An administratrix of one who in 1818 became a member of a firm
which had in 1798 sustained losses, resulting in what are known as
French Spoliation Claims, presented the claims under the act of
1885 to the Court of Claims and obtained awards therefor. The
findings clearly showed that the Court of Claims proceeded on the
assumption that her intestate was a member of the firm when the
losses were sustained. In 1899, Congress appropriated money to pay
certain claims which had been favorably passed on by the Court of
Claims, including those awarded to this administratrix as such and
as representing such firm. After collecting the amounts, she
applied to a state court of competent jurisdiction for instructions
as to distribution of the fund. Next of kin of the partners of 1798
denied that her intestate could share in the fund under the
provisions of the act of 1883, which limited payments thereunder to
next of kin of the original sufferers; she contended that the
awards of the Court of Claims and the appropriation by Congress to
her as administratrix were conclusive as to the right of her
intestate to participate in the awards.
Held that it was not the duty of the Court of Claims
under the act of 1885
Page 190 U. S. 354
to investigate and determine the rights of each individual of a
class, but only to determine the validity and amount of a claim
with a specification of ownership sufficient to identify the claim
itself for the payment of which an appropriation might thereafter
be made, and the particular individuals of the class would be
matter for subsequent investigation by some other tribunal.
Held that it was not within the intention of Congress
to conclusively determine by the Appropriation Act of 1899 what
persons were entitled thereto, but the payments were intended to be
for the next of kin of the original sufferers.
Held that as it was clear in this case that the party
named in the appropriation act was not entitled absolutely to the
money as her own, and as she had submitted the question of
distribution to a court of equity, that court had jurisdiction to
determine the real meaning and proper construction of the act of
Congress and who were entitled to the funds in her hands.
Held that, on the facts in this case, there was no
error in holding that the next of kin of the members of the firm in
1798 were entitled to the fund to the exclusion of the next of kin
of one who subsequently became a member thereof.
The plaintiff in error, Esther S. Buchanan, filed her bill in
Circuit Court No. 2 of Baltimore City on August 17, 1899, against
the parties defendant for the purpose of obtaining the instructions
of that court as to whom and in what proportions she should pay and
distribute certain sums of money received by her from the United
States under what is termed the French Spoliations Acts of
Congress. Answers were made by the various parties, and a decree
was subsequently entered giving directions for the distribution of
the funds. An appeal from that decree was taken by some of the
defendants to the Court of Appeals, and that court reversed a
portion of the decree (as to the proper distribution of the money)
and remanded the case for further proceedings. 92 Md. 334. The
trial court then entered a decree in accordance with the directions
of the Court of Appeals, and thereupon the original plaintiff,
Esther S. Buchanan, appealed to the Court of Appeals, and that
court then affirmed the decree of the court below. 94 Md. 534.
Plaintiffs in error bring the case here by writ of error.
The first act of Congress relating to the French spoliations was
passed January 20, 1885. 23 Stat. 283.
Page 190 U. S. 355
Miss Buchanan was, in May, 1885, duly appointed administratrix
upon the estate of her father, William B. Buchanan, deceased. She
then, through her counsel and in common with other claimants for
losses sustained by the seizures of the two vessels
Patapsco and
Jane, came into the Court of Claims
and proved the facts upon which the rights of the several claimants
were based as against the United States. In presenting the claims,
she did in truth represent, with their consent, all the parties
interested therein, including those now claiming against her.
The court reported (May 18, 1887) that the seizures of the two
vessels complained of were illegal, and that the claimants were
entitled to the following sums from the United States. A list was
then given of those entitled to an appropriation on account of the
ship
Patapsco, in which was included the name of Esther S.
Buchanan, as follows:
"Esther S. Buchanan, administratrix of the estate of William
Buchanan, who was the surviving partner of the firm of S. Smith
& Buchanan, deceased, to the sum of $25,056."
In relation to the ship
Jane, in the list of those
entitled to an appropriation was the following:
"Esther S. Buchanan, administratrix, representing Smith &
Buchanan, $11,660.21."
After this report had been made, and on March 23, 1891, Esther
S. Buchanan was duly appointed administratrix
de bonis non
with the will annexed of the personal estate of James A. Buchanan,
her grandfather.
No action of Congress in relation to these claims was had until
1899, when an act was passed, approved March 3, 1899, 30 Stat.
