The object of construction is to ascertain the legislative
intent, and, if possible, to effectuate the purposes of the
lawmakers.
Although not in accord with its technical meaning, or its office
when properly used, a frequent use of the proviso in federal
legislation is to introduce new matter extending, rather than
limiting or explaining, that which has gone before.
Page 194 U. S. 26
Under the proviso in § 3 of the Act of February 19, 1903, a
direct appeal may be taken to this Court from a judgment of the
circuit court in a proceeding brought by the Interstate Commerce
Commission, under the direction of the Attorney General, to obtain
orders requiring the testimony of witnesses and the production of
books and documents.
Relevancy of evidence does not depend upon the conclusiveness of
the testimony offered, but upon its legitimate tendency to
establish a controverted fact.
Where a company owned by a railroad purchases coal at the mines
or breakers under a contract fixing the price to the vendor on the
basis of a percentage of the average price received at tidewater in
another state, it being claimed that this transaction was the means
whereby the railroad gave preferential rates to the companies
selling the coal, the Interstate Commerce Commission may, in a
proceeding properly instituted, inquire into the manner in which
the business is done, and compel, through the circuit court, the
testimony of witnesses and the production of the contracts relating
thereto.
Where coal companies who had organized a competing line to
tidewater made contracts with railroad companies for the purchase
of the collieries by the railroad companies, which resulted in the
abandonment of the proposed competing line, the contracts are
relevant evidence bearing upon the manner in which rates were
fixed, and their production before the Commission in an
investigation, properly commenced, as to the reasonableness of coal
rates, should be ordered by the circuit court.
Compelling the giving of such testimony and the production of
such contracts does not deprive the witnesses of any rights under
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution of the United
States.
This is an appeal from an order made in the Circuit Court of the
United States for the Southern District of New York in the matter
of the petition of the Interstate Commerce Commission for orders
requiring the testimony of witnesses and the production of certain
books, papers, and documents. The petition recites that the
Attorney General of the United States at the request of the
Interstate Commerce Commission, instructed the United States
District Attorney for the Southern District of New York to present
the petition and institute proper proceedings for the enforcement
of the provisions of the Acts to Regulate Interstate Commerce, as
amended, and to invoke the aid of the court in requiring the
attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of books,
papers, and documents, pursuant to the provisions of said acts. The
case
Page 194 U. S. 27
grows out of a complaint of William Randolph Hearst, filed on
November 2, 1902, with the Interstate Commerce Commission, against
the Philadelphia & Reading Railway Company, Lehigh Valley
Railroad Company, Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad,
Central Railroad Company of New Jersey, New York, Susquehanna &
Western Railroad Company, Erie Railroad Company, New York, Ontario
& Western Railway Company, Delaware & Hudson Company,
Pennsylvania Railroad Company, and Baltimore & Ohio Railroad
Company.
