The trustees of The Sun Association are to be charged with
knowledge of the extent of the power usually exerted by its
managing editor, and must be held to have acquiesced in the
possession by him of such authority, even though they had not
expressly delegated it to him, and he is held to have been vested
with such power.
An authority to charter a yacht for the purpose of collecting
news was clearly within the corporate powers of the
association.
It is impossible to assume in this case that the relation of The
Sun Association to the hiring of the yacht was simply that of a
security for Lord as a hirer of the yacht on his personal account,
and the two papers in evidence are in legal effect but one
contract, and must be interpreted together.
As the trustees of The Sun Association must be presumed to have
exercised a supervision over the business of the corporation, they
are to be charged
Page 183 U. S. 643
with knowledge of the extent of the power usually exercised by
its managing editor.
The fixing of the value of the vessel in the contract can have
but one meaning -- that the value agreed on was to be paid in case
of default in returning.
The decision of the court below that the sum due in consequence
of a default in the return of the ship was not to be diminished by
the amount of the hire which had been paid at the inception of the
contract was correct.
The naming of a stipulated sum to be paid for the nonperformance
of a covenant, is conclusive upon the parties in the absence of
fraud or mutual mistake.
Parties may, in a case where the damages are of an uncertain
nature, estimate and agree upon the measure of damages which may be
sustained from the breach of an agreement.
The law does not limit an owner of property from affixing his
own estimate of its value upon a sale thereof.
As the stipulation for value in this case was binding upon the
parties, the court rightly refused to consider evidence tending to
show that the admitted value was excessive.
The yacht
Kanapaha, the property of the respondent
Moore, was let on April 1, 1898, for the term of two months, by a
charter party in which Chester S. Lord was recited to be the hirer,
but which was signed by him as follows: "Chester S. Lord, for The
Sun Printing & Publishing Association." At the time, Mr. Lord
was, and for many years prior thereto had been, the managing editor
of the Sun newspaper, and had special charge of the collection of
news for the Sun Printing & Publishing Association, the
publisher of the newspaper aforesaid. We shall hereafter speak of
this corporation as the Sun Association, and of the newspaper as
the Sun.
In the body of the charter party. the hirer agreed to furnish
security, and contemporaneously with the execution of the contract,
a paper was signed which is described in the body thereof as the
"understanding or agreement of suretyship" required by the charter
party. This paper recited on its face that it was made by "the Sun
Printing & Publishing Association," and it also was signed by
Lord exactly as he had signed the charter party. Before the time
fixed in the charter party had expired -- that is to say, about the
middle of May, 1898 -- a second charter party and a second
agreement of suretyship were executed.
Page 183 U. S. 644
These agreements were substantially identical with the previous
ones, except they provided for a new term to begin at the
expiration of the previous one and to continue for four months
thereafter, that is, up to October 1, 1898.
On the execution of the first papers, the yacht was delivered to
the Sun Association, was by it immediately manned, equipped, and
provisioned, and one or more of its reporters were placed on board
with authority to direct the movements of the vessel, and she was
sent to Cuban waters, to be used as a dispatch boat for the purpose
of gathering news concerning the events connected with the
hostilities between the United States and Spain.
Early in September, 1898, the yacht was wrecked, and became a
total loss. For a breach of an alleged covenant to return the
vessel, asserted to be contained in the charter party, this libel
in personam was filed against the Sun Association, and the
damages were averred to be the value of the vessel, which it was
alleged was fixed by the charter party at the sum of $75,000. The
district court held that the writings were contracts of the Sun
Association through Lord, its authorized agent, and were virtually
one agreement; that by them, that corporation was responsible for
the nonreturn of the ship, whether or not the vessel had been lost
by the fault of its agents or employees, and that there was a
liability to pay the value of the vessel as fixed by the charter.
Construing the two writings as a whole, this value, it was held,
was subject to be diminished by the extent of the charter hire,
paid when the charter party was executed. A judgment was entered
for the sum of $65,000, with interests and costs. 95 F. 485. On
appeal, the circuit court of appeals coincided with the district
court, except it disapproved the conclusion that the value of the
vessel should be reduced by the sum of the charter hire. The decree
of the district court was reversed, and the cause remanded with
instructions to enter a decree for $75,000, with interest and
costs. 101 F. 591. The case was then brought here by
certiorari.
Page 183 U. S. 645
MR. JUSTICE WHITE, after making the foregoing statement,
delivered the opinion of the Court.
All the issues involved are to be determined by ascertaining the
nature of the writings, the obligations which arose from their
execution, and the conduct of the parties in connection therewith.
It is essential, then, to bear in mind the exact form of the
writings and their text. They are annexed in the margin. [
Footnote 1]
Page 183 U. S. 646
It would seem to be necessary on the threshold to ascertain
whether there was both a principal contract and an accessory
contract of suretyship. The two writings are both signed by
Page 183 U. S. 647
Lord in exactly the same character. Judging by the signatures
alone, it is impossible to conceive of two contracts, the one
principal and the other accessory thereto, as, in the nature of
things, if the first evidenced the obligations of the one who hired
and the second manifested the agreement of the same person to
fulfill his own duty resulting from the hiring, there could be no
accessory contract of suretyship, since both documents but
expressed pressed the covenants of the same person relating to one
and the same transaction. There is, however, this difference
between the two papers. In the body of the first, "Chester S. Lord"
is recited to be the hirer, while in the body of the second paper,
it is recited that it is made by the Sun Printing & Publishing
Association.
The first question to be determined is, assuming for the present
that Lord had authority to bind the Sun Association, was the first
document the individual contract of Lord or that of the Sun
Association?
The rule of law to be applied in the determination of this
question is thus expressed in
Whitney v. Wyman, (1879)
101 U. S. 392,
101 U. S.
395:
"Where the question of agency in making a contract arises, there
is a broad line of distinction between instruments under seal and
stipulations in writing not under seal, or by parol. In the former
case, the contract must be in the name of the principal, must be
under seal, and must purport to be his deed, and not the deed of
the agent covenanting for him.
Stanton v. Camp, 4 Barb.
274. "
Page 183 U. S. 648
"In the latter cases the question is always one of intent, and
the court, being untrammeled by any other consideration, is bound
to give it effect. As the meaning of the lawmaker is the law, so
the meaning of the contracting parties is the agreement. Words are
merely the symbols they employ to manifest their purpose that it
may be carried into execution. If the contract be unsealed and the
meaning clear, it matters not how it is phrased nor how it is
signed, whether by the agent for the principal or with the name of
the principal by the agent, or otherwise."
"The intent developed is alone material, and when that is
ascertained it is conclusive. Where the principal is disclosed, and
the agent is known to be acting as such, the latter cannot be made
personally liable unless he agreed to be so."
Now while Lord is referred to in the body of the first writing
as an individual, he signed the agreement "for the Sun Printing
& Publishing Association." Clearly this was a disclosure of the
principal, and an apt manner of expressing an intent to bind such
principal.
Bradstreet v. Baker, 14 R.I. 546, 549;
Tucker Manufacturing Company v. Fairbanks, 98 Mass.
105.
It results that the first paper or charter party manifested the
intent to bind the Sun Association as hirer, if Lord possessed the
authority which he assumed to exercise, and consequently that the
two papers are in legal effect but one contract, must be
interpreted together, and the obligations of the parties arising
from them be enforced according to their plain import, seeking
always to give effect to the intention of the parties.
It is not denied that Lord was, in some respects, the agent of
the corporation, but it is asserted that he had not the power or
authority to make a contract of the character here involved. The
charter of the Sun Association provided for no other officers to
manage its concerns but a board of trustees. In the bylaws,
provision was made for the election of a president and secretary,
whose duties were not prescribed, except as to the signing of
certificates of stock and the transferring of stock on the books of
the company. An examining committee, as also an executive
committee, were provided for in article VII
Page 183 U. S. 649
of the bylaws, as amended June 27, 1893, a copy of which is
excerpted in the margin. [
Footnote
2] The provisions relating to such committees, however, were
omitted in the bylaws as amended June 28, 1898.
