A motion to quash an indictment for murder was made on the
ground that all colored men had been excluded from the grand jury
solely because of their race and color, and because of a certain
provision of the state constitution alleged to deny them the
franchise in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. These
provisions were set out. The motion, about two octavo pages in
length, was stricken from the files by the state court on the
ground of prolixity, members of the grand jury not having to have
the qualifications of electors.
Held, on error, that the reference of the motion to the
constitutional requirements concerning electors as one of the
motives for the exclusion of the blacks did not warrant such action
as would prevent the court from passing on constitutional rights
which it was the object of the motion to assert, and that the
exclusion of blacks from the grand jury as alleged was contrary to
the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
Page 192 U. S. 229
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a writ of error to the Supreme Court of Alabama, brought
on the ground that the plaintiff in error, one Rogers, has been
denied the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.
Rogers was indicted for murder, and in due time filed a motion to
quash the indictment because the jury commissioners appointed to
select the grand jury excluded from the list of persons to serve as
grand jurors all colored persons, although largely in the majority
of the population of the county, and although otherwise qualified
to serve as grand jurors, solely on the ground of their race and
color and of their having been disfranchised and deprived of all
rights as electors in the State of Alabama by the provisions of the
new Constitution of Alabama. The motion alleged that the grand jury
was composed exclusively of persons of the white race, and
concluded with a verification. To show the reality of the second
reason alleged for the exclusion of blacks from the grand jury
list, the motion, as a preliminary, alleged that the sections of
the new Constitution which were before this Court in
Giles v.
Harris, 189 U. S. 475,
were adopted for the purpose, and had the effect, of disfranchising
all the blacks on account of their race and color and previous
condition of servitude. On motion of the state, this motion to
quash was stricken from the files. Rogers excepted, but his
exceptions were overruled by the supreme court of the state,
seemingly on the ground that the prolixity of the motion was
sufficient to justify the action of
Page 192 U. S. 230
the court below. The Civil Code of Alabama provides by ยง 3286,
"if any pleading is unnecessarily prolix, irrelevant, or frivolous,
it may be stricken out at the costs of the party so pleading, on
motion of the adverse party."
We follow the construction impliedly adopted by the Supreme
Court of Alabama, and assume that this section was applicable to
the motion. We also assume, as said by the court, that the
qualifications of the grand jurors are not in law dependent upon
the qualifications of electors, and that any invalidity of the
conditions attached to the suffrage could not of itself affect the
validity of the indictment. But, in our opinion, that was not the
allegation. The allegation was that the conditions said to be
invalid worked as a reason and consideration in the minds of the
commissioners for excluding blacks from the list. It may be that
the allegation was superfluous and would have been hard to prove,
but it was not irrelevant, for it stated motives for the exclusion
which, however mistaken if proved, tended to show that the blacks
were excluded on account of their race, as part of a scheme to keep
them from having any part in the administration of the government
or of the law. The whole motion takes two pages of the printed
record, of the ordinary octavo size. A motion of that length, made
for the sole purpose of setting up a constitutional right and
distinctly claiming it, cannot be withdrawn for prolixity from the
consideration of this Court under the color of local practice
because it contains a statement of matter which, perhaps, it would
have been better to omit, but which is relevant to the principal
fact averred.
It is a necessary and well settled rule that the exercise of
jurisdiction by this Court to protect constitutional rights cannot
be declined when it is plain that the fair result of a decision is
to deny the rights. It is well known that this Court will decide
for itself whether a contract was made, as well as whether the
obligation of the contract has been impaired.
Jefferson
Branch Bank v. Skelly, 1 Black 436,
66 U. S. 443.
But that is merely an illustration of a more general rule. On the
same ground,
Page 192 U. S. 231
there can be no doubt that, if full faith and credit were denied
to a judgment rendered in another state upon a suggestion of want
of jurisdiction, without evidence to warrant the finding, this
Court would enforce the constitutional requirement.
See German
Savings and Loan Society v. Dormitzer, ante, p.
192 U. S. 125. In
Chapman v. Goodnow, 123 U. S. 540,
123 U. S.
547-548, where the parties sought to avoid the
obligation of a former decree by new matter, this Court said that
the effect of what was done was not a federal question, but
proceeded to inquire in terms whether that ground of decision was
the real one, or whether it was set up as an evasion, and merely to
give color to a refusal to allow the bar of the decree. We are of
opinion that the federal question is raised by the record, and is
properly before us. That question is disposed of by
Carter v.
Texas, 177 U. S. 442, and
it was error not to apply that decision. The result of that and the
earlier cases may be summed up in the following words of the
judgment delivered by Mr. Justice Gray:
"Whenever, by any action of a state, whether through its
legislature, through its courts, or through its executive or
administrative officers, all persons of the African race are
excluded solely because of their race or color from serving as
grand jurors in the criminal prosecution of a person of the African
race, the equal protection of the laws is denied to him, contrary
to the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States.
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S.
303;
Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S.
370,
103 U. S. 397;
Gibson v.
Mississippi, 162 U. S. 565."
Our judgment upon this point makes it unnecessary to consider a
motion to quash the panel of the petit jury for similar reasons,
which was disposed of as having been made too late.
Judgment reversed, and case remanded for further proceedings
not inconsistent herewith.