An adjudication by commissioners under sec. 4 of the Act of
March 3, 1807, amending the Act of March 2, 1805, for settlement of
claims of land in the Territory of Orleans and Louisiana, for an
exact quantity of land already occupied by the claimant by one
claiming under a grant of the former sovereign, and which was
confirmed by the Act of April 29, 1816, so vested the title in the
claimant that a patent issued by the government in 1900 to the
heirs of the claimant will not prevail against a title properly
acquired meanwhile by adverse possession based upon a tax sale,
notwithstanding no survey other than the general survey of 1856 was
made after the confirmation.
This action was brought by the Eighteenth Judicial District
Court, Parish of Acadia, State of Louisiana, by plaintiff in error,
to have himself declared the owner of a tract of land containing
870.06 acres, described as section 41, township 7 south, range 1
east. Subsequently he amended his petition and claimed one-tenth
individually and nine-tenths as administrator of the succession of
Bennet Joplin. He traced title in both capacities to Bennet Joplin,
to whom the land was confirmed by the Act of Congress, approved
March 3, 1807, entitled "An Act Respecting Claims of Land in the
Territories of Orleans and Louisiana." 2 Stat. 440. This act was an
amendment to the Act of March 2, 1805, 2 Stat. 324, which provided
for ascertaining and adjusting the titles and claims to land within
the same territory. The purpose of both acts was to recognize and
establish the titles possessed by the inhabitants of that territory
prior to its acquisition by the United States.
Section 4 of the act of 1807 provided:
"That the commissioners appointed or to be appointed for the
purpose of ascertaining the rights of persons claiming land in the
Territories of Orleans and Louisiana shall have full powers to
decide according to the laws and established usages and customs of
the French and Spanish governments, upon
Page 192 U. S. 95
all claims to lands within their respective districts, where the
claim is made by any person or persons, or the legal representative
of any person or persons who were, on the 20th day of December, one
thousand eight hundred and three, inhabitants of Louisiana, and for
a tract not exceeding the quantity of acres contained in a league
square, and which does not include either a lead mine or salt
spring, which decision of the commissioners, when in favor of the
claimant, shall be final against the United States, any act of
Congress to the contrary notwithstanding."
A patent was issued July 16, 1900, in favor of Bennet Joplin,
heirs and assigns. Stating the recitals of the patent and some
other facts, the Supreme Court of Louisiana said:
"That it [the patent] was granted in accordance with the
provisions of the act of Congress of the third of March, 1807. It
declares there had been deposited in the General Land Office of the
United States a patent certificate numbered 1499, issued by the
register and receiver of the United States Land Office, on the 25th
of May, one thousand nine hundred, whereby it appeared that the
private land claim of Bennet Joplin, being numbered one thousand
nine hundred and twenty-seven, class B, in the report of the old
board of commissioners for the Western District of the Territory of
Orleans, was confirmed by the said commissioners under the
authority conferred upon them by the act of Congress approved on
the 3d of March, 1807, entitled 'An Act Respecting Claims to Land
in the Territories of Orleans and Louisiana;' that the claim had
been regularly surveyed and designated as section forty-nine in
township seven south, of range one west, and section forty-one in
township seven south, of range one east, of the Louisiana Meridian,
in the Southwestern District of Louisiana, containing eight hundred
and seventy acres and six hundredths of an acre, as appeared by a
plat and descriptive notes on file (in the General Land Office)
thereof, duly examined and approved by James Lewis, Surveyor
Page 192 U. S. 96
General for Louisiana, on the 9th day of May, one thousand nine
hundred; that this plat and descriptive notes were inserted and
made part of the patent."
"The plat and descriptive notes referred to were signed, as
recited, by James Lewis, surveyor general of Louisiana, on the 9th
of May, 1900."