At the time of the hiring of the
Kanapaha, Mr. Paul
Dana was the president of the Sun Association, he having been
elected to that office on October 26, 1897. Long prior to the
last-mentioned date, however, from about 1879, Lord had been the
managing editor of the Sun. As such, the evidence establishes, he
exercised an unlimited discretionary authority in the collection of
news for the Sun, making all pecuniary and other arrangements in
respect thereto. Prior to the hiring of the
Kanapaha, he
had, solely on his own volition, hired vessels for the use of the
Sun for periods of a week at a time. By whom he was vested with
this authority does not appear with certainty, but in the absence
of direct evidence, we are authorized to presume that the authority
was conferred, either directly or indirectly, by the trustees of
the association, in whom was lodged the power to manage the
concerns of the company.
Bank of United States v.
Dandridge, (1827) 12 Wheat. 64. In the
Dandridge case, speaking through Mr. Justice Story, the
Court said (p.
25 U. S. 69):
"By the general rules of evidence, presumptions are continually
made in cases of private persons of acts even of the most solemn
nature, when those acts are the natural result or necessary
accompaniment of other circumstances."
After illustrating the application of the principle to cases of
public duty and many others, it was said (p.
25 U. S. 70):
Page 183 U. S. 650
"The same presumptions are, we think, applicable to
corporations. Persons acting publicly as officers of the
corporation are to be presumed rightfully in office; acts done by
the corporation, which presuppose the existence of other acts to
make them legally operative, are presumptive proofs of the latter.
Grants and proceedings beneficial to the corporation are presumed
to be accepted, and slight acts on their part, which can be
reasonably accounted for only upon the supposition of such
acceptance, are admitted as presumptions of the fact. If officers
of the corporation openly exercise a power which presupposes a
delegated authority for the purpose, and other corporate acts show
that the corporation must have contemplated the legal existence of
such authority, the acts of such officers will be deemed rightful,
and the delegated authority will be presumed. If a person acts
notoriously as cashier of a bank, and is recognized by the
directors, or by the corporation, as an existing officer, a regular
appointment will be presumed, and his acts as cashier will bind the
corporation, although no written proof is or can be adduced of his
appointment. In short, we think that the acts of artificial persons
afford the same presumptions as the acts of natural persons. Each
affords presumptions, from acts done, of what must have preceded
them, as matters of right or matters of duty."
See also Jacksonville &c. Railroad Company v.
Hooper, (1896)
160 U. S. 514,
160 U. S. 519,
and cases cited.
As said in
Mining Co. v. Anglo-California Bank,
104 U. S. 192,
speaking through MR. JUSTICE HARLAN:
"An agency may be established by proof of the course of business
between the parties themselves, by the usages and practice which
the company may have permitted to grow up in its business, and by
the knowledge which the board, charged with the duty of controlling
and conducting the transactions and property of the corporation,
had, or must be presumed to have had, of the acts and doings of its
subordinates in and about the affairs of the corporation."
As, therefore, the trustees of the Sun Association must be
presumed to have exercised a supervision over the business of the
corporation, they are to be charged with knowledge of the
Page 183 U. S. 651
extent of the power usually exerted by its managing editor, and
must be held to have acquiesced in the possession by him of such
authority, even though they had not expressly delegated it to
him.
It being, then, within the scope of the general authority
possessed by Lord to hire the yacht, the contention that in its
exercise he must be assumed to have been without right to incur an
absolute liability for the return of the vessel or become
responsible for the value thereof, and to stipulate as to such
value, is without merit. As Lord was charged with the full control
of the business of collecting news, and impliedly vested with power
to enter into contracts in respect thereto, he was in effect a
general officer of the corporation as to such matters, and it is
well settled that the president or other general officer of a
corporation has power
prima facie to do any act which the
directors or trustees of the corporation could authorize or ratify.
Oaks v. Cattaraugus Water Company, 143 N.Y. 430, 436, and
cases cited. The burden was on the Sun Association to establish
that Lord did not possess the authority he assumed to exercise in
executing the contracts.
Patterson v. Robinson, 116 N.Y.
193, 200, and cases cited. As the trustees of the Sun Association
were unrestrained by the charter, and might have authorized Lord to
execute the writings in question, and the association failed to
rebut the
prima facie presumption, he must be held to have
been vested with such power.
The argument that, if it be granted that the writings embodied
an absolute obligation to return and a stipulation as to value in
the event of nonreturn, such conditions were so extraordinary that
it must be assumed that authority had not been conferred to agree
to them, is equally unfounded. The proposition must rest on the
assumption that to charter a yacht upon the conditions referred to
was
ultra vires of the corporation, which, as we have
seen, is not correct. Certainly an authority to charter a yacht for
the purpose of collecting news was clearly within the corporate
powers of the Sun Association; the mere signing of a charter party
in execution of such a contract was not illegal, nor can it, we
think, with any plausibility be said where, in a case like this,
the vessel chartered was to be manned, equipped,
Page 183 U. S. 652
and operated by the hirer, to be taken far from her home port,
in time of threatened or actual war, on a presumably hazardous
venture, that the agreement to absolutely return, or, in default,
to pay a fixed value, was so beyond the means incidental to the
exercise of the power to charter as to cause the act to be beyond
the corporate power. For if the corporation could have done these
things, the agent having the broad powers possessed by Lord had a
similar right.
But the case in this regard does not depend upon legal
presumptions arising from the general course of business in other
matters, for the following reasons: the evidence clearly justifies
the inference that the president and secretary and the other
trustees of the Sun Association knew that Lord had exercised the
authority to hire the vessel in question, that the possession of
the vessel was pursuant to a contract, and that some obligation had
been entered into for its safe return. Mr. Hitchcock was one of the
four trustees and the secretary of the Sun Association. It was his
duty to affix the seal of the corporation to instruments directed
by the trustees to be executed in a formal manner. He was requested
by Lord to execute the writings in question, but he declined to do
so. The reasons actuating him in refusing do not appear, but, as he
testified that he had nothing to do with the collection of news, it
may well be that he felt he could not execute formal documents in a
matter not within his department. He does not, however, appear to
have regarded the signing of such documents by Lord as improper;
for he subsequently, in conjunction with the business manager, who
was also a trustee of the Sun Association, signed a check on behalf
of the corporation for a $10,000 payment, as recited on the books
of the association, for "charter
Kanapaha to October
1."
President Dana testified that he was not consulted in regard to
the drawing of the papers, and did not, in April or May, 1898, know
of their execution. He, however, was aware in those months that
dispatch boats were being used by the Sun to obtain news in regard
to the progress of events in Cuban waters, such information having
been acquired from several sources, including Mr. Lord. President
Dana testified that Lord had
Page 183 U. S. 653
charge of the getting of information as to the progress of
events in Cuban waters and in connection with the war; that he had
talked with him about the matter early in April, 1898, and had
inquired if his arrangements were satisfactory. He further
testified that, if the arrangements made were satisfactory to Lord,
they were to the witness, and that that was understood in the Sun
office, and by the other trustees. Lord attempted no concealment of
his actions in respect to the hiring of the
Kanapaha. The
payments for the hire of the boat, the expenses connected with its
management, sundry premiums paid out of the moneys of the Sun
Association for insurance upon the yacht, in the sum of nearly
$60,000, covering the first five months of the use of the vessel --
the later policies expiring only a few days before the loss of the
ship -- were entered in the books of the Sun. Besides, the
association received, under arrangements made by its business
manager and trustee, Laffan, money from various newspapers for
accommodations furnished to their reporters on board the
Kanapaha. All these matters must be presumed to have been
brought to the notice of the board, whose duty it was to manage the
concerns of the association. The deductions fairly to be drawn from
them are susceptible only of the construction that full discretion
in the premises had been vested in the managing editor. The
strongest possible confirmation of this arises from the fact that
Lord, who under oath acknowledged when executing the alleged
agreement of suretyship that he possessed the authority to do so,
and who was at the time of the trial below in the service of the
defendant, and able to be produced in court, was not called to the
witness stand.