In the complaint it was charged that the defendants are common
carriers, engaged in the transportation of passengers and freight
between points in different states of the United States, and are
particularly engaged in the transportation of anthracite and
bituminous coal mined in Pennsylvania, Maryland, and West Virginia,
and shipped as interstate traffic over said lines, and are carriers
subject to the provision of the Act of February 4, 1887 to regulate
commerce, and the acts amendatory thereto; that the rates charged
and exacted by the defendants for the transportation of anthracite
coal in carloads from points in the anthracite coal region of
Pennsylvania to New York city and New York harbor points and
internal points of destination in the State of New York, to Boston
and other points in the New England states, to Baltimore and other
points in the State of Maryland, and to Washington, in the District
of Columbia, are unreasonable and unjust, and subject consumers and
producers of such coal who are not common carriers or corporations
owned and controlled by common carriers, to undue and unreasonable
prejudice and disadvantage in favor of, and to the undue and
unreasonable preference and advantage of, said defendants and
companies under their control, in violation of sections 1 and 3 of
the Act to Regulate Commerce; that the rates charged and exacted by
the defendants for the transportation of anthracite coal are
relatively unreasonable and unjust, and unjustly discriminating
against the interests of dealers and consumers of that
commodity
Page 194 U. S. 28
as compared with the rates contemporaneously charged by said
defendants for transportation of bituminous coal for much longer
distances and to the points of destination above mentioned, and
also as compare with the defendants' rates and charges on other
carload freight generally, all of which is a violation of §§ 1, 2,
and 3 of the Act to Regulate Commerce; that the defendant companies
-- Lehigh Valley Railroad Company, Central Railroad Company of New
Jersey, Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad Company, New
York, Susquehanna & Western Railroad Company, and the
Philadelphia & Reading Railway Company -- are, in the absence
of agreement, natural competitors in the business of transporting
anthracite coal from the coal fields of Pennsylvania to tidewater
at New York, two of said defendants -- the Lehigh Valley Railroad
Company and the Central Railroad Company of New Jersey -- being
substantially parallel lines; that in 1896, 1897, 1898, 1899, 1900,
and 1901, the six defendants last named, by an agreement and
combination with one another, pooled, and have, during the year
1902, pooled, freights and freight traffic in anthracite coal, so
as to divide the same between their different lines in agreed
proportions, in violation of § 5 of the Act to Regulate Commerce.
The prayer of the petition was that the defendants be required to
make answer to the charges, and, after hearing, for an order or
orders commanding the said defendants, and each of them, wholly to
cease and desist from each and every of the alleged violations of
the Act to Regulate Commerce, and for such further order or orders
and action by the Commission as its duty under the act and the
cause of petitioner and others similarly situated may require.
Answers were filed by the railroad companies, taking issue with the
allegations of the petition and denying violation of the law. In
the course of the hearing, certain witnesses refused to produce
contracts and answer questions when required so to do by order of
the Commission, which refusal gave rise to the petition to the
circuit court. The character of the testimony required by the order
of the Commission is sufficiently
Page 194 U. S. 29
set forth in the opinion hereinafter given. To the petition
answers were filed too lengthy to abstract, and in substance
setting forth the right of the defendants to refuse the production
of the papers and documents and to decline to answer the questions
because the same did not relate to any subject which the Commission
had the right to investigate, and the contracts relate to the
private business of persons not parties to the proceedings before
the Commission; that the witnesses are protected in their right to
refuse to produce the contracts or answer the questions by the
Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth Amendments to the Constitution of the
United States; that the contracts were not relevant to the subject
matter of investigation before the Commission. The circuit court
placed its decision on the latter ground, and dismissed the
petition of the Interstate Commerce Commission.
Page 194 U. S. 35
MR. JUSTICE DAY, after making the foregoing statement, delivered
the opinion of the Court.
A motion is made to dismiss the appeal upon the ground that no
direct appeal lies to this Court from the order of the circuit
court. The Act of February 19, 1903 (Comp.Stat.
Page 194 U. S. 36
1901, Sup. for 1903, p. 365), to further regulate commerce with
foreign nations and among the states, § 3, closing paragraph,
enacts,
"
Provided, That the provisions of an act entitled "An
Act to Expedite the Hearing and Determination of Suits in Equity
Pending or Hereafter Brought Under the Act of July Second, Eighteen
Hundred and Ninety, Entitled
An Act to Protect Trade and
Commerce Against Unlawful Restraints and Monopolies,' `An Act to
Regulate Commerce,' approved February Fourth, Eighteen Hundred and
Eighty-seven, or Any Other Acts having a Like Purpose That May Be
Hereafter Enacted, Approved February Eleventh, Nineteen Hundred and
Three," shall apply to any case prosecuted under the direction of
the Attorney General in the name of the Interstate Commerce
Commission."
The second section of the Act of February 11, 1903 (Comp.Stat.
