A state may adopt new remedies for the collection of taxes, and
apply those remedies to taxes already delinquent, without any
violation of the federal Constitution.
That in the new remedy in the case at bar, as well as in the
change from the old to the new, there was no violation of the
Constitution of the State of Texas, is settled for this Court by
the decisions of the highest court of that state.
Whether the title on this case which passed by the sale was
conditioned or absolute, the state may waive the rights obtained by
such sale and prescribe the terms upon which it will waive
them.
A delinquent taxpayer who fails to discharge his obligation to
the state, compelling it to go into court to enforce payment of the
taxes due on his land, has no ground of complaint because he is
charged with the ordinary fees and expenses of a law suit.
The Fourteenth Amendment contains no prohibition of
retrospective legislation as such, and therefore, now, as before,
the mere fact that a statute is retroactive in its operation does
not make it repugnant to the federal Constitution.
On August 6, 1898, the State of Texas filed a petition in the
district court of San Augustine County, Texas, averring that the
defendant was justly indebted to the State of Texas and the County
of San Augustine in the sum of $1,305.87, on account of taxes,
interest, penalties, and costs due on certain described lands for
the years 1884, 1885, 1886, 1887, 1888, 1889, 1890, 1891, 1892,
1894, 1895, and 1896. The prayer was for a recovery of the taxes,
interest, etc., and for a decree establishing and enforcing a lien
upon the several tracts for the amounts found due upon each. An
answer was filed and a trial had, which resulted, on September 9,
1889, in a finding that there was due the state the amount claimed
for taxes, etc., a decree that the state recover the amount thereof
from the defendant, and adjudging a lien upon the several tracts
therefor, and directing a foreclosure and sale. On appeal to the
court of civil appeals,
Page 184 U. S. 157
the decree was modified by striking out the taxes of 1884 all
penalties and the personal judgment against the defendant, leaving
the decree to stand as a finding of the amount due for taxes
subsequent to the year 1884, interest and costs, and a foreclosure
of a lien therefor upon the several tracts. This modification
reduced the amount of the recovery to $1,232.77, with interest at
six percent from September 9, 1899, the date of the decree in the
district court. On error to the supreme court of the state, the
decree of the court of civil appeals was affirmed, 93 Tex. 553,
whereupon this writ of error was sued out.
MR. JUSTICE BREWER delivered the opinion of the Court.
In 1897 the Legislature of Texas passed an act for the
collection by judicial proceedings of delinquent taxes upon real
estate. Texas, General Laws 1897, c. 103, p. 132. The contention of
the defendant, now plaintiff in error, is that, prior thereto, the
collection of taxes was enforced by an administrative sale made by
the collector of taxes after January 1 of the succeeding year; that
the state's lien for taxes was merged in the estate passed or
vested by that sale; that the status of the rights of the state or
other purchaser was fixed by the sale, and must depend upon the
legality of the title acquired under the collector's deeds, and
that any right of a purchaser at such sale, whether state or
private individual, to revive or continue any lien for taxes must
depend upon some statute existing at the time of the sale, and that
hence this act of the legislature providing for the collection of
delinquent taxes by judicial proceedings was a violation of the
constitutional guaranty of due process insofar as it avoided the
legal effect of the prior administrative sale and directed a
further and judicial sale with the rights attending thereon.
Page 184 U. S. 158
There is no pretense that the taxes levied for these several
years were invalid, or that the proceedings up to and including the
collector's sale were irregular. On the contrary, the delinquent
tax record in evidence, duly certified and filed, which by section
3 of the act is made
prima facie evidence of the
regularity of all prior proceedings, and also that the amount of
the tax against any real estate is a true and correct charge,
showed taxes due as found by the court. It does not appear that the
lands were assessed to the defendant, or that he was the owner of
them at the time of the early assessments. Indeed, he alleges in
his answer that he acquired title about the year 1889, but does not
allege that this title was from the state. Apparently he had
purchased from some individual who claimed title. His argument
assumes that the taxes had not been paid, and that the lands had
been sold by the collector to the state. The case therefore
presented is one of a party, admitting that valid taxes have been
duly levied on his property and have not been paid, who is
contesting the manner in which the state shall collect them and
insisting that the only method which it can adopt for such
collection is one which has hitherto proved ineffectual.
That a state may adopt new remedies for the collection of taxes,
and apply those remedies to taxes already delinquent without any
violation of the federal Constitution is not a matter of doubt. A
delinquent taxpayer has no vested right in an existing mode of
collecting taxes. There is no contract between him and the state
that the latter will not vary the mode of collection. Indeed,
generally speaking, a party has no vested right in a mere matter of
remedy; that is subject to legislative change. And a new remedy may
be resorted to unless in some of its special provisions a
constitutional right of the debtor or obligor is infringed.
"There is no vested right in a mode of procedure. Each
succeeding legislature may establish a different one, providing
only that in each are preserved the essential elements of
protection."
Backus v. Fort Street Union Depot Co., 169 U.
S. 557,
169 U. S. 570.
That in the new remedy in the case at bar, as well as in the change
from the old to the new, there was no violation of the Constitution
of the State of Texas is for
Page 184 U. S. 159
us settled by the decisions of its highest court.
West River Bridge Co. v.
Dix, 6 How. 507;
Bucher v. Cheshire Railroad
Co., 125 U. S. 555;
Adams Express Co. v. Ohio, 165 U.
S. 194;
Long Island Water Supply Co. v.
Brooklyn, 166 U. S. 685.