The contract, then, being that of the Sun Association, made by
its agent duly empowered to that end, and inuring to its benefit,
we are not concerned with the questions of ratification discussed
at bar, and we are thus brought to consider the obligations which
the contract imposed, and, before passing from the subject just
considered, it is to be observed that the facts to which we have
referred, if there by ambiguity in the writings, confirm the
conclusion that the two writings embodied but one contract made by
the agent of the Sun in its behalf and for its benefit. This is
manifest because the taking charge
Page 183 U. S. 654
of the ship by the employees of the association, the payment of
all the expenses of the vessel, the payment of the rent, the
charging of the amount thereof in the books of the association, the
use of the vessel for the purposes of the association, the receipt
of revenues derived from such use, and the other facts previously
stated, when considered together, cause it to be impossible in
reason to assume that the relation of the Sun Association to the
hiring was simply that of a security for Lord as a hirer of the
yacht on his personal account.
It is elementary that, generally speaking, the hirer in a simple
contract of bailment is not responsible for the failure to return
the thing hired when it is has been lost or destroyed without his
fault. Such is the universal principle. This rule was tersely
stated by Mr. Justice Bradley in
Clark v. United States,
95 U. S. 539, where
it was said (p.
95 U. S.
542):
"A bailee for hire is only responsible for ordinary diligence
and liable for ordinary negligence in the care of the property
bailed. This is not only the common law, but the general law on the
subject.
See Jones, Bailm. p. 88; Story, Bailm. secs. 398,
399; Domat, Lois Civiles, lib. 1, title 4, sec. 3, pars. 3, 4; 1
Bell, Com. 7th ed. pp. 481, 483."
But it is equally true that, where by a contract of bailment the
hirer has, either expressly or by fair implication, assumed the
absolute obligation to return, even although the thing hired has
been lost or destroyed without his fault, the contract embracing
such liability is controlling, and must be enforced according to
its terms. In
Sturm v. Boker, (1893)
150 U.
S. 312, both the elementary principles above stated were
clearly expressed by the court, through Mr. Justice Jackson. It was
said (p.
150 U. S.
330):
"The complainant's common law responsibility as bailee exempted
him from liability for loss of the consigned goods arising from
inevitable accident. A bailee may, however, enlarge his legal
responsibility by contract, express or fairly implied, and render
himself liable for the loss or destruction of the goods committed
to his care-the bailment or compensation to be received therefor
being a sufficient consideration for such an undertaking. "
Page 183 U. S. 655
This statement of the binding effect of contracts upon those who
enter into them was, in substance, but a reiteration of the
principle clearly announced in
Dermott v.
Jones, (1865) 2 Wall. 1, where it was said:
"It is a well settled rule of law that, if a party by his
contract charge himself with an obligation possible to be
performed, he must make it good unless its performance is rendered
impossible by the act of God, the law, or the other party.
Unforeseen difficulties, however great, will not excuse him."
Among the cases approvingly referred to in
Dermott v.
Jones were
Bullock v. Dommitt, 6 T.R. 650, and
Brecknock Co. v. Pritchard, 6 T.R. 750, holding that an
agreement to keep the property in repair created a binding
obligation to rebuild and restore the property, even though its
destruction had been caused by inevitable accident.
It is to be observed in passing that the principle sustained by
these last-mentioned authorities is supported by many
adjudications.
Young v. Leary, 135 N.Y. 578, and cases
cited.
We approach, then, the contract for the purpose of determining
whether, by express agreement or by fair implication, it put the
positive duty on the hirer to surrender the vessel at the
expiration of the charter and to be responsible for the value, even
although impossibility of return was brought about without his
fault. The obligation was expressly imposed upon the hirer to
keep
"said yacht in repair, and to pay all its running expenses, and
to surrender said yacht with all its gear, furniture, and tackle at
the expiration of this contract, to the owner or his agent . . . in
as good condition as at the start, fair wear and tear from
reasonable and proper use only excepted."
Not only this, but the charter party contained the further
provision that the hirer "shall be liable and responsible for any
and all loss and damage to hull, machinery, equipment, tackle,
spars, furniture, or the like." This provision is immediately
followed by a reiteration of the duty to repair, previously stated,
by again stipulating
"that the hirer, during the continuance of this agreement, shall
at all times and at his own cost and expense, keep the said yacht,
its hull, machinery, tackle, spars, furniture, gears, boats, and
the like, in repair. "
Page 183 U. S. 656
Pausing for a moment to consider the foregoing stipulations, it
is difficult to conceive how language could more aptly express the
absolute obligation not only to repair and keep in good order to
the end of the hiring and to return, but, moreover, to be
responsible for any and all loss and damage to the vessel, her
fixtures and appointments. These stipulations seem to us to leave
no doubt of the absolute liability to return; in other words, of
the putting of the risk of damage or loss of the vessel upon the
hirer. But if there could be doubt after considering the provisions
just above referred to, such doubt is dispelled when it is
considered that the contract proceeds to say that,
"for the purpose of this charter, the value of the yacht shall
be considered and taken at the sum of $75,000. And the said hirer
shall procure security or guarantee to and for the owner"
in the sum stated,
"to secure any and all loss and damage which may occur to said
boat or its belongings, which may be sustained by the owner by
reason of such loss or damage, and by reason of the breach of any
of the terms or conditions of this contract."
In other words, having provided for all repairs, having
stipulated absolutely for the return of the vessel in full repair,
having put the risk of any and all loss on the hirer, the contract
then in express terms fixes the value of the vessel, and makes
provision for security to protect against any and all loss or
damage sustained by a failure of the hirer to fulfill each and all
of the positive obligations which the contract imposed.
Concluding as we do that, by the charter party, the absolute
obligation to return was placed on the hirer, and that, by that
contract, the risk was hence cast upon him of loss, even be it
without his fault, we are led to determine the amount which the
owner of the yacht is entitled to recover.
Before passing to this question, however, we remark that we have
not entered into any extended review of the case of
Young v.
Leary, 135 N.Y. 569, and the conflict of view asserted in
argument to exist between the ruling in that case and that made in
Steele v. Buck, 61 Ill. 343;
Drake v. White, 117
Mass. 10, and
Harvey v. Murray, 136 Mass. 377. We have not
done so because, as we have seen in
Page 183 U. S. 657
the opinion in
Young v. Leary, the absolute duty to
repair and keep in repair was conceded to import an obligation to
restore the property, even if the impossibility of doing so was
brought about without the fault of the bailee. Whatever differences
there may be, if any, in the opinions in the cases referred to,
arises not because they expound a discordant view of the law of
bailment, but from different applications made of that law to the
contract which was under consideration in the particular case. But
not only the legal principles announced in the cases referred to,
but also the application made of such principles in each and all of
the cases, render it necessary to construe a contract like the one
we have before us as meaning that which we find it to mean.
Recurring to the amount of liability, it appears that there are
two inquiries involved in deciding it; the first was the obligation
imposed by the first writing to pay the agreed value of the vessel
in the event of her nonreturn, and second, if yes, did any
modification thereof arise from the second writing? The answer to
the first inquiry is afforded by what we have already said in
discussing the nature of the obligations assumed by the hirer. As
they were to return the vessel in any event, and in default to make
good any and all loss arising from a failure to return, the fixing
of the value of the vessel can have but one meaning -- that is,
that the value agreed on was to be paid in case of default in
returning. Unless the agreement as to the value meant this, it had
no import whatever, and its presence in the contract is
inexplicable. That the obligation to return or pay the agreed value
was not modified by the second writing we think is clear.
