By sections 3317, 3387 of the Mississippi Code of 1892, a tax is
imposed
"on each sleeping and palace car company carrying passengers
from one point to another within the state, one hundred dollars,
and twenty-five cents per mile for each mile of railroad track [in
the state] over which the company runs its cars."
Section 196 of the state constitution declares sleeping car
companies to be common carriers. On the assumption that such
companies would be held free to abandon the business taxed if they
see fit, the tax is not void as an interference with commerce
between the states.
Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U. S.
47, distinguished;
Osborne v. Florida,
164 U. S. 650,
followed.
The case is stated in the opinion of the Court.
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an action for taxes, brought by the revenue agent of the
State of Mississippi against the Pullman Company. The defendant in
due form raised the objection that the tax law
Page 189 U. S. 421
was void as an interference with commerce between the states.
Judgment was given for the plaintiff in the local state court, and
the judgment was affirmed by the supreme court of the state. 78
Miss. 814. The case then was brought here by writ of error.
The tax in question was imposed by the following sections of the
Mississippi Code of 1892:
"§ 3317. A tax on privileges is levied as follows, to-wit: . . .
§ 3387. Sleeping car companies: on each sleeping and palace car
company carrying passengers from one point to another within the
state, one hundred dollars, and twenty-five cents per mile for each
mile of railroad track over which the company runs its cars."
We assume that the last words mean what afterwards was expressed
by an amendment, "over which the company runs its cars in this
state."
The Pullman Company is an Illinois corporation. Its sleeping
cars were carried by various railroad companies, and all of them
were carried into the state from another state, or out of the state
to another state, or both. But such cars in their passage also
carried passengers from point to point within the state, and a
specific fare was collected by the servants of the Pullman Company.
The company attempted by pleas and by an offer of evidence to bring
before the court the fact that its receipts from this class of
passengers did not equal the expenses chargeable against such
receipts. It contended that these facts would show that the
business within the state was merely a burden on its commerce
between the states, while at the same time, it argued, it was
compelled to assume that burden by section 195 of the state
constitution, which declares sleeping car companies to be common
carriers and subject to liability as such. The pleas were held bad
on demurrer, the evidence was rejected, and the jury was instructed
to find for the plaintiff on the facts admitted. These rulings and
the refusal of the court to declare the above-mentioned section
3387 unconstitutional are the errors assigned.
If the clause of the state constitution referred to were held to
impose the obligation supposed and to be valid, we assume without
discussion that the tax would be invalid. For then it
Page 189 U. S. 422
would seem to be true that the state constitution and the
statute combined would impose a burden on commerce between the
states analogous to that which was held bad in
Crutcher v.
Kentucky, 141 U. S. 47. On
the other hand, if the Pullman Company, whether called a common
carrier or not, had the right to choose between what points it
would carry, and therefore to give up the carriage of passengers
from one point to another within the state, the case is governed by
Osborne v. Florida, 164 U. S. 650. The
company cannot complain of being taxed for the privilege of doing a
local business which it is free to renounce. Both parties agree
that the tax is a privilege tax.
As the validity of the tax is thus bound up with the effect of
the section of the state constitution, we think that the Pullman
Company was entitled to know how it stood under the latter, and
that a judgment against it could not be justified by reasoning
which leaves that point obscure. We are somewhat embarrassed in
dealing with the case because we are not quite certain whether we
rightly interpret the intimations upon the subject in the judgment
under review. If the Constitution of Mississippi should be read as
imposing an obligation to take local passengers, the question for
us might be which, if not both, the clause of the Constitution or
the tax act, is invalid. But we assume that the opinion of the
Supreme Court of Mississippi intends to meet the difficulty
frankly, and when it says that the argument against the tax drawn
from the above interpretation of the Constitution is fallacious, we
take it as meaning that no such interpretation will be attempted in
the future, and we take it so the more readily that we can see no
ground for a different view. If we are right in our understanding,
the judgment of the supreme court was correct for the reason
sufficiently stated above.
Judgment affirmed.