It is the duty of this Court to decide actual controversies by a
judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions
upon moot questions or abstract propositions or to declare
principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue
in the case before it.
When, pending an appeal, it becomes, without any fault on the
part of the defendant, impossible for this Court to grant any
effectual relief to the plaintiff in error even if it should decide
the case in his favor, the appeal will be dismissed.
Mills v.
Green, 159 U. S. 651,
followed.
Page 189 U. S. 65
This was a bill filed in the Chancery Court of Knox County,
Tennessee, under the statute in that behalf, in the name of the
state, "on the information of" T. A. Rambo and G.L. Maloney, G. H.
Strong, S. L. England, Sam Vance, J. E. C. Harrell, and R. L.
Peters against Stephen P. Condon, T. T. McMillan, and James Rich,
and H. C. Anderson, representing
"that, at the January Term, 1898, G. H. Strong and T. A. Rambo
were duly and legally elected by the County Court of Knox County,
Tennessee, members of the Pike Commission of Knox County for the
term of four years, which would make their terms of office expire
in January, 1902, and G.L. Maloney, who is the judge of Knox
County, Tennessee, is by operation of the law,
ex officio
chairman of said commission. The said Sam Vance and J. F. C.
Harrell were duly elected members of the said Workhouse Commission
by the said County Court of Knox County, Tennessee at its January
Term, 1901, which would make their terms of office expire in 1903.
The said S. L. England and I. N. White were duly elected Workhouse
Commissioners of Knox County, Tennessee at its January Term, 1900,
which would make their terms of office expire in 1902, and the said
G.L. Maloney as judge of the county is
ex officio chairman
of the said commission. The said R. L. Peters was elected
Superintendent of the Workhouse in January, 1898, which would make
his term of office expire in January, 1902. All of said officers
were duly and legally elected, and inducted into their respective
offices, and assumed the duties thereof, and up to the time of the
qualification of defendants, to-wit, on March 2, 1901, continued to
perform the duties and exercise the functions and receive the
emoluments pertaining to said offices."
The bill then averred that, on February 8, 1901, an act of the
General Assembly of the State of Tennessee was approved by the
Governor, and went into effect, entitled:
"An Act to Create a Board of Public Road Commissioners, to
Regulate the Laying Out and Working of Public Roads in this state,
in Counties Having a Population of Not Less than 70,000 and Not
More than 90,000 under the federal Census of the Year 1900, or any
Subsequent federal Census, and to Provide a Method for the
Management
Page 189 U. S. 66
and Control of County Workhouses in Counties Coming under the
Provisions of this Act."
That, in pursuance of the act, the Governor of Tennessee, on
February 16, 1901, appointed Stephen P. Condon, James Rich, and T.
T. McMillan as the Board of Public Road Commissioners; that Condon
was appointed Superintendent of Public Roads, and the other two
associate members of the Road Commission; that the Governor had
issued to defendants commissions as such Public Road Commissioners,
and that they gave bond and qualified March 2, 1901, "and are now
attempting to perform the duties of the said offices."
That defendants had in fact ousted the pike commissioners, the
workhouse commissioners, and superintendent from their respective
positions, and deprived them of their privileges and powers, and
the H. C. Anderson had been elected by defendants manager of the
workhouse.
Complainants further represented that the Act of February 8,
1901, was in plain violation of the Constitution of the State of
Tennessee, illegal, null, and void, and
"not effective to deprive the said parties of the several
offices aforesaid, to which they were regularly elected, or of the
rights, powers, privileges, and emoluments thereof,"
and that defendants
"are unlawfully holding and exercising said offices of Public
Road Commissioners and Superintendent of Roads and associate
members, and that they are usurpers of said offices."
