A decree rendered upon a bill in equity brought under the Act of
March 2, 1889, 25 Stat. 850, to have patents for land declared void
as forfeited and to establish the title of the United States to the
land is a bar to a subsequent bill brought against the same
defendants to recover the same land on the ground that it was
excepted from the original grant as an Indian reservation.
As a general rule, a party asserting a right to suit is barred
by a judgment or decree upon the merits as to all
media
concludendi or grounds for asserting the right known when the
suit was brought.
The general rule is, where a bill is dismissed, to dismiss the
cross-bill also.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.
These are cross-appeals from a decree of the United States
circuit court. The bill was brought for the purpose of having
certain patents of land issued by the United States declared void.
These patents were issued on April 2, 1873, to the Oregon Central
Military Road Company, under an Act of Congress of July 2, 1864, 13
Stat. 355, granting lands to the State of Oregon to aid in the
construction of a wagon road, and in pursuance of
Page 192 U. S. 356
a grant of the same lands by the state to the road company on
October 24, 1864. The California & Oregon Land Company claims
through mesne conveyances from the patentee. The ground of the
bill, so far as the argument before us is concerned, is that the
lands in controversy were within the Klamath Indian Reservation,
and therefore were "lands heretofore reserved to the United States"
within the proviso, reserving such lands in the grant of July 2,
1864. As our decision is upon grounds independent of this question,
it is unnecessary to state the legislation and facts upon which
that controversy turns.
One of the pleas of the land company is that, on August 30,
1889, the United States filed an earlier bill in the United States
circuit court in respect of these same lands, praying, like the
present one, that the patents be declared void, that the land
company pleaded matters showing that the patents were valid, and
also that it was a purchaser for valuable consideration, without
notice, and that, on March 29, 1893, a final decree was entered,
finding the facts to be as alleged by the land company, including
the allegation that the land company was a
bona fide
purchaser for value and dismissing the bill on that ground. The
land company also filed a cross-bill in the present suit to enjoin
the allotments of said lands and the issue of patents for the same
to the Indians. The cross-bill was demurred to.
The circuit court sustained the demurrer, adjudged the plea to
be bad, and entered a decree declaring the patents void. We have to
deal only with the before-mentioned plea.
The former bill was brought in pursuance of the Act of Congress
of March 2, 1889, 25 Stat. 850. This act recited that the Oregon
Legislature had memorialized Congress, and had alleged that certain
of the wagon roads in the state were not completed within the time
required by the grants of the United States, and therefore enacted
that suits should be brought in the United States circuit court
against all claimants of any interest under the grant of 1864, and
certain others
"to determine the questions of the seasonable and proper
completion of said roads in accordance with the terms of the
granting
Page 192 U. S. 357
acts. . . . The legal effect of the several certificates of the
Governors of the State of Oregon of the completion of said roads,
and the right of resumption of such granted lands by the United
States."
The court was authorized to render judgment of forfeiture
"saving and preserving the rights of all
bona fide
purchasers of either of said grants or of any portion of said
grants for a valuable consideration, if any such there be. Said
suit or suits shall be tried and adjudicated in like manner and by
the same principles and rules of jurisprudence as other suits in
equity are therein tried."
(The Act of March 2, 1896, 29 Stat. 42, c. 39, also confirmed
the title of
bona fide purchasers.)
By § 2,
"the State of Oregon, and any person or corporation claiming any
interest under or through the grants aforesaid in the lands to be
affected by said suit or suits, and whether made a party thereto or
not, may intervene therein by sworn petition to defend his interest
therein, as against the United States or against each other, and
affecting the said question of forfeiture, and may, upon such
petition for intervention, also put in issue and have adjudicated
and determined any other question, whether of law or of fact, which
may be in dispute between said intervener and the United States,
and affecting the right or title to any part of the lands claimed
to have been embraced within the grants. . . . Should the lands
embraced within said grants or either of them, or any portion
thereof, be declared forfeited by the final determination of said
suit or suits, the same shall be immediately restored to the public
domain and become subject to disposal under the general land laws,
and should the final determination of said suit or suits maintain
the right of the aforesaid wagon road grantees or their assigns to
the lands embraced in said grants, the Secretary of the Interior
shall forthwith adjust said grants in accordance with such
determination, and shall cause patents to be issued for the lands
inuring to said grantees under said wagon road grants and which
have been heretofore unpatented."