"Immediately following the plat, the surveyor general recites
that it represents the survey of the private land claim of Bennet
Joplin, confirmed by the old board of commissioners for the Western
District of Louisiana, in pursuance of the authority conferred upon
them by the fourth section of the Act of Congress approved March 3,
1807, entitled 'An Act Respecting Claims to Lands in the
Territories of Orleans and Louisiana,' as appeared by their
confirmation certificate No. B, 1927, dated March 11, 1812. After
making this recital, the surveyor general says: 'The following
being a description of the survey taken from the approved field
notes of N. B. Phelps, deputy surveyor.' He then gives the field
notes of the survey."
"At the end of the document, under date of May 9th, 1900, are
the words 'examined and approved,' followed by the signature of the
surveyor general."
The defendants Chachere and Boagni depended for title upon
purchases from Victor C. Sittig, by authentic acts duly recorded.
Sitting purchased the same at tax sale in 1871. The defendants
pleaded that Sitting and themselves had the uninterrupted,
peaceable, and actual possession of the land in good faith since
1871; had erected improvements thereon and paid taxes. They also
pleaded the prescription of three, four, five, ten, and twenty
years. Victor Sitting was called in warranty and made the same
defenses.
The district court decreed that the claim of plaintiff be
rejected, the plea of prescription set up by defendants be
sustained, and they be quieted in their title and possession of the
land. The supreme court of the state affirmed the decree, and the
case was then brought here. Other facts are stated in the
opinion.
Page 192 U. S. 100
MR. JUSTICE McKENNA delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented is the effect of the defense of adverse
possession and the plea of prescription. The contention of
plaintiff in error is that such defense cannot avail against a
United States patent. In other words, until the issue of the
patent, the title was in the United States, and was unaffected by
the occupation of the defendants.
Counsel say:
"The confirmation to Joplin by act of Congress was only as to
quantity, and not to any specifically described tract of land.
There was only an equitable interest in Joplin and his heirs until
a survey should be made and approved by the surveyor general,
segregating his part from the public domain, and from conflicting
claims. The survey of 1856 was not approved until May 9, 1900, when
the receiver and register approved said survey, giving to Joplin
and to conflicting claimants the tracts to which they were entitled
under the confirmation. It was only then that the complete legal
title was vested in Joplin and his heirs to the tract of land in
controversy. It was only from this time that prescription
commences."
Is the contention of counsel justified? They cite
Langdeau v.
Hanes, 21 Wall. 521, and
Morrow v.
Whitney, 95 U. S. 551. To
determine the application of those cases, there are important facts
to be considered. The Supreme Court of Louisiana said:
"We do not think there is any dispute between the parties as to
the facts. That, on the 12th of March, 1812, the board of
commissioners appointed under section 4 of the Act of Congress
approved March 3, 1807, confirmed to Bennet Joplin under
certificate No. 1,927, by virtue of occupancy and settlement under
Joseph Chevalier Poiret, 913.98 acres of land in Bayou Mallet
Woods, in the County of Opelousas. That on April 29, 1816, Congress
reciting the various acts bearing upon the subject (Act of March
10, 1812 [2 Stat. 692, c. 38], Act of February 27, 1813, and Act of
April,
Page 192 U. S. 101
1814), passed an act for the confirmation of certain land claims
in the Western District of the State of Louisiana, and that, under
section 1 of that act, it was enacted"
"that the claims marked 'B.' described in the reports of the
commissioners for the Western District of the State of Louisiana,
formerly Territory of Orleans, and recommended by them for
confirmation, be, and the same are hereby, confirmed."
"That the claim of Bennet Joplin covered by certificate No.
1,927 of the board of commissioners, was confirmed in favor of
Joplin by that act of Congress. That, although the claim was so
confirmed by act of Congress, no patent was issued for the land by
the United States government until July, 1900."