In that writing it is provided that the Sun Association bound
itself that the hirer would faithfully fulfill and perform all the
obligations expressed in the previous writing. Certainly, because
of the contract that all the previous agreements are to be
fulfilled, it cannot be that some of them were destroyed. But
proceeding to make its significance, if possible, clearer, the
second writing adds that the intention of the parties to it is to
hold the Sun Association "primarily liable" for the obligations
Page 183 U. S. 658
created by the prior writing. To stipulate primary liability for
prior obligations cannot be so construed as to destroy them.
True, the provisions just referred to are followed by the
stipulation that "all our liability hereunto shall in no case
exceed the sum of $75,000." This cannot mean that the obligations
expressly assumed were destroyed, but that, in case they were not
fulfilled, the damage brought about by each and every breach should
not exceed $75,000. The contrary cannot be said without holding
that a provision which was manifestly intended to add sanction to
the obligations in effect abrogated them. And the import of the
clause under consideration is demonstrated by the provision in the
first writing by which it was agreed that the second paper should
be signed. The provision is,
"The said hirer shall procure security or guarantee, in and for
the Sun, in the sum of $75,000, to secure any and all loss and
damage which may occur to said boat or its belongings, which may be
sustained by the owner, by reason of such loss or damage, and by
reason of the breach of any of the terms or conditions of the
contract."
The second writing unquestionably stipulated a penalty for the
performance of each and all the obligations, but fixing a penalty
in case of a default did not extinguish them. The meaning of the
provision becomes quite clear when all the provisions are taken
into view in their proper connection. They all naturally divide
themselves into two classes, the one relating to the payment of the
hire, the payment of the expenses of the operation of the vessel,
the making of repairs, etc. -- from which we may eliminate the
hire, as it was to be paid on the execution of the contract -- and
the other to the duty to return, or pay in default the value agreed
on. We say they naturally so divide themselves because in no
reasonable probability could a default in both cases simultaneously
exist. Thus, if the vessel was not returned, and the owner got the
value as fixed in the contract, he could suffer no loss for any
default of the hirer in failing to pay for repair, etc., or for a
breach of the covenant to pay the running expenses of the vessel,
as no personal liability therefor could attach to him. And in the
event of a return of the vessel, lessened in value by the failure
to repair
Page 183 U. S. 659
or burdened with charges because of default in paying running
expenses, no loss could come to the owner if he was indemnified up
to the extent of $75,000, the value of the vessel, which, it will
be seen, was, hence, in any probable event, the maximum sum of
liability which the parties supposed might result from a breach of
the covenants contained in the charter party.
The contract arising from the two writings having this import,
the court below correctly decided that the sum due as a consequence
of a default in the return of the ship was not to be diminished by
the amount of the hire which had been paid at the inception of the
contract. To have otherwise ruled would have destroyed in part the
express agreement that the failure to return should be compensated
by the payment of the agreed value. Such would have been its
inevitable result, as it would have reduced the sum due for the
default in not returning the ship, by crediting the hirer with the
amount of the hire he had paid without default on an independent
and distinct liability.
The foregoing considerations are adequate to dispose of the case
if it be that the rights of the parties are to be administered
according to the contract into which they voluntarily entered. In
substance, however, it is pressed with much earnestness, and sought
to be supported by copious reference to authority, that the intent
of the contracting parties should not be given effect to, because
it is our duty to disregard the contract and substitute our will or
our conception of what the parties should have done for that which
they did plainly do. This contention thus arises.
Upon the trial, the Sun Association introduced some evidence
tending to show that the value of the yacht was a less sum than
$75,000, and it claimed that the recovery should be limited to such
actual damage as might be shown by the proof. The trial judge,
however, refused to hear further evidence offered on this subject,
and, in deciding the case, disregarded it altogether. The rulings
in this particular were made the subject of exception, and error
was assigned in relation thereto in the circuit court of appeals.
That court held that the value fixed in the contract was
controlling, especially in view of the fact that a yacht had no
market value.
The complaint that error in this regard was committed is
Page 183 U. S. 660
thus stated in argument:
"The naming of a stipulated sum to be paid for the
nonperformance of a covenant is not conclusive upon the parties
merely in the absence of fraud or mutual mistake; that, if the
amount is disproportioned to the loss, the court has the right and
the duty to disregard the particular expressions of the parties and
to consider the amount named merely as a penalty, even though it is
specifically said to be liquidated damages."
Now it is to be conceded that the proposition thus contended for
finds some support in expressions contained in some of the opinions
in the cases cited to sustain it. Indeed the contention but
embodies the conception of the doctrine of penalties and liquidated
damages expressed in the reasoning of the opinions in
Chicago
House-Wrecking Co. v. United States, (1901) 106 F. 385, 389,
and
Gay Manufacturing Co. v. Camp, (1895) 65 F. 794, 68 F.
67,
viz., that "where actual damages can be assessed from
testimony," the court must disregard any stipulation fixing the
amount, and require proof of the damage sustained. We think the
asserted doctrine is wrong in principle, was unknown to the common
law, does not prevail in the courts of England at the present time,
and it is not sanctioned by the decisions of this Court. And we
shall, as briefly as we can consistently with clearness, proceed to
so demonstrate.
At common law, prior to the statute of 8 & 9 Wm. III, c. 11,
in actions "upon a bond or on any penal sum, for nonperformance of
any covenants or agreements contained in any indenture, deed, or
writing," judgment, when entered for the plaintiff, was for the
amount of the penalty as of course.
Watts v. Camors,
115 U. S. 360;
Story, Eq.Jur. sec 1311. Equity, however, was accustomed to relieve
in cases of penalties annexed to bonds and other instruments, the
design of which was to secure the due fulfillment of a principal
obligation. Story, Eq.Jur. sec. 1313. The effect of the passage of
the statute was to restrict suitors in actions for penalties to a
collection of the actual damages sustained. As a result, also,
courts of law were thereafter frequently under the necessity of
determining whether or not an agreed sum stipulated in a bond
Page 183 U. S. 661
or other writing to be paid, in the event of a breach of some
condition, was in reality a penalty or liquidated damages.
Of course, courts of common law, merely by reason of the statute
of 8 & 9 Wm. III referred to, did not acquire the power to give
relief in cases of contract where a court of equity would not have
exercised a similar power. Now courts of equity do not grant relief
in cases of liquidated damages -- that is, cases
"when the parties have agreed that, in case one party shall do a
stipulated act, or omit to do it, the other party shall receive a
certain sum as the just, appropriate, and conventional amount of
the damages sustained by such act of omission."
Story, Eq.Jur. sec. 1318. And as long ago as 1768, Lord
Mansfield, in
Lowe v. Peers, 4 Burr. 2225, said -- italics
in original (p. 2228):
"Courts of equity . . . will
relieve against a penalty,
upon a
compensation, but where the covenant is to pay a
particular
liquidated sum, a court of equity
can
not make a
new covenant for a man; nor is
there any
room for
compensation or
relief."
Commenting upon the judgment of Lord Eldon in one of the leading
cases on the subject of liquidated damages (
Astley v.
Weldon, 2 Bos. & Pul. 346, 350), Jessel, Master of the
Rolls, in
Wallis v. Smith, L.R. 21 Ch.D. 256, said (p.
260):
"He perfectly well knew that whatever had been the doctrine of
equity at one time, it was not then the doctrine of equity to give
relief on the ground that agreements were oppressive, where the
parties were of full age and at arm's length. It is very likely,
and I believe it is true historically, that the doctrine of equity
did arise from a general notion that these acts were oppressive. At
all events, long before his time, it had been well settled in
equity that equity did relieve from forfeiture for nonpayment of
money, and I think I may say, in modern times, from nothing
else."
