This case is a continuation of
Southern Pacific Railroad Co.
v. United States, 188 U. S. 1, brought
to quiet the title of the government to lands within the limits of
the forfeited grant to the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company.
The questions in this case arise between the United States and
parties holding title or claiming rights to lands by deed from or
contract with the railroad company. The title of the company having
been adjudged void, the Acts of March 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 556; of
February 12, 1896, 29 Stat. 8; of March 2, 1896, 29 Stat. 42, were
passed for the purpose
Page 184 U. S. 50
of upholding the titles of parties who, in good faith, had
purchased lands from railroad companies which, though supposed to
be part of their grants, proved not to be so. The first section of
the Act of March 2, 1896, reads:
"But no patent to any lands held by a
bona fide
purchaser shall be vacated or annulled, but the right and title of
such purchaser is hereby confirmed."
Held: 1. That the facts bring this case within the
provisions of that section, and that the Circuit Court rightly
confirmed the title to lands patented under it; 2. That the
unpatented lands were so situated with reference to the constructed
road of the Southern Pacific, as to be within the scope of its
grant, and that the act was not intended to be limited to cases of
purchases from the railroad company prior to its date; 3. That
while the act was remedial, and to be liberally construed, yet to
sustain the purchase in controversy in this case as one made in
good faith would ignore the plainest provisions of law in respect
to
bona fide purchasers, and would uphold almost any kind
of speculative purchase.
This is a continuation of the case which was before this Court
and decided in 1897.
168 U. S. 168 U.S.
1. It was brought to quiet the title of the government to some
700,000 acres or land within the limits of the forfeited grant the
Atlantic & Pacific Railroad Company, and claimed by the
defendants under certain junior grants to the Southern Pacific
Railroad Company. The decree in the circuit court quieted, as
against the Southern Pacific Company, the title of the government
to all the lands. The other defendants asserted title or claimed
rights to certain portions of the land by virtue of conveyances
from or contracts with the Southern Pacific Company, and the decree
provided:
"Nor shall this decree in any wise affect any rights which the
defendants, or any of them, other than the said Southern Pacific
Railroad Company, now have or may hereafter acquire in, to, or
respecting any of the lands hereinbefore described, in virtue of
the act of Congress entitle 'An Act to Provide for the Adjustment
of Land Grants Made by Congress to Aid in the Construction of
Railroads and for the Forfeiture of Unearned Lands and for Other
Purposes,' approved March 3, 1887."
This decree was affirmed by this Court so far as the Southern
Pacific Company as well as the trustees in its mortgage were
concerned, the Court saying in reference to that portion of the
decree just quoted (p.
168 U. S.
65):
Page 184 U. S. 51
"Instead of leaving undetermined the matters in dispute between
the United States and the defendants other than the Southern
Pacific Railroad Company, the circuit court should have determined,
by its final decree, what rights those defendants have by virtue of
the above Act of March 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 556, c. 376, in the lands
or any of them now in dispute and claimed by the United States. The
effect of the decree is to leave undetermined the question whether
the defendants who claim under the Southern Pacific Railroad
Company are protected by that or any other act of Congress. The
government was entitled to a decree quieting its title to all the
lands described in its pleadings, except those, if any, that are
protected, in the hands of claimants, by acts of Congress.
United States v. Winona & St. Peter Railroad,
165 U. S.
463;
Winona & St. Peter Railroad v. United
States, 165 U. S. 483. But, as the
government has not appealed, the decree cannot be reversed for the
error of the circuit court in not finally disposing of the issues
between the United States and the individual defendants who claim
under the Southern Pacific Railroad Company."
"The result is that the decree must be affirmed in all respects
as to the Southern Pacific Railroad Company, as well as to the
trustees in the mortgage executed by that company, and affirmed
also as to the other defendants, subject, however, to the right of
the government to proceed in the circuit court to a final decree as
to those defendants, and it is so ordered."