In other words, the land claimed by Poiret was identified by his
possession. It contained a definite quantity. Fractions of acres
were even regarded, and almost necessarily. The right of a claimant
depended upon possession, and naturally its extent was marked by
definite boundaries. How else could a claim have any strength at
all -- any right to confirmation at all? The certificates issued by
the commissioners were denominated grants (sec. 7), and they were
required to designate a tract of land (sec. 6). Section 7, it is
true, provided for a survey. The provision is "that the tracts of
land thus granted by the commissioners shall be surveyed at the
expense of the parties, under the direction of the surveyor
general" in all cases where authenticated plats of the land, as
surveyed by the French, Spanish, and American governments,
respectively, shall not have been filed with the proper register
and recorder, or shall not appear on the public records of the
territories. The surveying officer was required to transmit general
and particular plats of land thus surveyed to the proper register
and recorder, and copies to the Secretary of the Treasury. The
duties of the officers under the act may be summarized a follows:
(1) The commissioners to investigate the claim, and, if they
confirmed it, to issue a certificate thereof, and transmit a
transcript of their final decision to the Secretary of the
Treasury. (2) The register and receiver, upon the filing of the
Page 192 U. S. 102
certificate with him and a plat of the land being also filed
with him by the surveyor general or officer acting as surveyor
general, should issue a certificate which, being transmitted to the
Secretary of the Treasury, would entitle the party to a patent. (3)
The survey of the land by the surveyor general or officer acting as
such. (4) Reports by the Secretary of the Treasury to Congress "for
their final determination hereon, in the manner and at the time
heretofore prescribed by law for that purpose." There is no
evidence that the register and receiver issued a certificate other
than that mentioned in the patent. The commissioners performed the
duties required of them and the Secretary of the Treasury performed
his. And a survey was made of the land in 1856.
Under these facts, did the title pass by the confirmation
expressed in the Act of Congress of April 29, 1816, 3 Stat. 328,
or, at the latest, upon the survey in 1856, or did it pass by the
patent in July, 1900? For answer, we may refer to the cases cited
by the plaintiff in error.
In
Langdeau v. Hanes, the contest was between a title
claimed by virtue of the act of Congress, March 26, 1804, which
confirmed claims to lands in the district of Vincennes, and a title
claimed by adverse possession. It was provided by the act of
Congress that a person to whom land is confirmed, whenever his
claim shall have been located and surveyed, shall be entitled to
the certificate from the register and receiver, which certificate
shall entitle him to a patent. The tract in dispute was surveyed in
1820, but a patent was not issued until 1872. The defendant's claim
of title rested on an adverse possession of thirty years. The state
court held that the act of confirmation of 1807 was a present
grant, and became so far operative and complete as to convey the
legal title when the land was located and surveyed by the United
States in 1820; second, the patent was not of itself a grant of the
land, but only evidence of a grant; third, the adverse possession
of the defendant was a bar to the recovery by the plaintiff. These
propositions were affirmed by this Court. The
Page 192 U. S. 103
Court held that the act of Congress of 1804 was a recognition
and discharge of the obligation incurred by the government upon
acquiring the territory from Virginia, to protect and confirm the
possession and titles of the inhabitants to their property. And it
was held that it was competent for Congress to provide how that it
should be done, and Congress required a presentation of the claims
to the register and receiver of the land office, constituted them
commissioners to pass upon the claims "according to justice and
equity," and to transmit to the Secretary of the Treasury a
transcript of their decisions with his report. The Secretary of the
Treasury submitted the decisions and the report to Congress, as he
has required to do, and Congress passed the act of 1807 to confirm
them. The Court said:
"This confirmation was the fulfillment of the condition
stipulated in the deed of cession so far as the claimants were
concerned. It was an authoritative recognition by record of the
ancient possession and title of their ancestor, and gave to them
such assurance of the validity of that possession and title as
would be always respected by the courts of the country. The
subsequent clause of the act providing for the issue of a patent to
the claimants when their claim was located and surveyed took
nothing from the force of the confirmation."
