The Supreme Court of the Michigan, having decided that the
amount of taxes in a case like the present which may be assessed
upon a district or upon any given parcel of land therein cannot
exceed the benefits, on a hearing given him, the property owner
could have shown
Page 184 U. S. 116
that there was a violation of that rule, if it had been
violated, and such
violation would have relieved his land from the tax; but he was
not entitled to a notice of every step in the proceedings.
This is a bill in equity brought by plaintiff in error in the
Circuit Court for Wayne County, Michigan, to restrain the sale of
his lands for an assessment levied by the City of Detroit for city
improvements on the ground that the law under which the assessment
was imposed is repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States and that the assessment therefore
puts a cloud upon plaintiff's title. A demurrer was filed to the
bill by defendants, which was sustained, and the bill dismissed.
That action was affirmed by the supreme court of the state. 123
Mich. 547. A writ of error was then allowed by the chief justice of
the state, and the case brought here.
The bill alleged that plaintiff was the owner of certain lots
(describing them) which were a part of the subdivision of the
"Voigt Park Farm," a plat of which had been made and recorded by
plaintiff. Upon the plat was designated a street called "Second
Avenue," and to extend that street proceedings were instituted
which resulted in a verdict opening the same as a public necessity.
Damages were awarded for the property taken to the amount of
$73,732.68.
The verdict was confirmed by the court, and the judgment of
confirmation was transmitted to the common council of the city, and
was referred to the committee on street openings. The committee
reported, recommending that $49,155.12 of the award be assessed on
a local assessment district and the balance be paid by the city. A
resolution was then adopted by the common council fixing and
determining the assessment district, and including therein the
property of plaintiff. The resolution recited
"that it is hereby determined that the sum of $49,155.12 is a
just proportion of the compensation awarded by the jury for the
property taken for said improvement which should be paid by the
owners"
of the property included in said assessment district, and it was
further resolved that said amount be assessed and levied upon the
several parcels of said property by the board of assessors of the
city. It was also alleged that
Page 184 U. S. 117
plaintiff in error
"had no notice of the intention of said common council to impose
and have assessed upon a local assessment district a part of the
damages awarded by the jury in said condemnation proceedings, and
no notice to appear before said council or any committee thereof in
relation to the matter of determining the limits of such district
and the amount to be assessed thereon, and that he was given no
opportunity to appear and be heard before said common council or
any committee thereof with reference thereto."
An assessment roll was subsequently prepared, "being street
assessment roll No. 111," and confirmed by the common council. By
the assessment roll, the sums assessed against the property of
plaintiff aggregated the sum of $9,957. The roll was placed in the
hands of the defendant, Thomas M. Lucking, receiver of taxes of the
city, for collection, and plaintiff notified of the assessment
against his property, and payment of the amount assessed was
demanded. And it is alleged that the receiver will, unless
restrained, advertise and sell plaintiff's property for the amount
assessed thereon.
The condemnation proceedings were instituted and conducted under
the provisions of section 3406 of the Compiled Laws of the State of
Michigan, and it is alleged those provisions violate the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States in that they
deprive plaintiff of his property without due process of law, for
the following reasons:
"1. Because said law does not provide for giving to the property
owners interested any notice of the proceedings of the common
council for the determination of the limits of the local assessment
district, and the amount or proportion of the award of the jury to
be assessed thereon, and does not provide for the giving to the
property owners interested notice of any hearing by such common
council as to the amount of land to be included in such assessment
district and as to the amount or proportion of such award to be
assessed thereon."
"2. Because said law does not fix the basis upon which or the
standard by which the common council are to determine what is the
just proportion of the compensation awarded by the jury to be
assessed upon the assessment district. "
Page 184 U. S. 118
"3. Because the said law does not require that the amount of the
award of the jury which the common council may order to be assessed
upon such assessment district shall not exceed the total amount of
the benefits derived by the lands in said district from the
improvement to pay the expense of which such award was made."
