1. When competition which controls rates prevails at a given
point, a dissimilarity of circumstances and conditions is created
justifying a carrier in charging a lesser rate to such point, it
being the longer distance, than it exacts to a shorter distance and
noncompetitive point on the same line.
2. A nearer and noncompetitive point on the same line is not
entitled to lower rates prevailing at a longer distance and
competitive place on the theory that it could also be made a
competitive point if designated lines of railway carriers, by
combinations between themselves, agreed to that end. The
competition necessary to produce a dissimilarity of conditions must
be real and controlling, and not merely conjectural or
possible.
3. Where a charge of a lesser rate for a longer than a shorter
haul over the same line is lawful because of the existence of
controlling competition at the longer distance place, the mere fact
that the less charge is made for the longer distance does not alone
suffice to cause the lesser rate for the longer distance to be
unduly discriminatory.
Page 190 U. S. 274
4. The Commission having found a rate to be unreasonable solely
because it was violative of the act which forbids a greater charge
for a lesser than for a longer distance under stated conditions and
which prohibits undue discrimination,
held that, as the
grounds upon which such holding was based resulted from an error of
law, it was proper not to conclude the question of the inherent
unreasonableness of the rates, but to leave it open for further
action by the Commission to be considered free from the errors of
law which had previously influenced the Commission.
5. A carrier, in order to give particular places the benefit of
their proximity to a competitive point and thereby afford them a
lower rate than they would otherwise enjoy, may take into
consideration the rate to the point of competition and make it the
basis of rates to the points in question. To give a lower rate as
the result of competition does not violate the provisions of the
Act to Regulate Commerce.
6.
Held that where a rate was based on an error of
fact, which was not complained of before or acted on by the
Commission, and had been corrected by the carriers long before the
decision below, and the corrected rate had been in force for a long
period, it was not necessary to revise the decree of the court
below, which was in all other respects correct, so as to secure a
continuance of the corrected rate.
The connecting roads of the appellees form the short line -- 496
miles in length -- between New Orleans and Atlanta. The through
line consists of the Louisville & Nashville Railroad from New
Orleans to Montgomery, the Western Railway of Alabama between
Montgomery and West Point, and the Atlanta & West Point
Railroad from West Point to Atlanta.
LaGrange is on the Western Railway of Alabama, 104 miles from
Montgomery. Opelika lies between Montgomery and LaGrange, and is 38
miles distant from the latter place. LaGrange and the following
stations between it and Atlanta are distant from Atlanta, as
follows: LaGrange, 71 miles; Hogansville, 58 miles; Newnan, 30
miles; Palmetto, 25 miles, and Fairburn, 18 miles.
Pursuant to § 13 of the Act to Regulate Commerce, Fuller E.
Calloway, a merchant of LaGrange, filed a complaint against the
appellees herein with the Interstate Commerce Commission. We take
from the opinion rendered by the Commission in that proceeding the
following synopsis of the averments of the complaint and
answer:
"The complaint alleges in substance that defendants are subject
to the provisions of the Act to Regulate Commerce; that rates
charged by them for the transportation by continuous carriage or
shipment of freights, wholly by railroad, from New Orleans,
Louisiana, to LaGrange, Georgia, are unjust and unreasonable
Page 190 U. S. 275
in themselves, and relatively unjust and unreasonable as
compared with lower rates charged by defendants for carrying the
same commodities over longer distances from New Orleans through
LaGrange to Hogansville, Newnan, Palmetto, and Fairburn, Georgia,
and other localities; that defendants' said rates from New Orleans
to LaGrange and said longer-distance points and other localities
unjustly discriminate against complainant and others, the City of
LaGrange and vicinity and traffic carried thereto, and subject
merchants and dealers therein to undue and unreasonable prejudice
and disadvantage, and give undue and unreasonable preference and
advantage to merchants and dealers at Hogansville, Newnan,
Palmetto, Fairburn, and other localities and traffic consigned
thereto; that defendants' said rates from New Orleans to LaGrange,
Hogansville, Newnan, Palmetto, and Fairburn give them greater
aggregate compensation for the transportation of like kind of
property, under substantially similar circumstances and conditions,
for the shorter distance from New Orleans to LaGrange than for the
longer distance over the same line, in the same direction, from New
Orleans to Hogansville, Newnan, Palmetto, or Fairburn; that the
rates charged by defendants as aforesaid are in violation of §§ 1,
2, 3, and 4 of the Act to Regulate Commerce. The rates and
distances involved are set forth in the complaint, and it is
further alleged therein that the lowest rate charged by defendants
from New Orleans to LaGrange yields them over 1 1/3 cents per ton
for each mile of haul, and that their highest rate between said
points affords them nearly 6 3/4 cents revenue per ton per
mile."
