The briefs filed in this case are in plain violation of the
amendment to Rule 31, adopted at the last term, and printed in a
note to this case.
The providing at the place of intersection of the two railroads
affected by this case, ample facilities for transferring cars used
in the regular business of the respective lines, and to provide
facilities for conducting the business, while it would afford
facilities to interstate commerce, would not regulate such
commerce, within the meaning of the Constitution.
The tracks of the two railroads being connected, the making of
joint rates
Page 179 U. S. 288
is a matter primarily for the companies interested, and the
objection that there is any violation of the interstate commerce
clause of the Constitution is untenable.
Whether a judgment enforcing trade connections between two
railroad corporations is a violation of the constitutional rights
of either or both depends upon the facts surrounding the cases in
regard to which the judgment was given.
In this case, the judgment given does not violate the
constitutional rights of the plaintiff in error.
This case comes here by writ of error to the Supreme Court of
Minnesota to review the judgment of that court affirming the
judgment of the district court, directing the plaintiff in error
and the Willmar & Sioux Falls Railway Company to make track
connections with each other at Hanley Falls, in the State of
Minnesota, where their respective tracks intersect.
The proceeding was duly commenced by the defendant in error,
pursuant to the provisions of chapter 91 of the General Laws of
Minnesota of 1895. The third section, a part of which is material
to the question reviewed, is set forth in the margin.
*
Page 179 U. S. 289
In accordance with the statute, the defendant in error filed his
petition before the railroad commission of the state, setting
Page 179 U. S. 290
forth the grounds upon which he based the request for an order
directing the two companies to make the track connection therein
referred to.
Both companies defended. The grounds of defense were
Page 179 U. S. 291
substantially alike. The plaintiff in error alleged in its
answer, among other matters, that to construct a connecting track,
as asked for in the petition and as provided for in the statute
mentioned, would require the company to go outside of its right of
way and to condemn land for that purpose.
In addition, it was urged that to compel the companies to make
such connection would violate the commerce clause and also the
Fourteenth Amendment of the federal Constitution in particulars
specially set forth, and it was claimed that the statute was
therefore void.
Evidence was taken before the commission, which finally ordered
the connection to be made. The two companies appealed to the
district court, which heard the case anew, and then made
substantially the same order as that made by the commission.
The judgment of the district court declared as follows:
"That it is the duty of the defendants, the Wisconsin, Minnesota
& Pacific Railroad Company and the Willmar & Sioux Falls
Railway Company, and they should be and are required to forthwith
provide at the place of intersection of their said roads at said
Hanley Falls, ample facilities by track connections for
transferring any and all cars used in the regular business of their
respective lines of road from the line or tracks of one of said
companies to those of the other, and to forthwith provide at said
place of intersection, equal and reasonable facilities for the
interchange of cars and traffic between their respective lines, and
for the receiving, forwarding, and delivering property and cars to
and from their respective lines."
Payment of the cost of furnishing this track connection is
provided for in section 3(a) of the statute.
No evidence was offered on the part of the companies either
before the commission or the district court. Reliance was placed on
the evidence offered upon the part of the defendant in error and
upon the admissions made in the district court.
The following are some of the facts appearing in the record
herein:
The road of the plaintiff in error runs from Watertown, in the
State of South Dakota, near the western boundary of the
Page 179 U. S. 292
State of Minnesota, easterly to Morton, in the latter state,
where it connects with the Minneapolis & St. Louis Railroad
Company, running from Morton to Minneapolis, and thereby
constitutes physically one straight line of road from Watertown to
Minneapolis. There is a small station called Hanley Falls, in the
State of Minnesota, on the line of the plaintiff in error's road, a
short distance east of Watertown. The plaintiff in error has a
trackage contract, by virtue of which it connects at Merriam
Junction, Minnesota (a station within a few miles of Minneapolis),
with the Northwestern system, and in that way reaches Sioux
Falls.