The doctrine of equity, as respects the withholding of or
granting relief against a contract because of inadequacy of
consideration, illustrates the conservative disposition of equity
not to interfere unnecessarily declines to grant relief because of
inadequacy of price or any other inequality in the bargain; the
bargain must be so unconscionable
Page 183 U. S. 662
as to warrant the presumption of fraud, imposition, or undue
influence. Story, Eq.Jur. secs. 244, 245.
While the courts of the United States, in actions at law,
undoubtedly possess the power conferred upon the courts of common
law by the statute of 8 and 9 Wm. III, and while recognition of
such power was embodied in the Judiciary Act of 1789, reproduced in
section 961 of the Revised Statutes, the duty of such courts to
give effect to the plainly expressed will of contracting parties is
as imperatively necessary now as it was at common law after the
adoption of the English statute, as will be made manifest by a
reference to some of the adjudications of this Court.
The decisions of this Court on the doctrine of liquidated
damages and penalties lend no support to the contention that
parties may not
bona fide, in a case where the damages are
of an uncertain nature, estimate and agree upon the measure of
damages which may be sustained from the breach of an agreement. On
the contrary, this Court has consistently maintained the principle
that the intention of the parties is to be arrived at by a proper
construction of the agreement made between them, and that whether a
particular stipulation to pay a sum of money is to be treated as a
penalty or as an agreed ascertainment of damages is to be
determined by the contract, fairly construed, it being the duty of
the court always, where the damages are uncertain and have been
liquidated by an agreement, to enforce the contract. Thus, Chief
Justice Marshall, in
Tayloe v.
Sandiford, 7 Wheat. 13, although deciding that the
particular contract under consideration provided for the payment of
a penalty, clearly manifested that this result was reached by an
interpretation of the contract itself. He said (p.
20 U. S. 17):
"In general, a sum of money in gross, to be paid for the
nonperformance of an agreement, is considered as a penalty, the
legal operation of which is to cover the damages which the party in
whose favor the stipulation is made may have sustained from the
breach of contract by the opposite party. It will not, of course,
be considered as liquidated damages, and it will be incumbent on
the party who claims them as such to show that they were so
considered by the contracting parties. Much
Page 183 U. S. 663
stronger is the inference in favor of its being a penalty, when
it is expressly reserved as one. The parties themselves denominate
it a penalty, and it would require very strong evidence to
authorize the court to say that their own words do not express
their own intention. These writings appear to have been drawn on
great deliberation, and no slight conjecture would justify the
court in saying that the parties were mistaken in the import of the
terms they have employed."
And, after having thus established that, on the face of the
contract it stipulated a penalty and not liquidated damages, the
opinion proceeded to refute the construction relied on to sustain
the contrary view that the contract manifested the intention to
assess liquidated damages. In connection therewith the Chief
Justice observed (p.
20 U. S. 18):
"The plaintiff in error relies on the case of
Fletcher v.
Dyche, reported in 2 T.R. 32, in which an agreement was
entered into to do certain work within a certain time, and if the
work should not be done within the time specified, 'to forfeit and
pay the sum of �10 for every week' until it should be
completed."
"But the words 'to forfeit and pay' are not so strongly
indicative of a stipulation in the nature of a penalty as the word
'penalty' itself, and the agreement to pay the specified sum weekly
during the failure of the party to perform the work partakes much
more of the character of liquidated damages than the reservation of
a sum in gross."
In
Van Buren v.
Digges, 11 How. 461, also construing a building
contract, it was said (p.
52 U. S.
477):
"The clause of the contract providing for the forfeiture of ten
percentum on the amount of the contract price upon failure to
complete the work by a given day cannot properly be regarded as an
agreement or settlement of liquidated damages. The term
'forfeiture' imports a penalty; it has no necessary or natural
connection with the measure or degree of injury which may result
from a breach of contract, or from an imperfect performance. It
implies an absolute infliction, regardless of the nature and extent
of the causes by which it is superinduced.
Unless therefore it
shall have been expressly adopted and declared by the parties to be
a measure of injury or compensation, it is
Page 183 U. S. 664
never taken as such by courts of justice, who leave it to be
enforced where this can be done in its real character, viz., that
of a penalty."
[Italics not in original.]
See also Quinn v. United States, 99 U. S.
30;
Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.
S. 436,
108 U. S. 454;
Watts v. Camors, 115 U. S. 353,
115 U. S. 360;
Bignall v. Gould, 119 U. S. 495. The
last-cited case illustrates the character of disproportion apparent
on the face of a contract which has influenced a court when
endeavoring to ascertain the meaning of parties to a contract in a
stipulation for the payment of a designated sum for the breach of a
condition. There, the penal sum was $10,000, several breaches of
the conditions of the bond might be committed, to each of which the
stipulated sum would be applicable, and one such breach might be
the failure to obtain a release of a claim of but ten dollars.
The courts in England, as already intimated, consistently
maintain the right of individuals, when contracting with each
other, to estimate the value of property or otherwise determine the
quantum of damages for a breach of an agreement where the damage is
of an uncertain nature.
Irving v. Manning, (1847) 1
H.L.Cas. 287, 307, 308;
Ranger v. Great Western Ry. Co.,
(1854) 5 H.L.Cas. 72, 94, 104, 118;
Dimech v. Corlett,
(1858) 12 Moore's P.C. 199, 229;
Lord Elphinstone v. Monkland
Iron & Coal Co., (1886) 11 App.Cas. 332, 345, 346;
Price v. Green, (1847) 16 M. & W. 346, 354.
We content ourselves with a few brief excerpts from some of the
decisions just referred to. In
Ranger v. Great Western Railway
Co., in the course of his opinion Lord Cranworth said (p.
94):
"There is no doubt that, where the doing of any particular act
is secured by a penalty, a court of equity is in general anxious to
treat the penalty as being merely a mode of securing the due
performance of the act contracted to be done and not as a sum of
money really intended to be paid. On the other hand, it is
certainly open to parties who are entering into contracts to
stipulate that, on failure to perform what has been agreed to be
done, a fixed sum shall be paid by way of compensation."
In
Lord Elphinstone v. Monkland Iron & Coal Co.,
(1886) L.R. 11
Page 183 U. S. 665
App.Cas. 332 -- a Scotch appeal -- Lord Fitzgerald, in the
course of his opinion, said (p. 346):
"I am not aware that there is any enactment in force in Scotland
corresponding to our statute of 8 and 9 Wm. III c. 11, sec. 8; nor
does the Scotch law seem to have required such aid. We may take it,
then, that, by the law of Scotland the parties to any contract may
fix the damages to result from a breach at a sum estimated as
liquidated damages, or they may enforce the performance of the
stipulations of the agreement by a penalty."
"In the first instance the pursuer is, in case of a breach,
entitled to recover the estimated sum as pactional damages,
irrespective of the actual loss sustained. In the other the penalty
is to cover all the damages actually sustained, but it does not
estimate them, and the amount of loss (not, however, exceeding the
penalty) is to be ascertained in the ordinary way. In determining
the character of these stipulations, we endeavor to ascertain what
the parties must reasonably be presumed to have intended, having
regard to the subject matter, and certain rules have been laid down
as judicial aids."
In
Irving v. Manning, (1847) 1 H.L.Cas. 287, it was
recognized that a policy of assurance was a contract of indemnity,
but it was declared that in a valued policy the agreed value was
conclusive, and each party must be held to have conclusively
admitted that the sum fixed by agreement should be that which the
other was entitled to receive in case of a total loss. In that
case, the opinion of the judges was delivered by Mr. Justice
Patterson, and we excerpt from the opinion of that justice in
Price v. Green (1847) 16 M. & W. 346, on error from
the Court of Exchequer, as follows (p. 354):
"The �5,000 is expressly declared by the covenant to be 'as and
by way of liquidated damages, and not of penalty.' It is a sum
named in respect of the breach of this one covenant only, and the
intention of the parties is clear and unequivocal. The courts have
indeed held that, in some cases, the words 'liquidated damages' are
not to be taken according to their obvious meaning; but those cases
are all where the doing or omitting to do several things of various
degrees of importance is secured by the sum named, and,
notwithstanding the language
Page 183 U. S. 666
used, it is plain from the whole instrument that the real
intention was different."