"The defendants filed a joint answer, in which they admit that
the rates charged are substantially as alleged in the complaint;
that their rates to LaGrange amount for each mile to 1.36 cents per
ton on the lowest class of freight (D), and to 6.71 cents per ton
on the highest class (1), and that the rates for the shorter
distance from New Orleans to LaGrange are more than they charge for
the longer distances in the same direction from New Orleans to
Hogansville, Newnan, Palmetto, and Fairburn; but they deny that the
transportation to LaGrange Hogansville, and other points mentioned
is conducted under substantially
Page 190 U. S. 276
similar circumstances and conditions, and thereupon further deny
that their said rates are in violation of section 4 of the statute.
The defendants also deny the unreasonableness, injustice, wrongful
discrimination, and undue and unreasonable prejudice and
preference, advantage, and disadvantage, alleged by complainant
under the first, second, and third sections of the act. The answer
contains statements of rates from New Orleans to the points in
question, and to and from Montgomery, Alabama, and Atlanta,
Georgia, showing also that the through rates to LaGrange,
Hogansville, and the other points mentioned are made by combination
of rates to Atlanta with local rates back over the same line to
Fairburn, Palmetto, Newnan, Hogansville, and LaGrange, and it is
further averred that the disparities in rates complained of are
caused by a competitive situation at Atlanta which compels low
rates to that point from New Orleans. The competitive circumstances
and conditions at Atlanta are stated in the answer to be the
competition of such supply markets as New Orleans, Baltimore, and
other northeastern cities, Cincinnati, Louisville, and other Ohio
River cities, and the competition of carriers from such markets to
Atlanta, and to have resulted, after frequent and disastrous rate
wars, in the establishment of certain relative rates from these
various market cities to Atlanta, a disturbance of which would
immediately lead to a repetition of such wars. Similar competitive
conditions are claimed by the defendants to exist at Montgomery,
Alabama, through which freight passes over defendants' through line
to LaGrange and the other points mentioned or referred to in the
complaint, and they further assert that the present relation of
rates to Montgomery and Atlanta must also, under existing
circumstances, be maintained. The following extract from the answer
seems to succinctly set out the defendants' position in this
case:"
"The rates from Atlanta to those stations, respectively,
LaGrange, Hogansville, Newnan, Palmetto, and Fairburn, are fixed by
the Georgia Railroad Commission, and are just and reasonable. The
rates from New Orleans to Atlanta are fixed by the competition
between markets, and the competition between carriers, as explained
above, and are just and reasonable. The rates charged by
respondents are the sum of those rates,
Page 190 U. S. 277
and therefore respondents' rates themselves are just and
reasonable. The reason that Fairburn, Palmetto, Newnan, and
Hogansville have lower rates than LaGrange is due alone to the fact
that they are nearer to Atlanta, and not to any favoritism or
discrimination on the part of the respondents."
The evidence introduced at the hearing before the Commission, in
support of the complaint, consisted solely of the testimony of the
complainant, which dealt merely with the discrimination alleged to
exist against LaGrange in the lesser rates accorded to greater
distance points from New Orleans beyond LaGrange towards Atlanta,
viz., Hogansville, Newnan, Palmetto, and Fairburn. Much
evidence -- both oral and documentary -- was introduced on behalf
of the railroads in support of the averments of the answer.
The various contentions contained in the complaint were
sustained by the Commission, which made voluminous findings, and
issued an order requiring the railroads in general terms to "wholly
cease and desist from each and every of the violations of law"
found and set forth in its report and opinion. The remaining
clauses of the order are set out in the margin.
*
Page 190 U. S. 278
The railroads not having obeyed the order, the Commission
instituted the present proceedings in equity in the Circuit Court
of the United States for the Southern District of Alabama. That
court sustained the order of the Commission. 102 Fed.
Page 190 U. S. 279
709. The circuit court of appeals reversed the decree of the
circuit court and remanded the cause, but
"without prejudice to the right of the Commission to proceed,
upon the evidence already introduced before it, or upon such
further pleadings and evidence as it may allow to be made or
introduced, to hear and determine the controversy according to
law."
