A judgment or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction is
conclusive wherever the same matter is again brought in
controversy.
But the rule does not apply to points which come only
collaterally under consideration, or are only incidentally
considered, or can only be argumentatively inferred from the
decree.
In an action at law by the vendee against the vendor for a
breach of the contract in not delivering the thing sold, the proper
measure of damages is not the price stipulated in the contract, but
the value at the time of the breach.
This rule applies to the sale of real as well as personal
property, but
quaere whether it is the proper measure of
damages in the case of an action for eviction
This was an action of covenant, brought by the defendant
Page 19 U. S. 110
in error (Lee) against the plaintiff in error (Hopkins) to
recover damages for not conveying certain tracts of military lands
which the plaintiff in error had agreed to convey upon the
defendant in error relieving a certain encumbrance held by one
Rawleigh Colston upon an estate called Hill and Dale, and which Lee
had previously granted and sold to Hopkins, and for which the
military lands in question were to be received in part payment. The
declaration set forth the covenant and averred that Lee had
completely removed the encumbrance from Hill and Dale. The
defendant below pleaded 1. that he had not completely removed the
encumbrance, and 2. that he (the defendant below) had never been
required by Lee to convey the military lands to him, and on these
pleas issues were joined. Upon the trial, Lee, in order to prove
the encumbrance in question was removed, offered in evidence to the
jury a record of the proceeding in chancery on a bill filed against
him in the circuit court by Hopkins. The bill stated that on 23
January, 1807, the date of the agreement on which the present
action at law was brought, Hopkins purchased of Lee the estate of
Hill and Dale, for which he agreed to pay $18,000,
viz.,
$10,000 in military lands at settled prices and to give his bond
for the residue payable in April, 1809. That Lee, in pursuance of
this agreement, selected certain military lands in the bill
mentioned. That at the time of the purchase of Hill and Dale, it
was mortgaged to Colston for a large sum, which Lee had promised to
discharge but had failed so to do, in consequence of which Hopkins
had paid off the
Page 19 U. S. 111
mortgage himself. The bill then claimed a large sum of money
from Lee for having removed this encumbrance, and prayed that the
defendant might be decreed to pay it, or in default thereof that
the claimant might be authorized by a decree of chancery to sell
the military lands, which he considered as a pledge remaining in
his hands, and out of the proceeds thereof, to pay himself. On the
coming in of Lee's answer denying several of the allegations of the
bill, the cause was referred to a master, who made a report stating
a balance of $427.77, due from Hopkins to Lee. This report was not
excepted to, and the court, after referring to it, proceeded to
decree the payment of the balance. To this testimony the defendant
in the present action objected so far as respected the reading of
the master's report and the decretal order thereon, but the
objection was overruled by the court below, and the evidence
admitted. The counsel for the plaintiff in error then prayed the
court to instruct the jury that in the assessment of damages, they
should take the price of the military lands as agreed upon by the
parties in the articles of agreement upon which the action was
brought, as the measure of damages for the breach of covenant. But
the court refused to give this instruction, and directed the jury
to take the price of the lands at the time they ought to have been
conveyed as the measure of damages. To this instruction the
plaintiff in error excepted, and a verdict and judgment thereon
being rendered for the plaintiff below, the cause was brought by
writ of error to this Court.
Page 19 U. S. 113
MR. JUSTICE LIVINGSTON delivered the opinion of the Court.
The first question which this Court has to consider is whether
the proceedings in chancery were properly admitted in evidence in
the court below.
It is not denied, as a general rule, that a fact which has been
directly tried and decided by a court of competent jurisdiction
cannot be contested again between the same parties in the same or
any other court. Hence a verdict and judgment of a court of record,
or a decree in chancery although not binding on strangers, puts an
end to all further controversy concerning the points thus decided
between the parties to such suit. In this there is and ought to be
no difference between a verdict and judgment
Page 19 U. S. 114
in a court of common law and a decree of a court of equity. They
both stand on the same footing, and may be offered in evidence
under the same limitations, and it would be difficult to assign a
reason why it should be otherwise. The rule has found its way into
every system of jurisprudence, not only from its obvious fitness
and propriety, but because without it an end could never be put to
litigation. It is therefore not confined in England or in this
country to judgments of the same court, or to the decisions of
courts of concurrent jurisdiction, but extends to matters litigated
before competent tribunals in foreign countries. It applies to
sentences of courts of admiralty -- to ecclesiastical tribunals --
and in short to every court which has proper cognizance of the
subject matter so far as they profess to decide the particular
matter in dispute. Under this rule, the decree in this case was
proper evidence, if it decided, or professed to decide, the same
question which was made on the trial at law. For to points which
came only collaterally under consideration, or were only
incidentally under cognizance, or could only be inferred by arguing
from the decree, it is admitted that the rule does not apply. On a
reference to the proceedings at law and in chancery in the case now
before us, the court is satisfied that the question which arose on
the trial of the action of covenant was precisely the same, if not
exclusively so (although that was not necessary) as the one which
had already been directly decided by the court of chancery. The
bill, which was filed by the present plaintiff in error, states
that on 23 January,
Page 19 U. S. 115
1807, which is the date of the agreement on which the action at
law is brought, Hopkins purchased of Lee the estate of Hill and
Dale, for which he was to pay $18,000 -- that is, $10,000 in
military lands at settled prices and the remainder in bonds,
payable in April, 1809. That Lee, in pursuance of this agreement,
selected certain military lands in the bill mentioned. That at the
time of the purchase of Hill and Dale, it was mortgaged to Rawleigh
Colston for a large sum, which Lee had promised to discharge, but
that he had failed so to do, in consequence of which Hopkins had
paid the mortgage himself. The complainant then claims a large sum
from Lee for having removed this encumbrance, and prays that the
defendant may be decreed to pay it, or in default thereof that the
complainant may be authorized by a decree of the court to sell the
military lands, which he considered as a pledge in his hands, and
out of the proceeds to pay himself. Not a single demand is stated
in the bill except the one arising out of the complainant's
extinguishment of the encumbrance, which Lee had taken upon himself
to remove.
