An allegation in the complaint, which is admitted by the answer
that defendant is a domestic corporation duly organized and
existing under the laws of a designated state and having its
principal office therein is a sufficient averment as to defendant's
citizenship.
In determining, on certified question of jurisdiction from the
circuit court of appeals, whether diverse citizenship exists, the
whole record may be looked to for the purpose of curing a defective
averment, and if the requisite citizenship is anywhere averred in
the record, or facts are therein stated which in legal intendment
constitute .such allegation, that is sufficient.
Where the court is satisfied, in the light of all the testimony,
that an averment of residence in a designated state was intended to
mean, and, reasonably construed must be interpreted as averring,
that plaintiff was a citizen. of that state, it is sufficient.
The facts, which involved the sufficiency of averments and
proof of diverse citizenship to maintain the jurisdiction of the
United States Circuit Court, are stated in the opinion of the
court.
Page 194 U. S. 379
MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
The certificate of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit is as follows:
"This cause comes here upon a writ of error to review a judgment
of the Circuit Court, Southern District of New York, entered upon
the verdict of a jury in favor of defendant in error, who was
plaintiff below. Upon examination of the record it appears that, in
addition to various questions as to the merits of the controversy
which are presented by the assignments of error, the jurisdiction
of the circuit court is in issue. Under sections 5 and 6 of the Act
of March 3, 1891, writs of errors in such cases are to be taken
direct to the
Page 194 U. S. 380
Supreme Court, and the grant of appellate jurisdiction to the
circuit courts of appeal does not include such cases."
"In accordance, therefore, with the practice indicated in
Cincinnati, Hamilton & Co. v. Thiebaud, 177 U. S.
615, and
Am. Sugar Ref. Co. v. New Orleans,
181 U. S.
277, and followed by this Court in
United States v.
Lee Yen Tai, 113 F. 465, this Court elects to reserve judgment
upon the other questions, and to certify the question of
jurisdiction to the Supreme Court."
"
Statement of Facts"
"The facts out of which the question of jurisdiction arises are
as follows:"
"The action is for breach of contract of employment. The
complaint avers, and the answer admits, that defendant is a
domestic corporation, duly organized and existing under the laws of
New York, having its principal office for the transaction of
business in the Southern District of New York. The complaint
further avers, and the answer admits, that 'plaintiff is a resident
of the State of Delaware.' Upon the trial, the plaintiff
testified:"
"I started in the printing business about thirty years ago. . .
. I have been on the New York Tribune, on the World, the
Philadelphia Record, and the American Press Association. . . . I
had charge of the Morning News, Wilmington, Delaware. . . . In this
city [New York], I worked on the New York Tribune, on the Sun, on
the World, and in the American Press Association. . . . Just prior
to my going to work upon the New York Sun [under the contract in
suit], I was the publisher and business manager of the Evening
Journal of Wilmington, Delaware, and president of the company. . .
. [After my discharge from the employ of the Sun,] I finally
secured a place with the New Haven Palladium, and I was there a
while. . . . One of the reasons I left the New Haven Palladium was
that it was too far away from home. I live in Delaware, and I had
to go back and forth. My family were over in Delaware. "
Page 194 U. S. 381
"There was no other testimony in any way bearing upon
plaintiff's residence or citizenship."
"The jurisdiction of the circuit court was not questioned by the
defendant in the court below, and the assignments of error do not
present any such question."
"
Questions Certified"
"Upon the facts above set forth, the question of law concerning
which this Court desires the instruction of the Supreme Court
is:"
" Had the circuit court jurisdiction of the controversy between
plaintiff and defendant?"
"In accordance with the provisions of section 6 of the Act of
March 31, 1891, establishing courts of appeal, etc., the foregoing
question of law is, by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, hereby certified to the Supreme Court."