MR. JUSTICE WHITE, after making the foregoing statement,
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The circuit court concurred in the finding of the Commission
that, by the exaction of the rates to LaGrange complained of the
third and fourth sections of the Act to Regulate Commerce were
violated, and, being unable to say that error clearly appeared in
the finding that the first section of the act was also violated,
refused to overrule the action of the Commission in any
particular.
Whilst the circuit court of appeals announced its
conclusions
Page 190 U. S. 280
in a per curiam opinion, it is fairly inferable from the
authorities which are cited in that opinion that the court
concluded that the rates charged to LaGrange did not constitute a
violation of the third and fourth sections of the act, prohibiting
undue discrimination and a greater charge for a shorter than for a
longer haul under substantially similar circumstances and
conditions. It is also inferable from the argument at bar that the
appellate court, so far as the reasonableness
per se of
the rates was concerned, ordered the case to be dismissed, without
prejudice to further proceedings because it was of opinion that, in
the consideration of this question, the Commission had been in
effect controlled by its finding, held to have been erroneous, that
there had been violations of the third and fourth sections of the
act. It was therefore deemed that the controversy, insofar as the
intrinsic reasonableness of the rates was concerned, should not be
foreclosed, but should be left for further consideration and
decision upon the evidence already introduced and such additional
evidence as might be taken on a further hearing before the
Commission if such new hearing was desired.
Whether or not the circuit court of appeals was correct in the
conclusions reached by it as above stated is the question now for
decision.
The record convinces us that the appellate court correctly
decided that there was no legal foundation for the contention that
the third and fourth sections of the Act to Regulate Commerce had
been violated. It was and is conceded that the rates on through
freight from New Orleans to Atlanta were the result of competition
at Atlanta, and that there was hence such a dissimilarity of
circumstances and conditions as justified the lesser charge for the
carriage of freight from New Orleans to Atlanta, the longer
distance point, than was exacted for the haul from New Orleans to
LaGrange, the shorter distance point.
The sum of the rate to LaGrange was arrived at by charging the
low rate produced by competition at Atlanta and adding thereto the
sum of the local rate back from Atlanta to LaGrange. The same rule
was applied to the stations between
Page 190 U. S. 281
LaGrange and Atlanta, each of those stations receiving therefore
a somewhat lower rate than LaGrange, although they were located a
greater distance from New Orleans and nearer Atlanta. The sum by
which the rates from New Orleans to these respective stations
between LaGrange and Atlanta were lower than the LaGrange rate was
dependent upon the distance these respective stations were from
Atlanta. It was shown, however, and is unquestioned, that except in
a particular to which we shall have occasion hereafter to refer, if
the charge had been based on the nearest competitive point south of
LaGrange -- that is, Montgomery -- and there had been added to the
competitive rate to Montgomery the local rate from Montgomery to
LaGrange and the other stations beyond, the freight rates on
shipments from New Orleans to LaGrange would have been much greater
than the rates now complained of as excessive. In other words, the
railroads, instead of putting out of view the competition
prevailing at Atlanta when they fixed the rates to the
noncompetitive points, took the low rates prevailing at Atlanta as
a basis and added thereto the local rate from Atlanta, the result
being that the places in question were given the advantage
resulting from their proximity to Atlanta, the competitive point,
in proportion to the degree of such proximity.
When the situation just stated is comprehended, it results that
the complaint in effect was that a method of ratemaking had been
resorted to which gave the places referred to a lower rate than
they otherwise would have enjoyed. In this situation of affairs, we
fail to see how there was any just cause of complaint. Clearly if,
disregarding the competition at Atlanta, the higher rate had been
established from New Orleans to the noncompetitive points within
the designated radius from Atlanta, the inevitable result would
have been to cause the traffic to move from New Orleans to the
competitive point (Atlanta), and thence to the places in question,
thus bringing about the same rates now complained of. It having
been established that competition affecting rates existing at a
particular point (Atlanta) produced the dissimilarity of
circumstances and conditions contemplated by the fourth section of
the act, we
Page 190 U. S. 282
think it inevitably followed that the railway companies had a
right to take the lower rate prevailing at Atlanta as a basis for
the charge made to places in territory contiguous to Atlanta, and
to ask, in addition to the low competitive rate, the local rate
from Atlanta to such places, provided thereby no increased charges
resulted over those which would have been occasioned if the low
rate to Atlanta had been left out of view. That is to say, it seems
incontrovertible that, in making the rate, as the railroads had a
right to meet the competition, they were authorized to give the
shippers the benefit of it by according to them a lower rate than
would otherwise have been afforded. True it is that, by this
method, a lower rate from New Orleans than was exacted at LaGrange
obtained at the longer distance places lying between LaGrange and
Atlanta, but this was only the result of their proximity to the
competitive point, and they hence obtained only the advantage
resulting from their situation. It could be no legal disadvantage
to LaGrange, since, if the low competitive rate prevailing at
Atlanta had been disregarded, and the rate had been fixed with
reference to Montgomery, and the local rate from thence on, the
sole result would have been, as we have previously said, to cause
the traffic to move along the line of least resistance to Atlanta,
and thence to the places named, leaving LaGrange in the exact
position in which it was placed by the rates now complained of.