The Willmar & Sioux Falls Railway runs from Willmar,
Minnesota, some distance south to Hanley Falls, and thence south to
Sioux Falls in South Dakota. This road is operated by the Great
Northern Railway Company.
It is 181 miles from Hanley Falls to Sioux City via the Willmar
& Sioux Falls Railway and its connections, while it is 380
miles between the two places by way of the Wisconsin, Minnesota
& Pacific Railroad and its connections, and it requires
forty-six to forty-eight hours to transport freight over the latter
road from Hanley Falls to Sioux City, while but fourteen hours are
required to transport it between those places by the Willmar &
Sioux Falls Railway. The tariff rates on stock from Hanley Falls to
Sioux City are the same on both roads.
Traffic originating on the railroad of the plaintiff in error
west of Hanley Falls and destined to Sioux City could, if
transferred at Hanley Falls to the Willmar & Sioux Falls
Railway, be transported to its destination by that road, which is
two hundred miles shorter than by the road of plaintiff in error,
in from thirty to thirty-five hours' less time, provided the
transfer from the road of the plaintiff in error to that of the
Willmar & Sioux Falls road could be made at Hanley Falls in
carloads without unloading from the cars in which the shipments
were first made. No facilities have been provided by either of the
companies for the transfer or interchange of business at Hanley
Falls, and there is no track connection between them, although they
have track connections and transfer facilities at Minneapolis.
Page 179 U. S. 293
There is an immense supply of wood along the line of the Great
Northern system of which the Willmar & Sioux Falls Railway
forms a part, much larger than upon the line of the railroad of
plaintiff in error, the wood on the line of the latter company
being scarce and becoming more so every day. Citizens of towns west
of Hanley Falls upon the line of the railroad of the plaintiff in
error are purchasers and consumers of wood and posts, and a
connection and transfer facilities at Hanley Falls would cheapen
these commodities at such towns. Taking the wood from the Willmar
road by transferring the cars might result in somewhat lessening
the benefit to the plaintiff in error of a much longer haul of
dearer wood along its own line.
The farmers along the line of the road of the plaintiff in
error, west of Hanley Falls, have heretofore raised many stock
cattle which are ready to be fed and fattened for market, the best
market for such cattle being Sioux City, in the State of Iowa,
"on account of the supply of feed being more plentiful and
cheaper at or near Sioux City, and such stock can be sold to the
best advantage in the market having the cheapest and best supply of
feed."
Making the connection at Hanley Falls would result in the use of
the Willmar road from that point to Sioux Falls for certain kinds
of cattle which otherwise would probably not be carried there and
might be sent to the poorer market of St. Paul or Minneapolis, and
thus give the plaintiff in error the benefit of its long haul. The
result of the continued lack of these facilities might also be that
the trade in that kind of cattle would decline and be extinguished
among the people west of Hanley Falls, in which event, while no one
would be benefited by such want of facilities, many would be
injured. At the station at Hanley Falls the tracks of these
respective roads intersect at grade
"at a point from 40 to 60 rods distant from the respective
depots of the two companies, and in such manner that it is
practicable for them to provide ample, equal, and reasonable
facilities by track connections for the transfer from one of said
roads to that of the other of any and all cars of whatsoever name
or nature used in the business or on the lines of the roads of the
two companies mentioned, or either of them. "
Page 179 U. S. 294
There was evidence showing that, on account of the great loss in
weight of the cattle known as "stockers and feeders" when arriving
at Sioux City over the long haul of 380 miles on the road of the
plaintiff in error and its connections, that market had become
practically shut out from the owners of such cattle living on the
road of the plaintiff in error west of Hanley Falls, while the St.
Paul and Minneapolis markets, being poor markets for "stockers and
feeders," the trade in that kind of cattle west of Hanley Falls had
greatly diminished, and was still diminishing.
MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM, after stating the foregoing facts,
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Before entering upon the discussion of the questions in this
case, we desire to say that the briefs filed herein during this
term are in plain violation of the amendment to Rule 31, adopted at
the last term.