In
Wallis v. Smith, (1882) 21 Ch.D. 256, the leading
cases in England on the subject of penalties and liquidated damages
were commented upon by the Court of Appeal. Jessel, Master of the
Rolls, classified the decisions and
dicta on the subject.
His summary will be found in the margin, [
Footnote 3] and measuring the contract in this case by
the rules which are embodied in the recapitulation, it follows that
the stipulated sum is embraced in the category of liquidated
damages.
Page 183 U. S. 667
In
Strickland v. Williams, (1899) 1 Q.B. 382, Lord
Justice A. L. Smith appears to have stated an additional class to
those mentioned by Jessel, M.R. He said (p. 384): "In my opinion,
it is the law that where payment is conditioned on one event, the
payment is in the nature of liquidated damages." This but seems to
reiterate the proposition of Justice Patterson in
Price v.
Green, previously cited. It was undoubtedly meant that the
"event" should not be the mere nonperformance of an
ordinary agreement for the payment of money.
See
also per Bramwell, B., in
Sparrow v. Paris, (1862) 7
Hurl. & N. 594, 599.
Now the stipulation here being considered obviously would be
within the last class, for it was a promise to pay a stipulated sum
on the breach of a covenant to return the yacht to its owner.
With the exception of the more recent decisions, the cases
generally on liquidated damages and penalties, as well as those
decided in England as in this country, are reviewed in 2
Evans-Pothier on Obligations, pp. 88 to 111, and in a note to
Graham v. Bickham, 1 Am.Dec. 331
et seq. A list
of some of the later decisions of the state courts is found in the
margin. [
Footnote 4]
The character of the stipulation under consideration renders it
unnecessary to review in detail the decisions of the state courts.
There is in them much contrariety of opinion on some phases of the
doctrine, but our attention has not been called to
Page 183 U. S. 668
any case which sustains the contention that a valuation clause
such as that we are considering, contained in a contract made under
circumstances like those which existed when this contract was
executed, must be disregarded despite the evident intention of the
parties to treat the sum named as estimated and ascertained damages
for a breach of the covenant to return the yacht. That the courts
of the State of New York do not lend any support to such a
contention -- which it was strenuously argued at bar they do -- we
will make evident.
The case of
Ward v. Hudson River Building Co., (1891)
125 N.Y. 230, is not an authority for the contention in question.
Equitable relief was sought in that case against the enforcement of
a stipulation, which the court, however, held to be liquidated
damages, and binding on the parties. True, the court did say, on
page 235, that
"where, however, a sum has been stipulated as a payment by the
defaulting party which is disproportioned to the presumable or
probable damage, or to readily ascertainable loss, the courts will
treat it as a penalty, and will relieve on the principle that the
precise sum was not of the essence of the agreement, but was in the
nature of a security for performance."
There is nothing, however, in this excerpt to countenance the
claim that, where it is clear from the terms of the contract that
the precise sum was of the essence of the agreement, and was the
agreed amount of estimated damages, no fraud or imposition having
been practiced, either a court of equity or of law might rightfully
decline to give effect to the stipulation. Nor does the quoted
statement support the further claim that a court of law, in an
action on a contract to recover a stipulated sum as damages, might
let in evidence to establish that a mere disproportion existed
between the agreed sum and the actual damage, for the purpose of
avoiding the stipulation. The meaning of the court is made clear by
the following statement, appearing on the same page with the above
excerpt:
"We may at most say that where they have stipulated for a
payment in liquidation of damages, which are in their nature
uncertain and unascertainable with exactness, and may be dependent
upon extrinsic considerations and circumstances, and the amount is
not,
on the face of the contract, out
Page 183 U. S. 669
of all proportion to the probable loss, it will be treated as
liquidated damages."
An inspection of the opinion in the
Ward case also
shows that the New York court approvingly referred to prior
decisions of the courts of that jurisdiction,
Dakin v.
Williams, 17 Wend. 447 and 22 Wend. 201, where it was
emphatically recognized that parties might embody in their contract
an agreed valuation of property or any other quantum of damages,
where the damage was uncertain in its nature. We quote in this
connection from the opinion as reported in 17 Wend., delivered by
Chief Justice Nelson, afterwards a member of this Court. It was
said (p. 454):
"The next question presented upon the above conclusion is
whether the sum of $3,000 is to be viewed as damages liquidated by
the contract of the parties, or only in the light of a
penalty. There are many cases in the English books in
which this question has been very fully examined and considered,
but it would be an unprofitable consumption of time to go over them
with a view or expectation of extracting any useful general
principle that could be applied to this case. The following are the
leading cases:
Astley v. Weldon, 2 Bos. & Pul. 346;
Barton v. Glover, Holt's N.P.R. 43, and note;
Reilly
v. Jones, 1 Bing. 302;
Davies v. Penton, 6 Barn.
& Cres. 216;
Crisdee v. Bolton, 3 Car. & Payne
240;
Randall v. Everest, 2 Car. & Payne 577;
Kemble v. Farren, 6 Bing. 141. In our court are the
following:
Dennis v. Cummins, 3 Johns.Cas. 297;
Slosson v. Beadle, 7 Johns. 72;
Spencer v.
Tilden, 5 Cow. 144, and note, p. 150;
Nobles v.
Bates, 7 Cow. 307;
Knapp v. Maltby, 13 Wend. 587.
From a critical examination of all these cases and others that
might be referred to, it will be found that the business of the
court in construing this clause of the agreement, as in respect to
every other part thereof, is to inquire after the meaning and
intent of the parties, and when that is clearly ascertained from
the terms and language used, it must be carried into effect. A
court of law possesses no dispensing powers; it cannot inquire
whether the parties have acted wisely or rashly in respect to any
stipulation they may have thought proper to introduce into their
agreements. If they are competent to contract within the prudential
rules the law has fixed as to parties, and there has been
Page 183 U. S. 670
no fraud, circumvention, or illegality in the case, the court is
bound to enforce the agreement. Men may enter into improvident
contracts where the advantage is knowingly and strikingly against
them; they may also expend their property upon idle or worthless
objects, or give it away if they please without an equivalent, in
spite of the powers or interference of the court, and it is
difficult to see why they may not fix for themselves by agreement
in advance, a measure of compensation, however extravagant it may
be, for a violation of their covenant (they surely may after it has
accrued), without the intervention of a court or jury. Can it be an
exception to their power to bind themselves by lawful contract? We
suppose not, and regarding the intent of the parties, it is not to
be doubted but that the sum of $3,000 was fixed upon by them
'mutually and expressly,' as they say, 'as the measure of damages
for the violation of the covenant, or any of its terms or
conditions.' If it be said that the measure is a hard one, it may
be replied that the defendants should not have stipulated for it,
or, having been thus indiscreet, they should have sought the only
exemption, which was still within their power -- namely, the
faithful fulfillment of their agreement."
Chancellor Walworth, in the opinion rendered in the same case by
the court for the correction of errors, embodied in his opinion the
following (22 Wend. 213):
"In
Hubard v. Grattan, Alcock & Nap.R. 389, in
which an action was brought to recover the stipulated damages which
the defendant had agreed to pay if he did not remove a lime kiln
adjacent to the plaintiff's premises, Bushe, C.J., says:"
"The stipulation consists of two parts, one affirmative that the
lime kiln should be prostrated before a particular day, the other
negative that the assignee shall not at any future time erect
another lime kiln, and upon those the breaches are assigned. Both
bear on one object -- to be relieved from the lime kiln altogether
-- and both are essential to that object's being accomplished, and
both parties agree in measuring beforehand the damages consequent
upon a breach of either agreement. Such stipulations as to damages
are upheld by courts of law upon two grounds: 1st., because a man
may set a value not
Page 183 U. S. 671
only upon matters connected with his property, which value is
capable of being estimated, but also upon matters of taste or
fancy, such as prospect or ornament, which he alone can appreciate,
and 2dly because, even in matters capable of ascertainment, great
difficulties might occur in some cases, and in all cases it is
prudent in both parties to provide against the trouble and expense
of a future investigation. The cases which seem to have interfered
with such compacts are those in which the subject matter of the
stipulation shows that, whatever the form of it may be, the parties
could not have contemplated anything more than a penalty to secure
against actual damage."