1161. The act provided for the payment of claims allowed under the
Bowman and Tucker Acts by the Court of Claims, and on page 1191 it
provided as follows:
"
French Spoliation Claims"
"To pay the findings of the Court of Claims on the following
claims for indemnity for spoliations by the French prior to July
thirtieth, eighteen hundred and one, under the act entitled 'An Act
to Provide for the Ascertainment of Claims of American
Page 190 U. S. 356
Citizens for Spoliations Committed by the French Prior to the
Thirty-first Day of July, Eighteen Hundred and One:'
Provided, That in all cases where the original sufferers
were adjudicated bankrupts, the awards shall be made on behalf of
the next of kin instead of to assignees in bankruptcy, and the
awards in the cases of individual claimants shall not be paid until
the Court of Claims shall certify to the Secretary of the Treasury
that the personal representatives on whose behalf the award is made
represent the next of kin, and the courts which granted the
administrations, respectively, shall have certified that the legal
representatives have given adequate security for the legal
disbursements of the awards, namely."
Then follow appropriations to a number of claimants in
satisfaction of the losses sustained by the illegal seizures of
vessels and cargoes.
Among them, on page 1194, is included the following:
"On the ship
Jane, John Wallace, master, namely:"
"Esther S. Buchanan, administratrix, representing Smith &
Buchanan, $11,660.21."
On page 1195 is the following:
"On the ship
Patapsco, William Hill, master, namely: .
. . [names of various claimants for other interests in same
ship]."
"Esther S. Buchanan, administratrix of the estate of William B.
Buchanan, who was the surviving partner of the firm of S. Smith
& Buchanan, deceased, $25,056, the value of the cargo shipped
by said firm."
Pursuant to the proviso in the act of 1899, the Court of Claims,
upon the application of the attorney of record for Esther S.
Buchanan, administratrix, representing Smith & Buchanan,
deceased, ordered, in the case of the ship
Jane, a
certificate to be issued to the Secretary of the Treasury as
follows:
"The Court of Claims hereby certifies that it appears by
evidence on file in the above-entitled case that said Esther S.
Buchanan, on whose behalf an appropriation or award was made by the
Act of March 3, 1899, entitled"
"An Act for the Allowance of Certain Claims for Stores and
Supplies Reported by the Court of Claims under the Provisions of
the Act Approved March Third,
Page 190 U. S. 357
Eighteen Hundred and Eighty-three, and Commonly Known as the
Bowman Act, and for Other Purposes,"
"for the sum of eleven thousand six hundred and sixty dollars
and twenty-one cents ($11,660.21), represents the next of kin of
William B. Buchanan, the surviving member of the firm of Samuel
Smith & Buchanan, deceased, the original owner of the claim
upon which said award was made."
"And the court further certifies that it appears on the record
of the said case that, at the time when the award of this court was
made, the said claim was not held by assignment or owned by an
insurance company."
The same kind of a certificate was made in relation to the ship
Patapsco.
These certificates were made on June 15, 1899, and were filed
with the Secretary of the Treasury, and the moneys mentioned, being
a total of $36,716.21, were thereafter paid to Miss Buchanan.
Having received the money from the government, the plaintiff in
error then commenced this suit individually, and as administratrix
of the estate of William B. Buchanan, deceased, and as
administratrix
de bonis non with the will annexed of James
A. Buchanan, deceased, in Circuit Court No. 2 of Baltimore city, in
which she stated the various facts under which the money had been
paid her, and that she had in her hands for distribution, among the
persons particularly entitled to the same, the sum of $22,629.47,
after the payment of all costs, etc. She also averred that she was
advised that she held funds for the benefit of and distribution
among not only the next of kin of her own decedent, the said
William B. Buchanan, but also the next of kin of the other partners
of said firm of S. Smith & Buchanan, to-wit, Samuel Smith and
James A. Buchanan, in the proportions and according to the laws of
distribution which the court might hold to be proper in the cause.
She also gave the names of the next of kin of William B. Buchanan,
namely, herself and her brother, Wilson C. Buchanan, and then
stated who were the next of kin of James A. Buchanan, deceased,
living at the date of the passage of the act of Congress directing
the payment of the claims, to-wit, March 3,
Page 190 U. S. 358
1899, so far as they were known to her, and she stated that she
had given the names of all of the next of kin of Samuel Smith and
James A. Buchanan living at the time of the passage of the Act of
Congress, March 3, 1899, although she said there might be others
unknown to her who might lay claim to participate in the
distribution of the fund, and she was in doubt as to the proportion
in which the beneficiaries should participate in the shares of
their ancestors in the fund. She then stated:
"Twelfth. That, according to the information and belief of your
oratrix, the said Samuel Smith, James A. Buchanan, and William B.
