While a master is not bound in every instance where a seaman is
seriously injured to disregard every other consideration, and put
into the nearest port where medical assistance can be obtained, his
duty to do so is manifest, if the accident happens within a
reasonable distance of such a port.
The duty of the master in each case depends upon its own
circumstances, and although the case may not be free from doubt,
this Court will apply its general rule both in equity and admiralty
cases, not to reverse the concurring decisions of two subordinate
courts upon questions of fact unless there be a clear preponderance
of evidence against their conclusion.
This was a libel filed in the District Court for the Northern
District of California by Matthew Bridges against the ship
Iroquois, to recover damages for a failure of the master
to provide suitable surgical treatment and care for the libellant,
who had suffered injury by a fall from the main yard to the deck of
the vessel.
The facts of the case were substantially as follows: the
Iroquois left New York on December 27, 1899, bound for the
port of San Francisco, with a full cargo of general merchandise. On
February 23, 1900, while the vessel was rounding Cape Horn during
heavy weather, and while libellant was aloft in the performance of
his duty, he accidentally fell from the main yard to the deck of
the vessel, thereby fracturing two ribs and his right leg in two
places. The master, with the aid of the carpenter, set the leg in
splints, kept the libellant in his berth, gave him such food and
delicacies as the supplies of the ship permitted, and on March 30,
after five weeks, removed the splints, and found the leg apparently
in good condition. Before arriving at San Francisco, and early in
April, he was able to leave his berth, go upon deck and walk about
with the aid of
Page 194 U. S. 241
a crutch. But, after arriving at that port on May 7, 1900, he
was sent to the hospital, where it was found that, while his ribs
had healed perfectly, the bones of his leg had not united, and he
was subsequently, and in October, compelled to suffer amputation,
and, of course, became a cripple for the remainder of his life. The
master was charged with a breach of duty in failing to put into an
intermediate port and procure the proper surgical attendance.
Upon this state of facts, the district court entered a decree in
favor of the libellant for $3,000, 113 F. 964, which was
subsequently affirmed by the court of appeals, 118 F. 1003.
MR. JUSTICE BROWN delivered the opinion of the Court.
The duty to provide proper medical treatment and attendance for
seamen falling ill or suffering injury the service of the ship has
been imposed upon the shipowners by all maritime
Page 194 U. S. 242
nations. It appears in the earliest Codes of Continental Europe,
and was expressly recognized by this Court in the recent case of
The Osceola, 189 U. S. 158.
Upon large passenger steamers, a physician or surgeon is always
employed, whose duty it is to minister to the passengers and crew
in cases of sickness or accident. Of course this would be
impracticable upon an ordinary freighting vessel, where the master
is presumed to have some knowledge of the treatment of diseases,
and in ordinary cases stands in the place of a physician or
surgeon,
The Wensleydale, 41 F. 602; but for the further
protection of seamen, vessels of the class of the
Iroquois
are compelled by law to be provided with a chest of medicines and
with such anti-scorbutics, clothing, and slop-chests as the
climate, particular trade, and the length of the voyage may
require. Rev.Stat. secs. 4569, 4572, 4573.
What is the measure of the master's obligation in cases where
the seaman is severely injured while the ship is at sea has been
made the subject of discussion in several cases, but each depends
so largely upon its own peculiar facts that the rule laid down in
one may afford little or no aid in determining another depending
upon a different state of facts. The early cases of
Harden v.
Gordon, 2 Mason 541, and
Reed v. Canfield, 1 Sumner
195, contain an exhaustive discussion of the general subject by Mr.
Justice Story. But, as in both cases the disability occurred at or
near a port, they are of no special value in this case.
We have carefully examined the cases of
Brown v.
Overton, 1 Sprague 462;
The Chandos, 4 F. 647;
The Scotland, 42 F. 925;
Whitney v. Olsen, 108 F.
292;
The Troop, 118 F. 769, and
Danvir v. Morse,
139 Mass. 323, and are of opinion that none of them fits the
exigencies of the present case. We cannot say that in every
instance where a serious accident occurs, the master is bound to
disregard every other consideration and put into the nearest port,
though, if the accident happen within a reasonable distance of such
port, his duty to do so would be manifest.
