There is no such difference in the several statutes of North
Dakota, so far as regards the rights of the parties, as to forbid
the application of the latest statute to a case where a mortgage
was forgiven, and the materials furnished prior to its passage, and
the legislation under review cannot be held to violate any rights
of the plaintiff in error protected by the Constitution of the
United States.
A mortgage which is subsequent to the right of subsequent
lienors who furnish materials or labor in the erection of a
building to sell the same, and have it removed for the payment of
the liens, is not reduced in value by a statute authorizing the
sale of the property such as is set forth in the opinion of the
Court.
This action was brought to enforce certain mechanic's liens
provided for by section 4796, Revised Code of North Dakota, upon
real estate described in the complaint. The trial resulted in a
judgment in favor of the lienors, which on appeal was affirmed by
the supreme court of the state, and the Red River Valley National
Bank of Fargo, one of the defendants below, has brought the case
here by writ of error.
The trial court found the following facts: on July 8, 1884,
Elvira Cooper was the owner of the property, being lot 6, block 5,
of the original townsite of Fargo, Cass County, North Dakota, and
on that day she, with her husband, mortgaged it to secure the
payment of the sum of $3,000 to the Travelers' Insurance Company of
Hartford, Connecticut. Prior to January 1, 1893, the mortgagor sold
and conveyed the property,
Page 181 U. S. 549
subject to the mortgage, to one Rosa Herzman, who remained the
owner until the foreclosure of the mortgage under the statute and
the sale of the property to the insurance company, which took place
on May 7, 1894, and on that day, a sheriff's certificate of sale
was issued to it. On January 12, 1895, the insurance company
assigned this certificate of sale to the plaintiff in error, and on
May 17, 1895, it received from the sheriff a deed of the premises.
During the time of the ownership of the property by Rosa Herzman,
she erected upon the lot a two-story and basement brick building,
which was completed by February 3, 1894, and which still remains on
the lot in good condition. During the summer and fall of 1893,
various work was done and materials furnished upon and for the
building for which the owner of the premises failed to pay in full,
and thereafter and between November 17, 1893, and February 2, 1894,
various persons who had furnished materials or performed work and
labor for and in the erection of the house filed their liens, and
subsequently, on November 15, 1898, commenced this action to
foreclose the same against (among others) the plaintiff in error as
the owner of the property.
It was also found by the court that the east and west walls of
this new two-story brick building were party walls, the east wall
standing equally upon its own and the adjoining lot, while the west
wall stood wholly upon its adjoining lot, and the walls were built
in pursuance of an agreement to that effect between the owners of
the different lots, so that the building in question and those on
each side constituted a solid row of three brick buildings
belonging to different owners, and the building was incapable of
being removed from the lot unless it were first torn down. It was
also found that it would be for the best interest of all parties
that the land and the improvements thereon should be sold together,
and that the land and the improvements were of equal value, each
one being at least of the value of $2,500. The judgment, after
adjudging the amounts of the liens of the various parties, gave the
plaintiff in error the privilege of paying the same within thirty
days from the service of a copy of the judgment, and in default,
after proper notice, the property was directed to be sold by the
sheriff of Cass County, and of
Page 181 U. S. 550
the moneys received therefor, one-half was directed to be paid
and delivered to the plaintiff in error, and from the other half
the lienors were to be paid, and if there were any excess after
such payment, it was to be paid over to the bank.
At the time of the execution of the mortgage, the mechanics'
lien law then in existence was known as chapter 31 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, as found in the Revised Codes of 1877. Sections
655, 666, and 667 are set out in the margin. [
Footnote 1]
At the time when the work was done upon and the materials
furnished for the erection of the house, the mechanics' lien law in
force is to be found from sections 5468-5485, Compiled Laws, N.D.
1887. Section 5469 is the same as section 655, of chapter 31, above
mentioned, with the exception of an immaterial addition at the end
of the section, while section 5480 is identical with section 666 of
that chapter. Section 5481 is a substitute for section 667 of the
same chapter, and is set forth in the margin. [
Footnote 2]
Page 181 U. S. 551
It is evident that the law was in substance the same on this
subject when the mortgage was executed and when the work was done
and the materials furnished.
The mechanics' lien law in existence at the time that this
action was brought is to be found from sections 4788-4801, Revised
Code of 1895. Section 4788 would seem to be a substitute for
section 655 of chapter 31, above mentioned, and section 4795 is a
substitute for section 666 of the same chapter. These sections are
placed in the margin. [
Footnote
3]
Page 181 U. S. 552
MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM, after making the above statement of facts,
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The federal question in this case arises because of the
legislation of North Dakota subsequent to 1884, the time of the
execution of the mortgage to the Travelers' Insurance Company, the
plaintiff in error contending that, by reason of such legislation
its rights, with reference to the property herein, have to some
extent been taken away or unfavorably affected, without due process
of law, and it also contends that the subsequent legislation
operated to impair the obligation of a contract arising out of the
execution of the mortgage already mentioned, its foreclosure, and
the sale of the property to the insurance company, and its
assignment to the plaintiff in error.