Buchanan were equal copartners, but a claim has been made on your
oratrix by Robert Carter Smith, one of the distributees of Samuel
Smith, and a party defendant herein, wherein he asserts that his
ancestor, the said Samuel Smith, had a one-half interest in the
property of said copartnership, and that therefore the next of kin
of the said Samuel Smith are entitled to have for distribution
among them one-half of the fund now in the hands of your oratrix
for distribution; but your oratrix is informed and does verily
believe that distribution of said fund should be made in three
equal parts among the next of kin of the three partners in said
firm of S. Smith & Buchanan."
Other facts were given in relation to the existence of parties
who might possibly claim some interest in the fund, and in her
complaint she finally said that, by reason of the facts above set
forth, she was in doubt to whom and in what proportion she should
pay and distribute the sum of money in her hands, and that she was
advised, and therefore alleges, that a distribution of the same can
only be had under the order of a court of equity in a manner
adequate to insure her own protection in the future. She thereupon
asked that the court assume jurisdiction of the fund in her hands
as administratrix, as already set forth, and that it direct and
supervise the distribution of the same among the parties whom the
court may find to be entitled to participate therein, according to
the proportion and rule which this Court may declare to govern the
same.
Answers were made by some of the parties and the bill taken as
confessed as against others. Upon the trial, evidence was
Page 190 U. S. 359
given under objection, and the state court has found that, at
the time of the illegal seizures of the vessels in 1798, William B.
Buchanan was about three years old, he having been born on
September 9, 1795; that, in 1798, the year the losses occurred,
there was a firm of S. Smith & Buchanan, consisting only of S.
Smith and James A. Buchanan, the father of William B. Buchanan, and
they were the only original sufferers from the illegal seizures of
the ships. William B. Buchanan did not become a member of the firm
until about twenty years later, or until January 1, 1818, and he
became the survivor of the firm formed in 1818, which was also
known as S. Smith & Buchanan.
It thus appears that, although William B. Buchanan was the
survivor of a firm of S. Smith & Buchanan as that firm was
constituted in 1818, he was not the survivor of the firm of S.
Smith & Buchanan as that firm was constituted in 1798, when
these illegal seizures occurred.
The trial court held that the moneys should be divided into
three portions, one of which should go to the next of kin of Samuel
Smith, another to the next of kin of James A. Buchanan, and another
to the next of kin of William B. Buchanan, being Esther S. and
Wilson C. Buchanan.
The Court of Appeals, on appeal from the decree of the circuit
court, held that this was an erroneous disposition of the money,
and that it should be divided into two portions, one of which
should go to the next of kin of Samuel Smith and the other to the
next of kin of James A. Buchanan, Samuel Smith and James A.
Buchanan being the only members of the firm that sustained the
losses, and being the original sufferers from the illegal seizures.
The writ of error has been sued out for the purpose of reviewing
this decree.
Page 190 U. S. 360
MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM, after making the foregoing statement of
facts, delivered the opinion of the Court.
The contention of the plaintiffs in error is that Congress, by
the acts mentioned, and particularly that of March 3, 1899,
ratified and adopted the findings and decisions of the Court of
Claims, made in pursuance of the act of 1885, in the cases of the
two ships
Patapsco and
Jane, and that the act of
1899 recognized and designated William B. Buchanan as an original
sufferer within the meaning of Congress, by virtue of his being a
partner, and the surviving partner, of S. Smith & Buchanan, and
that the act gave to the personal representative of William B.
Buchanan the awards in question for the benefit of his next of kin
and the next of kin of his two partners. They also assert that the
Court of Claims having made the additional final certificate
required by the act of Congress, and the Secretary of the Treasury,
in accordance with those certificates, having paid the money to the
plaintiff in error, administratrix, for the benefit of the next of
kin of William B. Buchanan, to the full extent of his partnership
interest in the firm, there was no power in any court to in anywise
alter the statute or make any other distribution than such as would
give to the next of kin of William B. Buchanan one-third of the
total sum to be distributed.