"
* * * *"
"That the proceedings of said common council, hereinbefore set
forth, in determining said assessment district and the amount to be
assessed upon it are invalid for the reasons aforesaid and for the
further reason that it does not appear by the resolution fixing
said district and determining the amount to be assessed thereon
upon what basis or standard or by what method the council
determined the proportion of the award to be assessed upon said
district, or that the amount to be assessed did not exceed the
total amount of benefits derived by the property to be assessed
from the improvement."
MR. JUSTICE McKENNA, after stating the case, delivered the
opinion of the Court.
The proceedings in the case were had under the provisions of an
act of the State of Michigan entitled "An Act to Authorize Cities
and Villages to Take Private Property for the Use or Benefit of the
Public, and to Repeal Act No. 26, Public Acts of 1882." This act is
reproduced in the Compiled Laws of Michigan of 1897 as sections
3392-3415.
The particular provisions attacked are contained in section 3406
(section 15 of the original act), and are as follows:
"When the verdict of the jury shall have been finally confirmed
by the court, and the time in which to take an appeal has expired,
or, if an appeal is taken, on the filing in the court below
Page 184 U. S. 119
of a certified copy of the order of the supreme court affirming
the judgment of confirmation, it shall be the duty of the clerk of
the court to transmit to the common council, board of trustees, or
board of supervisors, a certified copy of the verdict of the jury,
and of the judgment of confirmation, and of the judgment, if any,
of affirmance, and thereupon, the proper and necessary proceedings,
in due course, shall be taken for the collection of the sum or sums
awarded by the jury. If the common council, or board of trustees,
or board of supervisors believe that a portion of the city,
village, or county in the vicinity of the proposed improvement will
be benefited by such improvement, they may, by an entry in their
minutes, determine that the whole or any just proportion of the
compensation awarded by the jury shall be assessed upon the owners
or occupants of real estate deemed to be thus benefited, and
thereupon they shall, by resolution, fix and determine the district
or portion of the city [or] village or county benefited, and
specify the amount to be assessed upon the owners or occupants of
the taxable real estate therein. The amount of the benefit thus
ascertained shall be assessed upon the owners or occupants of such
taxable real estate, in proportion, as nearly as may [be], to the
advantage which such lot, parcel, or subdivision is deemed to
acquire by the improvement. The assessment shall be made and the
amount levied and collected in the same manner and by the same
officers and proceeding, as near as may be, as is provided in the
charter of the municipality for assessing, levying, and collecting
the expense of a public improvement when a street is graded. The
assessment roll containing said assessments, when ratified and
confirmed by the common council, board of trustees, or board of
supervisors, shall be final and conclusive, and
prima
facie evidence of the regularity and legality of all
proceedings prior thereto, and the assessment therein contained
shall be and continue a lien on the premises on which the same is
made until payment thereof. Whatever amount or portion of such
awarded compensation shall not be raised in the manner herein
provided shall be assessed, levied, and collected upon the taxable
real estate of the municipality the same as other general taxes are
assessed and collected in such city, village,
Page 184 U. S. 120
or county. At any sale which takes place of the assessed
premises, or any portion thereof, delinquent for nonpayment of the
amount assessed and levied thereon, the city [or] village or county
may become a purchaser at the sale."
Plaintiff in error makes two objections to the law:
"First. That it does not afford to the property owner notice and
opportunity of hearing upon the questions of what lands, if any,
are specially benefited by the improvement, and therefore to be
included in the assessment district, and what is the amount of the
special benefit, and therefore the maximum amount to be paid by the
district."
"Second. That it does not require the amount imposed upon the
district to be limited to the amount of special benefit."
The common council proceeded as required by the ordinance. They
determined that a portion of the city was benefited by the
improvement, created a district of the property benefited,
determined also that $49,155.12 was a just proportion of the
compensation awarded by the jury to be assessed upon the property
owners of the district created, and directed the board of assessors
to make the assessment. The assessment roll was subsequently made
out and was ratified and confirmed by the council. The assessment
against the property of plaintiff in error was nearly $10,000.
Passing on the ordinance, the supreme court said:
"No provision is made for a notice to property owners of a time
and place of hearing upon either the question of fixing a taxing
district or the question of the amount of the award to be spread
thereon."
But the court observed that such notices were not necessary to
vindicate the statute from the charge of being unconstitutional,
because
"the statute provides for a hearing in relation to the
proportion each piece of property shall bear to the whole cost of
the improvement, and the proper notice of this hearing was
given."