In the argument at bar on behalf of the Sun Printing &
Publishing Association, the plaintiff in error in the circuit court
of appeals, the jurisdiction of the circuit court over the
controversy was denied not only upon the hypothesis that Edwards,
the plaintiff, was not alleged or shown to have been a citizen of
Delaware, but also upon the assumption that the Sun Association was
not averred to have been a citizen of New York. The latter
contention may be at once dismissed from view, because the
allegation of the complaint, admitted by the answer,
"that defendant is a domestic corporation, duly organized and
existing under the laws of New York, having its principal office
for the transaction of business in the Southern District of New
York,"
clearly imported that the corporation was originally created by
the State of New York. The presumption necessarily followed that
the corporation was composed of citizens of that state, and
consequently the corporation was entitled to sue or be sued in the
courts of the United States as a citizen of New York.
Southern
Ry. Co. v. Allison, 190 U. S. 326.
We come to the contention that the citizenship of Edwards
Page 194 U. S. 382
was not averred in the complaint or shown by the record, and
hence jurisdiction did not appear.
In answering the question whether the circuit court had
jurisdiction of the controversy, we must put ourselves in the place
of the circuit court of appeals, and decide the question with
reference to the transcript of record in that court.
Had the transcript shown nothing more as to the statute of
Edwards than the averment of the complaint that he was a "resident
of the State of Delaware," as such an averment would not
necessarily have imported that Edwards was a citizen of Delaware, a
negative answer would have been impelled by prior decisions.
Mexican Central Ry. Co. v. Duthie, 189 U. S.
76;
Horne v. George H. Hammond Co.,
155 U. S. 393;
Denny v. Pironi, 141 U. S. 121;
Robertson v. Cease, 97 U. S. 646. The
whole record, however, may be looked to, for the purpose of curing
a defective averment of citizenship, where jurisdiction in a
federal court is asserted to depend upon diversity of citizenship,
and if the requisite citizenship is anywhere expressly averred in
the record, or facts are therein stated which, in legal intendment,
constitute such allegation, that is sufficient.
Horne v. George
H. Hammond Co., supra, and cases cited.
As this is an action at law, we are bound to assume that the
testimony of the plaintiff contained in the certificate of the
circuit court of appeals, and recited to have been given on the
trial, was preserved in a bill of exceptions, which formed part of
the transcript of record filed in the circuit court of appeals.
Being a part of the record, and proper to be resorted to in
settling a question of the character of that now under
consideration,
Robertson v. Cease, 97 U.
S. 648, we come to ascertain what is established by the
uncontradicted evidence referred to.
In the first place, it shows that Edwards, prior to his
employment on the New York Sun and the New Haven Palladium, we
legally domiciled in the State of Delaware. Next, it demonstrates
that he had no intention to abandon such domicil, for he testified
under oath as follows:
"One of the reasons I
Page 194 U. S. 383
left the New Haven Palladium was, it was too far away from home.
I lived in Delaware, and I had to go back and forth. My family are
over in Delaware."
Now, it is elementary that, to effect a change of one's legal
domicil, two things are indispensable: first, residence in a new
domicil, and second, the intention to remain there. The change
cannot be made, except
facto et animo. Both are alike
necessary. Either without the other is insufficient. Mere absence
from a fixed home, however long continued, cannot work the change.
Mitchell v. United
States, 21 Wall. 353.
As Delaware must, then, be held to have been the legal domicil
of Edwards at the time he commenced this action, had it appeared
that he was a citizen of the United States, it would have resulted,
by operation of the Fourteenth Amendment, that Edwards was also a
citizen of the State of Delaware.
Anderson v. Watt,
138 U. S. 702.
Be this as it may, however, Delaware being the legal domicil of
Edwards, it was impossible for him to have been a citizen of
another state, district, or territory, and he must then have been
either a citizen of Delaware or a citizen or subject of a foreign
state. In either of these contingencies, the circuit court would
have had jurisdiction over the controversy. But, in the light of
the testimony, we are satisfied that the averment in the complaint
that Edwards was a resident "of" the State of Delaware, was
intended to mean, and, reasonably construed, must be interpreted as
averring, that the plaintiff was a citizen of the State of
Delaware.
Jones v.
Andrews, 10 Wall. 331;
United
States Express Company v. Kountze, 8 Wall. 342.
The question is answered in the affirmative, and it will be
so certified.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN and MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM dissenting.