The court below erred in dismissing this action for want of
jurisdiction, as the right which it was claimed had been unlawfully
invaded was one arising under the Constitution and laws of the
United States, and although it has been held that, on error from a
state court to this Court, where the federal question asserted to
be contained in the record is manifestly lacking all color of
merit, the writ of error should be dismissed, that doctrine relates
to questions arising on writs of error from state courts, where,
aside from the federal status of the parties to the action or the
inherent nature of the federal right which is sought to be
vindicated, jurisdiction is to be determined by ascertaining
whether the record raises a
bona fide federal
question.
Page 185 U. S. 488
This action was begun by Swafford, plaintiff in error, in the
Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern Division of the
Eastern District of Tennessee. Templeton and Pearcy, defendants in
error, were made defendants to the action, the object of which was
to recover damages for an asserted wrongful refusal by the
defendants to permit the plaintiff to vote at a national election
for a member of the House of Representatives, held on November 6,
1900, in the district of the residence of the plaintiff.
The declaration expressly charged that the plaintiff was a white
man, a natural-born citizen of the United States, and was such on
November 6, 1900, and had been for many years prior thereto a
resident and duly qualified voter in the County of Rhea, State of
Tennessee, and, as such, entitled, under the Constitution and laws
of the United States and of the state, to vote for members of
Congress, and that he had been illegally deprived of such right by
the defendants, when serving as election officers at an election
held on November 6, 1900, in the district of the residence of the
plaintiff, in said County of Rhea.
The declaration specified the manner in which the right which it
was asserted existed under the Constitution and laws of the United
States and of the state had been violated, as follows: that for a
number of years there had been in force in Tennessee certain
special registration and ballot laws, which were operative only in
counties containing a population of fifty thousand inhabitants or
over, and in cities, towns, and civil districts having a population
of twenty-five hundred inhabitants or over; that Rhea County was
not, prior to 1899, affected by the legislation in question,
because it did not have a population of fifty thousand or upwards,
and had no town, city, or civil district within its borders
containing a population of twenty-five hundred; that, not being
subject to the operation of the statutes in question, the elections
in Rhea County, as in other counties similarly situated, were
governed by, and conducted in accordance with, the general election
laws prevailing in the State of Tennessee; that in 1899, the
Legislature of Tennessee passed a law known as chapter 163 of 1899,
by which the civil
Page 185 U. S. 489
districts or subdivisions theretofore existing in Rhea County
were diminished in number, and so arranged as to cause the civil
district in which the plaintiff lived and was entitled to vote to
contain a population of over twenty-five hundred inhabitants, and
therefore to become subject to the aforesaid special registration
and election laws if the redistricting law in question was valid.
It was further averred that, at the election held on November 6,
1900, for a member of Congress, the defendants, who were a majority
of the election judges conducting such election, when the
complainant presented himself to vote, insisted that he mark his
ballot, and fold it in a particular way without assistance, as
required by the special ballot law. It was asserted that this
demand by the election officers was lawful if the special ballot
law applied to the conduct of the election, but was unlawful if the
election in Rhea County was not subject to such special law, and
was controlled by the general election law of the state. Averring
that he was an illiterate person, and unable to mark or fold his
ballot unassisted, and was therefore not able to comply with the
provisions of the special ballot law referred to, it was alleged
that the vote of plaintiff was rejected by the defendants, despite
the insistence of the plaintiff that the election ought legally to
have been conducted according to the requirements of the general
law, and not by those of the special law, for the reason that the
redistricting act of 1899 was absolutely void.
The grounds upon which it was alleged that the act of 1899
redistricting Rhea County was void may be thus summarized: because
it was "class legislation in violation of the federal
Constitution," it being asserted that said law was enacted for
partisan purposes, and that, although there were other counties in
the state similarly situated as was Rhea County, the civil
districts as laid out by the county courts in such other counties,
pursuant to statutory authority, were left undisturbed by the
legislature. In other particulars also, the act in question was
averred to constitute special or class legislation. It was
specially averred that, as prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, plaintiff
enjoyed
Page 185 U. S. 490
the elective franchise, by virtue of that amendment and of
enumerated provisions of the state constitution
"plaintiff became, and was, possessed of the right of suffrage
as an immunity or privilege of citizenship, of which he could not
be deprived by the enactment of chapter 163 (the law of 1899) under
the circumstances aforesaid."