Page 181 U. S. 553
We think it was the legislative intent that the last statute
should apply to past transactions, and that no substantial rights
of the plaintiff in error are thereby unfavorably affected,
because, in our opinion, there is no such material difference in
the several statutes, so far as regards the rights of the parties,
as to forbid the application of the latest statute to a case where
the mortgage was given and the materials furnished prior to its
passage. The difference between that statute and its predecessors,
so far as relates to the point in question here, has special
reference to the remedy only and to the manner of executing the
provisions of the statute in force at the time of the execution of
the mortgage and also when the work was done and the materials
furnished. It in reality solely affects the remedy, and does not
thereby substantially alter those rights of the mortgagee or his
representatives which existed when the mortgage was made. A
mechanic's lien law was then in existence, and the mortgage was
taken subject to the right of the legislature, in its discretion,
to alter that law, so long as the alterations only affected the
means of enforcing an existing lien, while not in substance
enlarging its extent or unduly extending the remedy to the injury
of vested rights. So long as those rights remain thus unaffected
the subsequent statute must be held valid, although the remedy be
thereby to some extent altered and enlarged. Looked at in this
light, the legislation under review cannot be held to violate any
rights of the plaintiff in error protected by the Constitution of
the United States.
Section 655 of the old act provided for the lien, and gave it to
those persons who performed labor upon or furnished materials for a
building, upon complying with the provisions of the chapter (31).
Section 666 provided for the enforcement of the lien in certain
cases, and granted the right to any person having a lien to enforce
the sale of the building, and to the purchaser the right to remove
the same within a reasonable time. These two sections are
reproduced in substantially the same language in the act of 1887
(in force when the work was done), as sections 5469 and 5480 of the
Compiled Laws of 1887, there being an immaterial addition in
section 5469 to section 655, whose place it takes.
Page 181 U. S. 554
By the law of 1895, which was in force when this action was
commenced, the old section 655 is somewhat elaborated by section
4788 of the Revised Code of that year, but the substance of the old
section, so far as the facts of this case touch it, remains the
same in the new section.
Old section 666 is amended by section 4795, Revised Code, which
provides more in detail for the carrying out of the provisions of
the old section. The old section itself provided for the
enforcement of the lien which was given by that statute, and the
last statute, it must be remembered, neither created nor extended
that lien, but somewhat amplified the means to enforce or discharge
it. By this alteration, the prior statute was not altered to the
disadvantage of the owner or his mortgagee in regard to those
rights which the person furnishing the materials or performing the
labor had under such prior statute. In that, prior statute it was
provided that the lien for the work done or materials furnished
should attach to the buildings, erections, or improvements for
which they were furnished or done in preference to any prior lien
or encumbrance or mortgage upon the land upon which the same was
erected or put, and any person enforcing such lien was granted the
right to have the building, erection, or other improvement sold
under execution, and the purchaser had the right to remove the same
within a reasonable time.
By the last act (section 4795), the same right still exists; the
building may be sold separately and the purchaser may remove the
same. There is added, however, the further provision which permits
the court for the best interests of all the parties to sell the
land and the improvements together, and after ascertaining the
separate values of the land and of the building, provision is made
for the distribution of the proceeds of the sale so as to secure to
the prior mortgage or other lien priority upon the land, and to the
mechanic's lien priority upon the building into which his labor or
materials have entered.
True it is that the property was sold under the foreclosure when
there was no right to sell the land in connection with the building
for the purpose of paying the liens on the latter. The liens on the
building, however, were there, and the building
Page 181 U. S. 555
could be sold and removed to pay the amount thereof, and under
the foreclosure the purchaser bought subject to that existing
right. He thus obtained a title under which his building could be
sold from under him and removed from the land. Under the amended
statute, the court may sell all the property, land, and building
together, and return to the owner the value of the land and the
surplus arising from the building after payment of the liens. As
the liens were in existence when the mortgage was foreclosed, we
think the purchaser took title subject to the right of the
legislature, in making a reasonable and proper amendment of the
law, to provide in foreclosing the liens, for the sale of the whole
property and the return to the owner of the lot of the full value
thereof in money, instead of allowing him to keep the lot and have
the building thereon sold and removed. The plaintiff in error's
property was already in the grasp of the statute creating the liens
when the mortgage was foreclosed, and that fact is the material one
for consideration with reference to the statute and its
amendment.