See 178 U.S. 617. The rule as amended is
reproduced in the margin.* The type used in quoting the statute is
so small as to be exceedingly difficult to read. Many briefs are
still printed on glazed paper. We shall hereafter insist upon a
strict compliance with the terms of the rule as amended.
This writ of error has been sued out by the plaintiff in error
alone, and various grounds are stated for the claim that the
statute upon which the judgment below is founded is a violation of
the Constitution of the United States. It is alleged that this
judgment, and also the statute, interfere with and regulate
interstate commerce, and therefore they violate the commerce clause
of the Constitution.
Page 179 U. S. 295
Plaintiff in error urges that transporting cattle from Minnesota
to Iowa constitutes interstate commerce, and that neither the State
of Minnesota nor its railroad commission has the right to in any
manner interfere with or regulate such commerce. The judgment in
this case, however, neither regulates nor interferes with that
commerce, nor does that part of the statute upon which the judgment
is founded. Whether any other portion of the statute does regulate
such commerce is beside the question, and it is not necessary to
here decide. To provide, at the place of intersection of these two
railroads at Hanley Falls, ample facilities by track connections
for transferring any and all cars used in the regular business of
the respective lines of road from the lines or tracks of one of
said companies to those of the other, and to provide at such place
of intersection equal and reasonable facilities for the interchange
of cars and traffic between their respective lines, and for the
receiving, forwarding, and delivering of property and cars to and
from their respective lines, as provided for by this judgment,
would plainly afford facilities to interstate commerce, if there
were any, and would in nowise regulate such commerce within the
meaning of the Constitution. That is all that has been done by the
judgment under review. A state may furnish such facilities or
direct them to be furnished by persons or corporations within its
limits without violating the federal Constitution. But the supreme
court of the state, in the opinion delivered therein, said that
there was ample evidence in the case of a necessity for such track
connection resulting from the benefit which would accrue to
exclusively state commerce when considered alone, to justify the
ordering of the connection in question.
What is said in the statute in relation to the establishment of
joint through rates for the transportation of freight between
points on the respective lines of these roads within the state, and
the manner of enforcing the establishment of such rates in case of
the omission so to do by the companies, and as to any unjust or
unreasonable charge for the transportation of freight or cars, are
all matters which do not arise under this judgment, and which may
never arise as a result of its enforcement. The
Page 179 U. S. 296
tracks being connected, the making of joint rates is a matter
primarily for the companies interested, and it may be that they
will agree upon them, and thus do away with the necessity of any
resort to the courts. The objection that there is any violation of
the interstate commerce clause of the Constitution is, we think,
clearly untenable.
Adhering strictly to the question involved in this case --
namely, the validity or the invalidity of the judgment actually
rendered -- we are met by the objection of the plaintiff in error
that the judgment itself is necessarily and inherently illegal
because, upon the conceded facts, if the judgment be enforced, it
can only result in taking the property of the plaintiff in error
without due process of law, and in refusing it the equal protection
of the laws, and in depriving it of its liberty to contract with
such persons or corporations as it may choose. We think not one of
these objections is tenable.
At common law, the courts would be without power to make such an
order as was made in this case by the state court. Legislative
authority would be necessary in order to give power to the courts
to render a judgment of this kind. If power were granted by the
legislature, and it amounted in the particular case simply to a
fair, reasonable, and appropriate regulation of the business of the
corporation when considered with regard to the interests both of
the company and of the public, the legislation would be valid, and
would furnish therefore ample authority for the courts to enforce
it.
Atchison &c. Railroad Company v. Denver &c.d
Railroad Company, 110 U. S. 667,
110 U. S. 681;
People ex Rel. &c. v. Boston & Albany Railroad
Company, 70 N.Y. 569;
People v. Railroad Company, 104
N.Y. 58.