1901, Sup. for 1903, p. 376), provides,
"That in every suit in equity pending or hereafter brought in
any circuit court of the United States under any of said acts
[having reference to the anti-trust act of 1890 and the Act to
Regulate Commerce mentioned in the preceding section] wherein the
United States is complainant, including cases submitted but not yet
decided, an appeal from the final decree of the circuit court will
lie only to the Supreme Court, and must be taken within sixty days
from the entry thereof."
In support of the motion to dismiss, it is argued that the
language of the proviso of section 3, above quoted, "shall apply to
any case prosecuted under the direction of the Attorney General in
the name of the Interstate Commerce Commission," must be read in
connection with preceding paragraphs of the section, which provide
for bringing actions by direction of the Attorney General in the
circuit courts of the United States, and do not include proceedings
of the character of the present action to compel the production of
books and papers and the giving of testimony by witnesses called
before the Commission.
It is true that the office of a proviso, strictly considered, is
to make exception from the enacting clause, to restrain generality
and to prevent misinterpretation.
Minis v.
United
Page 194 U. S. 37
States, 15 Pet. 423;
Austin v. United States,
155 U. S. 417,
155 U. S. 431;
White v. United States, 191 U. S. 545,
191 U. S. 551.
It is apparent that this proviso was not inserted in any
restrictive sense, or to make clear that which might be doubtful
from the general language used. It was inserted for the purpose of
enlarging the operation of the statute so as to include a class of
cases not otherwise within the operation of the section. It may be
admitted that this use of a proviso is not in accord with the
technical meaning of the term or the office of such part of a
statute when properly used. But it is nevertheless a frequent use
of the proviso in federal legislation to introduce, as in the
present case, new matter extending, rather than limiting or
explaining, that which has gone before.
In
Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Manning,
186 U. S. 238,
186 U. S. 242,
the subject was under consideration, and MR. JUSTICE BREWER,
delivering the opinion, while recognizing the restrictive office of
a proviso as stated by Mr. Justice Story in
Minis v.
United States, 15 Pet. 423,
40 U. S.
445:
"While this is the general effect of a proviso, yet in practice
it is not always so limited. As said in
Georgia Banking Company
v. Smith, 128 U. S. 174,
128 U. S.
181. The general purpose of a proviso, as is well known,
is to except the clause covered by it from the general provisions
of a statute, or from some provisions of it, or to qualify the
operation of the statute in some particular. But it is often used
in other senses. It is a common practice in legislative
proceedings, on the consideration of bills, for parties desirous of
securing amendments to them to precede their proposed amendments
with the term 'provided,' so as to declare that, notwithstanding
existing provisions, the one thus expressed is to prevail, thus
having no greater signification than would be attached to the
conjunction 'but' or 'and' in the same place, and simply serving to
separate or distinguish the different paragraphs or sentences."
The provision in the statute under consideration being intended
to enlarge, rather than limit, the application of previous terms
should not receive so narrow a construction as to defeat
Page 194 U. S. 38
its purpose. It extends the terms of the act of February 11,
1903, to "any case" brought under the direction of the Attorney
General in the name of the Interstate Commerce Commission. The
second section of the Act of February 11 has reference, it is true,
to a suit in equity under certain acts wherein the United States is
complainant, and the argument is that the extension of the terms of
this act in the Act of February 19 is only to suits in equity. But
for some reason, Congress, in the act under consideration, saw fit
not to limit the terms of the extension to suits or proceedings
provided for in section 3 of the Act of February 19, or to suits in
equity, but broadly extended the rights and privileges of the Act
of February 11 to "cases" of the character designated. We cannot
assume that this use of the broader term was without purpose.
Before the passage of this act, this Court had held that a petition
filed under section 12 of the Interstate Commerce Act against a
witness duly summoned to testify before the Commission, to compel
him to testify or to produce books, documents, and papers relating
to the matter in controversy, makes a case or controversy to which
the judicial power of the United States extends.
Interstate
Commerce Commission v. Brimson, 154 U.
