There is no general right to a writ of error from this Court to
the courts of a state; nor does the mere fact that the action was
brought under sections 2325 and 2328 of the Revised Statutes in
support of an adverse claim entitle the defeated party to a writ of
error to the state court. There is but a special right to bring
such cases, and such cases only, as disclose a federal question
distinctly ruled adversely to the plaintiff in error. Where no
title, right, privilege or immunity of a federal nature was set up
and claimed, nor the validity of any federal statute denied in the
state court, nor the validity of any state statute challenged prior
to the judgment of affirmance in the highest court of the state, on
the ground of its repugnance to paramount federal law, this Court
is not justified in taking jurisdiction.
Generally speaking, estoppel and
res judicata present
questions of local, and not of federal, law.
This is what is known in the mining regions as an "adverse
suit," brought under the authority of sections 2325 and 2326,
Rev.Stat., in the District Court of the County of El Paso,
Colorado, to contest the right of defendants to a patent for the
Ophir lode mining claim. The plaintiff claimed a portion of this
ground as a part of his own mining claim, and the question
presented was as to the priority of right thereto of the respective
parties by virtue of discovery and location. Judgment was rendered
in the district court in favor of the defendants, which judgment
was affirmed by the supreme court of the state. 27 Colo. 473.
Thereupon the case was brought here on writ of error.
In the complaint, plaintiff averred that, on or about January 1,
1893, and ever since, he was the owner and in possession of the
Tecumseh lode mining claim; that, on or about April 1, 1896, the
defendants wrongfully entered upon a parcel of said claim, to-wit,
all that part thereof included within the exterior lines of the
Ophir lode mining claim, and that they have ever since
Page 188 U. S. 185
wrongfully withheld the possession of said parcel from the
plaintiff. The answer denied the allegations of the complaint, and
pleaded as a second defense that, before the alleged discovery of
the Tecumseh lode mining claim, to-wit, on February 3, 1892, the
defendants or their grantors were and defendants still are the
owners of the Ophir lode mining claim, and that, by reason of such
ownership, they are entitled to the possession of the ground in
dispute. To this answer a replication was filed setting forth that
defendants on February 10, 1893, made a mineral entry which
included said Ophir lode; that subsequently plaintiff, with others,
filed a protest against that portion of the entry which related to
the Ophir lode -- such protest charging, among other things, that
there had been no discovery of any vein, lode, ledge, or deposit of
mineral therein; that, on a hearing there was an adjudication by
the Commissioner of the General Land Office, affirmed by the
Secretary of the Interior, that no discovery had been made, and
cancelling the entry. Plaintiff also alleged that, at the hearing
on said protest, Cone, one of the defendants, testified that no
vein had been discovered in the Ophir claim and no work done on any
lode therein during the year 1893, and that the plaintiff was
induced by such testimony to go to large expenditures in exploring
for mineral in the ground in conflict between the two claims, the
defendants knowing at all times that such expenditures were being
made in reliance upon the truth of such testimony. In other words,
the plaintiff in his replication pleaded two defenses to
defendants' claim of title: first,
res judicata by reason
of the action of the Secretary of the Interior in setting aside the
original application for entry of the Ophir lode; and, second,
estoppel by reason of the testimony given by one of the defendants.
A demurrer to this replication was sustained, and the case went to
trial upon the complaint and answer.
Page 188 U. S. 186
MR. JUSTICE BREWER delivered the opinion of the Court.
The jurisdiction of this Court is denied. The validity of a
treaty or statute of or authority exercised under the United States
was not drawn in question in the state courts, nor was the validity
of a statute of or authority exercised under the State of Colorado
challenged on the ground of being repugnant to the Constitution,
treaties, or laws of the United States. So that the jurisdiction of
this Court depends on whether some title, right, privilege, or
immunity of a federal nature was specially set up and claimed by
the plaintiff in error and denied by the state courts. Rev.Stat.
sec. 709.
The mere fact that this is an action brought under sections 2325
and 2326, Rev.Stat., in support of an adverse claim, does not of
itself entitle the defeated party to a writ of error. Although
brought under the authority of a federal statute, the questions
involved may be only of general or local law.
Blackburn v.
Portland Gold Mining Company, 175 U.