"In the legislation of Congress, a patent has a double
operation. It is a conveyance by the government when the government
has any interest to convey, but where it is issued upon the
confirmation of a claim of a previously existing title, it is
documentary evidence, having the dignity of a record, of the
existence of that title or of such equities respecting the claim as
justify its recognition and confirmation. The instrument is not the
less efficacious as evidence of previously existing rights because
it also embodies words of release or transfer from the
government."
"In the present case, the patent would have been of great value
to the claimants as record evidence of the ancient possession and
title of their ancestor, and of the recognition and
confirmation
Page 192 U. S. 104
by the United States, and would have obviated in any
controversies at law respecting the land the necessity of other
proof, and would thus have been to them an instrument of quiet and
security. But it would have added nothing to the force of the
confirmation. The survey required for the patent was only to secure
certainty of description in the instrument, and to inform the
government of the quantity reserved to private parties from the
domain ceded by Virginia."
"The whole error of the plaintiff arises from his theory that
the fee to the land in controversy passed to the United States by
the cession from Virginia, and that a patent was essential to its
transfer to the claimants, whereas, with respect to the lands
covered by the possession of the inhabitants and settlers mentioned
in the deed of cession, the fee never passed to the United States,
and if it had passed, and a mere equitable title had remained in
the claimants after the cession, the confirmation by the act of
1807 would have operated as a release to them of the interest of
the United States. A legislative confirmation of a claim to land is
a recognition of the validity of such claim, and operates as
effectually as a grant or quitclaim from the government."
This doctrine was repeated in
Morrow v. Whitney,
95 U. S. 551. The
question arose upon the ruling of the trial court refusing to admit
a patent of the United States in evidence. Sustaining the ruling,
this Court said:
"In this case, the patent would have been of great value to the
claimant. It would have enabled him, without other proof, to
maintain his title in the tribunals of the country. Founded as it
would have been upon a survey by the government, it would have
removed the doubt as to the boundaries of the tract, which always
arises where their establishment rests in the uncertain
recollection of witnesses as to ancient possession. It would thus
have proved to its possessor an instrument of quiet and security,
but it would not have added anything to the interest vested by the
confirmation.
Ryan v. Carter, 93 U. S. 78.
"
Page 192 U. S. 105
These cases are not in conflict with
Gibson
v. Chouteau, 13 Wall. 93, as was observed in
Langdeau v. Hanes. The land in controversy had been part
of the public lands of the United States. The title of Gibson was
derived under the act of Congress of February 17, 1815, for the
relief of the inhabitants of the County of New Madrid, in the
Territory of Missouri, who had suffered by earthquakes. 3 Stat.
211. James T. O'Carroll obtained permission from the Spanish
authorities to settle on vacant lands in the District of New
Madrid, in the Territory of Louisiana, and in pursuance of the
permission, he settled upon a tract embracing about 1,000 arpents
of land in that part of the country which afterwards comprised the
County of New Madrid in the Territory of Missouri. The land settled
upon, to the extent of 640 acres, was confirmed to O'Carroll by
different acts of Congress. In 1812, the land was injured by an
earthquake, and, upon proof of the fact, the recorder of land
titles at St. Louis gave a certificate to that effect, which
authorized the location of a like quantity on any of the public
lands of the Territory of Missouri, a sale of which was authorized
by law. Under this certificate, the land in dispute was located.
The land located had been previously surveyed, but for some cause
the survey and plat were not returned to the recorder until August,
1841. The recorder then issued a patent certificate to "James T.
O'Carroll or his legal representatives." The survey was not
approved by the Commissioner of the General Land Office, because it
did not show its interferences with conflicting claimants. A new
survey and plat were made, showing interferences, and were filed
with the recorder on the 26th of March, 1862, and a new patent
certificate issued. In the following June, the patent of the United
States was issued to Mary McRee, who had acquired the interest of
the locator by various mesne conveyances. In August following, she
conveyed to Gibson. Against the title thus acquired, among other
defenses, adverse possession for the period prescribed by the
statute of Missouri was pleaded. The plea was sustained. The
judgment was reversed by this Court.
