In an ordinary contest between two applicants for preemption, in
which the officers of the Land Department have decided upon the
testimony in favor of one and against the other, the decision of
tile Land Department on questions of fact is conclusive upon the
courts.
When the Secretary of the Interior has made a decision in such a
contest, the courts will not entertain an inquiry as to the extent
of his investigation and knowledge of the points decided or as to
the methods by which he reached his determination.
On April 28, 1897, Hannah Rogers and Frank J. Rogers, holders of
the legal title to a tract of land in Alameda County,
Page 189 U. S. 120
commenced in the superior court of that county an action in
ejectment against Manuel S. De Cambra and others. The defendants
answered with a general denial, and, as authorized by the practice
in California, De Cambra filed a cross-complaint in equity alleging
that the plaintiffs had obtained the legal title wrongfully and
held it in trust for him, and prayed a decree quieting his title to
the land. A demurrer to this cross-complaint was sustained, and
upon a trial of the action, a judgment was rendered in favor of the
plaintiffs, which judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court of
California, 132 Cal. 502, and thereupon this writ of error was sued
out.
MR. JUSTICE BREWER delivered the opinion of the Court.
The only question presented arises on the demurrer to the
cross-complaint. That cross-complaint averred that, in 1867, De
Cabra purchased from one Hewett Steele the premises in controversy,
with other adjoining lands, all of which were enclosed with fences
and well known exterior boundaries; that he entered into actual
possession thereof, and has ever since continuously resided
thereon; that, in 1871, he sold an undivided half interest in the
tract to Enos J. Rogers, the husband of Hannah and the father of
Frank J. Rogers; that at that time, the land was supposed to be a
portion of a Mexican grant, and was within its exterior boundaries;
that, on August 10, 1878, the final official survey disclosed that
there were more than three leagues of land within the exterior
boundaries of said grant, and thereupon a part thereof, including
the land in controversy, was restored by the United States to the
public domain; that De Cambra and Rogers, who were brothers-in-law,
agreed upon a division of the land excluded from the grant and
restored to the public domain, De Cambra to take one portion, and
that the tract in controversy, and Rogers the other; that
Page 189 U. S. 121
thereupon they went to the local land office to file their
applications for entry; that De Cambra, being unable to read or
write, and understanding the English language very imperfectly,
trusted to Rogers to prepare the preemption papers; that Rogers
knowingly and fraudulently prepared the papers so as to make De
Cambra an applicant for land upon which there was no dwelling house
or other improvement, and only a small part of which was in his
possession, and three-fourths of which was thoroughly worthless,
Rogers himself filing a preemption claim for the land which it had
been agreed should be entered by De Cambra, the land which was his
homestead and upon which his improvements had been made; that De
Cambra did not discover this until December 29, 1883; that
thereupon he made the proper application at the land office for
this land; that a contest ensued, which was finally decided by the
Secretary of the Interior in favor of Rogers, and the land patented
to the plaintiffs, his widow and son. The cross-complaint further
averred that, although the decision apparently rendered by the
Secretary of the Interior was signed by him, yet in fact, for want
of time and opportunity, the Secretary had not read or heard read
the evidence in the contested case, and simply signed his name to a
report prepared by one of the clerks in the department.
This cross-complaint states no question of law decided in these
contest proceedings in the Land Department adversely to De Cambra.
Indeed, the grounds of the decision are not disclosed. There is no
copy of the testimony given on the contest. It appears that De
Cambra offered testimony showing his qualifications, settlement,
occupation, etc., and it is stated that some evidence was given in
support of the Rogers application. It is alleged that the land
officers came to their conclusion
"by the misconstruction of the evidence submitted to them and
the misapplication of the law to the evidence, and in violation of
the just and equitable rights and claims of Manuel S. De
Cambra."
For all that appears, the officers may have found the facts to
be just the contrary to the averments in the cross-complaint, and
if they misapplied any rule of law to the testimony, we are not
advised of the rule they misapplied or
Page 189 U. S. 122
how they misapplied it. As it appears affirmatively that, before
the contest, De Cambra was informed of the nature of the wrongs he
alleges were perpetrated upon him by Rogers, it may be presumed
that evidence was offered by both parties upon that question, and
that it was decided adversely to his contention. Under those
circumstances, nothing is shown except an ordinary contest between
two applicants for preemption in which the land officers upon the
testimony decided in favor of one and against the other. But it is
well settled that the decision of the Land Department upon
questions of fact is conclusive in the courts.
Burfenning v.
Chicago, &c. Railway, 163 U. S. 321,
163 U. S. 323,
and cases cited;
Johnson v. Drew, 171 U. S.
93,
171 U. S. 99;
Gardner v. Bonestell, 180 U. S. 362.
It is hardly necessary to say that, when a decision has been
made by the Secretary of the Interior, courts will not entertain an
inquiry as to the extent of his investigation and knowledge of the
points decided or as to the methods by which he reached his
determination.
These are the only federal questions presented, and their
decision was unquestionably correct.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of California is
Affirmed.