S. 447. The object of construction, as has been often
said by the courts and writers of authority, is to ascertain the
legislative intent, and, if possible, to effectuate the purposes of
the lawmakers. We cannot read these statutes without perceiving the
manifest purpose of Congress to facilitate the disposition of cases
brought under the direction of the Attorney General to enforce the
provision of the antitrust and interstate commerce statutes. The
present proceeding is not merely advisory to the Commission, but,
as was said in
Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson,
supra, a judgment rendered will be a final and indisputable
basis of action as between the Commission and the defendant, and
furnish a precedent for similar cases. While it has for its object
the obtaining of testimony in aid of proceedings before the
Commission, it is evident that important questions may be
involved
Page 194 U. S. 39
touching the power of the Commission and the constitutional
rights and privileges of citizens. Congress deemed it imperative
that such cases, affecting the commerce of the country as well as
personal rights, should be promptly determined in a court of last
resort.
If the appeal in the first instance was to the court of appeals,
the judgment of that court would not be final under the Act of
March 3, 1891, and in such case this Court would still be required
to consider the cases on final appeal. We think it was the purpose
of the act to eliminate an appeal to the circuit court of appeals,
and to permit the litigation to be shortened by a direct appeal to
this Court.
We pass now to the merits of the controversy. The record in this
case is voluminous, and much of the discussion before the
Commission is printed. We shall endeavor to classify and consider
the questions made so as to indicate our holdings with a view to a
proper judgment in the case.
It is urged that the complainant before the Commission did not
show any real interest in the case brought, and that the proceeding
should, for that reason, have been dismissed. It is provided in the
Act to Regulate Commerce, section 13, that "any person, firm,
corporation," etc., complaining of anything done or omitted to be
done by any common carrier subject to the provisions of this act,
in contravention of the provisions thereof, may apply to said
Commission by petition, etc. And certain procedure is provided for
-- and (said Commission) "may institute any inquiry on its own
motion in the same manner and to the same effect as though
complaint had been made," and the section concludes: "No complaint
shall at any time be dismissed because of the absence of direct
damage to the complainant." In face of this mandatory requirement
that the complaint shall not be dismissed because of the want of
direct damage to the complainant, no alternative is left the
Commission but to investigate the complaint, if it presents matter
within the purview of the act and the powers granted to the
Commission.
Page 194 U. S. 40
Power is conferred upon the Commission, under section 12 of the
act as amended March 2, 1889 and February 10, 1891 (Comp.Stat.
1901, p. 3162), to inquire into the management of the business of
all common carriers subject to the provisions of the act, and to
keep itself informed as to the manner and method in which the same
is conducted, with the right to obtain from such common carriers
full and complete information necessary to enable the Commission to
perform the duties and carry out the objects for which it was
created.
In making the orders which were the basis of the application to
the circuit court, and in the petition filed therein, it is set
forth that the Commission, at the time when the witnesses refused
to produce the contracts required, was engaged
"in the discharge of its duty to execute and enforce the
provisions of the Act to Regulate Commerce, and in the exercise of
its authority to inquire into the business of common carriers
subject to the provisions of the act, and to keep itself informed
as to the manner and method in which said business is conducted,
and to obtain from said common carriers full and complete
information necessary to enable it to perform the duties and carry
out the objects for which it was created, and your petitioner is of
the opinion that said contracts are not only material and relevant
to the issues on trial in said proceeding, but that the production
thereof as required by it, as aforesaid, is necessary to enable
your petitioner to discharge its duty and execute and enforce said
provisions of said Act to Regulate Commerce and to inform your
petitioner as to the manner and method in which the business of
said common carriers is conducted, and to enable your petitioner to
obtain the full and complete information necessary to enable your
petitioner to perform the duties and carry out the objects for
which it was created."