And further:
"When the proceeding has reached that stage where it becomes
necessary to decide what proportion of the cost of the proposed
improvement shall be assessed to any given description of land,
there must be an opportunity given to the owner of the land to be
heard upon that question. "
Page 184 U. S. 121
"There is no claim in the bill that complaint's property is not
benefited by the proposed improvement, in excess of the amount
assessed; nor is there any claim that he was not allowed to be
heard in relation to the amount which should be assessed against
his property, thus avoiding the difficulties found in the cases
cited by the counsel for complainant. We do not think it can be
said that complainant's property is taken without due process of
law. This statute has been construed in
Beecher v.
Detroit, 92 Mich. 268, and
Smith v. Detroit, 120
Mich. 572, and the action taken by the common council thereunder
upheld."
It was urged by plaintiff in error in the supreme court of the
state, as it is now urged here, that --
"The act is bad because it does not fix any rule or standard by
which the council are to determine the just proportion of the award
of the jury to be assessed upon the district, nor limit the total
assessment of the district to the amount of its benefits."
"The constitutional limit of the amount to be imposed upon the
district is the total benefit to the district. The law might
therefore permit the council, when, in their judgment, a portion of
the city in the vicinity of the improvement is benefited thereby,
to determine the amount of such benefit and to require a just
proportion of the compensation awarded by the jury, not exceeding
the total benefit, to be assessed upon such local district. This
act contains no such limitation. The council are empowered, when
they believe that a local district is benefited, to assess what in
their judgment is a just proportion of the whole award upon the
district, without requiring that proportion to be limited by the
amount of benefit."
To the contention the supreme court of the state replied:
"We do not think this is a fair construction of the language of
the statute. Before the council can create the district at all,
they must believe that a portion of the city in the vicinity of the
proposed improvement will be benefited by such improvement, and
then provide for an apportionment of the compensation awarded by
the jury upon the property deemed to be benefited."
"The amount of the benefit thus ascertained shall be assessed
upon the owners or occupants of such taxable real estate
Page 184 U. S. 122
in proportion, as nearly as may [be], to the advantage which
such lot, parcel, or subdivision is deemed to acquire by the
improvement."
"We think this language makes it clear that the amount of tax
which may be assessed upon the district or upon any given parcel of
land cannot exceed the benefit. Provision is then made for the
assessment, levy, and collection of the tax."
The law, then, as we understand the decision of the supreme
court of the state, provides for the formation of a district in the
vicinity of the proposed improvement, the limits of the district to
be determined by the benefits derived from that improvement, and
further provides that the common council shall determine what
proportion of the cost of the improvement ("compensation awarded by
the jury") shall be assessed upon the owners of the real estate
benefited. The language of the statute is:
"The amount of the benefit thus ascertained shall be assessed
upon the owners or occupants of such taxable real estate, in
proportion, as nearly as may [be], to the advantage which such lot,
parcel, or subdivision is deemed to acquire by the
improvement."
It would be difficult to find any provision fairer than this in
purpose and which so essentially satisfies every requirement of due
process of law. And such purpose cannot be defeated if a hearing to
the property owner can prevent defeat. He is given a thoroughly
efficient opportunity to be heard to test the legality of the
charge upon him. And it is only with the charge upon him that he is
concerned, and of that alone can he complain. In the legality of
that charge is necessarily involved the legality of all which
precedes it and of which it is the consequence. The supreme court
of the state decided, as we have seen, "that the amount of the
taxes which may be assessed upon the district or upon any given
parcel of land cannot exceed the benefits." On the hearing given,
therefore, the property owner can show a violation of the rule, if
a violation there be, and the showing will take his land out of the
district and relieve it from the tax.
The contentions of plaintiff in error seem to be based on the
assumption that a property owner must have notice of every step of
the proceedings. Such assumption is untenable.
Weyerhaueser
Page 184 U. S. 123
v. Minnesota, 176 U. S. 550, and
cases cited;
King v. Portland, ante, 184 U. S. 61.
Judgment affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN did not hear the argument and took no part in
the decision.
