The motion to dismiss this case for lack of jurisdiction must be
denied, because the question was duly raised, and its federal
character cannot be disputed, but the motion to affirm is granted
because the assignments of error are frivolous and evidently taken
only for delay.
This case comes here on writ of error to the Supreme Court of
California to review the judgment of that court affirming a
judgment of the Superior Court of California for the County of San
Francisco sustaining a demurrer to the complaint. The case involves
a large amount of real property belonging in his lifetime to one
Thomas H. Blythe, who was a naturalized citizen of the United
States, and died intestate on the 4th of April, 1883, a resident of
the City and County of San Francisco. Questions relating to the
title to this property have been in litigation for over fifteen
years, and various suits have been instituted in the state and
federal courts in California during that time, all of which have
resulted favorably to the interests of the defendant in error
herein, who claims to be the owner of the property. Three suits
have been before this Court upon a writ of error or by appeals
brought by some of the parties interested, and have been dismissed
for want of jurisdiction.
Blythe v. Hinckley, 167 U.S.
746;
Blythe Company v. Blythe, 172 U.S. 644;
Blythe v.
Hinckley, 173 U. S. 501.
The sole question which plaintiff in error herein seeks to have
decided is whether the defendant in error was capable of taking the
property of the intestate under the laws of California, the
plaintiff in error claiming as one of the next of kin and heirs at
law of the intestate, and objecting that the defendant in error
could not take the property because she was an alien and a subject
of the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland at
the time of the death of the intestate,
Page 180 U. S. 334
and that, in the absence of a treaty between the United States
and Great Britain permitting and providing for such taking on the
part of an alien, there was no power in the State of California to
legislate upon the subject, and the statute of that state assuming
to permit such alien to take was a violation of that part of
Section 10 of Article I of the Constitution of the United States,
which provides that "no state shall enter into any treaty,
alliance, or confederation, . . . " and the attempt of the State of
California to legislate upon this subject was therefore an invasion
of and an encroachment upon, the treatymaking power of the United
States.
The facts upon which the question arises are set forth in the
complaint, which stated in substance that the defendant in error
was an alien and illegitimate daughter of an unmarried woman, and
that, prior to the death of the intestate, neither the defendant
nor her mother had ever been outside of Great Britain, and that she
was incapable by the common law of England and of California and by
the Constitution of the United States, Section 10, Article I, and
by section 1978 of the Revised Statutes, of inheriting the real
property described in the complaint; that there was at the time of
the death of the intestate no treaty between the United States and
Great Britain which provided for the inheritance of aliens in the
United States. After the death of the intestate, the defendant in
error came to the United States and claimed (falsely, as alleged)
that she had been adopted by the intestate as his daughter in his
lifetime under the provisions of section 230, Civil Code of
California; also that he had adopted her as his heir under the
provisions of section 1387 of that Code. Sometime in 1885 she
therefore instituted by her guardian, under section 1664 of the
same Code, a proceeding for the purpose of establishing her claim
as such adopted daughter or as such heir to succeed to the estate
left by the intestate. Upon the trial, it was made to appear that
the defendant in error was an illegitimate child and an alien, and
the complaint herein then alleges that it was the duty of the court
before which the trial was going on to dismiss the proceeding for
want of jurisdiction to decree that defendant in error was an heir
to the real estate or capable of
Page 180 U. S. 335
taking by descent. The court, however, as the complaint alleged,
decided otherwise, and upon the evidence determined and adjudged
that the defendant was the natural heir of the intestate and that
in his lifetime he had adopted her as his daughter under section
230 of the California Civil Code, or had instituted her as his heir
under section 1387 of that Code.
It was further alleged that the seventeenth section of article 1
of the new Constitution of California, permitting aliens to
acquire, possess, enjoy, transmit, and inherit property the same as
native-born citizens, was void as an attempt by the people of the
State of California to encroach upon the treatymaking power of the
United States, and was in violation of Section 10 of Article I of
the federal Constitution. It was then alleged that the court in the
proceeding mentioned did not in legal effect determine the question
of heirship, title, or interest in the real estate for want of
jurisdiction, and that the legislature of the state had no power or
authority to enact any law which gave to the defendant in error the
right to inherit the real estate of the intestate.
