Under the Court of Private Land Claims Act, a party holding from
the
Spanish or Mexican government a title that was complete and
perfect at
the date of the treaty may apply for a confirmation of such
title upon
condition that, if any portion of such lands has been sold or
granted by
the United States to any other person, such title from the
United States
to such other person shall remain valid, and in such case, the
grantee
Page 184 U. S. 442
may obtain judgment against the United States for the value of
lands so granted.
Though the act requires that the petitioners shall set forth in
their original petition the names of such adverse patentees or
persons in possession if it be admitted that such adverse
possessors or claimants do hold under grants from the United States
and there is no dispute as to boundaries, they need not be made
parties, as they could not be affected by the decree.
So, while the act contemplates that notice shall be given such
adverse holders, and the claim for a money judgment incorporated in
the original petition, relief would not be refused solely upon that
ground if sufficient excuse were shown for the omission to make
these grantees parties.
But where the original petition for confirmation alleged that
there were no such adverse holders or claimants, and no effort
appears to have been made to ascertain the facts for more than
seven years after such petition was filed, although it appeared
such facts were easily ascertainable, it was held that some excuse
should be set forth for this long delay, and that a supplemental
petition for the value of the lands patented would not be
entertained.
This was a petition under the fourteenth section of the Court of
Private Land Claims Act for a money judgment against the United
States for lands within a Spanish land claim, which lands had been
patented by the United States to third parties before the Spanish
land grant had been acted upon or confirmed.
The original proceeding out of which the present claim for
indemnity grew was a suit begun February 28, 1893, by the present
appellees, who, with one exception, claimed to be the heirs at law
and legal representatives of Juan Jose Lobato, against the United
States, in the Court of Private Land Claims for the confirmation of
a grant alleged to have been made to Lobato August 24, 1740, of
which juridical possession was given, and the grant ratified and
confirmed by the proper authorities June 15, 1744. In their
petition, it was alleged that the same tract had been previously
granted to Cristobal de Torres, but that his grant had been revoked
in 1733 and the tract declared to be crown lands; that from the
date of the grant to Lobato in 1740 and for a period of 153 years
(down to the time of filing the petition), he and his legal
representatives had been in peaceable adverse possession of the
same, and that "there are no adverse holders, possessors, or
claimants of or to any portion
Page 184 U. S. 443
of said tract." The suit resulted in a decree in favor of the
claimants (appellees) confirming the grant and finding the title
complete and perfect in the claimants at the date of the cession by
the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. The decree fixed the boundaries of
the tract as shown in a map annexed to the petition. From this
decree no appeal was prosecuted, and becoming final, it was
executed by a survey approved by the court, and the land patented
to the grantees.
More than six years after the confirmation of the Lobato grant,
the petitioners filed the present petition, alleging that several
parcels of land, amounting to 2,056 acres in the aggregate, had
been disposed of, granted, and patented by the United States to
certain persons named in an exhibit to the petition; that the lands
so granted lay wholly within the boundaries of the Lobato grant as
confirmed and were among the most valuable parts of such grant. The
petition concluded with a prayer for judgment against the United
States for the value of the lands so patented.
The United States answered, admitting the confirmation of the
Lobato grant and averring that the plaintiffs neglected to make the
holders of the patented land parties defendant to the suit as
required by law, but that they proceeded to try their cause, obtain
a decree of confirmation, which had long since become final, and
that, by failure to make the patentees parties defendant and by
averring that there were no adverse claimants to any portion of the
tract,
"they thereby waived and disclaimed all right, if any they had,
to challenge any disposition theretofore made under the laws of the
United States to any portion of said grant."
The petitioners filed a general demurrer to this answer,
accompanied by an affidavit to the effect that the plaintiffs,
until the survey of said grant, did not and could not know or
certainly allege and affirm that the lands granted and disposed of
by the United States, as set forth in their petition, were within
the exterior limits of their grant, and consequently no allegation
with relation thereto was made in their original petition, and that
such knowledge only came to the petitioners within the last two
years.
Page 184 U. S. 444
The demurrer to the answer was sustained, the case submitted
upon an agreed statement of facts, and a judgment rendered against
the United States for $2,320.91, for 1,856.73 acres at $1.25 per
acre, in accordance with the prayer of the petition, Justices Sluss
and Murray dissenting.
MR. JUSTICE BROWN delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case raises the question whether, after a land grant has
been confirmed by the Court of Private Land Claims, that court may,
after an unexplained delay of over six years, entertain a
supplemental petition for the value of certain parcels disposed of
and patented by the United States to third parties before the
filing of the original petition.
The following sections of the Court of Private Land Claims Act,
26 Stat. 854, Act of March 3, 1891, c. 539, are pertinent in this
connection:
"SEC. 6. That it shall and may be lawful for any person . . .
claiming lands within the limits of the territory derived by the
United States from the Republic of Mexico . . . by virtue of any
such Spanish or Mexican grant . . . which . . . have not been
confirmed by act of Congress, . . .
and which are not already
complete and perfect, in every such case to present a
petition, in writing, to the said court,"
etc.