It becomes necessary, in order to fully appreciate the action of
the Court of Claims and of Congress subsequently to the passage of
the act of 1885, to examine the latter act and determine its scope
and purpose. The act provided for an investigation to be undertaken
by the court as to the validity of the claims for indemnity upon
the French government for losses of citizens of the United States
or their legal representatives arising from illegal captures,
seizures, etc., of vessels of cargoes prior to the treaty of 1800
between France and the United States. The act did not assume to
provide for the identification of all the next of kin of the
original sufferers from such illegal seizures. The court was to
determine the validity and the amount of the claims included within
the description contained in section 1 of the act of 1885, and it
was also to determine
Page 190 U. S. 361
the present ownership of such claims. The matter of chief
importance between the claimants and the United States was for the
court to ascertain and determine the validity and the extent of the
claims.
The particular class of persons who were the owners of the
claims, and to whom the moneys might be properly paid, was at this
time of subsidiary importance so far as the United States was
concerned. Although the present ownership was to be determined,
and, if by assignee, the date of the assignment and the
consideration paid therefor, yet this was obviously for the mere
purpose of informing Congress as to the present situation of a
claim, whether owned by next of kin of those who suffered the loss
or by assignees; but the particular individuals who composed the
next of kin or the assignees were not then of importance, as
gathered from the language and purpose of the act. All this action
of the court was, by the terms of the act, made advisory only.
Congress specifically withheld from the court any right to render a
judgment which would in any manner conclude the United States, or
commit it to the payment of any claims determined by the court
under the third section of the act. All that Congress did was to
give jurisdiction to the Court of Claims to inquire into the matter
of each claim which might be presented to it, and to report to
Congress its opinion of the validity and the amount of the claim,
with a statement as to its ownership. The whole subject thereafter
remained with Congress, subject to its future action.
Regarding its powers and duties under this act, the Court of
Claims itself stated its opinion in the case of the ship
Jane. 24 Ct.Cl. 74. It held that the court could not
determine to whom the money should be distributed, which Congress
might thereafter award as indemnity in the French spoliations
cases, nor could it determine who were the next of kin of a
deceased claimant, nor whether there were any. All that the court
could determine in its report to Congress was the validity of a
claim against France, its relinquishment by the United States, and
the amount thereof. It also held that its decisions in these cases
were not judgments which judicially affect the rights of anyone,
and that, after the court had reported a French spoliation
Page 190 U. S. 362
case, it remained with Congress to determine, first, the measure
of the indemnity which the United States should give, and, second,
the persons who were equitably entitled to participate therein. The
purpose of the court was, as it stated, to require a claimant to
file his letters of administration and prove, to the satisfaction
of the court,
that the decedent whose estate he administered
was the same person who suffered loss through the capture of a
vessel.
Again, in
The Leghorn Seizures, (Field, Administrator v.
United States), 27 Ct.Cl. 224, the court held that the French
Spoliations Act of 1885 conferred jurisdiction, but did not impose
liabilities; that Congress conceded that several classes of
claimants seeking redress for French spoliations might come into
the Court of Claims and have the question of the liability of the
United States determined, and conceded nothing more.
From these extracts it is plain that the Court of Claims did not
regard it as its duty under the act of 1885 to investigate and
determine the rights of each individual of a class, but only to
determine the validity and amount of a claim, with a specification
of ownership sufficient to identify the claim itself, for the
payment of which an appropriation might be thereafter made. The
particular individuals of the class would be matter for subsequent
investigation by some other tribunal.
In
Blagge v. Balch, 162 U. S. 439, and
meaning and purpose of the act of 1885, together with the Act of
March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 862, 908, came before this Court for
consideration, and it was held that the result of the action of
Congress was to place the payments prescribed under the act of 1891
within the category of payments by way of gratuity and grace, and
not as of right as against the government; that, under the proviso
contained in the act of 1891, Congress intended the next of kin to
be beneficiaries in every case, and excluded creditors, legatees,
assignees, and all strangers to the blood, and that the words "next
of kin," as used in the proviso, meant next of kin living at the
date of the act (1891), to be determined according to the statute
of distribution of the respective states of the domicil of the
original sufferers.
The court distinguished the case from
Comegys v.
Vasse, 1
Page 190 U. S. 363
Pet. 193, and
Williams v. Heard, 140 U.
S. 529. In these cases, it was held that assignees in
bankruptcy took title to the moneys.
The same proviso mentioned in
Blagge v. Balch, supra,
and contained in the Act of March 3, 1891, is found in the Act of
1899, 30 Stat. 1161, 1191. So we know from the above case that the
desire of Congress was to make payments to the next of kin of the
original sufferers of the losses, and that assignees in bankruptcy
should not take. The identification of the particular persons
belonging to the class that Congress desired to aid was evidently
not within the purpose of the act of 1891 or that of 1899.