It is to be observed that it is shown that the local charges on
freight moved between Atlanta and LaGrange and the stations
intermediate -- all of the points being in the State of Georgia --
conformed to the requirements of the Georgia state Railroad
Commission.
In the report of the Commission, a suggestion is found that
LaGrange should be entitled to the same rate as Atlanta because, if
the carriers concerned in this case in connection with other
carriers reaching LaGrange chose to do so, they might bring about
competition by the way of a line between Macon and LaGrange which
would be equivalent to the competitive conditions existing at
Atlanta. We are unable, however, to follow the suggestion. To adopt
it would amount to this: that the substantial dissimilarity of
circumstances and conditions
Page 190 U. S. 283
provided by the Act to Regulate Commerce would depend not, as
has been repeatedly held, upon a real and substantial competition
at a particular point affecting rates, but upon the mere
possibility of the arising of such competition. This would destroy
the whole effect of the act, and cause every case where competition
was involved to depend not upon the fact of its existence as
affecting rates, but upon the possibility of its arising. What the
fourth section of the Act to Regulate Commerce has reference to is
an actual dissimilarity of circumstances and conditions, not a
conjectural one. Of course, if, by agreements or combinations among
carriers, it were found that, at a particular point, rates were
unduly influenced by a suppression of competition, that fact would
be proper to consider in determining the question of undue
discrimination and the reasonableness
per se of the rates
at such possible competitive points. As, however, the finding of
the Commission concerning unjust discrimination was predicated
solely upon the conclusion that the fourth section of the act had
been violated, we may put that subject out of view. So far as the
reasonableness
per se of the rate is concerned, we come
now to its consideration.
Whilst there was nothing in the evidence taken before the
Commission to lend support to the finding that the rates to
LaGrange were intrinsically unreasonable, in the report of the
Commission, considerable reference was made to facts and
circumstances which it is to be presumed were upon the files of the
Commission, and which were deemed to conduce to the conclusion that
the rates to LaGrange were unreasonable
per se. But when
the statements on this subject made in the report are considered in
connection with the report as a whole, and the subjects to which no
reference is made in the report are recalled, we think it clearly
results that every conclusion reached by the Commission concerning
the unreasonableness
per se of the rates to LaGrange
rested wholly upon the error of law committed by the Commission
when it decided that the railroad companies were powerless to
consider the competitive rates prevailing at Atlanta, and to use
those rates as a basis for the charges to points within the
competitive area in order thereby to give a lower rate to such
points than they otherwise would
Page 190 U. S. 284
have enjoyed. Thus it was held in effect that, because the
competitive rate to Atlanta was not unduly low, therefore any
higher charge to LaGrange, the shorter distance, was unreasonable.
And the same misconception was manifested by the reasoning adopted
concerning the rates to Hogansville and the other stations between
LaGrange and Atlanta, since it was held that, because the charges
to these points were lower than to LaGrange, therefore the rates to
the last-named point were unreasonable
per se. Both of
these conclusions, however, but held that if the carriers elected
to meet the competitive rate at Atlanta, they must at once
correspondingly reduce their rates to all shorter distance and
noncompetitive points. But such a ruling was equivalent to
overthrowing the settled construction of the Interstate Commerce
Act allowing carriers to charge the lesser rate for the longer than
for the shorter distance if at the further point the lesser rate
was justified by a substantial dissimilarity of circumstances and
conditions there prevailing, consequent upon real competition. A
clause in the order of the Commission makes it clear that no
independent finding as to the unreasonableness of the rates was
made, since it allows the carriers to continue to charge the rates
complained of to LaGrange, provided no higher rates were charged to
the more distant points between there and Atlanta. The
inconsistency between such an order and the conclusion that the
rates to the shorter distance point were unreasonable
per
se was pointed out in
East Tennessee, Virginia &
Georgia Railway Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission,
181 U. S. 1, where
it was said (p.