Railroads have from the very outset been regarded as public
highways, and the right and the duty of the government to regulate
in a reasonable and proper manner the conduct and business of
railroad corporations have been founded upon that fact.
Constituting public highways of a most important character, the
function of proper regulation by the government springs from the
fact that, in relation to all highways, the duty of regulation is
governmental in its nature. At the present day, there is no denial
of these propositions.
Olcott v.
Supervisors,
Page 179 U. S. 297
16 Wall. 678,
83 U. S. 694;
Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Railway Company,
135 U. S. 641;
United States v. Joint Traffic Association, 171 U.
S. 505,
171 U. S.
569-570;
Lake Shore Railway Company v. Ohio,
173 U. S. 285,
173 U. S.
301.
It is because they are such highways that the land upon which
the rails are laid, and also that which may be necessary for the
other purposes of the corporation, is said to be used for a public
purpose, and on that ground the power of eminent domain which is
given them is held to be a constitutional exercise of legislative
authority. The right of the legislature to tax in furtherance of
such use is founded upon the same considerations that the use is a
public one, and therefore taxation in support of such use is valid.
Olcott v. Supervisors, supra. The companies hold a public
franchise, and governmental supervision is therefore valid. They
are organized for the public interests and to subserve primarily
the public good and convenience.
While this power of regulation exists, it is also to be
remembered that the legislature cannot, under the guise of
regulation, interfere with the proper conduct of the business of
the railroad corporation in matters which do not fairly belong to
the domain of reasonable regulation.
Lake Shore &c. Railway
Company v. Smith, 173 U. S. 684.
The only question arising as each case comes up for decision is
whether, in the particular case, the power has been duly exercised.
Instances where the exercise of this power has been discussed exist
in the cases of
Louisville Railroad Company v. Kentucky,
161 U. S. 677,
161 U. S. 696;
Lake Shore Railway v. Ohio, 173 U.
S. 285,
173 U. S. 292;
Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366,
169 U. S. 392.
The books contain almost countless cases where the question of the
police power of the states and its proper limitations and
conditions have arisen, but those above cited are sufficient for
the purposes of this case.
The argument favoring the invalidity set up by the plaintiff in
error, so far as it is founded upon the provisions of the judgment
in question, is directed to two alleged facts, the first of which
is that, by making track connections, the plaintiff in error may be
deprived of a long haul of a certain kind of cattle, and may be
compelled to deliver them in a car to be drawn by the
Page 179 U. S. 298
Willmar road from Hanley Falls to Sioux City. This long haul
exists, as stated, in transporting the cattle from Hanley Falls
directly east for about one hundred miles to Merriam, near
Minneapolis, then south for another hundred miles miles, and then
westerly to Sioux Falls, 180 miles further, consuming in the
transit forty-six to forty-eight hours, when, if the car were
placed on the Willmar & Sioux Falls road at Hanley Falls, the
transportation would cover but 180 miles, and the time consumed in
transit would be but fourteen hours.
The other fact referred to relates to the wood transportation.
There is now very little wood left along the line of the road of
the plaintiff in error east of Hanley Falls from which to supply
consumers west of that station, and the price is dearer than the
wood from northern Minnesota along the stations of the Willmar
road. But the complaint is that the enforcement of this judgment
would compel the plaintiff in error to receive wood from the
Willmar road at Hanley Falls, which would thus permit the latter
road to enter into competition at stations west of that place with
the wood taken from along the line of the road of the plaintiff in
error east of that station.
In truth, however, competition in the case of either cattle or
wood lies more in assertion than in substantial fact.