So, also, the case of
Bagley v. Peddie, (1857) 16 N.Y.
469, 471, makes clear the fact that the New York courts recognize
the right of parties to agree beforehand upon damages to be
sustained by the breach of a contract, and that evidence
aliunde the instrument declared on cannot be received
respecting the amount of damage. The last two of what were termed
"artificial rules" on the subject of liquidated damages and
penalties, recited in the opinion as being peculiar to contracts of
this character, were as follows:
"Sixth. If, independently of the stipulated damages, the damages
would be wholly uncertain and incapable of being ascertained except
by conjecture, in such case, the damages will be considered
liquidated, if they are so denominated in the instrument. Seventh.
If the language of the parties evince a clear and undoubted
intention to fix the sum mentioned as liquidated damages in case of
default of performance of some act agreed to be done, then the
court will enforce the contract, if legal in other respects."
Following a review of several decided cases in England, the
court said (p. 474):
"The above cases will serve to illustrate the kind of certainty
as to the sum to be paid as damages for breach of an agreement in
order to hold the larger sum agreed to be paid on such breach a
mere penalty. They are cases where the lesser sum is named
specifically in the instrument itself, or depends on the award of
arbitrators. These and similar cases are the cases of certain
damages to which the courts allude in the third rule. "
Page 183 U. S. 672
The court then quoted approvingly the prior decision of the
supreme court in
Dakin v. Williams, 17 Wend. 447, and
concluded as follows (p. 475):
"The case at bar seems to me to fall within the sixth rule, the
damages being wholly uncertain and depending entirely on proof
aliunde the instrument declared on."
And in connection with the New York cases, it becomes pertinent
to notice the case of
Gay Manufacturing Co. v. Camp,
(1895) 65 F. 794,
on rehearing, 68 F. 67, much relied upon
in argument. As we have previously observed, language is employed
in that opinion which, broadly interpreted, seems to countenance
the idea that, if a jury can ascertain the damages suffered by the
breach of a stipulation, an agreement by the parties, embodied in a
written contract fixing such damages will be treated as a nullity.
This deduction appears to have been drawn from certain rules of
construction respecting liquidated damages and penalties enunciated
by the trial judge in
Bagley v. Peddie, 5 Sandford 192,
194, the judgment in which case, it is proper to remark, was
reversed by the appellate court in 16 N.Y. 469, already referred
to. We do not think, however, the interpretation we have noticed as
having been put upon the rules in question was warranted; at least,
as we have shown, such a doctrine is altogether untenable. Nor do
the other authorities cited in the opinion in the
Gay case
lend support to the asserted doctrine. Those authorities were
Harris v. Miller, 11 F. 118, 121, and a note to
Spencer v. Tilden, (1825) 5 Cowen 144, 150.
Harris v.
Miller is referred to because of the statement by Judge Deady
that the courts, "instead of giving effect to the contract of the
parties according to their intentions, it assumes to control them
according to its standard of justice." The note to 5 Cowen need not
be commented upon in view of the reference we have made to later
decisions of the courts of New York.
It may, we think, fairly be stated that, when a claimed
disproportion has been asserted in actions at law, it has usually
been an excessive disproportion between the stipulated sum and the
possible damages resulting from a trivial breach
apparent on
the face of the contract, and the question of disproportion
has been
Page 183 U. S. 673
simply an element entering into the consideration of the
question of what was the intent of the parties, whether
bona
fide to fix the damages, or to stipulate the payment of an
arbitrary sum as a penalty, by way of security.
In the case at bar, aside from the agreement of the parties, the
damage which might be sustained by a breach of the covenant to
surrender the vessel was uncertain, and the unambiguous intent of
the parties was to ascertain and fix the amount of such damage. In
effect, however, the effort of the petitioner on the trial was to
nullify the stipulation in question by mere proof not that the
parties did not intend to fix the value of the yacht for all
purposes, but that it was improvident and unwise for its agent to
make such an agreement. Substantially, the petitioner claimed a
greater right than it would have had if it had made application to
a court of equity for relief, for it tendered in its answer no
issue concerning a disproportion between the agreed and actual
value, averred no fraud, surprise, or mistake, and stated no facts
claimed to warrant a reformation of the agreements. Its alleged
right to have eliminated from the agreement the clause in question,
for that is precisely the logical result of the contention, was
asserted for the first time at the trial by an offer of evidence on
the subject of damages.
The law does not limit an owner of property, in his dealings
with private individuals respecting such property, from affixing
his own estimate of its value upon a sale thereof, or, on being
solicited, to place the property at hazard by delivering it into
the custody of another for employment in a perilous adventure. If
the would-be buyer or lessee is of the opinion that the value
affixed to the property is exorbitant, he is at liberty to refuse
to enter into a contract for its acquisition. But if he does
contract, and has induced the owner to part with his property on
the faith of stipulations as to value, the purchaser or hirer, in
the absence of fraud, should not have the aid of a court of equity
or of law to reduce the agreed value to a sum which others may deem
is the actual value. And, as pertinent to these observations, we
quote from the opinion delivered by Wright, J., in
Clement v.
Cash, 21 N.Y. 253, where it was said (p. 257):
"When the parties to a contract, in which the damages to be
Page 183 U. S. 674
ascertained, growing out of a breach, are uncertain in amount,
mutually agree that a certain sum shall be the damages in case of a
failure to perform, and in language plainly expressive of such
agreement, I know of no sound principle or rule applicable to the
construction of contracts that will enable a court of law to say
that they intended something else. Where the sum fixed is greatly
disproportionate to the presumed actual damage, probably a court of
equity may relieve; but a court of law has no right to erroneously
construe the intention of the parties, when clearly expressed, in
the endeavor to make better contracts for them than they have made
for themselves. In these as in all other cases, the courts are
bound to ascertain and carry into effect the true intent of the
parties. I am not disposed to deny that a cause may arise in which
it is doubtful, from the language employed in the instrument,
whether the parties meant to agree upon the measure of compensation
to the injured party in case of a breach. In such cases, there
would be room for construction, but certainly none where the
meaning of the parties was evident and unmistakable. When they
declare in distinct and unequivocal terms that they have settled
and ascertained the damages to be $500.00, or any other sum, to be
paid by either failing to perform, it seems absurd for a court to
tell them that it has looked into the contract and reached the
conclusion that no such thing was intended, but that the intention
was to name the sum as a penalty to cover any damages that might be
proved to have been sustained by a breach of the agreement."
As the stipulation for value referred to was binding upon the
parties, the trial court rightly refused to consider evidence
tending to show that the admitted value was excessive, and the
circuit court of appeals properly gave effect to the expressed
intention of the parties.
The decree of the circuit court of appeals was right, and it is
therefore
Affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
"Memorandum of agreement made and entered into this 14th day of
May, 1898, by and between William L. Moore of the City of New York,
by Thomas Manning, his agent, party of the first part, hereinafter
called the owner, and Chester S. Lord of the City of New York,
party of the second part, hereinafter called the hirer,
witnesseth:"
"That the said William L. Moore, being the owner of the steam
yacht
Kanapaha, enrolled in the Atlantic Yacht Club,
agrees to let and hereby does let, and the hirer agrees to hire and
hereby does hire, the said yacht as she is now for the term of four
months from the first day of June, expiring on the first day of
October now next ensuing, for the sum of ten thousand dollars
($10,000.00), payable on the signing of this agreement."