The complaint further stated that an appeal was taken to the
supreme court of the state, and that all of the above matters were
made to appear to that court, which nevertheless affirmed the
judgment. The same averments of the lack of jurisdiction to make
such decree were made with regard to the supreme court as were set
forth regarding the lower court, and the plaintiff in error alleged
that the judgment of the supreme court was void for lack of
jurisdiction. It was also alleged that, after this affirmance of
the decree of the lower court, by which the rights of the defendant
in error to take the property were formally determined, she
instituted a proceeding pursuant to the provisions of the
California Code, in the Superior Court in San Francisco, where the
administration of the estate of the intestate was pending, to have
distributed the estate of the intestate in accordance with the
judgments of the superior and the supreme courts in the proceeding
already mentioned. This was opposed by the parties interested
adversely to the defendant in error upon the same grounds which had
been set up as a defense in the former suit. Upon the trial of the
latter proceeding, the
Page 180 U. S. 336
record in the former suit was offered in evidence and objected
to as void for want of jurisdiction, but it was received by the
court and held by it to be conclusive evidence of the rights of the
parties, and the court then made a decree of distribution in favor
of the defendant in error. An appeal was taken to the supreme
court, where the judgment was affirmed, although, as alleged, the
court was without jurisdiction. Pursuant to that decree, the
defendant in error obtained possession of the real property in
December, 1895.
It was further alleged that all the claims of the defendant in
error to inherit or to hold the real property were groundless and
unfounded in fact or in law, and judgment was asked declaring the
claims of the defendant to any of the property to be illegal and
unfounded, and that plaintiff, as against her, was the lawful owner
in fee of the real property mentioned, and was entitled to the
income and profits thereof, and decreeing that his title thereto
and estate therein should be quieted and the defendant perpetually
enjoined from setting up any claim whatever to the property, and
that the possession and accumulated rents of the property in the
hands of the receiver be delivered to the plaintiff.
The portions of the federal and state constitutions and the
various statutes referred to in the complaint are set forth in the
margin.
*
Page 180 U. S. 337
The defendant demurred to this complaint on the grounds, among
others (1) that the complaint stated no cause of action; (2) that
the judgment of distribution set forth in the complaint was a
conclusive bar and estoppel against the plaintiff and prevented him
from maintaining the action. The demurrer was sustained and
judgment entered in favor of the defendant on the merits, and upon
appeal it was affirmed by the Supreme Court of California. A writ
of error has been allowed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
of that state. A motion is now made to dismiss the writ of error
for lack of jurisdiction or to affirm the judgment.
MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM, after making the foregoing statement of
facts, delivered the opinion of the Court.
The motion to dismiss the writ of error in this case, for lack
of jurisdiction, must be denied.
The objections raised by the complaint to the validity of the
judgments mentioned therein were that they were void for want
Page 180 U. S. 338
of jurisdiction in the courts which rendered them over the
questions decided, because of the provisions of the federal
Constitution above recited. Although the claim may not be well
founded, the question nevertheless was duly raised, and its federal
character cannot be disputed. This necessitates the denial of the
motion to dismiss.
But the motion to affirm should be granted, because the
assignments of error are frivolous and we are convinced the writ
was taken only for delay. This is the ground for the decisions in
Chanute v. Trader, 132 U. S. 210,
132 U. S. 214,
and
Richardson v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co.,
169 U. S. 128,
169 U. S.
132.
The original judgment in the superior court of California, which
was affirmed by the Supreme Court of that state, determined the
rights of the defendant in error and conclusively adjudged her to
be the owner of the property in question unless the judgment were
reversed upon appeal. The state courts had jurisdiction over the
whole question, including the defense founded upon the federal
Constitution, and if that objection had been properly raised and
appeared in the record, an appeal to this Court from the Supreme
Court of California could have been taken if the defense had been
overruled. The allegation of the plaintiff in error that the state
courts had no jurisdiction to determine the question because of the
facts set forth by him in the complaint herein is therefore not
well founded, and being a mere conclusion of law is not admitted by
the demurrer.
This Court has already decided the question of jurisdiction of
the state courts in
Blythe v. Hinckley, 173 U.
S. 501,
173 U. S. 508,
where it was said by CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER, speaking for the Court,
that --
"The state courts had concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit
courts of the United States, to pass on the federal questions thus
intimated, for the Constitution, laws and treaties of the United
States are as much a part of the laws of every state as its own
local laws and Constitution, and if the state courts erred in
judgment it was mere error, and not to be corrected through the
medium of bills such as those under consideration."
