The amount of benefits resulting from an improvement, and
assessed under a state statute which this Court has declared to be
constitutional is a question of fact, and a hearing upon it being
assumed, the decision of the board making the assessment is final,
and no federal question arises.
In the apportionment of assessments for improvements, due
process of law is afforded to the taxpayer if he is given an
opportunity to be heard before the body making the assessment; and,
so far as the federal Constitution is concerned, the state
legislature may provide that such hearing shall be conclusive.
Whether a judgment in a state court based on an assessment is
void or only voidable because some of the members of the board were
residents of, and taxpayers in, the assessment district is a proper
question for the state courts to decide, and after the highest
court of the state has held that the judgment is not void and
cannot be attacked collaterally, this Court will follow that
determination.
The plaintiff in error seeks by this writ to review the judgment
of the Supreme Court of the State of Indiana affirming a judgment
in favor of one of the defendants in error, William C. Smith,
foreclosing the lien of an assessment levied upon certain real
estate in the Town of Irvington, belonging to the plaintiff in
error. The plaintiff Smith brought this action to foreclose the
lien, and alleged in his complaint that he was the contractor for
the doing of the work for a local improvement on Washington Street
in the town mentioned, and had complied with all the provisions of
the statute and with his contract,
Page 191 U. S. 311
and had finished the work, and was entitled to payment for the
same; that an assessment to provide for such payment had been duly
imposed by the board of town trustees upon the property abutting on
the portion of the street where the improvement was made, and that
the defendant, Sarah A. Hibben, was the owner of lots abutting on
that improved portion of the street, and her assessment amounted to
over $5,000, which she had not paid; that the assessment was then
due with six percentum interest, and the plaintiff prayed that the
lien might be foreclosed against her property, and that it might be
sold for the satisfaction of the assessment, and for other proper
relief in the premises.
The defendant Hibben demurred to the complaint and, the same
having been overruled, she filed an answer thereto. She also filed
a cross-complaint. The answer and cross-complaint set up the same
facts in substance, and they both averred the unconstitutionality
of the act of the Legislature of Indiana providing for the
improvement of streets under which the improvement in question was
made, and also it was objected to the validity of the assessment
that the alleged improvement was of no benefit to many of her lots,
and that, on the contrary, the assessment upon such lots was
greater than their value, and resulted in a substantial
confiscation of her property in those lots; also that the
assessment had been made by the front foot and without reference to
the benefits received from the improvement, and that no hearing
before the board of trustees was had and no consideration given to
the question of whether or not the abutting property or any part
thereof was specially benefited in an amount equal to, less than,
or in excess of, the amounts fixed by the assessments which were
confirmed by such board, but, on the contrary, that the assessments
were made and confirmed upon the theory and belief that the
statutes of the state established the rule of assessment at the
same fixed price per lineal front foot on each side for the whole
improvement, and that no change could be made therein by the board
of trustees, and that the board refused at
Page 191 U. S. 312
such hearings to hear or consider any objection to the
assessment based upon any inquiry into the amount of special
benefit accruing to any abutting lot or parcel of land.
It was also averred in the answer and in the cross-complaint
that all the members of the Board of Trustees of the Town of
Irvington were residents of that town and taxpayers therein, and
that two members of the board were owners of lots abutting upon
said improvement, and assessed therefor at the same rate per lineal
front foot as the others, and it was averred that no assessment
could legally be levied by such a board of trustees, and the
assessment was for that reason wholly void.
These defenses contained in the answer, and which were also set
up in the cross-complaint, were severally demurred to by the
complainant Smith, and the demurrers sustained, and upon the
refusal of the defendant Hibben to amend, judgment enforcing the
lien was entered, which, upon appeal to the Supreme Court of
Indiana, was affirmed.
Page 191 U. S. 320
MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM, after making the foregoing statement of
facts, delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Supreme Court of the State of Indiana has held the statute
to be constitutional under which this lien was established and
judgment entered for its foreclosure. That court has held that,
under the state constitution, an assessment arbitrarily by the
front foot is unconstitutional, but that the statute in question
provides only a rule of
prima facie assessment by the
front foot, and that such assessments are subject to review and
alteration by the common council or board of trustees upon the
basis of special benefits received from the improvement, and the
common council and board of trustees not only have the power, but
it is their imperative duty, to adjust an assessment to conform to
the actual special benefits accruing to each of the abutting
property owners.
Adams v. Shelbyville, 154 Ind. 467;
Schaefer v. Werling, 156 Ind. 704;
Martin v.
Wills, 157 Ind. 153;
Leeds v.
Page 191 U. S. 321
De Frees, 157 Ind. 392;
Shank v. Smith, 157
Ind. 401.