The plaintiff in error asserts that this change in the law
rendered the mortgage security less valuable, and that therefore it
impaired the obligation of the contract, and was void. This is mere
assertion, and we do not assent to its correctness. A mortgage
which is already subject to the right of subsequent lienors, who
furnish materials or labor in the erection of a building, to sell
the same and have it removed for the payment of the liens, is not
in our judgment reduced in value by the provision contained in the
amendment under consideration.
Some reference has been made to a decision of the Supreme Court
of North Dakota, decided before the foreclosure of the mortgage,
and it has been said that it is therein decided that section 5480
of the Compiled Laws of 1887, which, as we have stated, is
identical with section 666 of chapter 31, above mentioned (in force
when the mortgage was executed), does not give any lien as against
a mortgagee or one representing him in a case like this, because
such lien could not be enforced without a demolition of the
building, and in such case no lien is given, while by the latest
statute it is asserted that the lien is given, and also an
effective means of enforcing it. In brief, it
Page 181 U. S. 556
is urged that a lien is given by the last statute as against a
mortgagee or his representative, in a case where it did not exist
when the mortgage was made, as the supreme court of the state
decided, and that such decision had been given when the mortgage
was foreclosed and the property bid in by the mortgagee and then
assigned to the plaintiff in error, and it is claimed that the
subsequent statute giving the lien was a clear violation of the
contract as against the plaintiff in error.
James River Lumber
Co. v. Danner, 3 N.D. 470, is the authority referred to for
this contention, but an examination of the facts and the opinion of
the court therein shows that no such proposition was decided. In
that case, there was a mortgage upon the whole of the property,
which consisted of a lot with a brewery erected thereon. A fire
occurred which to some extent damaged, without destroying, the
building. It was therefore repaired, and for the materials for such
repairs and for the labor expended on the building, liens were
filed, and the claim was made that they were liens superior to the
mortgage thereon at the time the materials were furnished and the
labor performed. This the court held was not the true construction
of section 5480; that, while that section gives the lienor the
right to sell the building and the purchaser the right to have it
removed, yet no authority was given to sell the entire building to
pay the lien of one who had only repaired it while a recorded
mortgage existed against the land at the time he made the repairs.
It was said that a lien for repairs upon a building covered by a
mortgage at the time of the repairs would not justify a sale and
removal of the building as against such mortgage; that, priority of
lien was given in cases where the whole erection might be sold and
removed without unlawfully encroaching upon the right of the
mortgagee of the land, and that a priority of lien existed only
when a new structure had been put upon the land subsequently to the
execution of the mortgage, and one who claimed a prior lien must
have contributed to the erection of such building by the furnishing
of materials or the doing of work. And the court further held that,
as the work on the partially destroyed building was not begun until
some time after the recording of the mortgage on the
Page 181 U. S. 557
whole property, the lienor could not procure a sale of the whole
building and give to the purchaser the right to remove it, and as
this could not be done as against the mortgagee, the priority of
lien did not exist. The court, however, recognizes in terms the
existence of a lien under that statute, when a new structure has
been put upon the land subsequently to the execution of the
mortgage, if the person claiming the lien has contributed to the
erection of the building by furnishing materials therefor or
performing labor thereon.
In this case, the building did not exist at the time the
mortgage was executed, and the liens were filed to secure payment
for the materials used in its construction and the labor performed
upon it, and no decision of the Supreme Court of North Dakota has
been called to our attention holding that, under such
circumstances, there would not have been a lien upon the building
in favor of the mechanics and prior to that of the mortgage
executed before its erection. In such case as this, it is clear
that, under the act in force when the mortgage was executed and
when the labor was performed, a lien on the building was created by
virtue of that act, and that the building could have been sold
under it and the purchaser would have had the right to remove it
notwithstanding, in order to do so, he would have been compelled to
demolish the entire building.
One of the amendments contained in the last statute, which
provides a means for the enforcement of a lien by the sale of the
whole premises in the case of repairs upon a building already
covered by a mortgage, was probably passed because of the above
decision of the Dakota court, and we need not concern ourselves as
to its validity, because the plaintiff in error does not occupy
such a position as to enable it to raise that question, the whole
building in this case having been erected subsequently to the
mortgage. The same may be said as to any question which might upon
other facts be raised because of the cutting off of an existing
mortgage not yet due and the (claimed) impairment of the obligation
of a contract by the sale of the premises under the provisions of
the amended statute.
The mortgage in this case was past due, and had been foreclosed
and the land sold in 1894, subject to the lien on the
Page 181 U. S. 558
building provided by the statute then in existence. One who does
not belong to the class that might be injured by a a statute cannot
raise the question of its invalidity.
Supervisors v.
Stanley, 105 U. S. 305;
Clark v. Kansas City, 176 U. S. 114,
176 U. S. 118;
Lampasas v. Bell, 180 U. S. 276,
180 U. S.
283.