On Lee's answer coming in denying several of the allegations of
the bill, the cause is referred to a master commissioner, who,
after a long investigation, in the presence of both parties and the
examination of many witnesses, makes a report by which Hopkins is
made a debtor of Lee in the sum of $427.77. On inspection of this
report, it will be seen that the chief, if not the only controversy
between the parties was, whether Hill and Dale had been
relieved
Page 19 U. S. 116
from its encumbrance to Colston, by funds furnished by Lee to
Hopkins for that purpose, and that unless that fact had been found
affirmatively, a report could not have been made in Lee's favor.
The court, after referring to this report, and stating that it had
not been excepted to, proceeds to decree the payment of this
balance by the complainant to the defendant. From this summary
review of the proceedings in chancery, the conclusion seems
inevitable that the chief if not sole matter in litigation in that
suit was whether Hill and Dale had been freed of the encumbrance to
Colston, by Lee or by Hopkins, and that the report and subsequent
decree proceeded on the ground, and established the fact, that Lee
had discharged it, which was also the only point put in issue by
the first plea of the defendant in the action of covenant. No rule
of evidence, therefore, is violated in saying that this decree was
properly admitted by the circuit court. But if the decree were
admissible, it is supposed that the report of the master ought not
to have been submitted to the jury. The Court entertains a
different opinion. No reason has been assigned why a decision by a
proper and sworn officer of a court of chancery in the presence and
hearing of both parties, according to the acknowledged practice and
usage of the court on the very matters in controversy, not excepted
to by either party and confirmed by the court, should not be as
satisfactory evidence of any fact found by it, as the verdict of a
jury, on which a judgment is afterwards rendered. The advantage
which a verdict may be supposed to possess over a report from
its
Page 19 U. S. 117
being the decision of twelve, instead of the opinion of a single
man, is perhaps more than counterbalanced by the time which is
allowed to a master for deliberation, and a more thorough
investigation of the matters in controversy. But a better and more
satisfactory answer is that it is the usual, known, and approved
practice of the court to whose jurisdiction the parties had
submitted themselves. But if this document be withheld from a jury,
how are they or the court to arrive at the grounds of the decree,
or a knowledge of the points or matters which have been decided in
the cause? Without it, the decree may be intelligible, but the
grounds on which it proceeds, or the facts which it means to
decide, may be liable to much uncertainty and conjecture. The
report therefore, as well as the decree, was proper evidence not
only of the fact that such report and decree had been made, but of
the matter which they professed directly to decide. We are not now
called upon to say whether in those respects they were conclusive,
as they do not appear to have been offered with that view, but
without meaning to deny to them such effect, we only say, which is
all that the present case requires, that they were competent and
proper in the absence of other testimony to establish the fact of
the removal of the encumbrance by the defendant Lee from the estate
of Hill and Dale.
In the assessment of damages, the counsel for the plaintiff in
error prayed the court to instruct the jury that they should take
the price of the land, as agreed upon by the parties in the
articles of agreement upon which the suit was brought, for their
government.
Page 19 U. S. 118
But the court refused to give this instruction, and directed the
jury to take the price of the lands, at the time they ought to have
been conveyed, as the measure of damages. To this instruction the
plaintiff in error excepted. The rule is settled in this Court that
in an action by the vendee for a breach of contract on the part of
the vendor, for not delivering the article, the measure of damages
is its price at the time of the breach. The price being settled by
the contract, which is generally the case, makes no difference, nor
ought it to make any; otherwise the vendor, if the article have
risen in value, would always have it in his power to discharge
himself from his contract, and put the enhanced value in his own
pocket. Nor can it make any difference in principle whether the
contract be for the sale of real or personal property, if the
lands, as is the case here, have not been improved or built on. In
both cases, the vendee is entitled to have the thing agreed for, at
the contract price, and to sell it himself at its increased value.
If it be withheld, the vendor ought to make good to him the
difference. This is not an action for eviction, nor is the Court
now prescribing the proper rule of damages in such a case.
Judgment affirmed.