"That the hirer will carry out the provisions of the charter
party made on the first day of April last, and will until the
expiration of this contract keep said yacht in repair, and will pay
all its running expenses, including, amongst other things,
uniforms, wages, provisions, pilotage, tonnage, lighthouse and port
dues, and any and all other dues and charges, and will surrender
said yacht with all its gear, furniture, and tackle at the
expiration of this contract, to the owner or his agent at Manning's
basin, foot 26th Street, South Brooklyn, New York, in as good
condition as at the start, fair wear and tear from reasonable and
proper use only excepted, and free and clear of any and all
indebtedness, liens, or charges of any kind or of any
description."
"That the hirer will use the said steam yacht as a yacht only,
and will under no circumstances use her to carry freight,
merchandise, or passengers for hire, nor do anything in
contravention of its status as a yacht, nor in the sailing or
navigating of the same do anything in contravention of the laws of
the United States or of any foreign country."
"That, for the purpose of this charter, the value of the yacht
shall be considered and taken at the sum of seventy-five thousand
dollars ($75,000.00), and the said hirer shall procure security or
guarantee to and for the owner in the sum of seventy-five thousand
dollars ($75,000.00), to secure any and all losses and damages
which may occur to said boat or its belongings, which may be
sustained by the owner by reason of such loss or damage and by
reason of the breach of any of the terms or conditions of this
contract."
"That in the event of the failure of the hirer to return and
surrender the said yacht to the owner as hereinbefore provided, the
hirer shall be charged demurrage and shall pay demurrage to the
owner at the rate of five hundred dollars ($500.00) per day for
each and every day's detention."
"The hirer shall be liable and responsible for any and all loss
and damage to hull, machinery, equipment, tackle, spars, furniture,
or the like."
"That the hirer, during the continuance of this agreement, shall
be at all times, and at his own cost and expense, keep the said
yacht, its hull, machinery, tackle, spars, furniture, gear, boats,
and the like, in repair."
"In witness whereof, the parties hereto have hereunto set their
hands and seals the day and year first above written."
"Thomas Manning"
"Chester S. Lord"
"
For The Sun Printing & Publishing Association"
"Whereas by agreement or charter party dated May 14th, 1898,
William L. Moore, of the City of New York, hereinafter called the
owner, did or is about to hire or charter unto Chester S. Lord, of
the City of New York, hereinafter called the hirer, the steam yacht
Kanapaha, enrolled in the Atlantic Yacht Club, as will
more fully and at large appear by a copy of said agreement or
charter party hereunto annexed and hereby made part hereof."
"Now at the request of the said hirer and for valuable
consideration received from him, and in consideration of one dollar
($1.00) from the said owner received, and receipt whereof is hereby
acknowledged:"
"We, the Sun Printing & Publishing Company, of the City of
new York, for ourselves and each of us, our successor or
successors, and for each of our executors or administrators, enter
into the following understanding and agreement of suretyship:"
"
First. That the said hirer will well and faithfully
perform and fulfill everything in and by the said annexed agreement
on his part to be kept and performed."
"
Second. That we expressly waive and dispense with
notice of any demand, suit, or action at law against the hirer, and
expressly waive any and all notice of nonperformance of the terms
of said annexed agreement on the part of the hirer to be kept and
performed, the intention of this understanding being to hold us
primarily liable under the terms of the annexed agreement."
"
Third. That our liability hereunto shall in no case
exceed the sum of seventy-five thousand dollars ($75,000.00)."
"In witness whereof we have hereunto set our hands this 14th day
of May, 1898."
"Chester S. Lord"
"
For Sun Printing & Publishing Association"
"New York"
"County of New York ss:"
"On this 14th day of May, 1898, before me personally appeared
Chester S. Lord, to me known and known to me to be the managing
editor of the Sun Printing and Publishing Company, and who duly
acknowledged that he executed the above undertaking for and on
behalf of his firm, under authority of said company, as its act and
deed."
"A. H. Bradley"
"[Seal]
Notary Public, New York"
[
Footnote 2]
"The executive committee shall have the supervision of all the
property of the association contained in their building, and of the
building itself. It shall be their duty to rent such portion of the
same as is not required for the use of the association, and to see
that all necessary alterations and repairs are faithfully and
economically executed, but no expenditure shall be made by the
committee exceeding the sum of $500 unless by authority of the
trustees. They shall report their doings to the trustees at each
regular meeting."
"It shall be the duty of the examining committee to examine the
accounts of the association, and to inquire into both the receipts
and disbursements of money. They shall report to the trustees at
each regular meeting."
[
Footnote 3]
"1. Where a sum of money is stated to be payable either by way
of liquidated damages or by way of penalty for breach of
stipulations, all or some of which are, or one of which is, for the
payment of a sum of money of less amount, that is really as
penalty, and you can only recover the actual damage, and the court
will not sever the stipulations."
"2. cases in which the amount of damages is not ascertainable
per se, but in which the amount of damages for a breach of
one or more of the stipulations either must be small, or will, in
all human probability, be small-that is, where it is not absolutely
necessary that they should be small, but it is so near to a
necessity, having regard to the probabilities of the case, that the
court will presume it to be so."
"Then the question is whether, in that class of cases the same
rule applies. Now upon this there is no decision. There are a great
many
dicta upon the question, and a great many
dicta on each side. I do not think it is necessary to
express a final opinion in this case, but I do say this -- that the
court is not bound by the
dicta on either side, and the
case is open to discussion. It is within the principle, if
principle it be, of a larger sum being a penalty for nonpayment of
a smaller sum; but at the same time it is also within another class
of cases to which I am now going to call attention."
"3. The class of cases to which I refer is that in which the
damages for the breach of each stipulation are unascertainable, or
not readily ascertainable, but the stipulations may be of greater
or less importance, or they may be of equal importance. There are
dicta there which seem to say that, if they vary much in
importance the principle of which I have been speaking applies, but
there is no decision. On the contrary, all the reported cases are
decisions the other way; although the stipulations have varied in
importance, the sum has always been treated as liquidated
damages."
"4. A class of cases relating to deposits. Where a deposit is to
be forfeited for the breach of a number of stipulations, some of
which may be trifling, some of which may be for the payment of
money on a given day -- in all those cases, the judges have held
that this rule does not apply, and that the bargain of the parties
is to be carried out. I think that exhausts the substance of the
cases."
[
Footnote 4]
Hoagland v. Segur, (1876) 38 N.J.L. 230;
Wolf v.
Des Moines & Fort Dodge Railway Co., (1884) 64 Ia. 380,
386;
Burrill v. Daggett, (1885) 77 Me. 545;
Jaqua v.
Headington, (1888) 114 Ind. 309;
Wibaux v. Grinnell Live
Stock Co., (1889) 9 Mont. 154;
Wilhelm v. Eaves,
(1891) 21 Or.194;
Hennessy v. Metzger, (1894) 152 III.
505;
Willson v. Baltimore, (1896) 83 Md. 203, 210;
May
v. Crawford, (1898) 142 Mo. 390;
Garst v. Harris,
(1900) 177 Mass. 72;
Illinois Central R. Co. v. Southern
Seating & Cabinet Co., (1900) 104 Tenn. 568;
Weedon v.
American Bonding & Trust Co., (1901) 128 N.C. 69;
Young v. Gaut, (1901, Ark.) 61 S.W. 372;
Knox Rock
Blasting Co. v. Grafton Stone Co., (1901) 64 Ohio St. 361;
Johnson v. Cook, (1901, Wash.) 64 P. 729;
Taylor v.
Times Newspaper Co., (1901, Minn.) 86 N.W. 760;
Emery v.
Boyle, (1901) 200 Pa. 249.