The defendants filed a demurrer questioning the sufficiency of
the declaration upon various grounds.
After hearing upon the demurrer, the court filed an opinion in
which it said that it clearly appeared from the declaration that
the action did not really and substantially involve a federal
question, and that the court was without jurisdiction or power to
entertain the suit. 108 F. 309. An entry was made sustaining the
demurrer and dismissing the suit, and it was recited that the
dismissal was solely because of the want of jurisdiction. A
certificate of the judge, moreover, was filed, which is as
follows:
"In this cause, I hereby certify that the order of dismissal
herein made is based solely on the ground that no federal question
was involved, and that the declaration, in my opinion, disclosed
the infraction of no right arising under or out of the federal laws
or Constitution, and that treating the demurrer as presenting this
question of jurisdiction, and acting also independently of the
demurrer, and on the court's own motion, the suit is dismissed only
for the reasons above stated -- that is, that the controversy not
arising under the laws and Constitution of the United States, there
is consequently no jurisdiction of the circuit court of the United
States."
"This certificate is made conformably to act of Congress of
March 3, 1891, chapter 517, and the opinion filed herein April 30,
1901, is made a part of the record, and will be certified and sent
up as a part of the proceedings, together with the certificate.
"
Page 185 U. S. 491
MR. JUSTICE WHITE, after making the foregoing statement,
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The sole question is did the circuit court err in dismissing the
action on the ground that it was not one within the jurisdiction of
the court? An affirmative answer to this question is rendered
necessary by the decision in
Wiley v. Sinkler,
179 U. S. 58. In
that case, the action was brought in a circuit court of the United
States against state election officers to recover damages in the
sum of twenty-five hundred dollars for an alleged unlawful
rejection of plaintiff's vote at a federal election. A demurrer was
filed to the complaint. One of the grounds of the demurrer was that
the court had no jurisdiction of the action because it did not
affirmatively appear on the face of the complaint that a federal
question was involved. The demurrer, however, was sustained not
because of the want of jurisdiction, but solely upon the ground
that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action. The cause was brought directly to this Court under
that provision of the Act of March 3, 1891, which confers power to
review the judgment or decree of a circuit court, among others, in
any case involving the construction or application of the
Constitution of the United States. In this Court, the contention
was renewed that the circuit court was without jurisdiction, and
this contention involved necessarily, also, a denial of the power
of this Court to review, since the right directly to do so was
sustainable alone upon the ground that the cause was one involving
the construction or application of the Constitution of the United
States. The argument advanced to sustain the asserted want of
jurisdiction was this -- that, as the Constitution of the United
States did not confer the right of suffrage upon anyone, but the
same was a privilege which the elector enjoyed under the
constitution and laws of the state in which he was entitled to
vote, therefore the denial of the right to vote at an election for
a member of Congress did not and could not involve the construction
or application of the Constitution of the United States. The Court,
however, decided otherwise, and, speaking through Mr. Justice Gray,
said that the case "involves the construction
Page 185 U. S. 492
and application of the Constitution of the United States;" that
"the right to vote for members of the Congress of the United States
. . . has its foundation in the Constitution of the United States;"
that
"the circuit court of the United States has jurisdiction,
concurrent with the courts of the state, of any action under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, in which the
matter in dispute exceeds the sum or value of $2,000;"
and that, the action being
"brought against election officers to recover damages for their
rejection of the plaintiff's vote for a member of the House of
Representatives of the United States, the complaint, by alleging
that the plaintiff was at the time, under the Constitution and laws
of the State of South Carolina and the Constitution and laws of the
United States, a duly qualified elector of the state, shows that
the action is brought under the Constitution and laws of the United
States."
In concluding its examination of the question of jurisdiction,
it was declared that "the circuit court therefore clearly had
jurisdiction of this action." The conclusion thus expressed, by
necessary implication, decided the power of this Court to review,
which would not have obtained unless jurisdiction of the circuit
court had been found to rest on the constitutional right.