On the return of the mandate to the circuit court, the United
States dismissed their bill against the defendants other than the
railroad company and its mortgage trustee, without prejudice as to
all except certain specified tracts amounting in the aggregate to
about 52,600 acres, of which amount 9,284 were patented by the
United States to the Southern Pacific, the patents bearing date
March 29, 1876, April 4, 1879, December 27, 1883, and January 9,
1885, and 43,315 remained unpatented. In respect to these tracts,
the case proceeded to final hearing, which resulted in a decree in
favor of the defendants, 88 F. 832, confirming their title to the
lands patented, and adjudging them
bona fide purchasers
within the meaning of the Act of Congress of March 3, 1887, of the
lands not patented. From
Page 184 U. S. 52
this decree the United States appealed to the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed the decree, 98 F. 45, and
thereupon the United States brought the case here on appeal.
MR. JUSTICE BREWER delivered the opinion of the Court.
The questions now to be determined arise between the United
States and parties holding title or claiming rights to lands by
deed from or contract with the railroad company. The title of the
company having been adjudged void, the defendants rely upon the
acts of Congress of March 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 556, c. 376, February
12, 1896, 29 Stat. 6, c. 18, and March 2, 1896, 29 Stat. 42, c. 39.
These acts were passed for the purpose of upholding the titles of
parties who in good faith had purchased from railroad companies
lands which, though supposed to be part of their grants, proved not
to be so. This legislation was fully considered in
United
States v. Winona &c. Railroad Company, 165 U.
S. 463, and
Winona & St. Peter Railroad Company
v. United States, 165 U. S. 483, and
any further discussion of its scope is unnecessary. In respect to
it, we said:
"The act of 1896 confirming the right and title of a
bona
fide purchaser, and providing that the patent to his lands
should not be vacated or annulled, must be held to include one who,
if not in the fullest sense a '
bona fide purchaser,' has
nevertheless purchased in good faith from the railroad
company."
"
* * * *"
"Our conclusion is that these acts operate to confirm the title
to every purchaser from a railroad company of lands certified or
patented to or for its benefit, notwithstanding any mere errors or
irregularities in the proceedings of the Land Department and
notwithstanding the fact that the lands so certified or patented
were, by the true construction of the land grants, although
Page 184 U. S. 53
within the limits of the grants, excepted from their operation,
providing that he purchased in good faith, paid value for the
lands, and providing also that the lands were public lands in the
statutory sense of the term, and free from individual or other
claims."
P.
165 U. S.
481.
In the present case, the deeds to the patented lands were
executed by the company at different dates, commencing July 23,
1885, and ending July 19, 1892. These lands were apparently within
the grant made to the Southern Pacific by the Act of March 3, 1871,
16 Stat. 573, c. 122 -- that is, they were public lands in the
statutory sense of the term along the line of the Southern Pacific
as authorized by that act and within the place or indemnity limits
of the grant. The road had been constructed, and the Land
Department of the United States, the tribunal charged with the duty
of administering the public lands, had decided that the company had
earned the lands, and had caused patents therefor to be issued to
it. No third party claimed title; either the government or the
company was the owner. Under those circumstances, the purchasers
bought the lands; bought them in good faith; paid value for
them.
These facts bring the case within the first section of the Act
of March 2, 1896, as heretofore construed by us:
"But no patent to any lands held by a
bona fide
purchaser shall be vacated or annulled, but the right and title of
such purchaser is hereby confirmed."
Against this conclusion, it is contended that purchasers with
notice that the government questioned the company's title to these
lands are not
bona fide purchasers. And counsel say
that
"in the year 1886, every department of the government began to
operate to protect the title of the United States to these lands,
and in every public way gave notice to the world of the rights of
the government to them,"
enumerating the Act of Congress of July 6, 1886, forfeiting the
grant to the Atlantic & Pacific Company; various rulings of the
Interior Department, from that, on June 7, 1887 (Gordon v. Southern
P. R. Co. 5 L.D. 691), to the date of the last deed, to the effect
that the lands granted to the Atlantic & Pacific were not
operated upon by the subsequent grants to the Southern
Page 184 U. S. 54
Pacific, and were by the forfeiture act restored to the public
domain, and the commencement of the several suits by the government
to establish its title to these lands and others similarly
situated. Counsel also refer to
Winona &c. Railroad Co. v.
United States, supra, in which it was held that one cannot
claim to be a purchaser in good faith from a railroad company if,
at the time, he has notice of facts outside the records of the Land
Department disclosing a prior right in some third party.
