A decree of the District Court of the United States for the
Northern District of California, rendered in 1855, was affirmed by
this Court, and remanded to the district court, where a final
decree was entered in 1859. Subsequently in 1899, after a large
amount of intermediate litigation, a petition of intervention was
filed in the district court in the original case, praying that the
decree of 1859 might be ordered to be executed, the proceedings
having been originally begun in 1852 before the board of land
commissioners of California. A demurrer was filed to this petition,
which was sustained and the petition dismissed. This was followed
by another similar petition filed in 1900 which was also dismissed,
and an appeal taken to this Court.
Held: that the appeal
originally allowed to this Court by the act of 1851 was repealed in
1864, and an appeal allowed to the circuit court of the United
States; that this act was repealed by the act of 1891, which
provided for an appeal to the circuit court of appeals, and that
the appeal to this Court must therefore be dismissed.
Page 184 U. S. 670
This is an appeal from an order of the District Court of the
United States for the Northern District of California sustaining a
demurrer to and dismissing the petition of the appellants,
interveners, who prayed that a certain decree of the above-named
district court, made on November 30, 1859, be ordered to be
executed.
It appears that, on January 31, 1852, certain persons by the
name of Peralta presented to and filed with the board of land
commissioners, under the act of Congress "to ascertain and settle
the private land claims in the State of California," passed March
3, 1851, 9 Stat. 631, a petition for the confirmation of the rancho
of San Antonio. Subsequently the four claimants divided the lands
among themselves in severalty, and the board, proceeding to examine
the claim upon the evidence, decided in favor of its validity, but
restricted the area of the grant by fixing the northern boundary
line at San Antonio Creek, which included about one-half of the
claim. Both parties appealed from this decision, and the claim was
certified to the District Court for the Northern District of
California, in which court a transcript of the proceeding was filed
September 23, 1854. The district court upon the trial reversed the
decree of the land commissioners and declared the claim as set
forth in the petition to be valid by decree entered January 26,
1855.
From this decree the United States appealed to this Court, which
affirmed the decree of the district court (1857).
United
States v. Peralta, 19 How. 343. Two controversies
were decided: first, that the officers issuing the grant had power
to make grants of land, and second, that the northern boundary of
the land extended beyond San Antonio Creek, according to the claim
of the petitioners. Upon the mandate of this Court being filed in
the district court, a final decree was entered therein on November
30, 1859, slightly amending its former decree in substantial
compliance with such mandate. This decree is still in force.
Afterwards, and on August 10, 1860, the surveyor general
returned into court a corrected plat of a survey, purporting to be
in conformity with the decree of November 30, 1859. Thereupon, and
on October 8, 1860, one Carpentier and others filed
Page 184 U. S. 671
a petition of intervention in which they claimed adversely so
much land as lay under the waters of the estuary of San Antonio up
to the highest tide lands, through mesne conveyances from the State
of California, and afterwards filed in court their exceptions to
the survey. The United States also filed exceptions thereto. The
litigation thus inaugurated continued for more than ten years, and
finally resulted in a decree of the district court, August 4, 1871,
approving a modified survey of the tract, a certified plat of which
had been filed in the clerk's office. An appeal was taken from this
decree by the United States to the Circuit Court for the Ninth
Judicial Circuit, by which court the appeal was dismissed July 31,
1874, and a decree entered that the claimants have leave to proceed
under the decree confirming the survey as a final decree. The
Commissioner of the General Land Office thereupon caused to be
prepared and recorded a patent of the United States for that
portion of the lands included in the survey.
Thirty-seven years after the entry of the decree of November 30,
1859, and twenty-two years after the dismissal of the above appeal
in the circuit court, the successors in title of one of the
Peraltas presented to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
September 2, 1896, a plat of a survey of the rancho San Antonio
made by the surveyor general of California, November 25, 1895,
under the Act of Congress of July 23, 1866, 14 Stat. 218, with
certified copies of the decree of November 30, 1859, with a request
that he issue to the petitioners a patent in accordance with such
plat of survey, which the Commissioner declined to do, September
22, 1896, and the Secretary of the Interior affirmed his decision.
The appellants thereupon, and on July 27, 1899, filed in the
District Court for the Northern District of California a petition
of intervention in the original case of the
United States v.
Peralta, praying that the decree of November 30, 1859, might
be ordered to be executed; that the government be required to issue
to the appellants its patent for so much of the lands of the rancho
as had not theretofore been patented to them, or any of them. The
United States demurred to the petition, which on January 29, 1900,
was dismissed.
Page 184 U. S. 672
This was followed by another similar petition, filed March 29,
1900, based upon the survey of 1895, which was also demurred to,
and resulted in a decree, rendered May 28, 1900, sustaining the
demurrer and dismissing the petition. Whereupon petitioners
appealed to this Court.
MR. JUSTICE BROWN delivered the opinion of the Court.
The appeal in this case is taken from the decree of May 28,
1900, sustaining the demurrer to, and dismissing the petition of,
the appellants, which was filed March 29, 1900.
Our jurisdiction of this appeal depends upon certain statutes,
which it becomes necessary to consider. By the original Act of
March 3, 1851, 9 Stat. 631, to ascertain and settle the private
land claims in the State of California, a commission of three
persons was constituted (sec. 1) to settle such claims, whose duty
it was (sec. 8) to decide upon their validity and to certify the
same, with their reasons, to the district attorney of the United
States. By sec. 9, an appeal was given to the district court, which
was empowered to review the decision of the commissioners and to
decide upon the validity of such claim. By sec. 10, the district
court was required, on application of the party against whom
judgment was rendered, to grant an appeal to the Supreme Court of
the United States. It was held in
United
States v. Fossatt, 21 How. 445, that the
jurisdiction of the board of commissioners extended not only to the
adjudication of questions relating to the genuineness and
authenticity of the grant, but also to all questions relating to
its location and boundaries, and that it did not terminate until
the issue of a patent conformable to the decree.
