bills, the defendants filed pleas of
res
judicata, claiming that the controversy between the parties
was finally settled by the decision of the state court. These pleas
were accompanied by an answer, denying the allegations of fraud.
The circuit court sustained the pleas, and dismissed the bill and
cross bill on the ground that the cause of action set forth
Page 195 U. S. 288
in them was barred by the prior judgment of the state court.
From this decree of dismissal the plaintiffs appealed directly to
this Court.
Page 195 U. S. 297
MR. JUSTICE BREWER delivered the opinion of the Court.
Our jurisdiction of this direct appeal from the decision of the
circuit court is invoked on the ground that the case involves the
application of the Constitution of the United States.
The contention is that, by Article V of the Amendments to the
federal Constitution, no person can "be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law;" that these plaintiffs
were entitled to large shares of the estate of Daniel B.
Fayerweather; that they were deprived of this property by the
judgment of the circuit court, which gave unwarranted effect to a
judgment of the state courts; that this action of the circuit court
is not to be considered a mere error in the progress of a trial,
but a deprivation of property under the forms of legal procedure.
In
Chicago, Burlington &c. Railroad v. Chicago,
166 U. S. 226, we
held that a judgment of a state court might be here reviewed if it
operated to deprive a party of his property without due process of
law, and that the fact that the parties were properly brought into
court and admitted to make defense was not absolutely conclusive
upon the question of due process. We said (p.
166 U. S.
234):
"But a state may not, by any of its agencies, disregard the
prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment. Its judicial authorities
may keep within the letter of the statute prescribing forms of
procedure in the courts, and give the parties interested the
fullest opportunity to be heard, and yet it might be that its final
action would be inconsistent with that amendment. In determining
what is due process of law, regard must be had to substance, not to
form. This Court, referring to the Fourteenth Amendment, has
said:"
"Can a state make anything due process of law which, by its own
legislation, it chooses to declare such? To affirm this is to hold
that the prohibition to the states is of no avail, or has no
application where the invasion of private rights is effected under
the forms of state legislation."
"
Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97,
96 U. S. 102. The
Page 195 U. S. 298
same question could be propounded, and the same answer should be
made, in reference to judicial proceedings inconsistent with the
requirement of due process of law. If compensation for private
property taken for public use is an essential element of due
process of law as ordained by the Fourteenth Amendment, then the
final judgment of a state court, under the authority of which the
property is in fact taken, is to be deemed the act of the state
within the meaning of that amendment."
And again (p.
166 U. S.
236):
"The mere form of the proceeding instituted against the owner,
even if he be admitted to defend, cannot convert the process used
into due process of law, if the necessary result be to deprive him
of his property without compensation."
If a judgment of a state court can be reviewed by this Court on
error upon the ground that, although the forms of law were
observed, it necessarily operated to wrongfully deprive a party of
his property (as indicated by the decision just referred to), a
judgment of the circuit court of the United States, claimed to give
such unwarranted effect to a decision of a state court as to
accomplish the same result, may also be considered as presenting
the question how far it can be sustained in the view of the
prohibitory language of the Fifth Amendment, and thus involve the
application of the Constitution. It is said that the right of these
plaintiffs to share in the estate of Daniel B. Fayerweather is
undoubted, unless destroyed by the releases they executed; that the
fundamental question presented in the trial court of the state was
the validity of those releases; that, notwithstanding this, that
court came to its conclusion and rendered its judgment without any
determination thereof; that the appellate courts wrongfully assumed
that the trial court had decided the question, and rendered their
judgments on that assumption, so that the necessary result of the
proceedings in the state courts was a deprivation of the right of
the plaintiffs to a share of the estate, without any finding of the
vital fact which alone could destroy their right. The
Page 195 U. S. 299
contention is not that the state courts erred in their finding
in respect to this fact, but that there never was any finding. Such
decision of the state courts, made without any finding of the
fundamental fact, was accepted in the circuit court of the United
States as a conclusive determination of the fact. Although these
plaintiffs were parties to the proceedings in the state courts, and
presented their claim of right, if it be true that the necessary
result of the course of procedure in those courts was a denial of
their rights -- a taking away and depriving them of their property
without any judicial determination of the fact upon which alone
such deprivation could be justified -- a case is presented coming
directly within the decision in 166 U.S.
