1. In
175 U. S. 175 U.S.
187 and
178 U. S. 178 U.S.
317, this Court held that the collision between the
Conemaugh and the
New York in the Detroit River
was the fault of both vessels, and judgment was given in favor of
the
Conemaugh for one-half of her damages less one-half of
the damages of the
New York.
In this proceeding
held that the
New York,
against which judgments had been entered for damages to the cargo
on the
Conemaugh, could not in this action recoup or set
off any part of such damages against, or shift any part of such
judgment upon, the owners of the
Conemaugh, even though it
should result in the
New York's paying more than fifty
percent of the total loss.
2. The mandate having provided for interest at the same rate
that decrees bear in the courts of the Michigan, there was no error
in view of the statutory provisions as to interest in Michigan, in
computing the interest at seven percent per annum.
Page 189 U. S. 364
The facts of this case are fully set out in previous decisions
of this Court.
175 U. S. 175 U.S.
187;
178 U. S. 178 U.S.
317.
The steamer
Conemaugh, owned by respondents, and the
propeller
New York, owned by the petitioner, collided in
the Detroit River, November 11, 1891. The
Conemaugh, for
herself and as bailee of her cargo, filed a libel against the
New York for the sum of $70,000 damages in the District
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. Subsequently, certain
underwriters of the cargo of the
Conemaugh filed an
intervening petition in the cause. Subsequently, the
New
York, for damages sustained by her, filed a cross-libel
against the
Conemaugh for $3,000 damages sustained by the
New York in the collision. No answer was filed to this
cross-libel.
The district court held the
New York to have been
solely in fault, and passed a decree against her. The Circuit Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the decree of the
district court on the ground that the
Conemaugh had been
solely in fault, and adjudged that her owners pay the owners of the
New York, petitioners here, the damages sustained by the
New York. The case was then brought here by certiorari,
and both vessels were pronounced to have been in fault. The decrees
of the lower courts were reversed, and the damages caused by the
collision ordered to be divided. The following is the material part
of the judgment and mandate:
"On consideration whereof, it is now ordered, adjudged, and
decreed by this Court that the decree of the said United States
circuit court of appeals in the cause be and the same is hereby
reversed; the claimant of the
Conemaugh and the claimant
of the
New York each to pay one-half of all costs in this
cause."
"And that the said Erie & Western Transportation Company
recover against the Union Steamboat Company $276.75 for one-half of
the costs herein expended, and have execution therefor."
"And it is further ordered that this cause be, and the same is
hereby, remanded to the District Court of the United States for the
Eastern District of Michigan with direction to enter a decree in
conformity with the opinion of this court, with interest
Page 189 U. S. 365
from July 3, 1896, until paid at the same rate per annum that
decrees bear in the courts of the State of Michigan."
Upon the return of the case to the district court, that court
made its decree in favor of the several intervening underwriters
upon the cargo for their respective claims, with interest at seven
percent from July 3, 1896. The court also decreed that the owners
of the cargo and their underwriters, other than the interveners, by
reason of the collision, sustained damages in the sum of
$19,627.67, "for which the said Erie & Western Transportation
Company appears in this suit as trustee only." And it was adjudged
and decreed
"that said trustee recover from the said Union Steamboat Company
and its surety, in trust, for the said owners of and underwriters
on cargo, the aforesaid sum of $19,627.67, with interest thereon at
the rate of seven percent per annum from July 3, 1896, until paid,
and that it have execution therefor."
Judgment was also given in favor of the
Conemaugh for
one-half of the damages of that steamer, less one-half of the
damages of the
New York, with interest.