The amendments to the old section 667, relating to the bringing
of such an action as this, are simply of the same nature as those
above discussed, amplifying to some extent, but not materially, the
powers of the court as to the remedy.
The decision of the main question in this case is fatal to the
rights claimed by the plaintiff in error, and the judgment must
therefore be
Affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
"
Chapter 31, Code of Civil Procedure of the Revised
Codes"
"
of 1877, Territory of Dakota"
"SEC. 655.
Lien, to whom and for what. -- Every
mechanic, or other person who shall do any labor upon, or furnish
any materials, machinery, or fixtures for any building, erection,
or other improvements upon land, including those engaged in the
construction or repair of any work of internal improvement, by
virtue of any contract with the owner, his agent, trustee,
contractor, or subcontractor, upon complying with the provisions of
this chapter, shall have for his labor done, or materials,
machinery, or fixtures furnished, a lien upon such building,
erection, or improvement and upon the land belonging to such owner,
on which the same is situated, to secure the payment of such labor
done, or materials, machinery, or fixtures furnished."
"SEC. 666.
Lien superior to mortgage, when. -- The lien
for the things aforesaid, or work, shall attach to the buildings,
erections, or improvements, for which they were furnished or done,
in preference to any prior lien or encumbrance, or mortgage upon
the land upon which the same is erected or put, and any person
enforcing such lien, may have such building, erection, or other
improvement sold under execution, and the purchaser may remove the
same within a reasonable time thereafter."
"SEC. 667.
Action to enforce. -- Any person having a
lien by virtue of this chapter may bring an action to enforce the
same in the district court of the county or judicial subdivision
wherein the property is situated."
[
Footnote 2]
"
Compiled Laws, Territory of Dakota, 1887"
"
See section 667, supra"
"SEC. 5481. Any person having a lien by virtue of this article
may bring an action to enforce the same in the district court of
the county or judicial subdivision where the property is situated,
and any number of persons claiming liens against the same property
may join in the same action, and when separate actions are
commenced the court may consolidate them. The court may also allow
as part of the costs the money paid for filing each lien and the
sum of five dollars for drawing the same."
[
Footnote 3]
"
Chapter 77, Revised Codes, North Dakota, 1895"
"SEC. 4788.
Who may have and for what. -- Any person
who shall perform any labor upon or furnish any materials,
machinery, or fixtures for the construction or repair of any work
of internal improvement or for the erecting, alteration, or repair
of any building or other structures upon land, or in making any
other improvement thereon, including fences, sidewalks, paving,
wells, trees, drains, grades, or excavations under a contract with
the owner of such land, his agent, trustee, contractor or
subcontractor, or with the consent of such owner, shall, upon
complying with the provisions of this chapter, have for his labor
done, or materials, machinery, or fixtures furnished a lien upon
such building, erection, or improvement, and upon the land
belonging to such owner on which the same is situated, or to
improve which the work was done or the things furnished, to secure
the payment for such labor, materials, machinery, or fixtures. The
owner shall be presumed to have consented to the doing of any such
labor or the making of any such improvement, if at the time he had
knowledge thereof and did not give notice of his objection thereto
to the person entitled to the lien. The provisions of this section
and chapter shall not be construed to apply to claims or contracts
for furnishing lightning rods or any of their attachments."
"SEC. 4795.
When prior to prior lien on land. Power of
court. -- The liens for the things aforesaid or the work,
including liens for additions, repairs, and betterments, shall
attach to the building, erection, or improvement for which they
were furnished or done in preference to any prior lien or
encumbrance or mortgage upon the land upon which such erection,
building, or improvement belongs or is erected or put."
"If such material was furnished or labor performed in the
erection or construction of an original and independent building,
erection, or other improvement commenced since the attaching of
such prior lien, encumbrance, or mortgage, the court may in its
discretion order and direct such building, erection, or improvement
to be separately sold under execution, and the purchaser may remove
the same within such reasonable time as the court may fix. But if
in the opinion of the court it would be for the best interest of
all parties that the land and the improvements thereon should be
sold together, it shall so order, and the court shall take an
account and ascertain the separate values of the land and of the
erection, building, or other improvement, and distribute the
proceeds of sale so as to secure to the prior mortgage or other
lien priority upon the land, and to the mechanic's lien priority
upon the building, erection, or other improvement."
"If the material furnished or labor performed was for an
addition to, repairs of, or betterments upon, buildings, erections,
or other improvements, the court shall take an account of the
values before such material was furnished or labor performed, and
the enhanced value caused by such additions, repairs, or
betterments, and upon the sale of the premises distribute the
proceeds of sale so as to secure to the prior mortgage or lien
priority upon the land and improvements as they existed prior to
the attaching of the mechanic's lien and to the mechanic's lien
priority upon the enhanced value caused by such additions, repairs,
or betterments."