Under the rules of the Supreme Court of the District of
Columbia, the January terms begin on the first Tuesday of January.
The effect of January 1's being a holiday when it falls on Tuesday
is not to prolong an October term which ends on December 31, and
postpone the commencement of the January term until January 8, but
only to postpone the exercise by the court of its duties until the
following day.
It is too late, therefore, after January 1, to make a motion to
prolong the October term, which motion under the rules must be made
before the end of that term.
The rule prolonging the term is to be exercised when invoked;
there is no duty imposed upon the court to prolong the term of its
own motion.
The case is stated in the opinion of the court.
MR. JUSTICE McKENNA delivered the opinion of the Court.
The purpose of this writ is to review an order of the Court of
Appeals of the District of Columbia, made March 12, 1901, denying a
petition for mandamus to require Andrew C. Bradley at that time an
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia,
to settle a bill of exceptions.
Page 189 U. S. 418
The plaintiff in error brought suit against defendant in error,
in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, on the 20th day
of April, 1897, to recover the sum of $5,900, on several causes of
action. They need not be described, nor the defenses which were
interposed to them. It is enough to say that, upon the issues made,
a verdict resulted for defendant in error, on the 16th of November,
1900.
On December 14, 1900, a motion for new trial was made by
plaintiff and denied by the court, and judgment entered on the
verdict. The plaintiff prayed for, and was allowed, an appeal to
the Court of Appeals of the District. The case was tried and
judgment entered at October term, 1900, which expired December 31,
1900, unless it had been continued, and this resulted, it is
contended, from the following proceedings: on the 7th day of
January, 1901, the plaintiff, through his attorney, deposited with
the clerk fifty dollars in lieu of a bond on appeal, and moved the
court that October term be prolonged by adjournment in order to
prepare a bill of exceptions. The motion was overruled on the
ground that October term had ended on the 31st of December, 1900.
Notice was given by the attorney for the plaintiff that he would
present the "bill of exceptions to the court for settlement before
Justice Bradley in the Circuit Court Number 2." The bill was
presented in pursuance of the notice, but Justice Bradley declined
to settled the bill on the ground that October term had not been
prolonged. The petition now under review was then presented to the
Court of Appeals, praying "that the writ of mandamus may issue,
requiring Andrew C. Bradley, an Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the District of Columbia, to settle the bill of exceptions
in this cause." The petition was dismissed.
The rule of the court in regard to bills of exceptions is as
follows:
"SEC. 2. The bill of exceptions must be settled before the close
of the term, which may be prolonged by adjournment in order to
prepare it, but not longer than thirty-eight days, exclusive of
Sundays, save in case of a trial begun during a term, but not
concluded until after the expiration of the term,
Page 189 U. S. 419
in which case the trial justice may extend the term in his
discretion in order to prepare a bill of exceptions."
The case presents some anomalies. The mandamus was prayed
against Justice Bradley for refusing to act officially; but the
citation in error was directed to Arthur E. Randle, and he alone is
defendant in error here. He was a party in the original cause, but
not a party in the proceedings for mandamus. Making him a party
here is attempted to be justified by the death of Justice Bradley
and the action of the Court of Appeals in not entertaining the
petition for mandamus. The immediate answer would seem to be that
mandamus is itself an action, and can only, like other actions, be
prosecuted against the parties to it, and that one of two effects
resulted from the death of Justice Bradley: either the action
abated or could only be continued against the person who succeeded
to his office and duty.
But passing this, we think the main contention of plaintiff in
error is untenable. The argument of plaintiff is that the purpose
of the rule was to allow thirty-eight days for the settlement of
bills of exceptions, and, to afford time to do so, the rule
provided that the term might be prolonged by adjournment, and the
duty of prolonging the term was imposed on the court. We do not so
interpret the rule. It provided the means for parties to secure the
necessary time to present bills of exceptions. The court was not
required to anticipate the intention of parties. Its duty under the
rule, like its other duties, was to be exercised when invoked.
But it is also insisted that a motion to prolong the term was
made in time. The argument to support this is that October term did
not end on the 31st of December, 1900, but continued until the 7th
of January, 1901, because, by Rule 3 of the Supreme Court of the
District of Columbia, the January terms of the circuit court
commence on the first Tuesdays in January, and that the first
Tuesday of January, 1901, fell on the first of January, which,
being a holiday, and therefore, as it is insisted, a
dies
non, the term did not commence until the following Tuesday,
the 8th of January. We cannot concur in the contention. The term
commenced on the first of January,
Page 189 U. S. 420
and the only effect of the holiday was to deprive the court of
the power of doing any business and to discharge those who had been
required to attend until the succeeding day, when the general
duties and powers of the court could be legally exercised. It
follows, therefore, that there was no error in refusing to settle
the bill of exceptions, and the petition for mandamus was properly
denied.
Order affirmed.