166 U. S. 226.
Giving effect in the circuit court to the state judgment does not
change the character of the question. It is simply adding the force
of a new determination to one wrongfully obtained, and adding it
upon no new facts. Whether the contention of the plaintiffs in
respect to the character of the state proceedings can be sustained
or not is a question upon the merits, and does not determine the
matter of jurisdiction. That depends upon whether there is
presented a
bona fide and reasonable question of the
wrongful character of the proceedings in the state courts, and the
necessary result therefrom. We are of opinion that the jurisdiction
of this Court must be sustained.
We pass, therefore, to consider the merits of the case. Private
right and public welfare unite in demanding that a question once
adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction shall, except in
direct proceedings to review, be considered as finally settled and
conclusive upon the parties.
Interest rei publicae ut sit finis
litium. But, in order to make this finality rightful, it
should appear that the question was distinctly put in issue; that
the parties presented their evidence, or at least had an
opportunity to present it, and that the question was decided. cases
of an alleged prior adjudication have frequently been presented in
this Court and the scope of a plea thereof fully determined. In the
leading
Page 195 U. S. 300
case of
Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U. S.
351,
94 U. S. 352,
we said:
"In considering the operation of this judgment, it should be
borne in mind, as stated by counsel, that there is a difference
between the effect of a judgment as a bar or estoppel against the
prosecution of a second action upon the same claim or demand and
its effect as an estoppel in another action between the same
parties upon a different claim or cause of action. In the former
case, the judgment, if rendered upon the merits, constitutes an
absolute bar to a subsequent action. It is a finality as to the
claim or demand in controversy, concluding parties and those in
privity with them, not only as to every matter which was offered
and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to
any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that
purpose. Thus, for example, a judgment rendered upon a promissory
note is conclusive as to the validity of the instrument and the
amount due upon it, although it be subsequently alleged that
perfect defenses actually existed of which no proof was offered,
such as forgery, want of consideration, or payment. If such
defenses were not presented in the action, and established by
competent evidence, the subsequent allegation of their existence is
of no legal consequence. The judgment is as conclusive, so far as
future proceedings at law are concerned, as though the defenses
never existed. The language, therefore, which is so often used,
that a judgment estops not only as to every ground of recovery or
defense actually presented in the action, but also as to every
ground which might have been presented, is strictly accurate when
applied to the demand or claim in controversy. Such demand or
claim, having passed into judgment, cannot again be brought into
litigation between the parties in proceedings at law upon any
ground whatever."
See also Wilson v. Deen, 121 U.
S. 525;
Hefner v. Northwestern Life Ins. Co.,
123 U. S. 747;
Wiggins Ferry Co. v. O. & M. Ry. Co., 142 U.
S. 396;
Nesbit v.
Independent
Page 195 U. S. 301
District, 144 U. S. 610;
Johnson Company v. Wharton, 152 U.
S. 252;
Dowell v. Applegate, 152 U.
S. 327;
Last Chance Mining Co. v. Tyler Mining
Co., 157 U. S. 683;
New Orleans v. Citizens' Bank, 167 U.
S. 371;
Southern Pacific R. Co. v. United
States, 168 U. S. 1;
Bryar v. Campbell, 177 U. S. 649;
United States v. California & Oregon Land Company,
192 U. S. 355,
192 U. S.
358.
The state court was one of competent jurisdiction, and the
present contestants were before that court, taking part in the
litigation. The validity of the releases was put in issue by the
pleadings, and no judgment could properly have been rendered
without a determination of that question. The colleges sought to
enforce a secret trust, but the property covered by the trust,
together with that passing under the ninth article of the will, was
the bulk of the estate -- far more than half. Such a disposition of
the testator's property was in contravention of the laws of New
York. They who would take the estate in case of intestacy had a
right to object to the enforcement of the trust. Only on condition
that they waived their objections and released could it be
sustained. The judgment enforced it. It therefore practically
determined that the releases were valid, and decided against the
contention of these plaintiffs, that they were fraudulent and void.
