An averment in a bill that the complainants are "all of Cognac
in France, and citizens of the Republic of France," is sufficient
to give the Circuit Court of the United States for Nebraska
jurisdiction in a controversy where the defendants are citizens of
Nebraska. No averment of alienage is necessary.
Where the circuit court dismisses a bill on the ground that it
has no jurisdiction because diversity of citizenship did not
appear, and certifies this question of jurisdiction, that is the
only question for the consideration of this Court on an appeal
under the first subdivision of section 5 of the Judiciary Act of
March 3, 1891, and if jurisdiction is found to exist, the case will
be remanded to be heard on the merits notwithstanding the circuit
court also expressed the opinion that the bill was without
equity.
The case is stated in the opinion of the Court.
Page 189 U. S. 32
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER delivered the opinion of the Court.
This was a bill alleging that complainants were "all of
Cognac
Page 189 U. S. 33
in France and citizens of the Republic of France," and that
defendant was a citizen of Nebraska, and a resident of the judicial
district thereof; that complainants owned and employed a certain
trademark for Hennessy brandy (which they produced, bottled, and
sold) of a value exceeding $2,000, which trademark had been
properly registered in the Patent Office under the Act of Congress
of March 3, 1881, and that defendant was selling an imitation
"Hennessy brandy," using facsimiles of complainants' tradename,
devices, and labels. Injunction, profits, and damages were prayed
for.
The case was brought to issue, heard on pleadings and proofs,
and dismissed, it being held that the court had no jurisdiction
because "complainants' citizenship or alienage is not alleged, as
required," and also that the case was with defendant on the
merits.
The decree stated, among other things:
"And the court finds that neither the bill nor the bill as
amended nor the evidence shows the citizenship of complainants or
any of them so as to confer jurisdiction upon this Court. And the
court further finds with and for the defendants and against the
complainants on the evidence, and that the bill as amended is
without equity. And, for both and all the reasons hereinbefore
recited,"
the bill was dismissed.
The court then granted a certificate in these words:
"It is certified that the question of jurisdiction referred to
in the opinion was passed upon, but that the case was also
determined upon its merits. The question of jurisdiction set forth
in the opinion filed herein, together with the question of the
merits of the case, is hereby certified to the supreme court, all
of which are shown by the decree and the opinion."
An appeal was taken directly to this Court under the first of
the classes of cases enumerated in section 5 of the Judiciary Act
of March 3, 1891, and we are shut up to the consideration of the
question of jurisdiction alone. We do not understand that the
amount in controversy was treated below as having any bearing in
respect of that question. The Act of March 3, 1881, provides for
jurisdiction "without regard to the amount in controversy," and the
averment here was that the
Page 189 U. S. 34
value of the trademark exceeded $2,000. The point, however, was
not relied on, and we confine ourselves to the question of
jurisdiction as dependent on citizenship.
By the Constitution, the judicial power of the United States
extends to controversies between citizens of a state "and foreign
states, citizens, or subjects." And by statute, circuit courts of
the United States have original cognizance of all suits of a civil
nature at common law or in equity, in which there is "a controversy
between citizens of a state and foreign states, citizens, or
subjects." 25 Stat. 433, c. 866.
In
Stuart v. Easton, 156 U. S. 46, it
was held that, by the description of plaintiff as "a citizen of
London, England," the fact that he was a subject of the British
Crown was not made affirmatively to appear as required; but, in the
case at bar, complainants described themselves as "all of Cognac in
France, and citizens of the Republic of France," and this was
sufficient.
No averment of alienage was necessary. It is true that, by
section 6 of the Judiciary Act of March 3, 1891, the judgments and
decrees of the circuit courts of appeals were made final in cases,
among others, in which the jurisdiction was dependent entirely on
the opposite parties to the suit or controversy being citizens of
different states, or "aliens and citizens of the United States."
But the word "aliens" as there used embraces subjects or citizens
of foreign countries, and not merely persons resident in this
country who owe allegiance to another. And the language of the
Constitution and of the act determining the jurisdiction of the
circuit courts is explicit.
In
Chisholm v.
Georgia, 2 Dall. 419,
2 U. S. 456, Mr.
Justice Wilson said that, under the Constitution of the United
States,
"there are citizens, but no subjects. 'Citizen of the United
States.' 'Citizens of another state.' 'Citizens of different
states.' 'A state or citizen thereof.' The term 'subject' occurs,
indeed, once in the instrument, but to mark the contrast strongly,
the epithet 'foreign' is prefixed."
The Supreme Court of North Carolina, in
State v.
Manuel, 4 Dev. & Bat. 20, 26 (quoted in
United States
v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649),
said:
"The term 'citizen,' as understood in our law, is precisely
analogous to the term 'subject' in the common
Page 189 U. S. 35
law, and the change of phrase has entirely resulted from the
change of government. The sovereignty has been transferred from one
man to the collective body of the people, and he who before was a
'subject of the King' is now 'a citizen of the state.'"
In that view, the people of France are properly described as
citizens of that Republic.
As complainants were citizens of a foreign state, and defendant
was a citizen of Nebraska, as affirmatively appeared from the
pleadings, no issue of fact arising in that regard, the circuit
court had jurisdiction.
Decree reversed, and cause remanded for rehearing on the
merits.