A railroad company on receiving from the plaintiff a conveyance
of and for its road, agreed for itself and its assigns not to build
a depot within three miles of one which it built on the land
conveyed. Subsequently it sold its road to defendant, which
proposed to build a station within the three miles, in pursuance,
as was admitted, of an order of the State Railroad Commission.
Held that the injunction should not issue.
Quaere whether the burden of the contract passed to the
defendant.
Whether a railroad station shall be built in a certain place is
a question involving public interests.
If it appears to the court that it would be against public
policy to issue an injunction against a railroad corporation, the
court may properly refuse to be made an instrument for such a
result whatever the pleadings in the case may be.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Page 191 U. S. 493
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an appeal from a decree of the circuit court of appeals
ordering a bill against a railway company incorporated under the
laws of the United States to be dismissed. The bill seeks to enjoin
the railway company from building a depot within three miles of one
already built at Uni, in Louisiana, and alleges the following
facts: Mrs. Beasley, the first-named plaintiff, conveyed to a
Louisiana corporation -- the Texarkana, Shreveport & Natchez
Railway Company -- a strip of land one hundred feet wide for a
railroad track through her plantation, habendum to the company and
its assigns so long as the
Page 191 U. S. 494
railroad was maintained and operated over the strip. By the act
of sale, which was executed by both parties, it was declared to be
a part of the consideration for the transfer
"that the grantee or its assigns shall not build . . . or
establish any other depot along the line of said railroad within
three miles north or south of the one stipulated for."
The defendant purchased the road from the grantee "subject to
the obligations and stipulations contained in" the act of sale. It
now is constructing a depot on the road within a mile and a
fraction of the one at Uni. The bill further alleges that there is
no public necessity for a depot within the stipulated limits. There
was a demurrer for the reason that there is an adequate remedy at
law, and the demurrer was sustained by the circuit court, and the
bill dismissed. This decree was reversed by the circuit court of
appeals, and the bill was ordered to be dismissed for want of
equity, without prejudice to an action at law. There is a motion to
dismiss the appeal to this Court on the ground that the decree was
not final in form; but the decisions are the other way, and the
case being one in which the decree of the circuit court of appeals
can be reviewed in this Court under the Act of March 3, 1891, we
have jurisdiction, and the motion must be overruled.
Merrill v.
National Bank of Jacksonville, 173 U.
S. 131.
See Great Western Telegraph Co. v.
Burnham, 162 U. S. 339,
162 U. S.
342.
The act of sale gives its own definition of the word "depot,"
but no question is made that the depot intended to be built is
within the prohibition of the instrument in that and other
respects. We assume that, if the plaintiff's grantee had built the
structure, it would have broken its agreement. We also assume, for
the purposes of the case, without deciding, that the contract, as a
contract, is not void, although similar contracts have been
pronounced void in some of the cases cited below. On these
assumptions, the question is how far the burden of that agreement
passed to the defendant, and whether, at least as against the
defendant, equity will require it to be specifically performed.
Page 191 U. S. 495
Such a liability, wherever asserted, would have to be worked
out, if at all, in terms of easement, covenant running with the
land, implied contract, or equitable restriction.
Although the Louisiana Code recognizes such servitudes "as the
prohibition of building on an estate, or of building above a
particular height," Rev.Civil Code, Art. 728 [724];
see
Art. 718 [714], and although it has been held at common law that
such a servitude for the benefit of neighboring land may be created
within reasonable limits, and created by words of covenant,
Ladd v. Boston, 151 Mass. 585, 588;
Brown v.
O'Brien, 168 Mass. 484;
compare La.Rev. Civil Code,
Art. 743 [739], it was not argued that there was an easement in
this case. it would be questionable whether the obligation was "not
imposed on the person or in favor of the person, but only on an
estate or in favor of an estate;" La.Rev. Civil Code, Art. 709
[705]; Code Nap., 686; whether it was not, in the words of Marcade,
commenting on this article of the Code Napoleon, a
servitude
reelle entachee de personnalite. 2 Marcade 627. "There can be
no praedial servitude when the object is merely to satisfy the
wants of the present owner." Sohm, Inst. Roman Law, Ledlie's
transl. ยง 56, II, p. 262. Apart from the peculiarities of Louisiana
law, there would be almost equal difficulty in regarding the
agreement as a covenant the burden of which ran with the land
according to the principles of the common law, and for
substantially the same reason. It is true that the covenant is
negative, but it does not benefit the use and occupation of the
plaintiff's land physically, and is not intended to. It is intended
simply to improve the market value of that land by giving to it a
right not to be competed with in the way of railway conveniences.
Norcross v. James, 140 Mass. 188, 192. As to an implied
contract, that would be a fiction, and the plaintiff's rights, so
far as the question of policy is concerned, would not be enlarged
by adopting that form.
See Lincoln v. Burrage, 177 Mass.
378, 380.