Page 192 U. S. 106
It is obvious that there is a clear distinction between the case
and
Langdeau v. Hanes and
Morrow v. Whitney. The
act of 1815 did not confirm to O'Carroll the tract of land which he
obtained from the Spanish authorities. It only enabled him or his
representatives to locate a like quantity of the public land, and a
segregation of that quantity and its exact identification were
necessary, and this did not occur until the issue of the patent in
1862. The patent therefore was not the mere formal assurance of a
title that had been conveyed by another government, but it was the
conveyance of the title of this government after conditions
performed, which authorized but did not anticipate it, nor were
they its equivalent. The case at bar therefore does not come under
the precedent of
Gibson v. Chouteau; it comes under that
of
Langdeau v. Hanes and
Morrow v. Whitney.
Plaintiff in error claims under Joplin, who claimed under
Poiret, who claimed under the French government. And it was the
title to a tract of land thus claimed that the commissioners under
the act of 1807 adjudicated and granted, and it was that title
which was confirmed by the Act of April 29, 1816.
What element, then, is wanting? Plaintiff in error says the
identification of the land -- its complete definition by boundaries
-- and until this was done, the title was in the United States. We
need not dispute the principle upon which the contention rests. We
think its conditions were satisfied. Poiret's title was obtained by
occupation, and the right of his successor, Joplin, depended upon
that, and by that the award of the commissioners could only have
been measured. It is not conceivable that the boundaries of the
tract were not ascertained by them. Their certificate, as was seen,
expressed an exact quantity, 918.98 acres, and having a frontage of
1,080 arpents. The evidence before the commissioners is not
exhibited, but there was a survey in 1856. The remarks of the
Supreme Court of Louisiana are therefore apposite:
"It is evident that Poiret was shown to the board to have
already occupied and settled a particular body of land for the
time
Page 192 U. S. 107
stated, and to have
already had an existing right
or privilege to a particular tract. The identity of the tract
confirmed must have been fixed by evidence before the board, and
the survey which followed was unquestionably based upon that
evidence, preserved and made known to the surveyor. The Joplin
claim under Poiret was not based upon the survey, but the survey
was based upon the existing claim, and simply identified the land
to which Poiret and Joplin were entitled by antecedent occupancy
and settlement."
Speaking of the survey, the Court said:
"If, however, a survey of the claim was necessary in order to
complete the transfer of ownership of this property to Joplin, we
are satisfied that a survey of the same was made and approved by
the surveyor general, W. J. McCulloh, as far back as 1856. The
present surveyor general of Louisiana refers to the survey and
field notes of Phelps as having been approved, but not as a matter
of original approval by himself, as the plaintiff seems to contend.
In the act of sale of this land under which the plaintiff claims
from James W. Joplin to James H. Houston, Jr., the land transferred
is referred to as a 'Spanish grant' with the added words (see
parish map and a list of private land claims, where the above
described property is well defined as belonging to Bennet Jopling).
We have before us a copy of the parish map here referred to, with
the different private claims (among others that of Bennet Jopling)
distinctly set out, and the surveys on which they were located
minutely detailed, certified to as far back as 1856 by the surveyor
general. It may be that it is not strictly and technically in
evidence, but it is before us by reference in one of the acts, and
were we not to act upon it the only effect would be to remand
uselessly the case in order to have it formally introduced."
Bennet Joplin, it was testified, died before the assessment was
made upon which the tax sale upon which the title of the defendants
in error depended, and the validity of the assessment therefore is
denied, because it was not made in the name of the owner, as
required by the statute of the State of 1870.
Page 192 U. S. 108
The assessment is also attacked for nonconformity with the
statutes in other particulars. In passing on the questions thus
raised, the Supreme Court of Louisiana construed the statutes of
the state differently from plaintiff in error, and answered all the
questions on grounds not federal, and which therefore we need not
discuss.
Judgment affirmed.
