1. The expression in section 721 Rev.Stat. (the "laws of the
several states") in regard to the authentication of foreign
statutes applies not only to statutes of the states, but to the
decisions of their highest courts.
The circuit court of the United States, sitting in New
Hampshire, may receive as evidence, when attached to the deposition
of the manager of a corporation, who is an attorney and solicitor
of the Supreme Court of Judicature in England of thirty years'
standing, intimately acquainted with the English Corporation Laws,
what purport to be the copies of the laws under which such
corporation was organized, and which he testifies were issued by
authority, being printed by Her Majesty's printer, and as such are
by law receivable in evidence without further proof, in the
domestic courts of Great Britain.
2. By subscribing to the stock in a foreign corporation, the
subscriber subjects itself to the laws of such foreign country in
respect to the powers and obligations of such corporation, and if
the statute under which the
Page 189 U. S. 222
corporation is organized and the bylaws of the corporation
provide that the directors may from time to time make such calls as
they think fit upon members for all moneys unpaid on shares of
stock, it is not necessary fur the declaration to contain averments
either as to the conditions upon which the corporation can make
assessments or that the assessments sued for were necessary.
There is a presumption of good faith attaching to foreign as
well as to domestic corporations.
Variances between the allegation and proof must be taken when
the evidence is offered, and if such evidence be sufficient to
support the verdict, the defect in the declaration is cured.
Where the bill of exceptions contains nothing to indicate that
the call for assessments was not properly made, and does not show
that it contains all the evidence, this Court is at liberty, if the
circumstances of the case require it, to infer that there was other
evidence to support the verdict. The sufficiency of evidence cannot
be reviewed on writ of error.
3. Where it appears by the articles of association that the
remedy by forfeiture and sale for nonpayment of assessments is
cumulative, such remedy is not a bar to an action at law for the
debt, and such sale or forfeiture is not a condition precedent to
the right to recover the assessments.
4. Where the statute under which a corporation is organized
provides that moneys payable in pursuance of the articles of the
company shall be deemed a debt due by such member, it is not
necessary to prove an express promise to pay an assessment.
This was an action by the defendant in error, a British
corporation, in the Circuit Court for the District of New
Hampshire, against the Nashua Savings Bank, a New Hampshire
corporation, to recover an assessment made by such corporation in
pursuance of its charter and bylaws, upon defendant's subscription
to a thousand shares of its stock.
The case was tried before the circuit judge and a jury, and
resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff by direction of the court,
and a judgment against the bank in the sum of $7,131.10, which was
affirmed on writ of error by the circuit court of appeals. 108 F.
764.
Page 189 U. S. 227
MR. JUSTICE Brown delivered the opinion of the Court.
The assessment in question had been made by the directors of the
company, in pursuance of their amended articles of association,
which declared that
"the directors may, from time to time, make such calls as they
think fit upon the members in respect of all moneys unpaid on their
shares, and each member shall pay the amount of every call so made
upon him to the persons, and at the times and places, appointed by
the directors."
1. In order to prove the incorporation of the plaintiff company,
as well as the liability and rights of the stockholders, the
deposition of an attorney and solicitor of the Supreme Court of
Judicature in England, who was also managing director of the
plaintiff company, was read in evidence. His testimony showed that
the plaintiff was a corporation organized with limited liability
under five different acts of Parliament, from 1862 to 1880, copies
of which he produced and delivered to the commissioner, stating
that these copies were "issued by authority, being printed by Her
Majesty's printer, and are as such by law receivable in evidence
without further proof." To the
Page 189 U. S. 228
admission of the statutes the defendant excepted upon the ground
that they were not proved according to the established rules of
law.
As these statutes were the basis of the plaintiff's corporate
existence, and its right to bring this action, they must
undoubtedly be proved as facts.
Liverpool Steam Co. v. Phenix
Ins. Co., 129 U. S. 397,
129 U. S. 445.
While it was stated by this Court in the early case of
Church v.
Hubbart, 2 Cranch 187,
6 U. S. 238,
that foreign judgments are usually and most properly authenticated
either by an exemplification under the great seal, by a copy proved
to be a true copy, or by the certificate of an officer authorized
by law, which certificate must itself be properly authenticated,
the circuit court of the United States sitting in New Hampshire
may, under Rev.Stat. section 721, declaring that "the laws of the
several states," with certain exceptions, "shall be regarded as
rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts of the
United States," receive such evidence of the authentication of
foreign statutes as the practice of the courts in that state may
authorize and justify.