Whether the true theory of equitable restrictions is the
same
Page 191 U. S. 496
as that of covenants running with the land, or different, as
their historical antecedents are different in part, it would seem
that the two must have somewhat similar limits. With regard to
injunctions, we see in Art. 298, 3, of the Code of Practice, cited
by the plaintiff, no reason to suppose that the law of Louisiana is
peculiar in any way affecting the present case. Whatever the form
which the attempt to restrict may take, obviously it is not
desirable to allow large tracts of land to be tied up and cut off
from the ordinary incidents of ownership, according to the
invention of the owner, in perpetuity, in favor of other large
tracts which may come by division into many hands. La.Rev.Civil
Code, Art. 656 (652).
See Parish v. Municipality, No. 2, 8
La.Ann. 145, 169. If such restrictions should be enforced without
limit in equity as against all purchasers with notice, the
practical result would be an unlimited extension of easements,
since notice always can be secured by registration. Easements
hitherto have been confined pretty narrowly, both in quality and in
space. Equitable relief has been refused upon a covenant by a
grantee not to open or work a quarry upon his land adjoining the
land conveyed, in a suit between assignees of the original grantor
and grantee. It was a mere covenant against competition.
Norcross v. James, 140 Mass. 188. On the other hand, a
covenant by a grantee not to sell sand from half an acre was
enforced against the grantee's son and grantee in favor of the
grantor in
Hodge v. Sloan, 107 N.Y. 244, and in old times
it would seem that a covenant in connection with a gift of a mill
in Tenbury not to raise another mill in Tenbury might have been
enforced against the heir of the covenantor. Y.B. 5 Edw. III 57,
pl. 71;
S.C., 7 Edw. III, 65, pl. 6, 7. Of course, there
are numberless cases in which contracts have been enforced which in
a more immediate sense affected the occupation and enjoyment of the
quasi-dominant land. It is to be noted, too, that the
restriction is confined to a narrow strip, which very likely might
have been subjected to a servitude of way.
We do not think it necessary to decide whether the foregoing
Page 191 U. S. 497
general considerations would be enough to prevent the burden of
this agreement falling on the defendant, or whether the allegation
which has been quoted, and which means no more than that the
defendant bought with notice, is enough to establish a relation of
contract or
quasi-contract between the parties. There are
more specific obstacles in the way of the bill. Whether a railroad
station shall be built in a certain place is a question involving
public interests. Assuming that a contract like the present is
valid as a contract, and making the more debatable assumption that
the burden of the contract passed to a purchaser with notice, it
does not follow that such a contract will be specifically enforced.
Illegality apart, a man may make himself answerable in damages for
the happening or not happening of what event he likes. But he
cannot secure to his contractor the help of the court to bring that
event to pass unless it is in accordance with policy to grant that
help. To compel the specific performance of contracts still is the
exception, not the rule, and courts would be slow to compel it in
cases where it appears that paramount interests will or even may be
interfered with by their action. It has been intimated by this
Court that a covenant much like the present should not be enforced
in equity, and that the railroad should be left at liberty to
follow the course which its best interests and those of the public
demand.
Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Marshall, 136 U.
S. 393,
136 U. S. 405;
Northern Pacific Railroad v. Washington, 142 U.
S. 492,
142 U. S. 509.
See further Marsh v. Fairbury, Pontiac & Northwestern
Ry., 64 Ill. 414;
People v. Chicago & Alton
Railroad, 130 Ill. 175, 184;
St. Joseph & Denver City
Railroad v. Ryan, 11 Kan. 602;
Pacific Railroad v.
Seely, 45 Mo. 212;
Florida Central & Peninsular
Railroad v. State, 31 Fla. 482, 508;
Currie v. Natchez,
Jackson & Columbus Railroad, 61 Miss. 725, 731;
Holladay v. Patterson, 5 Or. 177;
Texas & Pacific
Ry. v. Scolt, 77 F. 726.
The difficulty is illustrated, as well as made greater, in the
case at bar. There is in Louisiana a railroad commission having
Page 191 U. S. 498
authority to require all railroads to build and maintain depots.
La.Const. 1898, Art. 384. That fact is enough to suggest the
possibility of a conflict if an injunction were granted. But
further, although it was not pleaded, it was admitted at the bar
that the commission had ordered the erection of the station in
dispute. It is true that this admission was coupled with charges of
improper influence. But such imputations would not be tried or
listened to in a collateral proceeding like this. It is apparent,
therefore, that, if the facts appeared of record, an injunction
would be denied, and that as soon as they do appear, it must be
denied, so that a trial would be an idle form. The bill alleges
that there is no public necessity or demand for a depot within the
stipulated limit. But this no more could be tried for the purpose
of collaterally impeaching the decision of the railroad commission
than could the purity of their motives.
It is objected that the foregoing was not the ground of the
demurrer. But, as was observed by the court below, other grounds
are open on demurrer
ore tenus, and apart from that
consideration, if it appears that an injunction would be against
public policy, the court properly may refuse to be made an
instrument for such a result, whatever the pleadings. The defendant
may desire the relief to be granted. It is suggested that it does.
But the very meaning of public policy is the interest of others
than the parties, and that interest is not to be at the mercy of
the defendant alone.
See Northern Pacific Railroad
Washington, 142 U. S. 492,
142 U. S.
509.
Decree affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE BREWER concurred in the result. MR. JUSTICE BROWN
took no part in the decision.