Where there is evidence of a substantial character bearing upon
the general issue, the question is for the jury even though the
court may think there is a preponderance of evidence for the party
moving for a direction.
Plaintiff is entitled to a verdict if the injury is caused by
any of defendant's employees, and it is not error for the court to
insert "or other employees" in a requested instruction to the jury
that they must find for defendant in absence of negligence on the
part of the particular employees against whom the evidence was
principally directed.
The plaintiff in error is a corporation organized under acts of
Congress and engaged in the business of carrying passengers for
hire in streetcars operated on public highways in the District of
Columbia.
The defendant in error was received as a passenger on one of
such cars, and, in alighting from the one in which she was riding,
was thrown to the ground and seriously injured.
The present action was brought against the railway company to
cover damages on account of such injuries, the theory of the
plaintiff's case being that the car in which she was a passenger
was stopped for her to alight from it, and, while she was stepping
off it, was suddenly and recklessly started, whereby, without
negligence on her part, she was violently thrown to the ground.
The railway company pleaded not guilty as alleged, and the
plaintiff joined issue on that plea.
The case was then tried before the court and a jury, the
plaintiff introducing evidence tending to sustain her theory as to
the cause of the injuries received by her, while the defendant
introduced evidence tending to sustain its theory, which was that
the plaintiff negligently attempted to alight from the car before
it had actually stopped.
Page 194 U. S. 202
At the conclusion of the plaintiff's evidence, the defendant
asked the court to instruct the jury to find in its favor upon the
ground that the evidence was insufficient to justify a verdict for
the plaintiff. That motion was denied, and the defendant excepted.
The defendant then introduced evidence at the close of which the
motion to direct a verdict in its favor was renewed. The motion was
also denied, and the defendant excepted.
It appears from the record that the court then granted two
instructions at the request of the plaintiff and six instructions
asked by the defendant. But none of the instructions so given on
either side was embodied in the bill of exceptions. What they were
this Court has no means of knowing.
There was a verdict and judgment in favor of the plaintiff for
$6,500, and that judgment was affirmed in the Court of Appeals for
the District.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
The railway company assigns for error the refusal of the trial
court to direct the jury to find a verdict in its favor. The
refusal was proper, for there was evidence of a substantial
character bearing upon the general issue as to the negligence of
the defendant, and therefore the question was one peculiarly for
the jury. Even if the court thought that the preponderance of
evidence was for the defendant, it was not bound, simply for that
reason, to have taken the case from the jury, whatever influence
that fact might have in disposing of a motion for a new trial.
It is also assigned for error that the trial court refused to
give the following instructions to the jury:
Page 194 U. S. 203
"In order to entitle the plaintiff to a verdict, the burden is
upon her to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, to the
satisfaction of the jury, that the car stopped for her to alight,
and that, while she was in the act of alighting, the car, through
the negligence of the motorman, started, and thereby threw her to
the pavement, and injured her, and unless, upon the whole evidence,
the jury shall so find, the verdict should be for the
defendant."
The court refused to grant that instruction without inserting
after the word "motorman" the words "or conductor or both." These
words having been inserted, the instruction was granted. The
defendant excepted to the refusal of the court to give the
instruction as asked.
It is contended that it was error prejudicial to the railway
company to have added these words to the instruction asked,
because, by so doing, the jury were, in effect, told that there was
sufficient evidence upon which to base an inquiry whether the
conductor was guilty of negligence, whereas, the company insists,
there was not the slightest proof showing negligence on the part of
the conductor.
We need not review the evidence as to the conductor, for if, as
the defendant insists, there was no evidence whatever showing
negligence upon the part of the conductor, then the modification
made by the court could not have so misled the jury as to prejudice
the defense.
It is assigned for error that the trial court refused to grant
the following instruction asked by the defendant:
"The jury are instructed that, under the evidence in this case,
they cannot find any negligence on the part of the conductor of the
car, and unless they shall find from the evidence that the motorman
was guilty of negligence which caused the accident to plaintiff,
they should find for the defendant, and in considering that
question they cannot infer the existence of any fact not shown to
their satisfaction by the evidence."
Testing the action of the trial court alone by the evidence set
out in the bill of exceptions, we cannot hold that the
instruction
Page 194 U. S. 204
in question was improperly denied, for that instruction took it
for granted that there was not a scintilla of proof -- none
whatever -- of negligence on the part of the conductor, and that
the negligence, if there was any, was wholly or exclusively that of
the motorman. The court below was not bound to submit the case to
the jury in that way. It was not bound to make a particular part of
the evidence the subject of a special instruction. Under the
circumstances, it properly submitted to the jury the whole case as
to the alleged negligence of the company, leaving them to determine
whether, under all the evidence, the injury was caused by the
negligence of its employees or any of them. The plaintiff was
entitled to a verdict if the injury was caused by the negligence of
any employee.
Pomeroy v. Boston & Maine Railroad, 172
Mass. 92.
In the argument at the bar, much was said by counsel as to the
principles of law announced by the Court of Appeals, particularly
in respect of the application of the maxim "
res ipsa
loquitur." Our attention has been called to many authorities
upon that branch of the case. But we deem it unnecessary to extend
this opinion by a review of those authorities; for, even if the
Court of Appeals erred in its application of that maxim -- and we
express no opinion upon that point -- the judgment should not be
reversed, since, as we have seen, the record before us does not
show that the trial court committed any error to the substantial
prejudice of the defendant.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of
the Supreme Court of the District must therefore be affirmed.
It is so ordered.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE and MR. JUSTICE McKENNA dissented.