All this is evident from a perusal of the pleadings. The appellants
concede this, and rest their claim in the federal court partly upon
that basis. Thus, in their brief it is said:
"The issues so joined came on to be tried in the state supreme
court; these complainants gave evidence tending to prove their
allegations, and thereupon it became the duty of the court to
adjudge whether the releases which they assailed were invalid, and
whether they were entitled to the affirmative relief prayed. The
issues so tendered were necessary to be determined before any valid
judgment upon those issues could be given pursuant to due process
of law, the law of the land and the provisions of the Constitution
of the United States."
The case was tried by the court without a jury. No special
Page 195 U. S. 302
findings of fact were made. According to testimony given on the
trial of this case in the circuit court, the omission to make
special findings was with the acquiescence (if not at the instance)
of all the counsel appearing in the state court. The decree
adjudged that the residuary estate was held in trust for the
colleges named in the ninth article of the will, enjoined the
residuary legatees from distributing any portion of that estate
under the deed of gift, and directed that it be paid over to the
respective colleges. The ordinary rule in respect to a judgment
without any special findings is that it, like a general verdict of
a jury, is tantamount to a finding in favor of the successful party
of all the facts necessary to sustain the judgment. In the general
term, on the appeal taken to it, two opinions were filed -- one by
Judge Follett, in which Judge Parker concurred, and one by the
presiding judge, Van Brunt. Judge Follett, after stating that the
executors of the testator's widow and two of his heirs at law and
next of kin sought to have the residuary clause declared invalid,
under c. 360 of the Laws of 1860, said:
"The difficulty with their contention is that the widow and
heirs released all of their interest in the estate for valuable
considerations paid to them. . . . It is urged that these releases
were procured by fraud and undue influence. There is no evidence in
the record justifying this contention. The terms of settlement were
agreed on during the controversy in the surrogate's court over the
probate of the will and codicils, and the widow and heirs were
represented in that controversy, and in the settlement by
distinguished counsel, and acted under their advice. . . . If the
person entitled to contest a will, or some one or more of its
provisions, voluntarily, and for a valuable consideration, received
after the testator's death, with full knowledge of the invalidity
of the will, divests himself of all interest in the property
attempted to be disposed of by it, he cannot impeach its
validity."
Presiding Judge Van Brunt thus stated his conclusions:
"The testator left him surviving a widow, who was the only
Page 195 U. S. 303
person who could call into operation, for her protection, the
statute which we have quoted. The widow, however, has released to
the executors all claims to the estate, which release cannot be
successfully attacked or set aside. There is consequently no person
for whose benefit he statute can operate."
"No rights of heirs and next of kin have been infringed upon,
because the trust does not contravene any statute for their
benefit, and is not the subject of attack by them. If it were, they
have also executed a release of their interest in the estate in the
same manner as the widow."
"We have therefore the case of a trust established, which would
be valid as against all the world but for the statute in favor of
the widow, and the widow, having released all her rights in the
estate, how can her representatives claim the invalidity of a trust
as to property in which she had no interest?"
The opinion in the Court of Appeals was delivered by Judge Vann,
and concurred in by all the judges except Chief Judge Andrews. In
it it is said:
"Although the decision by the special term and the affirmance by
the general term were general in form, necessarily some facts were
found by those courts, even if they are not specified in the
record. Otherwise the burden of deciding questions of fact would be
cast upon this Court, which has jurisdiction to decide only
questions of law. We think that the effect of a decision by the
trial court without expressing the facts found is the same as if
there had been a general verdict rendered by a jury, and that the
same presumptions arise in its support."
"
* * * *"
"We are of the opinion therefore that, where the decision of the
special term does not state the facts found, and the judgment
entered thereon has been affirmed by the general term, upon an
appeal to this Court all the facts [alleged in the complaint]
warranted by the evidence, and necessary to support the judgments
below, are presumed to have been found. Hence, upon such an appeal,
we have no more control over the facts than we have
Page 195 U. S. 304
when specific findings are made by the special term and affirmed
by the general term. This conclusion takes the question as to the
fraud alleged to have been practiced by the residuary legatees upon
the widow and next of kin in procuring the releases our of the
case, for it cannot be said on the record before us that the
evidence tending to show fraud is so irresistible as to make the
omission to find fraud an error of law. Assuming that there was
evidence enough to warrant the inference of fraud, there was also
ample evidence to warrant the inference that there was no fraud. A
question of fact was thus presented which is beyond our power of
review."