The prayer was (1) for process; (2)
"that the said defendants may be enjoined from holding the said
offices of Public Road Commissioners, or Superintendent of Public
Roads, or associate members of said Road Commission, or manager of
the workhouse, or from exercising any of the powers and rights
which the said act of February 8, 1901, attempts to confer upon
them, and that they may be enjoined from receiving any of the
emoluments appertaining to the said offices under and by virtue of
the said unconstitutional and void act, and that, upon final
hearing, said injunction may be made perpetual;"
(3) that the defendants be required to execute a bond to
indemnify and hold harmless; (4)
"that, upon final hearing, a decree may be rendered declaring
that the said act of February
Page 189 U. S. 67
8, 1901, is unconstitutional, null, and void, and that the same
confers no right upon the defendants, and that the defendants are
not entitled to exercise any of the powers and privileges therein
contained or to enjoy any of the rights and emoluments therein
given to them, and that they be required to surrender same and turn
over all the powers, property, and privileges thereof to the
rightful owners aforesaid;"
(5) and for general relief.
On March 21, 1901, an application for injunction was denied, and
on March 23d, the bill was amended by striking out the third clause
of the prayer. Defendants filed a demurrer March 29, 1901, which on
the next day was sustained and the bill dismissed. The case was
then carried to the Court of Chancery Appeals, and it was there
contended, on errors assigned, that the Act of February 8, 1901,
was invalid because in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, as well as of the state
constitution. The Court of Chancery Appeals affirmed the judgment
of the chancellor, August 29, 1901, and an appeal was prosecuted to
the supreme court of the state, where it was again alleged, in the
assignment of errors, that the act in question was in violation of
the state constitution and of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme
Court held, on November 15, 1901, that the statute was not in
violation of either, and affirmed the decrees of the chancellor and
of the Court of Chancery Appeals. 108 Tenn. 82. Thereupon, a writ
of error was sued out from this Court, and the record was filed and
the cause docketed December 10, 1901. No motion was made to advance
the case, and it came on for argument and was argued March 12 and
13, 1903.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER, after making the foregoing statement,
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Page 189 U. S. 68
This was a proceeding under provisions of the Code of Tennessee
authorizing a bill in equity to be filed "whenever any person
unlawfully holds or exercises any public office or franchise within
this state." Shannon's Tenn.Code (1896), § 5165, cl. 1; § 5167.
By sections 5168 and 5179, it is provided that the suit may be
brought "by the Attorney General for the district or county, when
directed so to do by the General Assembly, or by the Governor and
Attorney General of the state concurring" or "on the information of
any person, upon such person giving security for the costs," when
the Attorney General for the district or county may institute the
proceeding without direction.
State v. Campbell, 8 Lea 74,
75.
Such was this suit, which was not brought by direction of the
General Assembly or of the Governor and Attorney General of the
state, but was instituted at the instance of persons superseded in
public office by an act of the General Assembly (approved by the
Governor and carried into effect by him) which they charged was
unconstitutional. Acts 1901, c. 8.
The question of constitutionality had been raised in an
application for mandatory injunction to compel the county judge to
approve the bonds of the persons appointed commissioners under the
act, the writ had been awarded and obeyed, and the decree was
affirmed and the act sustained by the Supreme Court at the same
time that the decree in this case, subsequently brought, was
affirmed.
Condon v. Maloney, 108 Tenn. 82. But the Supreme
Court also ruled in the prior case that as the writ had been obeyed
it had spent its force, so that, even if they differed with the
chancellor as to the use of the particular process -- an objection
therein urged -- a reversal of his decree "could not undo what had
been done," and to enter it "would be an idle ceremony."
In the circumstances, this case assumed the aspect of a civil
contest between individuals, and not of a prerogative writ to
correct usurpation of office.
Sections 5175, 5176, 5177, and 5180 are as follows:
"5175. Whenever the action is brought against a person for
usurping an office, in addition to the other allegations, the
Page 189 U. S. 69
name of the person rightfully entitled to the office, with a
statement of his right thereto, may be added, and the trial should,
if practicable, determine the right of the contesting parties."
"5176. If judgment is rendered in favor of such claimant, the
court may order the defendant to deliver to him, upon his
qualifying as required by law, all books and papers belonging to
the office in his (defendant's) custody, or under his control, and
such claimant may thereupon proceed to exercise the functions of
the office."