Page 194 U. S. 243
Each case must depend upon its own circumstances, having
reference to the seriousness of the injury, the care that can be
given the sailor on shipboard, the proximity of an intermediate
port, the consequences of delay to the interests of the shipowner,
the direction of the wind and the probability of its continuing in
the same direction, and the fact whether a surgeon is likely to be
found with competent skill to take charge of the case. With
reference to putting into port, all that can be demanded of the
master is the exercise of reasonable judgment and the ordinary
acquaintance of a seaman with the geography and resources of the
country. He is not absolutely bound to put into such port if the
cargo be such as would be seriously injured by the delay. Even the
claims of humanity must be weighed in a balance with the loss that
would probably occur to the owners of the ship and cargo. A
seafaring life is a dangerous one, accidents of this kind are
peculiarly liable to occur, and the general principle of law that a
person entering a dangerous employment is regarded as assuming the
ordinary risks of such employment is peculiarly applicable to the
case of seamen.
To judge of the propriety of the master's conduct in a
particular case, we are bound, so far as possible, to put ourselves
in his place and inquire whether, in view of all the circumstances,
he was bound to put into an intermediate port. The charge in the
libel is that he should either have put back to Port Stanley in the
East Falkland islands or deviated from his course and made the port
of Valparaiso "or any one of several other ports in the southern
part of South America." The very indefiniteness of this charge
shows that neither libellant nor counsel had in mind any particular
port, and it was not until the testimony of a former officer of the
Chilian Navy was taken at San Francisco that they were able to fix
upon the port of San Carlos or the Evangelist Islands as proper
places at which to make call. In view of this inability to select a
proper port until the officer whose business it had been to cruise
up and down the Chilian coast had informed them, it may certainly
be contended
Page 194 U. S. 244
with great show of reason that the master was not bound to know
of the existence of these ports except as he was informed by the
chart, or of the possibility of obtaining surgical treatment at
them. While masters plying upon vessels between New York and
Pacific ports would be presumed to know of such familiar harbors as
those of Port Stanley and Valparaiso, it by no means follows that
they are chargeable with knowledge of every port upon the southwest
coast of South America, or of their surgical facilities. The
accident occurred upon one of the loneliest and most tempestuous
seas in the world. For over one thousand miles from Cape Horn to
Valparaiso, there seem to have been but one or two places at which
it would be feasible to make a call. The evidence shows that the
ship at the time was about 480 miles from Port Stanley, and, with
the winds then prevailing, it would have been possible to reach
that port in three or four days, but that to return to the place of
the accident, in view of the headwinds, might have taken as many
weeks. During this time, the owners of the ship would sustain a
heavy loss in the wages and provisions of the crew and the
demurrage of the ship, and while the cargo is not shown to have
been perishable, there would be a risk of the loss of a market by
the consequent delay in reaching San Francisco. The master is not
chargeable with fault in failing to put back to Port Stanley.
It was also suggested that the ship could have made the
Evangelist Islands at the western end of the Straits of Magellan by
sailing one or two days out of her course; but it was shown that
the only building there was a lighthouse, from which a small
steamer was accustomed to put out to passing vessels in case a
signal for relief was hoisted, and that nothing could be done there
except possibly to place the seaman upon a steamer bound north to
Valparaiso or east to Sandy Point, near the middle of the straits.
The probability of obtaining aid by this course and the certainty
of the limb's being injured by the delay would have made it highly
inadvisable to adopt it. As there is no harbor in the islands, the
various transfers
Page 194 U. S. 245
from the ship to a boat and from the boat to shore, and the
return to another ship in the rough water that might be expected at
that point, would have been extremely dangerous to a person in
libellant's crippled condition. The transfer of passengers from a
ship to a boat, even in a moderate sea, is attended with
considerable difficulty, and, to a person with a broken leg, with
great danger in view of the unequal rising and falling of a large
ship and a small boat. Had the master adopted this course and
injury had resulted to the libellant, he could hardly have escaped
the imputation of negligence.
The libellant contended in his brief that, assuming that the
master was not in fault for failing to stop at the Evangelist
Islands, he should have put in at the port of San Carlos or Ancud,
which lie near together, where it seems there is a good harbor, a
city of 15,000 or 20,000 inhabitants, and ample surgical
facilities. We are not impressed with the force of this argument.