Thus, the Court of Appeals held in accord with the ordinary
ruling as to the effect of a judgment without findings. So it has
frequently decided. In
Bartlett v. Goodrich, 153 N.Y. 421,
424, it said:
"The learned trial judge held that the plaintiff was entitled to
recover, and the general term has affirmed the judgment. There were
no findings made as the result of the trial, but simply a brief
statement of the ground of the decision. In this condition of the
record, we must presume that all facts warranted by the evidence
and necessary to support the judgment, have been found.
Amherst
College v. Ritch, 151 N.Y. 282. The appeal therefore cannot
prevail unless it appears as matter of law that the learned trial
judge was not warranted, upon any fair view of the evidence, in
finding as he did, that the deceased was at the time of his death,
the equitable owner of the policies."
See also New York Security & Trust Co. v. Lipman,
157 N.Y. 551, 556;
Garvey v. Long Island R. Co., 159 N.Y.
323, 328;
Reed v. McCord, 160 N.Y. 330, 334;
Solomon
v. Continental Fire Insurance Company, 160 N.Y. 595, 598;
Rodgers v. Clement, 162 N.Y. 422, 427;
National Harrow
Company v. Bement & Sons, 163 N.Y. 505, 510;
Niagara
Falls v. N.Y.C. & H. R. Co., 168 N.Y. 611;
Critten v.
Chemical National Bank, 171 N.Y. 219, 231;
Hutton v.
Smith, 175 N.Y. 375, 378.
Page 195 U. S. 305
After the filing of its opinion an application made to the Court
of Appeals, as shown in the statement of facts, to amend the
remittitur so as to direct the trial court to find specifically
whether the releases were valid or not, was denied.
We have thus the case of a hearing in the trial court upon
issues which required a determination of the validity of these
releases as a condition of a judgment adverse to these plaintiffs,
a judgment against them, an affirmance of the judgment by the
general term of the supreme court, with an opinion declaring that
there was in the record no evidence justifying the claim that these
releases were fraudulently obtained, and void, and a further
affirmance by the Court of Appeals, accompanied by an opinion
declaring that, upon the state of the record, it was to be presumed
that the validity of the releases had been affirmatively found, and
also that there was sufficient evidence to sustain such a finding,
followed by a refusal to send the question of the validity of the
releases back to the trial court for consideration. Notwithstanding
all this, apparent upon the face of the record, the plaintiffs
insist that the validity of the releases was never determined by
any of the state courts, and that the final judgment of affirmance
by the Court of Appeals was based upon the presumption of a
determination which was never in fact made.
Upon what is this contention based? First, the silence of the
judgment, which contains no findings to indicate upon what it is
based; second, a memorandum of decision filed by the trial judge,
in which he states that "the grounds upon which the issues have
been decided are" a promise of the executors that, if made
residuary legatees they would distribute the residuary estate among
the colleges named in the ninth article, and that the testator made
them residuary legatees in reliance upon such promise; the opinion
of the trial judge, in which he discusses at some length, and with
citation of authorities, the validity of the secret trust and the
testimony by which it was established, and then, without in terms
passing upon the contention respecting the releases, states
"the
Page 195 U. S. 306
view that I have taken of the facts and the law of this case
renders it unnecessary for me to consider the very interesting
questions of law propounded by the learned counsel for the
defendants Reynolds, Achter, and Fayerweather,"
and, finally, the testimony of the trial judge, given on the
hearing in this case some six years after his decision in the state
court, to the effect that, in deciding the case he did not consider
the question of the validity of the releases.
It is undoubtedly true that, in some cases, evidence may be
introduced outside the record to show what particular question was
tried and determined in the former suit.
Washington, Alexandria &
Georgetown Steam-Packet Company v. Sickles, 24 How.
333,
65 U. S. 344;
Packet Co. v.
Sickles, 5 Wall. 580,
72 U. S. 592;
Russell v. Place, 94 U. S. 606,
94 U. S. 608.
But it does not follow that testimony of every kind is admissible
for that purpose. In
Packet Company v. Sickles, supra,
although it was held that,
"in cases where the record itself does not show that the matter
was necessarily and directly found by the jury, evidence
aliunde consistent with the record may be received to
prove the fact,"
yet, it appearing that some of the jurors on the former trial
were permitted to testify as to the particular ground upon which
they found their verdict, it was said (p.