McNiel v.
Holbrook, 12 Pet. 84,
37 U. S. 89;
Conn. Life. Ins. Co. v. Union Trust Co., 112 U.
S. 250,
112 U. S. 255;
Vance v.
Campbell, 1 Black. 427. The "laws of the several
states" with respect to evidence within the meaning of this section
apply, not only to the statutes, but to the decisions of their
highest courts.
Bucher v. Cheshire Railroad Co.,
125 U. S. 555,
125 U. S. 582;
Ex Parte Fisk, 113 U. S. 713,
113 U. S. 720;
Ryan v.
Bindley, 1 Wall. 66.
The law of New Hampshire upon this subject appears to have been
settled in
Hall v. Costello, 48 N.H. 176, in which an
attorney, resident in New Hampshire, who had gone to Canada to
investigate Canadian law, was permitted to state orally what he
found the law to be, as embodied in the Queen's proclamation of
neutrality. To same effect are
Barrows v. Downs, 9 R.I.
446;
Jones v. Maffet, 5 S. & R. 523. There is an even
greater reason for permitting a local attorney, of thirty years'
experience, who, as he states, was intimately acquainted with the
English company or corporation laws, to produce as evidence of such
laws copies of the statutes printed by authority
Page 189 U. S. 229
of the English government, and used as proofs of statutes in the
English courts.
It would appear that such authentication of foreign laws would
be deemed sufficient in the English courts, as in
Lacon v.
Higgins, 3 Starkie 178, it was held that the French Code was
sufficiently proved by a witness -- a French vice consul -- who
produced a book printed by authority of the French government,
which the witness stated contained the French Code, upon which he
acted in his office as vice consul. In most, if not all, of the
states of this Union statutes have been passed permitting laws of
sister states to be proved simply by the production of a book
containing what purports to be an authorized edition of such laws
printed by state authority.
Emery v. Berry, 28 N.H. 473.
While the same liberality is not extended to foreign laws required
to be proved as facts, it would seem like sticking in the bark to
hold that a foreign expert might testify orally as to what such
laws were, and not be able to produce what purports to be the
official edition of such laws, and to testify as to the
authenticity of such edition, and to the fact that it was received
as evidence in the domestic courts of that country. To the average
mind, it would seem as though there was much less liability to
mistake in a printed copy of a statute from the official printer,
than in a copy written and compared by an ordinary scrivener. The
evidence was properly received.
2. Exception was also taken to the declaration, in that it
contained no averment or allegation upon what conditions the
plaintiff was authorized to make assessments. In this connection,
it is insisted that the declaration should have averred that such
an assessment was necessary to pay the debts of the plaintiff, or
was made for the benefit of its creditors; that it is also
defective in that it contains no averment of notice of such
assessment to defendant, or that defendant ever made an express
promise to pay such assessment, and no direct allegation that
defendant was a stockholder at the time the assessment was made. It
appears, however, by the Act of 25 and 26 Vict., c. 89, "for the
incorporation, regulation, and winding up of trading companies and
other associations," that the articles
Page 189 U. S. 230
of association,
"when registered, . . . shall bind the company and the members
thereof to the same extent as if each member had subscribed his
name and affixed his seal thereto, and there were in such articles
contained a covenant on the part of himself, his heirs, executors,
and administrators, to conform to all the regulations contained in
such articles, subject to the provisions of this act, and all
moneys payable by any member of the company, in pursuance of the
conditions and regulations of the company or any of such conditions
or regulations shall be deemed to be a debt due from such member to
the company, and in England and Ireland to be in the nature of a
specialty debt."
It also appeared by the articles of association of the plaintiff
corporation, No. 3,
"that every person who has accepted any share or shares in this
company, and whose name is entered in the registry of members, and
no other person, shall be deemed to be a member."
These regulations also contained the provision heretofore
mentioned, that the directors might from time to time make such
calls as they think fit upon the members in respect of all moneys
unpaid on their shares. The board of directors is thus constituted
a tribunal to determine when and to what amount assessments shall
be made upon the unpaid shares of stock. By subscribing to stock in
a foreign corporation, defendant subjected itself to the laws of
such foreign country in respect to the powers and obligations of
such corporation.
Canada Southern Ry. Co. v. Gebhard,
109 U. S. 527;
Relfe v. Rundle, 103 U. S. 222.
In the absence of fraud, the necessity for an assessment upon
the capital stock cannot be made the subject of inquiry by the
courts. As was said by Mr. Justice Field in
Oglesby v.