"The petition shall set forth fully the nature of their claims
to the lands, . . .
the name or names of any person or persons
in possession of or claiming the same, or any part thereof,
otherwise than by the lease or permission of the petitioner, . . .
and a copy of such petition, with a citation to any adverse
possessor or claimant, shall, immediately after the filing of the
same, be served on such possessor or claimant in the ordinary legal
manner of serving such process in the proper state or
territory,"
etc.
Page 184 U. S. 445
"SEC. 8. That any person or corporation claiming lands in any of
the states or territories mentioned in this act under a title
derived from the Spanish or Mexican government
that was
complete and perfect at the date when the United States
acquired sovereignty therein shall have the right (but shall not be
bound) to apply to said court in the manner in this act provided
for other cases for a confirmation of such title."
"
* * * *"
"If in any such case a title so claimed to be perfect shall be
established and confirmed, such confirmation shall be for
so
much land only as such perfect title shall be found to cover,
always excepting any part of such land that shall have been
disposed of by the United States,"
etc.
"SEC. 14. That if in any case it shall appear that the lands or
any part thereof decreed to any claimant under the provisions of
this act shall have been sold or granted by the United States to
any other person,
such title from the United States to such
other person shall remain valid, notwithstanding such decree,
and upon proof being made to the satisfaction of said court of such
sale or grant, and the value of the lands so sold or granted, such
court shall render judgment in favor of such claimant against the
United States for the reasonable value of said lands so sold or
granted, exclusive of betterments, not exceeding one dollar and
twenty-five cents per acre for such lands, and such judgment, when
found, shall be a charge on the Treasury of the United States."
Under these sections, the holder of a complete and perfect title
may resort to either of two remedies: he may bring suit in the
local courts upon his title against anyone in possession of the
land covered by the grant, or any portion of it,
United
States v. Pillerin, 13 How. 9;
Ainsa v. New
Mexico & Arizona Railroad, 175 U.
S. 75,
175 U. S. 90, or
he may file his petition in the Court of Private Land Claims under
section 8, subject to the condition that the
"confirmation shall be for so much land only as such perfect
title shall be found to cover, always excepting any part of such
land that shall have been disposed of by the United States."
In such case, however, while he affirms the title of the
patentee of the United States, he may, under section 14, if
"it
Page 184 U. S. 446
shall appear that the lands or any part thereof decreed to any
claimant . . . shall have been sold or granted by the United States
to any other person,"
recover a money judgment against the United States "for the
reasonable value of said lands so sold or granted."
As the petitioners in this case elected the latter remedy, they
are entitled to a recourse against the United States to recover the
value of the land patented unless they have in some way estopped
themselves to make the claim at this time. The argument of the
government in this connection is that, under section 6, the
petitioners were bound to set forth in their original petition
"the name or names of any person or persons in possession of or
claiming the same, or any part thereof, otherwise than by the lease
or permission of the petitioners,"
and that
"a copy of such petition, with citation to any adverse possessor
or claimant, shall, immediately after the filing of the same, be
served upon such possessor or claimant in the ordinary legal
manner,"
etc., whose duty it shall be to enter an appearance and plead,
answer, or demur to said petition, in default of which the court is
at liberty to proceed to hear the case upon the petition and proofs
presented. Apparently, however, the only object of requiring notice
to be given the adverse possessors or claimants is to compel them
to show the location and boundaries of their claims and that they
are not mere squatters or trespassers, but hold the land under a
grant from the United States, in which case, under section 14, such
title from the United States to such other person "shall remain
valid notwithstanding such decree." If, however, it appear, as it
does in this case, that the petitioners admit that the adverse
possessors or claimants do hold under grants from the United
States, and there are no disputed boundaries, there would appear to
be no substantial reason for making them parties, inasmuch as they
could not be affected by the decree. The only consequence of an
omission to serve on them a copy of the petition is an
acknowledgment of their title and of its boundaries.
The government could doubtless exonerate itself from payment by
showing that it had never granted or disposed of the
Page 184 U. S. 447
lands; but no attempt of that kind was made, and the proof that
the lands were entered under the homestead laws and subsequently
patented comes from the land office at Santa Fe, as well as by the
express stipulation of the parties. It is true that, in
United States v.
Moore, 12 How. 209,
53 U. S. 223,
it was said with regard to a similar act that persons holding under
patents from the United States
"should be compelled to produce their title, so that if a decree
was made for complainant, the court could ascertain what part of
the land should be granted to him by patent, and as this could only
be done by a specific ascertainment of interfering claims, the
decree must of necessity specify their boundaries and
quantities."
But where, as in this case, the quantities and boundaries of the
lands patented or otherwise disposed of are expressly stipulated
between the United States and the claimants of the land grant, and
the rights of the entrymen cannot be affected by the decree, we see
no occasion for making them parties.