But, in the present case, whatever may be the right of the
Commission to carry on an investigation under the general powers
conferred in section 12, this proceeding was under the
Page 194 U. S. 41
complaint filed, and we will examine the testimony offered with
a view to its competency under the allegations made by the
complainant.
Coming now to the specific items of testimony which the circuit
court, in dismissing the petition, considered irrelevant to the
controversy, we will first consider the so-called coal purchase
contracts.
It is unnecessary for the present purpose to go into detail as
to the provisions of these contracts. In the main, they were made
with coal companies owned principally by the railroad companies,
and contain the same general provisions. Among others, the purchase
price of anthracite coal above a certain size is to be 65 percent
of the average price, computed monthly at certain tide points, of
coal of the same quality and size. All the coal mined by the
contracting operators is sold, shipments to be made as called for
by the purchasers.
While the contracts were produced for inspection, the witnesses
refused to permit them to be given in evidence. The circuit court
held them to be irrelevant upon the ground that they related solely
to an intrastate transaction -- the sale of the coal in
Pennsylvania -- and had nothing to do with interstate commerce. It
appears that the railroad companies proceeded against in the
complaint are engaged in carrying coal from the anthracite coal
regions to tidewater. The contracts are between certain coal
companies and independent operators engaged in mining coal in that
region. The testimony shows that the coal companies making the
contracts are principally owned by the railroad companies. For what
purpose this separate ownership is maintained it is not necessary
now to inquire. The fact of such ownership is undisputed, and, for
the present purpose, it may be conceded that the ownership is
lawful under the laws of the State of Pennsylvania.
The railroads are all engaged in interstate commerce, and into
their affairs and methods of doing business the Commission might
be, and is, lawfully authorized by the Commerce Act to make
investigation. In speaking of this power as undertaken
Page 194 U. S. 42
to be vested in the Commission, this Court said in the
Brimson case,
154 U. S. 154 U.S.
447,
154 U. S.
472:
"It was not disputed at the bar, nor indeed can it be
successfully denied, that the prohibition of unjust charges,
discriminations, or preferences by carriers engaged in interstate
commerce, in respect to property or persons transported from one
state to another, is a proper regulation of interstate commerce, or
that the object that Congress has in view by the act in question
may be legitimately accomplished by it under the power to regulate
commerce among the several states. In every substantial sense, such
prohibition is a rule by which interstate commerce must be
governed, and is plainly adapted to the object to be accomplished.
The same observation may be made in respect to those provisions
empowering the Commission to inquire into the management of the
business of carriers subject to the provisions of the act, and to
investigate the whole subject of interstate commerce as conducted
by such carriers, and in that way to obtain full and accurate
information of all matters involved in the enforcement of the act
of Congress. It was clearly competent for Congress, to that end, to
invest the Commission with authority to require the attendance and
testimony of witnesses, and the production of books, papers,
tariffs, contracts, agreements, and documents relating to any
matter legally committed to that body for investigation."
In
Interstate Commerce Commission v. Cincinnati, New Orleans
&c. Railway Co., 167 U. S. 479,
167 U. S. 506,
this Court held that the Commission had no power to fix rates. In
the course of the opinion, it was said:
"It [the Commission] is charged with the general duty of
inquiring as to the management of the business of railroad
companies, and to keep itself informed as to the manner in which
the same is conducted, and has the right to compel complete and
full information as to the manner in which such carriers are
transacting their business."