181 U. S.
23):
"A decree which ordered the carriers to desist from charging a
greater compensation for the lesser than for the longer haul would
be in no way responsive to the conclusion that the rate for the
lesser distance was unreasonable in and of itself. Such a decree
would in effect authorize the carrier to continue to charge at its
election a rate which was, in itself, unreasonable to the shorter
point."
And when, in connection with the matters just stated, it is
observed that the report of the Commission makes no reference
whatever to any intrinsic disparity between the LaGrange
Page 190 U. S. 285
rates and those prevailing at other noncompetitive points
between New Orleans and LaGrange, no room in reason is left to
sustain the view that the Commission could have held that the rates
to LaGrange were in and of themselves unreasonable, irrespective of
the competitive condition prevailing at Atlanta and the arrangement
of rates which arose from it which formed the main subject of the
complaint.
We conclude that, under the circumstances disclosed by the
record, the circuit court of appeals committed no error in refusing
to enforce the order of the Commission and in remanding the case to
that body for such independent consideration of the question of the
reasonableness
per se of the rates as the ends of justice
might require.
It remains only to consider a special question concerning the
third and fourth sections of the act which was passed over in an
earlier part of this opinion. As has been said, the complaint made
before the Commission alleged a disparity and discrimination alone,
because of the difference of rates between LaGrange and the points
beyond to Atlanta, and the report of the Commission in effect dealt
only with such alleged grievances. However, in the course of its
report, it was remarked by the Commission that Opelika, which was
38 miles south of LaGrange, was a competitive point, and that, if
Opelika was used as the basis for calculating the rate to LaGrange,
a slightly lesser rate on some articles would be enjoyed by
LaGrange than was the case by basing the rate on Atlanta as the
nearest competitive point. The Commission, however, would seem to
have attached no great importance to the matter which it thus
noticed, since nothing in the order entered by it was responsive to
the suggestion. It was stated, however, at bar that, in the
argument of the case in the circuit court of appeals, that court
directed the attention of the counsel of the railroads to the fact
that, even if their theories of the case were sound and were
approved, there was a suggestion in the report of the Commission
which indicated that Opelika, and not Atlanta, was the proper
basing point for fixing the rates to LaGrange, as thereby LaGrange
would enjoy on some classes of freight a slightly lower rate than
resulted from using Atlanta as the
Page 190 U. S. 286
basic point. It was also conceded at bar by counsel for all
parties that, when this suggestion was made, the counsel for the
railroad companies immediately declared that such fact had escaped
attention, that it would at once be brought to the notice of the
railroad companies, and a change of rates would be immediately put
into effect upon that basis. And the brief of counsel for the
Commission states that a modified tariff, based on Opelika, was put
into operation by the railroad companies in May, 1900, immediately
after the argument of the case in the circuit court of appeals, and
has been continued in force from that time to this, the decree
below having been entered more than one year after the submission
of the cause. It is, however, now insisted that the change made by
the railway companies to conform to the development as to Opelika
is a confession that there was error in the action of the circuit
court of appeals, and therefore requires that the decree of that
court should be at least in part reversed. It would be, it is said,
indeed dangerous to allow a railway company to exact illegal rates,
and persist in doing so even after the order of the Commission had
been issued, and then escape the consequences of its wrongdoing by
at the last hour changing its rates in order to prevent the entry
of a decree against it. The reasoning has abstract force, but its
application to the case in hand is devoid of merit, since neither
in the complaint made before the Commission nor in the evidence
introduced for the complainant was any claim made that wrong had
been done because of a combination of rates based on Atlanta
instead of Opelika. Indeed, the relief sought by the complaint and
that accorded by the Commission was inconsistent with the theory
that the rates should be based on either Opelika or Atlanta. As the
altered tariff based on Opelika had been in force more than one
year prior to the entry of the decree below, the court doubtless
considered it unnecessary to provide for its continuance. The
record does not disclose, nor was it suggested, that any
application was made to the circuit court of appeals to modify its
decree so as to direct the continuance of such new tariff, both
parties evidently acting on the reasonable assumption that it was
an accomplished fact. Under these circumstances,
Page 190 U. S. 287
we do not think a formal modification of the decree of the
circuit court of appeals is required, and that decree is
therefore
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN dissents.