Attrill, 105 U. S. 605,
105 U. S.
609:
"As to the wisdom of an assessment, or its necessity at the
time, or the motives which prompt it, the courts will not inquire,
if it be within the legitimate authority of the directors to levy
it, and the objects for which the company was incorporated would
justify the expenditure of the money to be raised. They will not
examine into the affairs of a corporation to determine the
expediency of its action, or the motives for it, when the action
itself is lawful."
Bailey v. Birkenhead &c. Railway Co., 12 Beav. 433.
See also Cook on
Page 189 U. S. 231
Stockholders, sec. 113;
Great Western Telegraph Co. v.
Purdy, 162 U. S. 329.
Whether such assessment could be impeached by showing that the
corporation was not a
bona fide enterprise, or had never
actually engaged in business, or become a going concern, or that
the assessment was made unnecessarily and in bad faith, or that a
discrimination was made against foreign stockholders, it is
unnecessary to determine, since no evidence to that effect was
offered on behalf of the defendant. Certainly, under the cases
above cited, it would be unnecessary in order to make a
prima
facie case to negative these facts. There is a presumption of
good faith attaching as well to foreign, as to domestic,
corporations.
The trial proceeded under the third count of the declaration,
which was in
indebitatus assumpsit, and no objection was
made to the evidence offered upon the ground of variance. Under
such circumstances, and without expressing an opinion as to the
admissibility of the evidence offered, the declaration is good
after verdict. In
Roberts v.
Graham, 6 Wall. 578, we held that variances between
the allegation and proof must be taken when the evidence is
offered, and if such evidence be sufficient to support the verdict
the defect in the declaration is cured.
Patrick v. Graham,
132 U. S. 627.
The court, in charging the jury in this case, instructed them
that there was no doubt the call for this assessment had been
properly proved; that the only possible question which could have
arisen was whether or not certain persons were directors of the
corporation at the time of the call, and that, as the amended
articles of the association provided that calls might be made by
the directors, there was no doubt that the call in question was
properly made.
As the bill of exceptions contains nothing to indicate that the
call was not properly made, and does not show that it contained all
the evidence in the case, we should be at liberty, if the
circumstances of the case required it, to infer that there was
other evidence to supply any defect in respect to the legality of
the call.
Hansen v. Boyd, 161 U.
S. 397;
Providence v.
Babcock, 3 Wall. 240;
United States v.
Patrick, 73 F. 800. The sufficiency of the evidence cannot be
reviewed on writ of
Page 189 U. S. 232
error.
Generes v.
Campbell, 11 Wall. 193,
78 U. S. 199;
Dower v. Richards, 151 U. S. 658.
It appears from the testimony of the secretary of the company
that a notice of the call was posted up in a conspicuous place in
the registered office of the company for more than a month before
the call was payable, and in addition thereto a printed notice of
the call was also forwarded to the defendant bank. This was a
sufficient compliance with article 140 of the articles of
association, which provides that,
"if any member resident out of the United Kingdom neglect to
give such address as is herebefore required, notices for him may be
posted up in a conspicuous place in the registered office of the
company, and for all the purposes of these regulations, the
registered office of the company shall be deemed to be the
registered place of abode of such member."
3. A sale or forfeiture of defendant's shares was not a
condition precedent to the right to recover this assessment. While
a remedy by forfeiture is given by the articles of the association,
this remedy is cumulative, and is no bar to an action at law for
the debt. This is clearly intended as a concurrent remedy.
4. Nor do we think there was any necessity of proving an express
promise to pay this assessment. The English statute above quoted
provides that all moneys payable by any member in pursuance of the
articles of the company shall be deemed a
debt due by such
member of the company, and as this statute implies a promise
to pay from a subscription to the shares, it clearly obviates the
necessity of proving an express promise.
Upton v.
Tribilcock, 91 U. S. 45;
Webster v. Upton, 91 U. S. 65;
Chubb v. Upton, 95 U. S. 665;
Howarth v. Lombard, 175 Mass. 574. Although the law of New
Hampshire seems to be that, in the absence of an express promise,
no personal action will lie,
Shattuck v. Robbins, 68 N.H.
565, yet even there an obligation created by the charter is treated
as the equivalent of an express promise. Cook on Stockholders, sec.
71;
Anglo-American Co. v. Dyer, 181 Mass. 593.
There was no error in the action of the court below, and its
judgment is therefore
Affirmed.