The testimony shows that much of the coal purchased under these
contracts is sold in Pennsylvania, but a considerable portion is
carried to tidewater. The coal is purchased by
Page 194 U. S. 43
companies owned by the railroads, for which payment is made on
the basis of 65 percent of the general average price received at
tidewater by the sale of sizes above pea coal, leaving 35 percent
for the purchaser, from which he must pay transportation charges
and cost of sale. Here is a railroad company engaged at once in the
purchase of coal through a company which it practically owns and
the transportation of the same coal through different states to the
seaboard. Why may not the Interstate Commerce Commission, under the
powers conferred, and under this complaint, inquire into the manner
in which this business is done? It has the right to know how
interstate traffic is conducted, the relations between the carrier
and its shippers, and the rates charged and collected. We see no
reason why contracts of this character, which have direct relation
to a large amount of its carrying trade, can be withheld from
examination as evidence by the Commission. These contracts were
made by the officials of the railroad companies, who were also
officials of the coal companies, after protracted conferences. Upon
the ground that they pertained to the manner of conducting a
material part of the business of these interstate carriers which
was under investigation, we think the Commission had a right to
demand their production. And further it was claimed that, while
these contracts were in form purchases of coal, their real purpose
was to fix a rate for transportation to the carriers, who were in
fact paid for the only interest they had in the coal -- the right
to receive pay for its transportation -- by the percentage retained
from the selling price after deducting charges and expenses in
marketing the coal.
It is to be remembered in this connection that we are not
dealing with the ultimate fact of controversy, or deciding which of
the contending claims will be finally established. This is a
question of relevancy of proof before a body not authorized to make
a final judgment, but to investigate and make orders which may or
may not be finally embodied in judgments or decrees of the court.
If the railroad companies in fact received
Page 194 U. S. 44
their compensation for carriage from the sum retained by the
coal companies as was claimed, then, whether they realized more or
less than their published rates depended upon the price of coal.
Taking the prices at times as shown in the statements filed with
the Commission, it is apparent that the 35 percent was less than
published rates, and if that was the sum received for
transportation, would work a discrimination against coal companies
not having such contracts and paying the full rate. On the other
hand, if the coal companies paid the full rate and failed to
realize as much from the percentage of the selling price retained,
they would be losing money, and as they were owned by the railroad
companies, the loss would be ultimately theirs, and not the coal
companies. It may be that the Commission or the courts will
ultimately find that these contracts do not fix the compensation
received by the carriers, and that, as claimed, the full rate is
paid by these purchasing companies, and if there is a loss on these
contracts, it is made up in other business; but, as we have said,
the question concerns the relevancy of proof, and not whether it
finally establishes the issue made, one way or the other. Relevancy
does not depend upon the conclusiveness of the testimony offered,
but upon its legitimate tendency to establish a controverted fact.
Relevancy is that "quality of evidence which renders it properly
applicable in determining the truth or falsity of the matter in
issue between the parties to a suit." 1 Bouvier Law Dict., Rawle's
Revision 866.
The inquiry of a board of the character of the Interstate
Commerce Commission should not be too narrowly constrained by
technical rules as to the admissibility of proof. Its function is
largely one of investigation, and it should not be hampered in
making inquiry pertaining to interstate commerce by those narrow
rules which prevail in trials at common law, where a strict
correspondence is required between allegation and proof.
It is contended in the answers filed in the circuit court that
to require the production of these contracts would be to compel
Page 194 U. S. 45
the witnesses to furnish evidence against themselves which might
result in forfeiture of estate, in violation of the Fifth Amendment
to the Constitution, would subject the parties to unreasonable
searches and seizure of their papers, contrary to the Fourth
Amendment, and would require them to produce papers pertaining
wholly to intrastate affairs, in violation of the reserved rights
of the people of the states, and beyond the power of the
Commission, whose duties are limited to investigations pertaining
to interstate commerce.
At the hearing, the constitutional objections do not seem to
have been relied upon; those argued pertained to the relevancy of
the proof and the rights of persons not before the court to be
protected from the publication of their private contracts. As to
the constitutional objection based upon the Fifth Amendment, the
act as amended February 11, 1893, expressly extends immunity from
prosecution or forfeiture of estate because of testimony given in
pursuance of the requirements of the law. The full consideration of
the subject and the decision of this Court in
Brown v.
Walker, 161 U. S. 591,
renders further consideration of this objection unnecessary.