Defendant further contends that interest, expenses, and costs
are included in the new remedy by judicial proceedings which were
not provided for by the prior statutes in reference to collector's
sales. The court of civil appeals and the supreme court of the
state dealt with this question in these ways. The latter, in its
opinion, quoted the following averment from the sworn answer of the
defendant:
"And for answer in this behalf, defendant denies all and
singular the allegations of plaintiff's petition, and further
answering, defendant shows that he purchased the lands described in
plaintiff's petition and exhibits about the year 1889; that said
lands have been sold by the collector of taxes of San Augustine
County for 1884 taxes and for the taxes of subsequent years, and
they have in every instance been bid in by the collector of taxes
for the State of Texas in obedience to the laws of the said
state."
Upon this it observed that it had granted the writ of error upon
a question of the validity of the charge for interest, and
added:
"However, upon the point on which the writ was granted, we will
say that the answer of the defendant sets up the sale of the lands
for taxes and the purchase of them by the state, insisting that the
state is bound by its purchase. No attack is made upon the sale,
nor upon any of the proceedings leading up to it, and it stands
before the court, under the defendant's allegations, as a valid
sale by which the title passed to the state. The state, having
acquired the title, had the power to waive its right, and, in order
to perfect the claim beyond all dispute, to foreclose its lien on
the land as against the then claimant, and in doing so had the
authority to prescribe such terms as it deemed proper and just. The
claimant of the lands, being a party defendant, could have
disclaimed any interest in them, and might thus have escaped any
cost for proceedings had after such disclaimer. The defendant chose
not to pursue
Page 184 U. S. 160
this course, and he has no cause of complaint as the case stands
before this Court, because, by his own showing, he had no title to
be affected by it, and depended solely upon the grace of the state
for whatever he might get out of the land."
The court of appeals said:
"The lands were forfeited to the state by the sale for the taxes
of 1884, the forfeiture to become absolute in two years. The offer
of the state is to waive this forfeiture and restore the land to
the owner if he will only pay the taxes accruing since then and six
percent interest thereon, together with the costs which had been
incurred in making the sale, and in making up the delinquent lists,
and of the suit. The state has waived its right of forfeiture on
condition that the taxes, with interest and costs, shall be
enforced against the land. This it might do."
Whichever be the true view of the effect of the answer (and, of
course, so far as the two courts differ, we must accept the view
expressed by the highest court of the state as controlling), the
same result will follow. Whether the title which passed by the sale
was conditional or absolute, the state may waive the rights
obtained by such sale and prescribe the terms upon which it will
waive them. In the one view, it waives the right to a forfeiture,
in the other, the title acquired by the sale, and in either case
the state may fix the conditions of its waiver.
The costs referred to are simply the ordinary expenses which
attend proceedings of the character prescribed, to-wit,
compensation to the collector for preparing the delinquent list and
certifying it to the commissioners; to the county attorney for
conducting the suit; to the sheriff for selling the land, and to
the district clerk for making the court records. There is no
pretense that any separate charge is exorbitant or unreasonable.
And if the state is compelled to resort to such proceedings for the
collection of its taxes, it may provide reasonable compensation for
the officials charged with any duty in connection therewith, and
incorporate the charges therefor as costs in the case. Liability
for these costs and expenses can be avoided by payment of taxes,
and a delinquent taxpayer -- one who fails to discharge his
obligations to the state, compelling it to go into court to enforce
payment of the taxes due upon his land --
Page 184 U. S. 161
has no ground of complaint because he is charged with the
ordinary fees and expenses of a law suit.
While the matter of interest stands upon a little different
basis, yet, so far as the federal Constitution is concerned, there
is nothing to prevent its collection. The statute may be
retroactive, but a statute of a state is not brought into conflict
with the federal Constitution by the mere fact that it is
retroactive in its operation. In
Baltimore
& Susquehanna Railroad Co. v. Nesbit, 10 How.
395,
51 U. S. 401,
it was said:
"That there exists a general power in the state governments to
enact retrospective or retroactive laws is a point too well settled
to admit of question at this day. The only limit upon this power in
the states by the federal Constitution, and therefore the only
source of cognizance or control with respect to that power existing
in this Court, is the provision that these retrospective laws shall
not be such as are technically
ex post facto, or such as
impair the obligation of contracts. Thus, in the case of
Watson v. Mercer, 8 Pet.
110, the Court says:"
"It is clear that this Court has no right to pronounce an act of
the state legislature void, as contrary to the Constitution of the
United States, from the mere fact that it divests antecedent vested
rights or property. The Constitution of the United States does not
prohibit the states from passing retrospective laws generally, but
only
ex post facto laws. Now it has been solemnly settled
by this Court that the phrase
ex post facto is not
applicable to civil laws, but to penal and criminal laws."
For this position is cited the case of
Calder v.
Bull, 3 Dall. 386, already mentioned; of
Fletcher v.
Peck, 6 Cranch 138;
Ogden
v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 266, and
Satterlee
v. Matthewson, 2 Pet. 380.
This decision, it is true, was before the Fourteenth Amendment,
and the restrictions placed by that amendment upon state action
apply to retrospective, as well as prospective, legislation. But it
contains no prohibition of retrospective legislation as such, and
therefore now, as before, the mere fact that a statute is
retroactive in its operation does not make it repugnant to the
federal Constitution.
As the state may, in the first instance, enact that taxes shall
bear interest from the time they become due, so, without
conflicting
Page 184 U. S. 162
with any provision of the federal Constitution, it may in like
manner provide that taxes which have already become delinquent
shall bear interest from the time the delinquency commenced. This
is adding no novel or extraordinary penalty, for interest is the
ordinary incident to the nonpayment of obligations.
We see nothing else in the record calling for notice, and,
finding no error, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Texas is
Affirmed.