Under the act of 1885, the plaintiff in error, Esther S.
Buchanan, presented the claims arising out of the capture of the
vessels
Patapsco and
Jane, together with their
cargoes. It is not disputed -- on the contrary, it is admitted --
that she represented on the trial before the Court of Claims, with
their consent, all the parties interested in the claim of S. Smith
& Buchanan, including those who now claim in opposition to her
so far as the proportion of the award to be paid to the different
parties is concerned. That she represented these different persons,
with their consent, in the examination before the Court of Claims
shows that there was between them at that time no diverse interest
involved; that, so far as regarded the validity of the whole claim
and its amount, the parties were situated alike, and had the same
interest as against the United States in proving the validity of
their claim and the amount thereof. That she was authorized to
receive the amount that might be awarded, and that thereafter the
question of proportion and distribution would arise is a plain
deduction from the facts stated. As the material point before the
Court of Claims was the validity of the claim and its amount, in
regard to which all claimants appeared in the same interest, it was
not of much moment who should be named to receive the award (if any
were to be made), and therefore the statement by the court that
Esther S. Buchanan was the administratrix of William B. Buchanan,
the survivor of the firm, was not calculated to call for any
comment, for the reason, as stated, that the appropriation would be
to a
Page 190 U. S. 364
representative of the next of kin, the individual members of
which might be thereafter identified. The history given by the
Court of Claims was, upon the question of ownership, just enough to
form a basis for an appropriation to someone, who would thereupon
distribute to the proper persons among themselves. The reports of
the court were not intended as an identification of such
persons.
After the report of the Court of Claims to Congress, Miss
Buchanan had, in 1891, taken out letters of administration upon the
estate of James A. Buchanan. Soon after the passage of the act of
1899, she obtained the certificates already referred to from the
Court of Claims, in one of which, in regard to the ship
Jane, it was stated that she
"represents the next of kin of William B. Buchanan, the
surviving member of the firm of Samuel Smith & Buchanan,
deceased, the original owners of the claim upon which said award
was made,"
and in the other certificate, in regard to the ship
Patapsco, it was stated that she
"represents the next of kin of William B. Buchanan, surviving
partner, etc., deceased, the original owner of the claim upon which
said award was made."
These certificates obviously proceeded upon the report which the
court had theretofore made in these two cases, and in which it is
plain that the court reported the fact that the members of the firm
of S. Smith & Buchanan, as that firm was constituted in 1798,
were the original sufferers of the loss in 1798. It is also plain
that the court assumed that the William B. Buchanan named in the
certificate was a member of the firm in 1798, which suffered the
loss, and it was to the administratrix of the survivor of that firm
(1798) that the certificate in truth applied. This simply carried
out the purpose of the court, expressly stated in this case, to
insist that the decedent whose estate was administered was the same
person who suffered loss through the capture of a vessel. In the
certificates, as well as in the report of the Court of Claims, it
is evident that the court assumed that the persons entitled to the
distributive share of the moneys were the next of kin of the
original sufferers, whoever they might turn out to be, although the
court supposed that William B. Buchanan was the survivor of the
firm that suffered the loss in 1798.
Page 190 U. S. 365
The case of
United States v. Gilliat, 164 U. S.
42, simply holds that, under the special statute therein
referred to, the certificate made by the Court of Claims and sent
to the Secretary of the Treasury was conclusive, and the United
States had no right of appeal from the conclusion stated in the
certificate.
In this case, the Court of Claims thought there were three
members of the firm of S. Smith & Buchanan at the time of these
captures. In the fourth finding, in regard to the ship
Patapsco, the court reported that
"John Donnell and the firm of S. Smith & Buchanan owned
jointly the cotton shipped on that vessel, and that Samuel Smith,
James A. Buchanan, and William B. Buchanan, citizens of the United
States, formed the said firm of S. Smith & Buchanan"
-- that is, formed the firm at the time of the capture in 1798,
and in the tenth finding, the court found that, on November 9,
1820,
"said Samuel Smith, James A. Buchanan, and William B. Buchanan,
copartners, and trading as hereinbefore set forth at copartners,
under the firm name of S. Smith & Buchanan, assigned"
to assignees for the benefit of their creditors. Thus, the court
assumed that the firm consisted of the same members in 1798 and in
1820, and that William B. Buchanan was the survivor. This is
clearly a mistake. William B. Buchanan was born in 1795, and was
then at the time of these captures, but three years old, and was
not a member of the firm at that time, as the state court finds.