The origin and interpretation of the Fourth Amendment to the
Constitution, securing immunity from unreasonable searches and
seizures, was fully discussed by Mr. Justice Bradley in the leading
case of
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.
S. 616. In that opinion, the learned Justice points out
the analogy between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, and the object
of both to protect a citizen from compulsory testimony against
himself which may result in his punishment or the forfeiture of his
estate, or the seizure of his papers by force, or their compulsory
production by process for the like purpose. In the course of the
opinion, it is said:
"Breaking into a house and opening boxes and drawers are
circumstances of aggravation; but any forcible and compulsory
extortion of a man's own testimony or of his private papers to be
used as evidence to convict him of crime or to forfeit his goods is
within the condemnation of that judgment. In this regard the Fourth
and
Page 194 U. S. 46
Fifth Amendments run almost into each other."
And see Adams v. New York, 192 U.
S. 585, decided this term.
As we have seen, the statute protects the witness from such use
of the testimony given as will result in his punishment for crime
or the forfeiture of his estate. Testimony given under such
circumstances presents scarcely a suggestion of an unreasonable
search or seizure. Indeed, the parties seem to have made little
objection to the inspection of the papers; the contest was over
their relevancy as testimony. Nor can we see force in the
suggestion that these contracts were made with persons not parties
to the proceeding. Undoubtedly the courts should protect
nonlitigants from unnecessary exposure of their business affairs
and papers. But it certainly can be no valid objection to the
admission of testimony, otherwise relevant and competent, that a
third person is interested in it.
As to the so-called Temple Iron Company contracts: it appears
that, in 1889, certain operators in the anthracite coal region
organized a competing railroad with a view to carrying their
product from the coal regions to market at tidewater. It became
evident that this company was likely to succeed and to construct a
competing railroad from the coal fields to the sea. With a view to
acquiring its property, five of the leading railroad carriers
purchased the collieries whose proprietors were developing the new
scheme. To pay for these, the charter of the Temple Iron Company
was purchased and its capital stock increased. The company issued a
large amount of stock and bonds, and the contracting railroad
companies agreed among themselves and with the Guaranty Trustee
Company of New York, as trustee, to guarantee a six percent
dividend upon the Temple Iron Company stock and the payment of
principal and interest of the bonds. This ended the building of an
independent line, and the transportation of coal from the
collieries is distributed among the carriers interested.
It is argued that these contracts, if given in evidence, will
tend to show a pooling of freights, in violation of the fifth
Page 194 U. S. 47
section of the Commerce Act. While this testimony may not
establish such an arrangement as is suggested, it has, in our
opinion, a legitimate bearing upon the question. There is a
division of freight among several railroads where, by agreement or
otherwise, the companies have a common interest in the source from
which it is obtained. Furthermore, we think the testimony competent
as bearing upon the manner in which transportation rates are fixed,
in view of determining the question of reasonableness of rates,
into which the Commission has a right to inquire. To unreasonably
hamper the Commission by narrowing its field of inquiry beyond the
requirements of the due protection of rights of citizens will be to
seriously impair its usefulness and prevent a realization of the
salutary purposes for which it was established by Congress.
An appeal is also prosecuted from the refusal of the circuit
court to order the witnesses Eben B. Thomas and William H.
Truesdale to answer certain questions respecting the prices and
sale of coal. Upon the principles already discussed, we think these
questions had legitimate bearing upon the matters into which the
Commission was making inquiry.
We are of the opinion that the circuit court erred in holding
the contracts for the purchase of coal by the companies or directly
by the railroad, where a percentage of the price was agreed to be
paid for the coal, to be irrelevant, and in refusing to order their
production as evidence by the witnesses who are parties to the
appeal, and likewise erred as to the Temple Iron Company contracts,
and in refusing to require the witnesses aforesaid to answer the
questions stated in the petition, and the order appealed from is
reversed, and the cause is remanded to the Circuit Court for
further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
MR. JUSTICE BREWER dissents.