On the general principles of our law, it is tolerably plain that
the decree in the suit under the foregoing statute would
Page 192 U. S. 358
be a bar. The parties, the subject matter, and the relief sought
all were the same. It is said, to be sure, that the United States
now is suing in a different character from that in which it brought
the former suit. There, it sued for itself; here it sues on behalf
of the Indians. But that is not true in any sense having legal
significance. It would be true of a suit by an executor as compared
with a suit by the same person on his own behalf. But that is
because, in theory of law, the executor continues the persona of
the testator, and therefore is a different person from the natural
man who fills the office. This is recognized in
Leggott v.
Great Northern Ry., 1 Q.B. Div. 599, 606, cited for the United
States. Here, the plaintiff is the same person that brought the
former bill, whatever the difference of the interest intended to be
asserted.
See Werlein v. New Orleans, 177 U.
S. 390,
177 U. S.
400-401. The best that can be said, apart from the act
just quoted, to distinguish the two suits is that now the United
States puts forward a new ground for its prayer. Formerly it sought
to avoid the patents by way of forfeiture. Now it seeks the same
conclusion by a different means -- that is to say, by evidence that
the lands originally were excepted from the grant. But in this as
in the former suit, it seeks to establish its own title to the
fee.
It may be the law in Scotland that a judgment is not a bar to a
second attempt to reach the same result by a different
medium
concludendi. Phosphate Sewage Co. v. Molleson, 5 Ct.
of Sess.Cas. (4th Ser.) 1125, 1139, although in the same case on
appeal, Lord Blackburn seemed to doubt the proposition if the facts
were known before.
S.C., 4 App.Cas. 801, 820. But the
whole tendency of our decisions is to require a plaintiff to try
his whole cause of action and his whole case at one time. He cannot
even split up his claim,
Fetter v. Beale, 1 Salk. 11;
Trask v. Hartford & New Haven Railroad, 2 Allen 331;
Freeman, Judgments, 4th ed. §§ 238, 241; and,
a fortiori,
he cannot divide the grounds of recovery. Unless the statute of
1889 put the former suit upon a peculiar footing, the United States
was bound then to bring forward all the grounds it had for
declaring the patents void, and when the bill was dismissed, was
barred as to all by the decree.
<|177 U.S. 390|>Werlein
v. New Orleans,
Page 192 U. S. 359
177 U. S. 390;
Bienville Water Supply Co. v. Mobile, 186 U.
S. 212,
186 U. S.
216-217;
Hoseason v. Keegen, 178 Mass. 247;
Wildman v. Wildman, 70 Conn. 700, 710;
Sayers v.
Auditor General, 124 Mich. 259;
Foster v. Hinson, 76
Iowa 714, 720;
State v. Brown, 64 Md. 199;
Boyd v.
Boyd, 53 App.Div. 152, 159;
Shaffer v. Scuddy, 14
La.Ann. 576;
Henderson v. Henderson, 3 Hare, 100, 115.
The question, then, is narrowed to whether the statute
established a special and peculiar rule of procedure for the cases
to be brought under it. No doubt it is true that the ground of
recovery that was prominent in the mind of Congress was an alleged
forfeiture of the grant, and therefore, not unnaturally, in § 2,
the result of a forfeiture is stated. But a forfeiture was not the
only ground on which the United States might have prevailed. All
claimants of any interest were at liberty to intervene and to have
any other question affecting the title settled, and if any such
other question had been raised and resolved in favor of the United
States, of course, the same result would have followed. But it
cannot be supposed that the United States was not at liberty to
raise the same issues which defendants and interveners were given
the right to raise. There is no reason for such a discrimination,
and its right was admitted at the argument. But if the United
States was at liberty to state all its grounds for claiming the
land, it was bound to do so on "the same principles and rules of
jurisprudence as other suits in equity are therin tried," by which
principles and rules, as has been shown, it was expressly enacted
that the case should be tried. So far from establishing a special
rule, the act shows an intent to settle the title once for all. It
was dealing with several grants which might present different
cases. It stated in terms that the suits should be brought to
determine not merely the question of forfeiture, but "the right of
resumption of such granted lands by the United States," § 1, and it
provided that, if the suits should maintain the right of the wagon
road grantees or their assigns to the lands embraced in said
grants, the Secretary of the Interior should adjust the grants in
accordance with the determination, and issue patents for the lands
to which the grantees
Page 192 U. S. 360
were entitled and which had not been patented.
See also
the language of the Act of March 2, 1896, § 1, 29 Stat. 42, c. 39.
It would not be consistent with the good faith of the United States
to attribute to it the intent to keep a concealed weapon in reserve
in case these suits should fail. On the face of the act, it seems
to us apparent that these suits were intended to quiet or to end
the title of the wagon road grantees.