S. 571;
Shoshone Mining Company v. Rutter,
177 U. S. 505.
Two questions of law arose on the pleadings. Both were presented
by the demurrer to the replication -- one, a question of estoppel;
the other, of
res judicata. The estoppel was not one of
record, but
in pais, arising, as contended, from
contradictory statements made by one of the defendants at a
different time and place. Whether such statements work an estoppel
depends, not upon the Constitution or any law of Congress, involves
no federal question, but is determined by rules of general law.
With respect to the other question, this may be said: the
validity of the denial of the original application for entry was
not challenged. It was accepted as conclusive, and a subsequent
entry was relied upon. The rule of
res judicata was,
however, invoked by plaintiff on the ground that a question of fact
had been decided in the first application, which, as alleged, was
conclusive between the parties in this action. But the
applicability of the rule depends on the fact that the parties to
the two actions or proceedings are the same, and also acting in the
same right. Here, the parties to the prior proceeding were the
applicants
Page 188 U. S. 187
for the patent and the United States, and the matters decided
bound them, and them only. The fact that his plaintiff, with
others, filed a protest against the entry did not make them parties
to the application to the extent that they were concluded by a
decision either way. There is no suggestion in the pleadings that
the protestants were in any way interested in the ground applied
for, or that they were acting other than as good citizens, seeking
to prevent a wrong upon the government. Their standing in the
proceeding was in the nature of
amici curiae. As such,
whatever the result, no rule of
res judicata could be
invoked by or against them. Hence, the ruling on the demurrer was
not concerning the effect of a decision made by the Land Department
upon the parties to the proceeding, but a mere determination that
one who was not a party could not claim the advantages of a party.
It is not open to question that the trial court properly sustained
the demurrer to this portion of the replication. To call this the
decision of a federal question adverse to the plaintiff is so
manifestly without foundation that it may rightfully be
disregarded.
The record of the trial, which took place before a jury, is
voluminous -- the bill of exceptions, containing the testimony, the
instructions, and the proceedings on the motion for a new trial,
filling 436 printed pages. The testimony was mainly directed to
such matters of fact as the time and place of discovery of mineral,
the character of the veins, the percent of mineral, and the general
nature of the rock formations in which the veins were alleged to
have been discovered. From the beginning of the trial to the end of
the testimony, there appears no single distinct claim based upon
the Constitution or statutes of the United States. No statute of
the State of Colorado was questioned, nor was any title, right,
privilege, or immunity under the Constitution or laws of the United
States specially set up or claimed. In the instructions asked and
refused, as well as in those given, there is only a general mention
of the laws of the United States, and none of any particular
statute. In the motion for a new trial, as well as in the
assignments of error in the supreme court of the state, there is
not the slightest reference to the Constitution, the laws of the
United States, or
Page 188 U. S. 188
any section or part thereof. And in the opinion of the supreme
court, outside of the matters of estoppel and
res judicata
before referred to, there is nothing to even suggest that it was
requested to consider any question of a title, right, privilege, or
immunity under the Constitution or laws of the United States.
Indeed, while this case has evidently been hotly contested, yet the
matters which were subjects of controversy and determination were
questions of fact concerning the time, extent, and effect of the
alleged discoveries of mineral, and also alleged wrongs in respect
to the jury. To those matters, and to those alone, was the
attention of the parties and the courts directed. Counsel for
plaintiff in error has filed an elaborate brief of 249 printed
pages which is able and exhaustive both on questions of mining law
and the conduct of the trial. One cannot, however, fail to be
impressed, after a perusal thereof, with the fact of a failure to
recognize that there is no general right to a writ of error from
this Court to the courts of a state; that there is but a special
right, a right to bring such cases, and such cases only, as
disclose a federal question distinctly ruled adversely to the
plaintiff in error. We fail to see that any title, right,
privilege, or immunity of a federal nature was specially set up and
claimed. Very likely the construction and the effect of federal
statutes were, in a general way, discussed and considered, but
nowhere do we find that special setting up or claiming of a federal
right which justifies us in taking jurisdiction. As we have stated,
the validity of no federal statute was denied in the state courts.
Neither did the plaintiff in error, prior to the judgment of
affirmance in the supreme court, challenge the validity of any
state statute on the ground of its repugnance to paramount federal
law.
The writ of error is
Dismissed.