Schaefer v. Werling, 156 Ind. 704, has been affirmed
upon writ of error by this Court,
188 U. S. 188 U.S.
516, where it was held that the statute in question was not in
conflict with the Constitution of the United States, and the
principle was reiterated in that case that the construction placed
by the highest court of a state upon a statute providing for paving
the streets and distributing the assessment therefor was conclusive
upon this Court.
See also Merchants & Manufacturers' Bank
v. Pennsylvania, 167 U. S. 461.
The amount of benefits resulting from the improvement is a
question of fact, and a hearing upon it being assumed, the decision
of the board is final. No constitutional question of a federal
nature arises therefrom.
If the board of trustees refuse to hear the owners of property
abutting the street improvement, in regard to the subject of
benefits, and arbitrarily proceed to levy the assessment solely
according to the front foot, the Supreme Court of Indiana has held
that such lot owner was not without remedy, and that he could, by
mandamus or injunction, compel a hearing as to the amount of the
assessment upon each lot, or prevent the approval of the engineer's
report until such hearing had been accorded, and that the lot owner
could not waive such a remedy and make the denial of a hearing
available as a defense in an action to collect the assessment.
Shank v. Smith, 157 Ind. 401. Under the cases above cited,
this Court follows the decision of the Supreme Court of Indiana
upon this question of remedy. The claim set up on the part of the
lot owner, that there can be no due process of law under which an
assessment can be made which does not provide for a review of such
assessment and a hearing by a court, is not tenable. Assuming the
necessity of a hearing before an assessment can be made conclusive,
the law may provide for that hearing by the body which levies the
assessment, and after such hearing may make the decision of that
body conclusive. Although, in imposing such
Page 191 U. S. 322
assessments, the common council or board of trustees may be
acting somewhat in a judicial character, yet the foundation of the
right to assess exists in the taxing power, and it is not necessary
that, in imposing an assessment, there shall be a hearing before a
court provided by the law in order to give validity to such
assessment. Due process of law is afforded where there is
opportunity to be heard before the body which is to make the
assessment, and the legislature of a state may provide that such
hearing shall be conclusive so far as the federal Constitution is
concerned.
In
Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley,
164 U. S. 112,
164 U. S. 168,
it was said that --
"Due process of law is not violated, and the equal protection of
the laws is given, when the ordinary course is pursued in such
proceedings for the assessment and collection of taxes that has
been customarily followed in the state, and where the party who may
subsequently be charged in his property has had a hearing, or an
opportunity for one provided by the statute."
And it was also said in that case that whether a review is or is
not given upon any of these questions of fact (that is, as to
benefits and the amounts of the assessments) was a mere question of
legislative discretion, so long as the tribunal created by the
state had power to decide them, and the opportunity for a hearing
was given by the act, and that it was not constitutionally
necessary in such case to give a rehearing or an appeal.
In
Spring Valley Water Works v. Schottler, 110 U.
S. 347, where the law provided for the fixing of water
rates by a board of supervisors after a hearing, and without any
right of review by any court, it was stated (at page
110 U. S. 354)
by Mr. Chief Justice Waite, giving the opinion of the Court:
"Like every other tribunal established by the legislature for
such a purpose, their duties are judicial in their nature, and they
are bound in morals and in law to exercise an honest judgment as to
all matters submitted for their official determination.
Page 191 U. S. 323
It is not to be presumed that they will act otherwise than
according to this rule."
See Spencer v. Merchant, 125 U.
S. 345.
The sole remaining question arises upon the allegations
contained in the answer and cross-complaint that all the members of
the board of trustees were residents of the town and taxpayers
therein, and that two members of the board were owners of lots
abutting upon the improvement, and assessed therefor at the same
rate as the others.
The objection to the tribunal constituted by the legislature of
Indiana which the plaintiff in error makes in this particular
instance is that it results in making a person a judge in his own
case, and that hence any judgment of a tribunal thus constituted is
absolutely void, and may be attacked, as it is attacked in this
case, collaterally. It is said that to impose an assessment, which
is the same as a judgment under such circumstances, is to take the
lot owner's property without due process of law, and violates
thereby the federal Constitution. We think the first objection,
that all of the members of the board of trustees were residents of
and taxpayers in the town, is wholly unimportant. We have not the
slightest doubt of the power of a legislature of a state, unless
hampered by some special constitutional provision, to create a
tribunal in a city or town, such as the common council or board of
trustees, to make an assessment, and that such assessment would be
valid notwithstanding the fact that every member of the board was a
taxpayer of the city or the town. It is a matter of legislative
discretion as to how such a board shall be constituted, and we
hazard nothing in saying that it is quite common throughout the
country for the legislatures of the states to create a tribunal for
levying assessments for local improvements in a manner precisely
like the case in question. It is not at all analogous, even in
principle, to a judge of a court acting in a case in which he was
personally interested.