But we do not think a mere change in the opinions of the
officers of the government as to the validity of the company's
title, although made known to parties proposing to purchase from
such company, is sufficient to take away from them the protection
of good faith. A party may have notice of conflicting claims, and
still, in the exercise of an honest judgment as to the rightful
owner, buy property and pay for it, and be acting in good faith. So
far as suits are concerned, all the decisions of the courts had
been, up to the date of the last deed, in favor of the title of the
company. Thus, the purchasers had not merely the action of the Land
Department in issuing the patents, but all past decisions of the
courts, justifying their conclusions. The conditions are not like
those in
Winona &c. R. Co. v. United States. That was
a suit to cancel a certification of a tract of land made for the
benefit of a railroad company, and also a deed from it. The
certification was wrongfully made, and the company in fact took no
title. The purchaser sought protection under these statutes. Before
any certification, or any pretense of right in the company, as well
as at the time of the conveyance to its grantee, there was and had
been for many years a party in actual possession of the land under
a title
prima facie regular and valid, and it was held
that the grantee, charged with notice of that occupancy and that
claim of title, could not be adjudged a
bona fide
purchaser from the railroad company within the meaning of the
statute.
"The statute was not intended to cut off the rights of parties
continuing after the certification, and of which at the time of his
purchase the purchaser had notice. Only the purely technical claims
of the government were waived."
Nothing of that kind appears here; no independent and
outside
Page 184 U. S. 55
facts are shown, no title in any third party -- simply a change
of opinion on the part of the officers of the government as to the
validity of the title of the Southern Pacific Company, and it would
be harsh indeed if remedial statutes like these were shorn of their
beneficent application by reason of the fact that the officials of
the government had changed their views of the law. We think the
circuit court was right in confirming the title to the lands
patented.
With reference to the unpatented lands, they, like the former,
were so situated with respect to the constructed road of the
Southern Pacific as to be apparently within the scope of its grant,
and the same general comments are appropriate here as in reference
to the patented land. The act of 1896 refers only to lands patented
or certified, and the parties who contracted with the company for
unpatented lands must rely for protection upon the act of 1887.
Most of the transactions in respect to them were after the date of
this act, and it is contended that it is not prospective in its
operation, and only purports to protect prior transactions.
The ruling of the Land Department has been to the contrary
effect. In Sethman v. Clise, 17 L.D. 307, a purchase from the
railroad company was made prior to the act of 1887, but after the
act, the purchaser conveyed to a transferee, and it was held that
the latter was entitled to relief under the statute.
"The act directed the manner of making adjustments, and it was
the evident intention of Congress, as expressed in the fifth
section of the act, that, when, in the adjustment of these grants,
it was ascertained that land had been bought from the railroad
companies for which they could convey no good title, such buyers or
their transferees, if
bona fide, should be allowed to
purchase the tracts claimed by them. And it can make no difference,
I think, whether a transferee, otherwise entitled to purchase,
bought the land before or after the day of the approval of the act,
if it was originally purchased in good faith from any said
company."
P. 312.
In Andrus v. Balch, 22 L.D. 238, was presented the case of a
purchase from the railroad company after the Act of March 3, 1887,
and it was held that that did not prevent the
Page 184 U. S. 56
operation of the act. The same proposition was reaffirmed in
Briley v. Beach, 22 L.D. 549; In re Seaver, 23 L.D. 108; Grandin v.
La Bar, 25 L.D.194; Neilsen v. Central P. R. Co. 26 L.D. 252. There
has been no decision to the contrary. This uniform ruling and
practice of the Land Department would, in case of doubt, be of
great weight in determining the true construction of the act.
Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41,
178 U. S. 56,
178 U. S. 92;
Fairbank v. United States, 181 U.
S. 283,
181 U. S.
306.
But the act itself bears upon its face evidence that it was not
intended to be limited to cases of purchases from the railroad
company prior to its date. While the first section directs the
Secretary of the Interior "to immediately adjust" the several land
grants, section 3 provides
"that if, in the adjustment of said grants, it shall appear that
the homestead or preemption entry of any
bona fide settler
has been erroneously cancelled on account of any railroad grant or
the withdrawal of public lands from market, such settler upon
application shall be reinstated in all his rights, and allowed to
perfect his entry by complying with the public land laws."