But clearly the Court of Claims had reference to the firm as it was
composed when the losses occurred, whoever in fact were then the
members of that firm.
There is nothing in its report which would show that it regarded
William B. Buchanan as one of the original sufferers because of his
being a member of the firm of 1818, of S. Smith & Buchanan. The
whole history of the case as given by the court shows that William
B. Buchanan was mistakenly supposed to have been a member of the
firm in 1798, and it was on that account that he was regarded as
the survivor of that firm. Whatever equity the parties might claim
on account of William B. Buchanan's becoming a member of the firm
in 1818, it is plain that those equities were not regarded or known
or supposed to exist by the Court of Claims.
Page 190 U. S. 366
Taking this report of the Court of Claims, it seems to us
evident that the appropriations for the payment of the claims made
by the act of 1899, 30 Stat. 1194, 1195, proceeded upon the report
made by that court to Congress in these cases, and that the
language of that act, in the case of the ship
Jane, to
"Esther S. Buchanan, administratrix, representing Smith &
Buchanan, $11,660.21," and in the case of the ship
Patapsco,
"Esther S. Buchanan, administratrix of the estate of William B.
Buchanan, who was the surviving partner of S. Smith & Buchanan,
deceased, $25,056, the value of the cargo shipped by said
firm,"
when taken in connection with the other facts as to the firm of
1798, shows that the appropriation was intended for the
administratrix of the survivor of the original firm existing in
1798 at the time the losses occurred, and that the next of kin of
the members of that firm at that time were in reality the parties
intended by Congress to receive its gratuity. It was not within the
intention of Congress to determine by the appropriation who those
persons were, but the appropriation was to Esther S. Buchanan as a
representative of the class -- in other words, the representative
of the next of kin of the original sufferers, without therein
determining who they were. The intent of Congress to make the
payment in each case to the representative of those who were next
of kin of the original sufferers, or, in other words, of the firm
as it stood in 1798, we think is perfectly certain. Whoever they
might be, Congress intended the payment to be for those who were
the next of kin, and it did not conclude the fact as to who they
were by appropriating the money to Esther S. Buchanan. It was to be
for her as the representative of the next of kin of the original
sufferers.
Congress could, of course, have given this fund to anyone it
chose, as it was a case of gratuity in any event; but the question
is what did Congress in fact mean when it made the appropriation in
the act of 1899?, and that meaning, we feel convinced, was as we
have already stated.
The cases of
United States v. Jordan, 113 U.
S. 418;
United States v. Price, 116 U. S.
43, and
United States v. Louisville,
169 U. S. 249, are
not in conflict with this result. In those cases, the
Page 190 U. S. 367
appropriation was to the party named in the act, and a specific
sum was directed to be paid to such party. It was not a payment to
him in trust for some other and unidentified members of a class to
which he belonged, but it was a positive and absolute direction by
Congress to pay to the individual named in the act the amount
stated therein. In such cases, there is no subject for
identification of the members of any class, and no occasion for the
further action of anyone before payment is to be made.
In the case at bar, it is clear that the party named in the
appropriation was not entitled to the money absolutely as her own.
It was an appropriation to her for the benefit of others, herself
included, and those others were identified only as a class, and
that class was intended as the next of kin of the firm of S. Smith
& Buchanan as it existed in 1798.
Having obtained payment of the sum appropriated by Congress, the
plaintiff in error, Esther S. Buchanan, came into a court of equity
and asked to have the fund distributed under its authority. She
stated all the facts, and while claiming the right to share in the
distribution of the money in her character as one of the next of
kin of William B. Buchanan, yet she still submitted the whole
question as to the proper distribution to the court. The court had
jurisdiction to determine as to the real meaning and the proper
construction of the act of Congress, and the highest court of that
state, upon appeal from the trial court, has held in substance that
it appears that there were but two members of the firm in 1798, and
it accordingly decided that the intent of Congress was clearly to
make the gift to the next of kin of the members of the firm in
1798, which would result in giving one-half to the next of kin of
S. Smith and the other one-half to the next of kin of James A.
Buchanan, among whom are found Esther S. Buchanan and her brother,
Wilson C. Buchanan.
We see no error in the decree of the Maryland Court of Appeals,
and it is, for the reasons stated,
Affirmed.