72 U. S.
593):
"But it is proper to say that the secret deliberations of the
jury or grounds of their proceedings while engaged in making up
their verdict are not competent or admissible evidence of the
issues or finding. The jurors oftentimes, though they may concur in
the result, differ as to the grounds or reasons upon which they
arrive at it."
"The evidence should be confined to the points in controversy on
the former trial to the testimony given by the parties, and to the
questions submitted to the jury for their consideration, and then
the record furnishes the only proper proof of the verdict."
See also Wood v. Jackson, 8 Wend. 9, 36;
Lawrence
v. Hunt, 10 Wend. 80, 85.
Tested by the rule thus laid down the testimony of the trial
Page 195 U. S. 307
judge, given six years after the case had been disposed of, in
respect to the matters he considered and passed upon, was obviously
incompetent. True, the reasoning of the court for the rule is not
wholly applicable, for, as the case was tried before a single
judge, there were not two or more minds coming by different
processes to the same result. Nevertheless, no testimony should be
received except of open and tangible facts, matters which are
susceptible of evidence on both sides. A judgment is a solemn
record. Parties have a right to rely upon it. It should not lightly
be disturbed, and ought never to be overthrown or limited by the
oral testimony of a judge or juror of what he had in mind at the
time of the decision. Undoubtedly when the pleadings are general,
as in a case of the common counts, evidence may be given of the
testimony which was introduced on the trial, for that may disclose
what must have been considered and determined. And where the
evidence is that testimony was offered at the prior trial upon
several distinct issues the decision of any one of which would
justify the verdict or judgment, then the conclusion must be that
the prior decision is not an adjudication upon any particular issue
or issues, and the plea of
res judicata must fail.
Putting one side the oral testimony of the trial judge, there is
nothing in the other matters specified to disturb the conclusion
which follows from an examination of the record that the validity
of the releases was actually determined. Of course, the omission of
special findings means nothing, for the judgment implies a finding
of all necessary facts. The memorandum of decision naturally states
the grounds for arriving at a conclusion concerning the respective
claims of the colleges named in the ninth clause and the
beneficiaries of the deed of gift, for that was the controversy
between those parties, and indeed, the primary controversy
presented by the pleadings. The declaration in the opinion that the
conclusion reached upon the matters discussed rendered it
unnecessary to consider the questions of law propounded by the
counsel for these plaintiffs must be read in the light of the
Page 195 U. S. 308
prior statement therein that the widow and next of kin were
demanding that the releases executed by them be set aside and they
be given the residuary estate, and the further fact that whether
the releases were fraudulently obtained and void was a question of
fact, rather than of law. Evidently the opinion proceeded and the
conclusion was reached on the assumption that there was no
sufficient testimony to invalidate the releases.
Further, the entire record of the case was taken on appeal to
the general term. That court had before it for consideration all
the evidence which was presented to the trial court, and, as we
have seen, declared in its opinion that there was no evidence
justifying the contention that the releases were procured by fraud
and undue influence. While this was not stated in the form of a
special finding, it discloses the conclusion of the court from the
evidence. We cannot hold that it was not authorized to pass upon
this question, for its conclusion was sustained by the Court of
Appeals, which, in its opinion, also referred to the question.
Finally, by the motion to amend its remittitur, the attention of
the Court of Appeals was specifically called to these very matters
which are now urged as showing a failure on the part of the lower
courts to determine the question of the validity of the releases,
and it refused to make any order which would permit a further
consideration. Nothing can be clearer from this record than that
the question of the validity of the releases was not only before
the state courts, but was considered and determined by them, and
the regularity of the procedure was sustained by the highest court
of the state. The question was, as affirmed by counsel for these
appellants, put in issue by the pleadings, and its determination
was a necessary prerequisite to an adverse judgment. It was
referred to by all the courts in their opinions, was affirmatively
decided by the general term, its decision sustained by the Court of
Appeals, and reaffirmed by that court, by a refusal to amend its
remittitur.
Under these circumstances, the pleas of
res judicata
were
Page 195 U. S. 309
properly sustained, and the decree of the Circuit Court
dismissing the bill and cross bill is
Affirmed.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE did not hear the argument, and took no part in
the decision of this case.