This seems to imply an intent that all mistakes of the nature
referred to which shall have occurred up to the very completion of
the adjustment may be rectified. Section 4 makes provision for the
issue of patents to certain purchasers from railroad companies,
providing proof shall be made "within such time and under such
rules as may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior after
the grants respectively shall have been adjusted." While other
sections may not be so specific, yet, placing them alongside of
those from which quotations have been made, it is reasonable to
hold that the act applies not merely to transactions had before its
date, but to any had before the time of final adjustment. In this
case, the several grants to the Southern Pacific have not yet been
finally adjusted. Further, it must be borne in mind that this is a
remedial statute, and is to be construed liberally, and so as to
effectuate the purpose of Congress and secure the relief which was
designed, and the mere date of the transaction between the
purchaser and the railroad company is not of itself vital in
determining
Page 184 U. S. 57
whether there is or is not an equity in behalf of the purchaser.
As said in Potter's Dwarris on Statutes, 231:
"A remedial act shall be so construed as most effectually to
meet the beneficial end in view, and to prevent a failure of the
remedy. As a general rule, a remedial statute ought to be construed
liberally. Receiving an equitable, or rather a benignant,
interpretation, the letter of the act will be sometimes enlarged,
sometimes restrained, and sometimes it has been said the
construction made is contrary to the letter; which should be read
--
ultra the letter, and confined to ancient
statutes."
See also the letter of Attorney General Garland to the
Secretary of the Interior in response to a question as to the true
construction of this act. 6 L.D. 275.
"The whole scope of the law from the second to the sixth
sections, inclusive, is remedial. Its intent is to relieve from
loss settlers and
bona fide purchasers who, through the
erroneous or wrongful disposition of the lands in the grants, by
the officers of the government, or by the railroads, have lost
their rights or acquired equities. . . . The fifth section
expressly refers to such lands as had been sold, which had not been
conveyed 'to or for the use of such companies.' It is not required
that the sale by the railroad companies shall have been made on its
part in good faith, but only that the purchaser shall have bought
in good faith. That it was sold under a claim of the grant to
another in good faith is the ground of his equity."
The remaining question arises on the ruling that one of the
defendants, Jackson A. Graves, was a
bona fide purchaser,
and entitled to the protection of the fifth section of the Act of
March 3, 1887, and affects something like thirty-five thousand
acres. These were purchased from the railroad company in 1885 by
the Atlantic & Pacific Fibre Importing & Manufacturing
Company, Limited, a corporation organized under the laws of Great
Britain. This suit was commenced on May 17, 1890. On September 25,
1891, an amended bill of complaint was filed in which the fibre
company was made party defendant. Its answer was filed March 14,
1892. On January 27, 1893, it conveyed the lands to Graves, who
thereafter caused himself to
Page 184 U. S. 58
be substituted for it as party defendant. Said section 5, so far
as is applicable, reads:
"SEC. 5. That where any said company shall have sold to citizens
of the United States, or to persons who have declared their
intention to become such citizens, as a part of its grant, lands
not conveyed to or for the use of such company, said lands being
the numbered sections prescribed in the grant, and being
conterminous with the constructed parts of said road, and where the
lands so sold are for any reason excepted from the operation of the
grant to said company, it shall be lawful for the
bona
fide purchaser thereof from said company to make payment to
the United States for said lands at the ordinary government price
for like lands, and thereupon patents shall issue therefor to the
said
bona fide purchaser, his heirs or assigns."
The fibre company was an alien, and therefore not within the
terms of the section. Graves, it is true, was a citizen, and the
ruling of the Department has been that the right of purchase from
the government conferred by this section is not limited to the
immediate purchaser from the company, but may be exercised by a
subsequent grantee who has the necessary qualifications, and that
in such case it is immaterial what were the qualifications of such
purchaser.
See letter of Secretary Noble to the
Commissioner of the General Land Office (11 L.D. 229), in which the
Secretary said:
"It can make no difference, in my judgment, whether the
applicant is the immediate purchaser from the company or a
purchaser one or more degrees removed. If he is a
bona
fide purchaser of the land and has the required qualifications
as to citizenship, he is within the intendment of the statute, and
if he be not the original purchaser from the company, it is
immaterial what the qualifications of his immediate grantor, or the
intervening purchasers, may have been. If his immediate grantor was
a foreigner, and his purchase was simply for the purpose of
acquiring title from the government for the benefit of the
foreigner, he would not be a
bona fide purchaser, and
would not therefore come within the terms of the act."
Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. McKinley, 14 L.D. 237; Union Colony v.
Fulmele,
Page 184 U. S. 59
6 L.D. 273; Sethman v. Clise, 17 L.D. 307; Ray v. Gross, 27 L.D.
707.
Within the scope of these rulings, Graves is entitled to the
protection of the statute if he can be considered a
bona
fide purchaser. He bought
pendente lite, and while he
testified that he purchased in good faith and for value, that he
was holding the lands under the conveyances, and had paid all legal
taxes and assessments levied and assessed since the deeds, he
further testified as follows:
"Q. 19. Did you buy these lands in good faith?"
"A. Yes, expecting to make title to them."
"Q. 20. And do you hold them as said purchaser and as a citizen
of the United States?"
"A. I do."
"Q. 21. And as an innocent purchaser?"
"A. Well _____"
"Q. 22. For value received?"
"A. I hold them for a valuable consideration."
"Q. 23. Well, do you claim to be an innocent purchaser of said
lands, under the Act of Congress of March 3, 1887?"
"A. I think I am protected under the act of Congress of 1887. I
would like to understand this 'innocent.' What you mean by that? Of
course, I have notice of the defect -- I have notice of the
congressional action taken, and of the pendency of this suit; had
it when I bought. Outside of that, I consider myself an innocent
purchaser. Of course, I had that notice of that suit. There is no
use denying that. At the same time, I understand -- I think I
understand -- the act of Congress of 1887, and I think I am
protected under it."
Cross-examination:
"Q. 24. How much did you pay the Atlantic & Pacific Fibre
Importing & Manufacturing Company for these lands?"
"A. I have not paid them anything in coin. But I have agreements
with them which are the equivalent of the coin."
"Q. 25. What is the nature of the agreements?"
"A. I am to protect them in the title -- that is, protect them
in their original purchase money; make what I can out of it over
and above that."
"Q. 26. And devote your legal services to that end?"
"A. Yes. They have to have somebody on this end. "
Page 184 U. S. 60
Now while the statute is, as we have stated, remedial and to be
liberally construed in order to carry out the purpose of its
enactment, yet to sustain this purchase as one made in good faith
would ignore the plainest provisions of law in respect to
bona
fide purchasers, and would uphold almost any kind of
speculative purchase. Congress expressly limited the privileges
granted by the act of 1887 to citizens of the United States or
those who had declared their intention to become such. It excluded
aliens, and in so doing acted in harmony with the general scope of
public land legislation. True, in the act of 1896 in respect to
patented lands, it recognized aliens as entitled to the benefits of
a
bona fide purchase, but the fact that in a later
statute, and in respect to a different class of lands, it extended
certain privileges, is no reason for ignoring the limitations
contained in this act as applied to the lands covered by it.
While, according to the construction of the Land Department, the
grantee of a purchaser from the railroad company is entitled to
invoke the protection of this statute, yet it is one who is himself
a
bona fide purchaser, and not one whose "purchase was
simply for the purpose of acquiring title from the government for
the benefit of the foreigner." It seems to us that the testimony
plainly discloses a purely speculative transaction. Graves paid
nothing. His agreement was, as he says, to protect the company in
its title, or rather in its purchase money, and then he would make
what he could over and above that. He was not buying with the
purpose of owning the land, but was simply engaged in an effort to
secure to the original purchaser from the railroad company the
money which it had invested in its purchase, advancing, it is true,
in that effort, some money in the way of taxes, and devoting his
legal services to that end, and hoping to make a profitable
speculation out of the matter.
Another matter worthy of notice as tending to show a community
of interest with the fibre company is his testimony in respect to
the matter of possession. When asked, "Q. Are you in possession of
the same?" he replied, "A. Well, we are exercising possession; we
are keeping other people off of them. Not farming them, but yes, we
are in possession."
We do not think that defendant Graves has shown that he
Page 184 U. S. 61
was a purchaser in good faith. As to him, the decree cannot be
sustained.
The decree of the court of appeals will therefore be
affirmed in all respects except as to the lands standing in the
name of Jackson A. Graves. As to those lands, it will be reversed,
and the case remanded to the Circuit Court for the Southern
District of California, for further proceedings in conformity with
this opinion.