"5177. Such claimant, in this event, may also at any time within
one year thereafter, bring suit against the defendant, and recover
the damages he has sustained by reason of the act of the
defendant."
"5180. When a defendant, whether a natural person or a
corporation, is adjudged guilty of usurping, unlawfully holding, or
exercising any office or franchise, judgment shall be rendered that
such defendant be excluded from the office or franchise, and that
he pay the costs."
In
State ex Rel. Curry v. Wright, 5 Heiskell 612, it
was held that the bond given in case of appeal in an action for
usurpation of office need be only for costs, and the court, after
referring to sections 5176, 5177, and 5180 (by the prior numbers),
said:
"These provisions are specific and clear that the matter in
contest to be decided is the usurpation of the office or franchise,
and the judgment, exclusion from that office or franchise, and the
money judgment to be given is for costs, and the damages, if any
have accrued, are provided for in another suit to be brought within
a year after the judgment."
"The provision 'that the suit will be conducted as other suits
in equity' only means that it shall be conducted as such a suit to
the attainment of the results above indicated, but cannot be held
to include an inquiry into the damages sustained."
The present case was argued March 12 and 13, and it appears on
the face of the bill that the terms of office of all the relators,
except the county judge, expired before that day. And this was true
as to him because we find, by reference to
Page 189 U. S. 70
articles VI and VII of the Constitution of Tennessee, and
State v. Maloney, 92 Tenn. 62, that his then term of
office as county judge terminated in 1902.
As to the defendants, the bill shows that defendant Anderson was
merely a subordinate appointee of his codefendants, and that they
had been appointed by the Governor commissioners under the Act of
February 8, 1901. That act provided for the appointment of three
commissioners, to
"hold their offices until the next general election of county
officers, when their successors shall be elected by the people, and
every two (2) years thereafter said offices shall be filled by
popular election."
The next general election of county officers referred to was
held, according to section 1154 of the Code, in August, 1902. So
that these commissioners were appointed to serve until that date,
and their temporary commissions then terminated.
We cannot assume that relators, who were originally elected by
the county court, would hold over, and manifestly, the provisional
title of defendants has determined. It follows that the relief as
prayed cannot now be granted.
There are cases in
quo warranto in which judgment of
ouster has been entered although the term of the person lawfully
entitled had expired, and also where informations have been
retained when the statute provided for fine or damages; but here,
the proceeding cannot now be maintained as on behalf of the public,
and, considered, as counsel insists it should be, as merely a
contest between two sets of officials, and not between the state
and its officials, the state courts would be at liberty to treat it
as abated, and the mere matter of costs cannot be availed of to
sustain jurisdiction.
See Boring v. Griffith, 1 Heiskell
457, 461;
State v. McConnell, 3 Lea 332;
Williamson
County v. Perkins, 39 S.W. 347;
State v. Lindsay, 103
Tenn. 635.
Doubtless the question of the validity of the act of 1901 is of
importance, but it has been upheld by the highest judicial tribunal
of the State of Tennessee as consistent with the state
constitution, and it affects only the citizens of that state.
If we were to hold that the act could be subjected to the test
of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that it could not stand that
Page 189 U. S. 71
test, we should do nothing more than reverse the decree below
and remand the cause, and, as such a judgment would be ineffectual,
we must decline to intimate any opinion on the subject.
"The duty of this Court, as of every other judicial tribunal, is
to decide actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried
into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions or
abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law
which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it. It
necessarily follows that, when, pending an appeal from the judgment
of a lower court and without any fault of the defendant, an event
occurs which renders it impossible for this Court, if it should
decide the case in favor of the plaintiff, to grant him any
effectual relief whatever, the Court will not proceed to a formal
judgment, but will dismiss the appeal."
Mr. Justice Gray,
Mills v. Green, 159 U.
S. 651,
159 U. S.
653.
We think this writ of error comes within the rule thus declared,
and it is therefore
Dismissed without costs to either party.