To say that no one who was a taxpayer in a city or town could
act in imposing an assessment upon property therein is
Page 191 U. S. 324
to say that the legislature is wholly without power, by reason
of the federal Constitution, to constitute a tribunal to make an
assessment where such tribunal is composed of taxpayers in the city
or town. This we do not believe. It must frequently happen that a
board of assessors for a city, to assess all property for general
taxation, will be composed of men who themselves own property in
the city and assess the same for purposes of such taxation. Can
there be any doubt of the validity of the general assessments under
such circumstances? And would not the assessment for taxation of
the property of the individual members of the board of assessors,
made by the board, be valid if authorized by the statute?
See
Brown v. Massachusetts, 144 U. S. 573,
citing 147 Mass. 585, 591, 150 Mass. 334.
Then as to the averment that there were two members of the board
who were owners of lots abutting upon the improvement, and were
assessed therefor at the same rate as other lot owners. Although it
might have been more seemly for those two members, if they
recollected the fact of such ownership, to have refused to act in
the matter, yet there is nothing to show that their attention was
called to the fact, nor does it appear that any objection was made
by plaintiff in error or any one else to their acting, nor that the
plaintiff in error was ignorant of their interest at the time when
the proceedings were commenced. The state court has held that an
assessment for improvements under this statute of Indiana is in the
nature of a judgment, and the fact that members of the board who
levied the assessment owned property, as stated, would not render
the judgment void, but, at most, voidable, and that it could not be
attacked collaterally. The cases of
Bradley v. Frankfort,
99 Ind. 417;
Jackson v. Smith, 120 Ind. 520, and
Board
of Commissioners v. Justice, 133 Ind. 89, are referred to.
Whether a judgment obtained in a case like this, where two
members of a general board created by statute for the purpose of
making it had some interest in some of the property subject
Page 191 U. S. 325
to the assessment, was a void or voidable judgment is a proper
question for the state court to decide. A state court has the right
to place its own construction upon its own judgments, and where, as
in a case like this, it holds that the judgment is not void, and
that it cannot be attacked collaterally, we ought to follow that
determination.
Newport Light Co. v. Newport, 151 U.
S. 527,
151 U. S.
539.
In
Lent v. Tillson, 140 U. S. 316,
which was an assessment case, it was stated by MR. JUSTICE HARLAN,
in delivering the opinion of the Court (p.
140 U. S.
333), as follows
"Other objections have been urged by the plaintiffs which we do
not deem it necessary to consider. For instance, it is said that
the Mayor of the City of San Francisco, one of the board of
commissioners, was himself the owner of a lot on Dupont Street,
and, for that reason, was incompetent to act as one of the board of
street commissioners. . . . In respect to all these and like
objections, it is sufficient to say that they do not necessarily
involve any question of a federal nature, and so far as this Court
is concerned, are concluded by the decision of the Supreme Court of
California."
The provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment do not cover such an
objection as is now under consideration. The general system of
procedure for the levying and collection of taxes which is
established in this country is, within the meaning of the
Constitution, due process of law.
Kelly v. Pittsburgh,
104 U. S. 78. A
provision made by the legislature of a state in relation to the
manner of levying an assessment for a local improvement is, within
this principle, a proceeding for the levying and collection of
taxes, and unless it be in violation of some particular provision
of the federal Constitution, it will be upheld in this Court. The
Fourteenth Amendment, it has been held, legitimately operates to
extend to the citizens and residents of the states the same
protection against arbitrary state legislation affecting life,
liberty, and property as is offered by the Fifth Amendment against
similar legislation by Congress; but that the federal courts ought
not to interfere when what
Page 191 U. S. 326
is complained of amounts to the enforcement of the laws of a
state applicable to all persons in like circumstances and
conditions, and that the federal courts should not interfere unless
there is some abuse of law amounting to confiscation of property or
a deprivation of personal rights, such as existed in the case of
Norwood v. Baker, 172 U. S. 269.
These principles have been reiterated in a series of cases
reported in 181 U.S., commencing with
French v. Barber Asphalt
Paving Co., at
181 U. S. 324 of
that volume.
The facts contained in the objection now under discussion do
not, in our judgment, constitute any violation of the federal
Constitution, or result in the taking of the property of the
plaintiff in error without due process of law as that term is
understood when used in the Constitution of the United States. We
see no error in the record in this case which we can review, and
the judgment of the Supreme Court of Indiana is
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE concurred in the result.