The second objection is that the language of section 14, "that,
if
in any case it shall appear that the lands or any part
thereof . . . shall have been sold or granted," limits the recovery
of the value of such lands to cases wherein it appears in the
original petition for confirmation that such lands have been
granted, and that the original petition in this case having gone to
a decree affirming the survey, the court lost control of the grant,
and in addition thereto that the petitioners had, by the lapse of
six years, waived and abandoned their claim, and are guilty of
inexcusable laches. The original petition for confirmation was
filed February 28, 1893, the decree of confirmation pronounced
December 4, 1893, and the decree approving the survey October 19,
1895. The present petition for the value of the lands granted was
filed April 23, 1900, over seven years after the original petition
was filed and over four years from the time of the decree approving
the survey. While section 14 evidently contemplates that the names
of the adverse holders shall be set forth in the original petition,
that notice shall be given them and that the claim for a money
judgment for the lands granted them shall be incorporated therein,
we should not refuse relief solely upon that ground, if
sufficient
Page 184 U. S. 448
excuse were shown for the omission to make these grantees
parties, since it might well be that, if the grant were a large one
and its boundaries indefinite or unsettled, entries might
inadvertently be made within the exterior limits of such grant and
patents issued therefor in good faith and without the knowledge of
the original grantee. In such event the right to reimbursement
ought not to be denied if due diligence to ascertain the facts were
exercised at the time the petition for confirmation was filed.
But we are unwilling to admit that a claimant may wait an
unlimited time and then, upon a simple allegation that certain
lands within the grant had been disposed of, may recover their
value. We think the claimant is bound to act with promptness, and
if a long delay has occurred, to explain it by proper averments.
The original petition for confirmation in this case not only
suggested no adverse claimants, but alleged positively that "there
are no adverse holders, possessors, or claimants of or to any
portion of said tract," when a simple reference to the records of
the land office at Santa Fe would have shown the facts stated in
Exhibit A annexed to the petition in this case, that fifteen
homesteads a had been entered upon this tract before the original
petition was filed, in all but five of which patents had already
issued. Not the slightest effort appears to have been made to
ascertain these facts, and it was not until more than seven years
thereafter that the petition in this case was filed. The petition
sets forth that several parcels of land aggregating, 2,056 acres,
within the Lobato grant, were disposed of by the United States to
other parties, but there is no allegation explaining why these
grantees were not made parties to the original petition, or why the
long delay occurred in making the claim for a money judgment.
The answer of the United States sets up the failure of the
petitioners to make the patentees parties to the original petition
and alleges that they thereby waived and disclaimed all right to a
money judgment. Upon the same day this answer was filed, April 26,
1900, a demurrer thereto was filed, together with a deposition or
affidavit setting up the fact that, "prior and up to the survey of
said grant, under the decree of confirmation,"
Page 184 U. S. 449
neither the original claimants nor their solicitor
"knew or could know or certainly allege and affirm that the
lands granted and disposed of by the United States as set forth and
shown in the above said petition were within the exterior limits of
the said Lobato grant,"
and that the facts were not ascertained "until within the past
two years." How this affidavit came upon the record is not shown.
No order was made permitting it to be filed. No reference to it or
to the allegations it contains was made in the stipulation or
agreed statement of facts upon which the case was tried, nor in the
finding of facts incorporated in the decree of the court. For aught
that appears, it was thrust upon the files without authority. But
even if the affidavit were treated as a proper part of the record,
it fails to show the slightest diligence to ascertain the real
facts, although a map annexed to the original petition exhibited
the claimed boundaries of the tract, and a reference to the records
of the land office would have shown the description of each parcel
entered as a homestead. Indeed, it virtually confesses a neglect to
file the petition for two years after the facts came to the
knowledge of the petitioners.
The case then comes to this: whether, upon a petition for value
filed seven years after the original petition for confirmation, a
decree against the United States can be entered upon a simple
allegation that certain parcels had been conveyed and patented by
the United States without showing some excuse for the delay in
presenting the petition, or some diligence in ascertaining the real
facts. Under the Court of Claims Act, petitions must be presented
to that court within six years from the time the cause of action
accrues, Act of March 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 505, c. 359, and while
there is no limitation of the time for petitions of this character
to be filed in the Court of Private Land Claims, we have held that
a similar act required that cases should be heard and disposed of
upon equitable principles, and that we were "bound to give due
weight to lapse of time."
United States v.
Moore, 12 How. 209,
53 U. S. 222;
Indiana v. Kentucky, 136 U. S. 479,
136 U. S.
509-510. We think there has been such unexplained delay
in this case as to justify the court in holding that petitioners
had abandoned their claim for a pecuniary judgment.
Page 184 U. S. 450
The decree of the Court of Private Land Claims is therefore
reversed, and the case remanded to that court for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN and MR. JUSTICE GRAY did not sit in this
case.