If the federal question which plaintiff in error claimed existed
in the suits in the state court were not plainly enough
presented
Page 180 U. S. 339
by him to those tribunals so as to permit of their review by
this Court, that is no answer to the proposition that those
judgments are conclusive of the matters therein decided, unless
reviewed by this Court and reversed in a proper proceeding in error
to the state court.
Litigation in regard to the merits of the claim of the defendant
in error to this property has been continued by her opponents since
the judgments of the state courts, just as if the whole merits of
the case had not been decided by the state courts in her favor
several times. This Court has been asked to review a judgment
dismissing the complaint filed in a separate action, brought in the
federal circuit court to set aside the state judgments, and this we
refused to do on the grounds stated in the report.
Blythe v.
Hinckley, 173 U. S. 507.
It was said in that case:
"The Superior Court of San Francisco was a court of general
jurisdiction, and authorized to take original jurisdiction 'of all
matters of probate,' and the bill averred that Thomas H. Blythe
died a resident of the City and County of San Francisco, and left
an estate therein, and that court repeatedly decreed that Florence
was the heir of Thomas H. Blythe, and its decrees were repeatedly
affirmed by the supreme court of the state. So far as the
construction of the state statutes and state constitution in this
behalf by the state courts was concerned, it was not the province
of the circuit court to reexamine their conclusions. As to the
question of the capacity of an alien to inherit, that was
necessarily involved in the determination by the decrees, that
Florence did inherit, and that judgment covered the various
objections in respect of section 1978 of the Revised Statutes, and
the tenth section of Article I of the Constitution of the United
States, and any treaty relating to the subject."
In the same case, it was said:
"We are not to be understood as intimating in the least degree
that the provisions of the California Code amounted to an invasion
of the treatymaking power or were in conflict with the Constitution
or laws of the United States, or any treaty with the United
States."
This decision conclusively determined that the superior court of
California and the supreme court of that state, upon appeal
therefrom,
Page 180 U. S. 340
had full jurisdiction to determine the whole case and give the
judgments that they have given. Notwithstanding which it is now
again argued that those judgments were void for want of
jurisdiction.
There must be an end to these claims at some time, and we think
that this is a proper occasion to terminate them.
The sole question now remaining before us arises as to the claim
made by plaintiff in error under the Constitution of the United
States, already referred to, and although it was not in terms
decided in the above case, we now say that the provision of the
federal Constitution had no bearing in this case, and that the
question is, in our opinion, entirely free from doubt.
Plaintiff urges that never before has the question been directly
passed upon by this Court. If he means that it has never heretofore
been asserted that in the absence of any treaty whatever upon the
subject, the state had no right to pass a law in regard to the
inheritance of property within its borders by an alien, counsel may
be correct. The absence of such a claim is not so extraordinary as
is the claim itself.
Questions have arisen as to the rights of aliens to hold
property in a state under treaties between this government and
foreign nations which distinctly provide for that right, and it has
been said that in such case the right of aliens was governed by the
treaty, and if that were in opposition to the law of the particular
state where the property was situated, in such case the state law
was suspended during the treaty or the term provided for therein.
Counsel cite
Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.
S. 258, a case arising and affecting lands in the
District of Columbia, in regard to which Congress has exclusive
jurisdiction, and in that case, Mr. Justice Field, in delivering
the opinion of the Court, said at
133 U. S.
266:
"This article, by its terms, suspended, during the existence of
the treaty, the provisions of the common law of Maryland and of the
statutes of that State of 1780 and 1791 so far as they prevented
citizens of France from taking by inheritance from citizens of the
United States, property, real or personal, situated therein."
But there is no hint in that case that, in the absence of
any
Page 180 U. S. 341
treaty, the state itself could not legislate upon the subject
and permit aliens to hold property, real and personal, within its
borders, according to its own laws. This Court has held from the
earliest times, in cases where there was no treaty, that the laws
of the state where the real property was situated governed the
title and were conclusive in regard thereto.
The latest exposition of the rule is found in the case of
Clarke v. Clarke, 178 U. S. 186.
De Vaughn v. Hutchinson, 165 U. S. 566,
165 U. S. 570,
is another illustration of the same rule. The right of the state to
make this determination by her own laws, in the absence of a treaty
to the contrary, is distinctly recognized in
Chirac v.