At the hearing in the district court on the return of the
mandate, the petitioner
"submitted a decree to the effect that both vessels were in
fault for the collision, and that the damage resulting therefrom be
equally divided between the Erie & Western Transportation
Company, owner of the
Conemaugh, and the Union Steamboat
Company, owner of the
New York; that such damages amounted
in all to the sum of $74,319.49, of which certain intervening
underwriters of the cargo were entitled to, and recovered from the
steamboat company, $19,841.56; that the transportation company, as
trustees for the underwriters and owners of the cargo of the
Conemaugh, not intervening, suffered damages in the sum of
$19,627.67; that, as owner of the propeller, it had suffered
damages in the sum of $30,508.46, aggregating the sum of
$50,136.13; that the transportation company recover of the
petitioner one-half of $50,136.13, less one-half the sum of
$19,841.56, decreed to be paid to the intervening petitioners,
etc."
"The court, however, declined to enter this decree, refused to
permit the petitioner to recoup any sum that it might pay
Page 189 U. S. 366
to the owners or underwriters of the cargo of the
Conemaugh from any sum that was due from the steamboat
company for damages sustained by the
Conemaugh, so that
such company was compelled to pay of the total damages about
seventy-six percent instead of fifty percent."
178 U. S. 178 U.S.
317,
178 U. S.
318.
The action of the district court was affirmed by the circuit
court of appeals, 108 F. 102, and the case was then brought
here.
MR. JUSTICE McKENNA delivered the opinion of the Court.
There is one main and several subsidiary propositions asserted
by petitioner. The main proposition is that, in all cases of
collision, if both vessels are in fault, the damages resulting are
to be equally divided between the owners of the vessels.
The subsidiary propositions are that, if one of the offending
vessels pays more than half the damages to a third or innocent
party, she may recoup or set off such excess against any claim for
damages which the other vessel may have without bringing in the
other vessel as a codefendant under Admiralty Rule 59, or filing
other pleadings than an answer to the libel. In such case, it is
insisted that all the parties are before the court. And further,
that it is not necessary upon an appeal to the circuit court of
appeals, or to this Court, that the pleadings show a demand for
recoupment -- the hearing in both courts being a trial
de
novo.
The main proposition asserted may be conceded. It was the basis
of our decision when the case was here on the first certiorari
Page 189 U. S. 367
and determined the judgment rendered.
175 U. S. 175 U.S.
187. And if under some circumstances the other propositions could
be applied (which is not necessary to decide), they cannot be under
the circumstances of this case. The petitioner made no claim for a
division of damages upon the original trial of the case. It
asserted its own innocence and the entire guilt of the
Conemaugh, and submitted that issue for judgment. It
sought to escape all liability, not to divide liability, and on the
issues hence arising, judgments were entered against it not only
for the
Conemaugh, but for the cargo owners, some having
intervened, others still being represented by the
Conemaugh. Petitioners maintained the same attitude in the
circuit court of appeals and in this Court. After the decision in
this Court, it changed its attitude, and for justification says it
had no earlier opportunity to do so. It urges that the decision of
the district court was completely against it, the decision of the
circuit court completely for it, and that the judgment from which
its right of recoupment arose was rendered by this Court.
But the controversy as presented by the pleadings was not only
between the
Conemaugh and the
New York, but
between the latter and cargo, and this Court did not disturb the
judgment obtained by the cargo owners against the
New
York. Explaining our decision we said:
"The only questions decided were as to the respective faults of
the two vessels, and the claim of the underwriters upon the
Conemaugh's cargo, that they were entitled to a recovery
to the full amount of their damages against the
New York,
notwithstanding the
Conemaugh was also in fault for the
collision. This claim was sustained, and directions given to enter
a decree in conformity to the opinion of this Court."
The decree against it, the
New York now seeks to shift
in part to the owners of the
Conemaugh -- indeed, not to
shift it, but virtually to vacate it and put the claims of the
cargo owners into controversy with the
Conemaugh. This, we
think, should not be done. The cargo owners' judgments were
affirmed by this Court, as we have seen, and they are nonetheless
entitled to them under the circumstances of this record, although
as to some of them they were represented by the
Conemaugh.
The
Page 189 U. S. 368
New York, having been in fault, was responsible to the
cargo, and if, as between her and the
Conemaugh, she have
a claim for recoupment, the way is open to recover it. We think
that the district court rightly construed our mandate.
