This Court follows the state court as to the validity of a state
statute under the constitution of the state, and the question here
is whether the state constitution in authorizing the law encounters
the Constitution of the United States.
A state has absolute power over the sale of intoxicating
liquors, and may prohibit it altogether or conditionally, as it
sees fit.
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.
S. 623.
The provisions in articles 3384-3394, Revised Statutes, and
articles 402-407, Penal Code of Texas, as to the submission to the
people of the question of prohibiting or allowing the sale of
liquor in different sections of the state are not contrary to any
of the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution
of the United States, because they discriminate in favor of a vote
for prohibition.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Page 193 U. S. 508
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.
The plaintiff in error was convicted of selling intoxicating
liquors contrary to vote of his precinct prohibiting such sale.
This vote was in pursuance of a statute which the plaintiff in
error alleges to be contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States. The question was raised at the
outset by a motion to quash, which was overruled, subject to
exception; the exception was overruled on appeal, and the case was
brought here by writ of error.
The Constitution of Texas, art. 16, sec. 20, required the
legislature to enact a law by which the majority of qualified
voters of any county, justice's precinct, town, or city, from time
to time might determine whether the sale of intoxicating liquors
should be prohibited. The legislature thereupon enacted what now
are articles 3384-3399 of the Revised Statutes, and articles
402-407 of the Penal Code. These all are assailed, but the
particular object of attack is art. 3395.
Article 3395 is as follows:
"Art. 3395 [3238]. The failure to carry prohibition in a county
shall not prevent an election for the same being immediately
thereafter held in a justice's precinct or subdivision of such
county as designated by the commissioners' court, or of any town or
city in such county, nor shall the failure to carry prohibition in
a town or city prevent an election from being immediately
thereafter held for the entire justice's precinct or county in
which said town or city is situated; nor shall the holding of an
election in a justice's precinct in any way prevent the holding
Page 193 U. S. 509
of an election immediately thereafter for the entire county in
which the justice's precinct is situated; but when prohibition has
been carried at an election ordered for the entire county, no
election on the question of prohibition shall be thereafter ordered
in any justice's precinct, town, or city of said county until after
prohibition has been defeated at a subsequent election for the same
purpose, ordered and held for the entire county, in accordance with
the provisions of this title, nor in any case where prohibition has
carried in any justice's precinct shall an election on the question
of prohibition be ordered thereafter in any town or city of such
precinct until after prohibition has been defeated at a subsequent
election, ordered and held for such entire precinct."
It will be seen that this section discriminates in favor of
those who vote for prohibition, and the argument is that, since the
legislature was not authorized to pass a prohibitory law,
Dawson v. State, 25 Tex.App. 670, 674, 675, but was
required to leave the question to a local vote, it necessarily
created a pure democracy to that extent, and therefore could not
interfere with the equality of the voters in their right to propose
or carry a law. Many questions would have to be answered before so
speculative a piece of ratiocination could be followed. But we
think it may be dealt with in short space, so far as is necessary
to decide this case.
We follow the state court, of course, as to the state
constitution, and assume that the law is not invalid under that.
The question for us is whether, if the state constitution
undertakes to authorize such a law, it encounters the Constitution
of the United States. It is a question of the power of the state as
a whole.
Missouri v. Dockery, 191 U.
S. 165,
191 U. S. 171. But
the state has power to prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors
altogether, if it sees fit,
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.
S. 623, and that being so it has power to prohibit it
conditionally. It does not infringe the Constitution by giving
those in favor of the sale a chance which it might have denied. It
is true that the greater does not always include the less. A man
may give his
Page 193 U. S. 510
property away, yet he may not contract with a carrier to take
the risk of the latter's negligently injuring it, or part with it
on the valuable consideration of a wager. But, in general, the rule
holds good. It does here. The state has absolute power over the
subject. It does not abridge that power by adopting the form of
reference to a local vote. It may favor prohibition to just such
degree as it chooses, and to that end may let in a local vote upon
the subject as much or as little as it may please. There is no such
overmastering consideration of expediency attaching everywhere and
always to the form of voting, still less is there any such
principle to be drawn from the Fourteenth Amendment, as requires
the two sides of a vote on prohibition to be treated with equal
favor by the state, the subject matter of the vote being wholly
within the state's control. The only chance for the plaintiff in
error to prevail was under the state constitution. He has no case
under the Constitution of the United States.
Judgment affirmed.