As the bill must be dismissed, there seems to be no reason why
the cross-bill should not be dismissed, according to the general
rule in such cases.
<|11 Wall. 108|>Dows v. Chicago,
11 Wall. 108. It is true that the cross-bill is not merely in aid
of the defense, and that relief has been given upon a cross-bill in
such a case, notwithstanding the dismissal of the bill.
Holgate
v. Eaton, 116 U. S. 33,
116 U. S. 42;
Blythe v. Hinckley, 84 F. 228, 236-237. But, apart from
any other questions, it may be presumed that, after this decision,
no action will be attempted based on a denial of the land company's
title to the fee.
Decree reversed and case remanded to the circuit court with
instructions to enter a decree dismissing the bill and
cross-bill.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER, with whom concurred MR. JUSTICE HARLAN
and MR. JUSTICE BROWN, dissenting:
It will be assumed that the lands in controversy had been
reserved for the Indians prior to the taking effect of the grant,
"except so far as it may be necessary to locate the route of said
road through the same, in which case the right of way is
granted."
The act of 1866 made provision for supplying deficiencies
"occasioned by any lands sold or reserved, or to which the rights
of preemption or homestead have attached, or which for any reason
were not subject to said grant."
March 2, 1889, Congress directed the Attorney General to cause a
suit or suits to be brought against all persons, firms, and
corporations claiming interests in lands granted to the State of
Oregon, by three enumerated acts of Congress, including that under
consideration:
"To determine the questions
Page 192 U. S. 361
of the seasonable and proper completion of said roads in
accordance with the terms of the granting acts, either in whole or
in part, the legal effect of the several certificates of the
governors of the State of Oregon of the completion of said roads,
and the right of resumption of such granted lands by the United
States, and to obtain judgments, which the court is hereby
authorized to render, declaring forfeited to the United States, all
of such lands as are coterminous with the part or parts of either
of said wagon roads which were not constructed in accordance with
requirements of the granting acts, and setting aside patents which
have issued for any such lands, saving and preserving the rights of
all
bona fide purchasers of either of said grants or of
any portion of said grants for a valuable consideration, if any
such there be. . . ."
By the second section of the act, it was provided that the state
or any person or corporation claiming under the grant might
intervene and defend his interest therein, and might
"also put in issue and have adjudicated and determined any other
question, whether of law or of fact, which may be in dispute
between said intervener and the United States, and affecting the
right or title to any part of the lands claimed to have been
embraced within the grants of lands by the United States to or for
either of said wagon roads. Should the lands embraced within said
grants or either of them or any portion thereof be declared
forfeited by the final determination of said suit or suits, the
same shall be immediately restored to the public domain, and become
subject to disposal under the general land laws, and should the
final determination of said suit or suits maintain the right of the
aforesaid wagon road grantees or their assigns to the lands
embraced in said grants, the Secretary of the Interior shall
forthwith adjust said grants in accordance with such
determination,"
etc.
The act related to three wagon road grants, only one of which
was involved in this case. This bill sought a forfeiture of the
entire grant for reasons stated, and no other matter was put in
issue. The bill covered the lands in the reservation and many
thousands of acres besides. It seems to me
Page 192 U. S. 362
clear that Congress did not intend that the United States should
ask a forfeiture and at the same time litigate exceptions from the
grant. The second section is wholly inconsistent with such a
theory. The issue was a single issue, and defendants did not seek
to have it expanded. The suit was decided in favor of defendants,
148 U.S. <|148 U.S. 31|>31, and the present bill having been
filed in respect of the lands of the Indian reservation, it is now
contended that the former decree is a bar to its prosecution.
I do not think so. The former case sought a forfeiture of the
entire grant. This bill, accepting the conclusion that there could
be no forfeiture, simply sought relief as to particular lands which
had not been embraced in the grant and did not pass thereby, but
which had been patented in error. Conceding that Congress may pass
title subject to Indian occupancy, it did not do so; but these
lands were reserved from the grant, while in terms the right of way
through the reservation was granted. Had the decree in the prior
case been for the government, this right of way would have been
declared forfeited with other lands included in the grant, but, as
the case turned out, the right of way passed while the reservation
remained unaffected. The cause of action in this suit is entirely
different, and governed by entirely different considerations from
the cause of action in the prior suit. And I think the decree in
the former suit operates as an estoppel only as to the point or
question actually litigated and determined.
There is no hardship involved in this view, as while the United
States were shut up to the question of forfeitures, defendants were
permitted to raise any questions they chose, and did not see fit to
bring any other into the case.
My brothers HARLAN and BROWN concur in this dissent.