2. Our mandate directed that a decree be entered "with interest
from July 3, 1896, until paid at the same rate per annum that
decrees bear in the courts of the State of Michigan." The district
court and the circuit court of appeals found the rate to be seven
percent. This is assigned as error.
The statute which provided for interest on judgments and decrees
in Michigan at seven percent was enacted in 1838, and has been
carried forward with amendments into the various compilations of
the statutes, and appears as section 4865, Compiled Laws of
Michigan of 1897. It is as follows:
"Interest may be allowed and received upon all judgments at law,
for the recovery of any sums of money, and upon all decrees in
chancery for the payment of any sums of money, whatever may be the
form or cause of action or suit in which such judgment or decree
shall be rendered or made, and such interest may be collected on
execution at the rate of seven percentum per annum:
Provided, That on a judgment rendered or any written
instrument, having a different rate, the interest shall be computed
at the rate specified in such instrument not exceeding ten
percentum."
This section, it is insisted by appellants, was repealed by a
statute passed in 1891, which statute was entitled "An Act to
Regulate the Interest of Money on Account, Interest on Money
Judgments, Verdicts," etc., and provided as follows:
"SEC. 1. The people of the State of Michigan enact: That the
interest of money shall be at the rate of six dollars upon one
hundred dollars for a year and at the same rate for a greater or
less sum, and for a longer or shorter time, except that in all
cases it shall be lawful for the parties to stipulate in writing
for the payment of any rate of interest not exceeding eight percent
per annum:
Provided, That this act shall not apply to
existing contracts, whether the same be either due, not due, or
part due. "
Page 189 U. S. 369
"SEC. 4. All acts or parts of acts contravening the provisions
of this act are hereby repealed."
Subsequently, the rate was reduced to five percent by a statute
passed September 22, 1899, which reads as follows:
"SEC. 1. That section one of act number one hundred and
fifty-six of Public Acts of 1891, entitled, 'An Act to Regulate the
Interest of Money, on Account, Interest on Money Judgments,
Verdicts,' etc., the same being compiler's section one thousand
five hundred ninety-four of volume three of Howell's Annotated
Statutes, and section four thousand eight hundred fifty-six be, and
the same is hereby, amended to read as follows:"
" SECTION 1. The People of the State of Michigan enact: That the
interest of money shall be at the rate of five dollars upon one
hundred dollars for a year, and at the same rate for a greater or
less sum, and for a longer or shorter time, except that in all
cases it shall be lawful for the parties to stipulate in writing
for the payment of any rate of interest not exceeding seven percent
per annum:
Provided, That this act shall not apply to
existing contracts, whether the same be either due, not due, or
part due."
According to its title, the act is one to regulate the interest
of money on account and interest on money judgments. Section one,
however, provides only "that the interest of money shall be at the
rate of five dollars upon one hundred dollars for a year." It is
urged, however, that section one must take meaning from the title
of the act, and that, by "interest of money" is meant "interest of
money on account" and "interest on money judgments," and, having
that meaning, it repeals section 4865,
supra. But money on
account and money judgments are distinguished in the title, and it
is hard to suppose that the former was intended to include the
latter in the body of the act. They are distinguished also in the
prior statutes. "Interest of money" was provided for in section 3
of the act of 1838 in substantially the same language as in the
acts of 1891 and 1899, and it is certain that it was not intended
thereby to include interest on judgments and decrees. The
Page 189 U. S. 370
latter were provided for in section eight of the act of 1838,
which became section 4865, and as such has been given a place in
the compiled laws of the state ever since.
If it is anomalous, as urged by counsel and as observed by the
circuit court of appeals, for legal interest in the state to be
fixed at five percent, and judgments left to bear seven percent, we
cannot correct the anomaly. Nor can we regard the words "interest
of money" to have been suddenly given a meaning in 1891 or 1899
different from that which they had borne for over fifty years in
the statutes of the state with the intention to work by implication
the repeal of a provision with which for the same length of time
they were regarded as consistent.
Decree affirmed.