These are not harbors at which vessels from the Atlantic and
Pacific ports are in the habit of stopping. While the master was
apprised by his charts of their existence, it might well be that he
was ignorant of the population and of the accommodations for
disabled seamen. There was no American consul there, and quite
possibly no one familiar with the English language. To convict the
captain of negligence for not calling there, it must be shown that
he knew or should have known that the libellant could obtain proper
treatment. In short, the suggestion of these ports appears to have
been purely an afterthought inspired by the testimony of the
Chilian officer.
With respect to Valparaiso, the case is different. This port
appears to be about 1,500 miles from the place of the accident,
and, with favorable winds, could have been reached in fourteen
days. It is true that the direct course from Cape Horn to San
Francisco passes Valparaiso at a distance of about 600 miles; but
the testimony all shows that, if the
Iroquois had borne
away and hugged the South American coast, she might have put
into
Page 194 U. S. 246
Valparaiso, left the libellant there, and resumed her course
without more than five or six days' detention. Valparaiso is a
large city, with ample hospital facilities and with an American
consul general resident there.
We have no criticism to make of the treatment of libellant
immediately following the injury except that we think he should
have been taken into the cabin, where he could have been more
comfortably provided for. His leg was put in splints as well as the
master and carpenter knew how to do it; he was kept to his berth in
the forecastle, and was fed with such delicacies as the ship's
supplies afforded. No fever set in, and when the splints were taken
off, about five weeks after the accident, and after the vessel had
passed Valparaiso, the leg was found to be in good condition,
except for certain sores which had broken out upon it, caused by
the long confinement in splints. It is true the libellant said the
bones were not united, but he does not seem to have complained of
this to the master; yet, with a careful examination, such as the
master was bound to make, we think he should have detected it. It
may be, however, that the bones failed to unite by reason of the
libellant's being allowed to go upon deck and walk about on
crutches. But, however this may be, it was admitted that, when the
splints were taken off, the vessel was about as near San Francisco
as Valparaiso, and that nothing would have been gained by turning
about at that time.
The real question in the case is whether the master, knowing his
ignorance of surgery, the serious nature of the libellant's injury,
the poor accommodations for him in the forecastle, the liability of
inflammation's setting in and of the bones not uniting, the fact
that he was to be carried through the tropics, where, to an invalid
confined in the forecastle, the heat would be almost intolerable,
he should not, even at the sacrifice of a week, have put into
Valparaiso and left the libellant there in charge of the American
consul. Upon the other hand, libellant made no complaint of his
treatment, did not ask to be taken into an intermediate port, and,
so far as appears, the master
Page 194 U. S. 247
did not know that the wound was not hearing properly. The fact
that the ribs had already united probably induced him to believe
that the leg had also healed, although a careful examination could
not have failed to reveal the truth. We lay no stress upon the fact
that the libellant did not ask to be taken into an intermediate
port. He was a boy, largely ignorant of his rights and duties. The
master was his legal guardian in the sense that it is a part of his
duty to look out for the safety and care of his seamen whether they
make a distinct request for it or not. If, on arriving at
Valparaiso, the bones were found not to have knitted together,
there was at least a chance of securing their union by proper
treatment. If, upon the other hand, they had united, there was a
certainty of securing ultimate recovery by careful nursing and by
the use of facilities which the hospital undoubtedly would have,
and which the ship undoubtedly had not. To put it in a light most
favorable to the master, he speculated upon the chance that the
union of the bones had taken place without seeking to inform
himself of the fact. The courts below held that the master did not
discharge, as he should have done, the claim of humanity which the
serious nature of the injury and the helpless condition of the
libellant imposed upon him.
Upon the whole, while the case is by no means free from doubt,
we are not disposed to disturb the decree of the court below in
holding it to have been the duty of the master to put into an
intermediate port. We regard the case as peculiarly one for the
application of the general rule so often announced by this Court,
both in equity and admiralty cases, that this Court will not
reverse the concurring decisions of two subordinate courts upon
questions of fact unless there be a clear preponderance of evidence
against their conclusions.
The S. B.
Wheeler, 20 Wall. 385;
The Lady
Pike, 21 Wall. 1,
88 U. S. 8;
The
Richmond, 103 U. S. 540;
Towson v. Moore, 173 U. S. 17;
Smith v. Burnett, 173 U. S. 430,
173 U. S.
436.
As the decision of the district court was unanimously affirmed
by the circuit court of appeals, we do not think there is any such
preponderance of evidence as would justify us in disturbing their
conclusions. The decree is therefore
Affirmed.