Chirac, 2 Wheat. 259,
15 U. S. 272,
where the Court said:
"John Baptiste Chirac having died seised in fee of the land in
controversy, his heirs at law being subjects of France, and there
being at that time no treaty in existence between the two nations,
did this land pass to these heirs, or did it become escheatable?
This question depends upon the law of Maryland."
In
Lessee of Levy v.
McCartee, 6 Pet. 102, the question was in regard to
the law of New York, and the right of an individual to inherit
through an alien title to real estate in that state. Mr. Justice
Story delivered the opinion of the Court, in which he stated that
the question resolved itself into
"whether one citizen can inherit in the collateral line to
another when he must make his pedigree or title through a deceased
alien ancestor. The question is one of purely local law, and as
such must be decided by this Court."
It was not claimed that the State of New York had no power to
permit an inheritance through an alien or an inheritance by an
alien himself of land situated in that state in the absence of a
treaty upon the subject.
There has not been cited a single case where any doubt has been
thrown upon the right of a state, in the absence of a treaty, to
declare an alien capable of inheriting or taking property and
holding the same within its borders. The treaties have always been
for the purpose of enabling an alien to take even though the
particular state may not have expressly permitted it. But no case
has arisen where it was asserted or
Page 180 U. S. 342
claimed that a state in the absence of a treaty might not itself
permit an alien to take property within its limits.
Again, in
Haguenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.
S. 483, where the question depended upon a consideration
of the treaty between the United States and the Swiss Confederation
of November 25, 1850, it was said by Mr. Justice Swayne, in
delivering the opinion of the Court, that
"The law of nations recognizes the liberty of every government
to give to foreigners only such rights touching immovable property
within its territory as it may see fit to concede. Vattel, book 2,
c. 8, section 114. In our country, this authority is primarily in
the states where the property is situated."
And it is also said in that case, if a law of a state is
contrary to a treaty, the treaty is superior under the federal
Constitution, but there is no intimation that, when there is no
treaty the right of the state does not exist in full force. The
treaty, it will be observed, in cases where by the laws of the
state the alien could not hold real property, permitted him to sell
it and export the proceeds without difficulty, while by the state
statute he was permitted to take and hold by being in the state,
and making under oath and having recorded within five years a
declaration that he intended to reside in the state.
See also
Hanrick v. Patrick, 119 U. S. 156. The
question of the extent of the power of the United States to provide
by treaty for the inheriting, by aliens, of real estate, in spite
of the statutes of the state in which the land may be, does not
arise in this case, and we express no opinion thereon.
The claim which the plaintiff in error founds upon the section
of the federal Constitution is too plainly without foundation to
require further argument. The right of the defendant in error to
this property has been in litigation for more than fifteen years,
and many years after courts of competent jurisdiction have decided
all the questions in her favor, and we think this writ of error,
judging by the character of the question sought to be raised under
it, has been taken for delay only. The judgment must be
Affirmed.
* Section 10, Article I, of the federal Constitution:
"No state shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or
confederation. . . ."
Section 10, Article II:
"No state shall, without the consent of the Congress, . . .
enter into any agreement or compact with another state or with a
foreign power. . . ."
Section 17 of article 1 of the Constitution of California:
"Foreigners of the white race or of African descent eligible to
become citizens of the United States under the naturalization laws
thereof, while
bona fide residents of this state, shall
have the same rights in respect to the acquisition, possession,
enjoyment, transmission, and inheritance of property as native-born
citizens."
Civil Code of California:
"SEC. 230. The father of an illegitimate child, by publicly
acknowledging it as his own, receiving it as such, with the consent
of his wife, if he is married, into his family, and otherwise
treating it as if it were a legitimate child, thereby adopts it as
such, and such child is thereupon deemed for all purposes
legitimate from the time of its birth."
"SEC. 671. Any person, whether citizen or alien, may take, hold,
and dispose of property, real or personal, within this state."
"SEC. 672. If a nonresident alien takes by succession, he must
appear and claim the property within five years from the time of
succession, or be barred. The property in such case is disposed of
as provided in Title VIII, Part III, Code of Civil Procedure."
"SEC. 1387. Every illegitimate child is an heir of any person
who, in writing signed in the presence of a competent witness,
acknowledges himself to be the father of such child."
Revised Statutes of the United States:
"SEC. 1978. All citizens of the United States shall have the
same right, in every state and territory, as is enjoyed by white
citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and
convey real and personal property."