The law remained in this condition until 1864, when, on July 1,
an act was passed, 13 Stat. 332, "to expedite the settlement
Page 184 U. S. 673
of titles to lands in the State of California," the second
section of which provided
"that, where proceedings for the correction or confirmation of a
survey are pending . . . , it shall be lawful for such district
court to proceed and complete its examination and determination of
the matter, and its decree thereon shall be subject to appeal to
the circuit court of the United States for the district, in like
manner, and with like effect, as hereafter provided for appeals in
other cases to the circuit court."
By section three, it was enacted
"that, where a plat and survey have already been approved or
corrected by one of the district courts, . . . and an appeal from
the decree of approval or correction has already been taken to the
Supreme Court of the United States, the said Supreme Court shall
have jurisdiction to hear and determine the appeal. But where from
such decree of approval or correction no appeal has been taken to
the Supreme Court, no appeal to that court shall be allowed, but an
appeal may be taken within twelve months after this act shall take
effect, to the circuit court of the United States for California,
and said circuit court shall proceed to fully determine the
matter."
It appears perfectly clear from section three that the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court was taken away except as to cases
where an appeal had already been taken. With this exception,
appeals must be taken under that act to the circuit court. The law
remained in that condition until the passage of the Court of
Appeals Act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 826, by the fifth section of
which appeals can only be taken directly from the district court to
this Court in cases where the jurisdiction of the district court is
in issue, in prize cases, criminal cases, constitutional cases, or
cases involving the validity or construction of a treaty. As to all
other cases, by section six, appeal must be taken to the circuit
court of appeals. As we said in
McLish v. Roff,
141 U. S. 661,
this act provides for the distribution of the entire appellate
jurisdiction of our national judicial system between the Supreme
Court and the circuit court of appeals. As this case does not fall
within any of the classes excepted by section five, it is clear
that if any appeal will lie at all, it should have been taken to
the circuit court
Page 184 U. S. 674
of appeals, and that we have no jurisdiction to enforce the
execution of this decree by appeal from the district court. If the
decree of November 30, 1859, rendered by the district court in
pursuance of the mandate of this Court, were not a final decree, it
became final either August 4, 1871, when the modified survey was
approved, and an appeal was taken to the circuit court and the
appeal dismissed by Mr. Justice Field, July 31, 1874, or upon May
28, 1900, from which the appeal was taken in this case.
It is clear that, so far as concerns appeals from final decrees,
they must be taken under laws then in existence, and to the court
provided by such laws. To say that a decree rendered in 1900 may be
appealed to a court whose jurisdiction to review it was taken away
in 1864 is beyond belief. Even if the court of appeals act do not
apply to this case, the jurisdiction of this Court was clearly
taken away by the act of 1864, and transferred to the circuit court
of the United States for California, except as to appeals which had
already been taken. If there had been no reservation of pending
cases, even such cases would have fallen within the law.
Railroad Co. v. Grant, 98 U. S. 398,
98 U. S. 401.
In that case, a writ of error had been sued out on December 6,
1875, to reverse a judgment of $2,250 by the Supreme Court of the
District of Columbia. At that time, the appeal was properly taken
to this Court, but on February 25, 1879, Congress passed an act
limiting writs of error from this Court to judgments exceeding the
value of $2,500, and it was held that the writ of error must be
dismissed. Said the Chief Justice:
"The act of 1879 is undoubtedly prospective in its operation. It
does not vacate or annul what has been done under the old law. It
destroys no vested rights. It does not set aside any judgment
already rendered by this Court under the jurisdiction conferred by
the Revised Statutes when in force. But a party to a suit has no
vested right to an appeal or a writ of error from one court to
another. Such a privilege, once granted, may be taken away, and if
taken away, pending proceedings in the appellate court stop just
where the rescinding act finds them, unless special provision is
made to the contrary. The Revised Statutes gave parties the right
to remove
Page 184 U. S. 675
their causes to this Court by writ of error and appeal, and gave
us the authority to reexamine, reverse, or affirm judgments or
decrees thus brought up. The repeal of that law does not vacate or
annul an appeal or a writ [of error] already taken or sued out, but
it takes away our right to hear and determine the cause, if the
matter in dispute is less than the present jurisdictional amount.
The appeal or the writ remains in full force, but we dismiss the
suit because our jurisdiction is gone."
Similar cases are by no means infrequent in this Court. Thus, in
Yeaton v. United
States, 5 Cranch 281, it was held that, if the law
under which a sentence of forfeiture was inflicted expired or were
absolutely repealed after an appeal and before sentence by the
appellate court, the sentence must be reversed.
See also The Rachel v. United
States, 6 Cranch 329;
United
States v. Preston, 3 Pet. 57;
Norris v.
Crocker, 13 How. 429. In
Insurance
Co. v. Ritchie, 5 Wall. 541, it was held that the
jurisdiction of the circuit courts between citizens of the same
state in internal revenue cases, conferred by the act of 1864, was
taken away by the act of 1866, and that cases pending at the
passage of the act fell with its repeal.
Ex Parte
McCardle, 7 Wall. 506. These cases fully establish
the proposition that a repealing statute which contains no saving
clause operates as well upon pending cases as upon those thereafter
commenced.
In the case under consideration, there was a saving of suits
already begun, but there was an express proviso that, where no
appeal had been taken to the Supreme Court, no appeal to that court
should be allowed. That law remained unchanged until the Court of
Appeals Act of 1891, to which all appeals from circuit or district
court must now be taken, with a few specified exceptions.
The appeal must be
Dismissed.