It is manifest from the context of the opinion in the case just
referred to that the conclusion that the cause was one arising
under the Constitution of the United States was predicated on the
conception that the action sought the vindication or protection of
the right to vote for a member of Congress, a right, as declared in
Ex Parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 655,
110 U. S.
664,
"fundamentally based upon the Constitution [of the United
States], which created the office of member of Congress, and
declared it should be elective, and pointed to the means of
ascertaining who should be electors."
That is to say, the ruling was that the case was equally one
arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States whether
the illegal act complained of arose from a charged violation of
some specific provision of the Constitution or laws of the United
States or from the violation of a state law which affected the
exercise of the right to vote for a member of Congress, since the
Constitution of the
Page 185 U. S. 493
United States had adopted, as the qualifications of electors for
members of Congress, those prescribed by the state for electors of
the most numerous branch of the legislature of the state.
It results from what has just been said that the court erred in
dismissing the action for want of jurisdiction, since the right
which it was claimed had been unlawfully invaded was one, in the
very nature of things, arising under the Constitution and laws of
the United States, and that this inhered in the very substance of
the claim. It is obvious from an inspection of the certificate that
the court, in dismissing for want of jurisdiction, was controlled
by what it deemed to be the want of merit in the averments which
were made in the complaint as to the violation of the federal
right. But as the very nature of the controversy was federal, and
therefore jurisdiction existed, whilst the opinion of the court as
to the want of merit in the cause of action might have furnished
ground for dismissing for that reason, it afforded no sufficient
ground for deciding that the action was not one arising under the
Constitution and laws of the United States.
True, it has been repeatedly held that, on error from a state
court to this Court, where the federal question asserted to be
contained in the record is manifestly lacking all color of merit,
the writ of error should be dismissed.
New Orleans Waterworks
Co. v. Louisiana, ante, 185 U. S. 336, and
authorities cited. This doctrine, however, relates to questions
arising on writs of error from state courts where, aside from the
federal status of the parties to the action or the inherent nature
of the federal right which is sought to be vindicated, jurisdiction
is to be determined by ascertaining whether the record raises a
bona fide federal question. In that class of cases, not
only this Court may, but it is its duty to, determine whether in
truth and in fact a real federal question arises on the record. And
it is true also, as observed in
New Orleans Waterworks Co. v.
Louisiana, supra, that a similar principle is applied in
analogous cases originally brought in a court of the United States.
McCain v. Des Moines, 174 U. S. 168;
St. Joseph & Grand Island Railroad v. Steele,
167 U. S. 659. But
the doctrine referred to has no application to a case brought in a
federal court where the
Page 185 U. S. 494
very subject matter of the controversy is federal, however much
wanting in merit may be the averments which it is claimed establish
the violation of the federal right. The distinction between the
cases referred to and the one at bar is that which must necessarily
exist between controversies concerning rights which are created by
the Constitution or laws of the United States, and which
consequently are in their essence federal, and controversies
concerning rights not conferred by the Constitution or laws of the
United States, the contention respecting which may or may not
involve a federal question depending upon what is the real issue to
be decided or the substantiality of the averments as to the
existence of the rights which it is claimed are federal in
character. The distinction finds apt illustration in the decisions
of this Court holding that suits brought by or against corporations
chartered by acts of Congress are cases
per se of federal
cognizance.
Osborn v. U.S.
Bank, 9 Wheat. 817;
Texas & Pacific R. Co.
v. Cody, 166 U. S. 606. It
may not be doubted that, if an action be brought in a circuit court
of the United States by such a corporation, there would be
jurisdiction to entertain it, although the averments set out to
establish the wrong complained of or the defense interposed were
unsubstantial in character. The distinction is also well
illustrated by the case of
Huntington v. Laidley,
176 U. S. 668,
where, finding that jurisdiction obtained in a circuit court, this
Court held that it was error to dismiss the action for want of
jurisdiction because it was deemed that the record established that
the cause of action asserted was not well founded.
It follows that the court below erred in dismissing the action
for want of jurisdiction. Of course, in reaching this conclusion,
we must not be understood as expressing any opinion as to the
sufficiency of the declaration.
The judgment of the Circuit Court is reversed, and the
action is remanded for further proceedings, in conformity with this
opinion, and it is so ordered.