* Portion of Order of Commission.
"It is further ordered and adjudged that said defendants, the
Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company, the Western Railway of
Alabama, and the Atlanta & West Point Railroad Company, do more
particularly cease and desist from violations of the law, so found
and set forth in said report and opinion as follows, to-wit:"
"1. That said defendants and each of them cease and desist from
charging, demanding, collecting, or receiving rates for the
transportation of the several kinds or classes of freight from New
Orleans, Louisiana, to LaGrange, Georgia, which, as a whole or upon
any article of merchandise, are in any respect unreasonable or
unjust."
"2. That said defendants and each of them cease and desist from
charging, demanding, collecting, or receiving the following
unreasonable, unjust, and unlawful rates for the transportation
from New Orleans, Louisiana, to La Grange, Georgia, of articles
embraced in the various classes of their freight classification,
that is to say:"
per
Classes; rates in cents per 100 pounds bar-
rel
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. A. B. C. D. E. H. F.
143 124 109 93 74 59 41 48 33 1-229 66 74 59
"3. That said defendants and each of them cease and desist from
charging, demanding, collecting, or receiving rates or charges for
the transportation of freight articles from New Orleans, Louisiana,
to LaGrange, Georgia, which are equal to rates or charges
contemporaneously in force over their railroads on like traffic
carried from New Orleans through La Grange to Atlanta, Georgia;
added to local rates in force on such traffic for local service
over the Atlanta & West Point Railroad back from Atlanta to La
Grange, such combined rates having been found and held in and by
said report and opinion of the Commission herein to be
unreasonable, unjust, unduly prejudicial, and unlawful, and so
unreasonable, unjust, unduly prejudicial, and unlawful to the
extent of such added local charges of the defendant the Atlanta
& West Point Railroad Company."
"4. That said defendants, and each of them, cease and desist
from charging, demanding, collecting, or receiving any greater
compensation in the aggregate for the transporting of freight
articles from New Orleans, Louisiana, for the shorter distance to
LaGrange, Georgia, than they contemporaneously charge, demand,
collect, or receive for transporting the like kind of freight
traffic from New Orleans for the longer distance over the same line
in the same direction to Hogansville, or Newnan, or Palmetto, or
Fairburn, Georgia, the shorter being included within the longer
distance."
"5. That said defendants, and each of them, cease and desist
from charging, demanding, collecting, or receiving unreasonable,
unjust, unduly prejudicial, and unlawful rates for the
transportation of freight articles from New Orleans to LaGrange
which are higher than aggregate rates contemporaneously charged,
demanded, collected, or received by them, or either of them, for
the transportation of like kind of freight from New Orleans to
Hogansville, or from New Orleans to Newnan, or from New Orleans to
Palmetto, or from New Orleans to Fairburn."
"6. That said defendants, and each of them, in the
transportation of freight articles from New Orleans, cease and
desist from charging and collecting rates or compensation which
subject complainant and other dealers and consignees at LaGrange,
Georgia, their traffic, or the City of LaGrange itself, to undue
and unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect
whatsoever, and also cease and desist from giving any undue or
unreasonable preference or advantage to merchants, dealers, and
consignees at Atlanta, Fairburn, Palmetto, Newnan, or Hogansville,
or to their traffic, or to either of such cities or localities,
namely, Atlanta, Fairburn, Palmetto, Newnan, or Hogansville, as
against complainant and said other dealers and consignees at
LaGrange, or the City of LaGrange itself."
"And it is further ordered and adjudged that said defendants be,
and they severally are hereby, recommended to so revise their
schedules of rates and charges that the aggregate compensation
charged and collected by them for the transportation from New
Orleans to LaGrange of freight articles embraced in the several
freight classes shall not exceed reasonable, just, and lawful class
rates in cents per hundred pounds and per barrel on Class F as
follows, to-wit:"
Class 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. A. B. C. D. E. H. F.
Rates 103 88 77 64 52 42 24 31 24 20 44 49 40
"and that they make corresponding reductions or relatively
reasonable and just charges in commodity rates, otherwise known as
exceptions to class rates, from New Orleans to LaGrange,
aforesaid."
"And it is further ordered that a notice embodying this order be
forthwith sent to each of the defendant corporations, together with
a copy of the report and opinion of the Commission herein, in
conformity with the fifteenth section of the Act to Regulate
Commerce."