First as to the cattle. This long haul of 380 miles necessarily
causes a great loss in weight in the cattle, and much greater
liability arises of the lighter cattle being trampled upon and
killed by the heavier ones in the same car. Such liability
increases the longer the transportation exists. These facts act
almost as a complete bar to the traffic in that kind of cattle
called "stockers and feeders" from stations west of Hanley Falls
over the road of the plaintiff in error to Sioux City. It may be
said, therefore, that competition between the roads for the
transportation of such cattle to Sioux Falls does not exist. Those
who own these cattle and are near enough to Hanley Falls to drive
them to that station and there load them upon the Willmar &
Sioux Falls Railway do so, but those who are so far off as to make
that impracticable have largely given up the attempt to reach Sioux
Falls with their cattle on account of the difficulties and losses
above mentioned. Nor does the failure
Page 179 U. S. 299
of the owners to reach the Sioux City market result in sending
all the cattle of the "stockers and feeders" class, which would
otherwise go to that market, to Minneapolis or St. Paul, which
would give the long haul for those cattle to the road of the
plaintiff in error. The evidence is that St. Paul and Minneapolis
are much poorer markets for the above named cattle than Sioux City
because of the absence of feed in those markets, which is present
in large quantities and at cheaper prices at Sioux City. The result
has therefore been that this lack of facilities at Hanley Falls has
materially injured trade in this particular class of cattle by
parties west of Hanley Falls, while the plaintiff in error does not
secure any substantially greater amount of such transportation for
the Minneapolis or St. Paul market, for the reason just stated.
Second as to the wood. It seems that there is very little wood
along and near the line of the road of the plaintiff in error east
of Hanley Falls, and the supply is being rapidly exhausted, but
that which yet remains is being brought in decreasing quantities
and comes so dear to the inhabitants of towns west of Hanley Falls
that, rather than purchase, it they will and do drive from ten to
fifteen miles to get to a station on the Willmar road, and there
buy wood which they bring back for less than it costs to buy wood
on the line of the road of the plaintiff in error coming from
stations east of Hanley Falls. The country west of Hanley Falls is
rolling prairie, and produces no wood. The inhabitants of those
towns are buying more wood, and yet are taking less from the road
of the plaintiff in error. They obtain wood, as stated, by drawing
it from stations on the Willmar road anywhere from ten to fifteen
miles away. To furnish facilities, therefore, at Hanley Falls so
that the wood from the forests of northern Minnesota may be brought
there on the Willmar road and transferred in cars to the road of
the plaintiff in error, and transported to stations west of Hanley
Falls, is not in fact to compete or provide for competition with
the plaintiff in error in the article of wood. It is simply
affording facilities to people along the line of its road west of
Hanley Falls to obtain wood by a short haul on the road of the
plaintiff in error, which, without such facilities, would be
obtained by many
Page 179 U. S. 300
people by drawing it in their own conveyances from stations on
the Willmar road.
These are the facts upon which the plaintiff in error must rest
its argument that to enforce the judgment would compel it to pay
its share in the cost of the construction of a track to be used for
the purpose of depriving the company of its traffic and
transferring it to its competitor. The facts do not afford a fair
foundation for the argument.
As has been seen, it is not a case, so far as the cattle are
concerned, where the plaintiff in error in deprived of its traffic
and compelled to transfer it to another and competing company. The
question is whether this company, in its effort to compel owners of
this class of cattle to transport them over its road to
Minneapolis, which is a less favorable market, can rightfully
refuse to make track connections with another company by which the
owners of the cattle can reach the more favorable market of Sioux
City at such a cost as will render the transportation profitable.
In the consideration of this question, the further fact must be
borne in mind that the failure to get to Sioux City with such
cattle does not necessarily result in sending them over the road of
the plaintiff in error to either Minneapolis or St. Paul, but the
lack of facilities at Hanley Falls simply tends to diminish, if not
to extinguish, the trade in such cattle west of that station. Other
kinds of cattle would still be sent to St. Paul Minneapolis, the
same as ever. Can it be possible that a railroad chartered and
built primarily for the accommodation and in the interests of the
public can under such facts legally refuse the track connections
directed in this case? Can it refuse to obey the commands of the
legislature in such case upon the sole ground that it may thereby
somewhat lessen the earnings of its road? Or can it refuse to make
such connections because, it they were made, wood could be brought
from the forests of northern Minnesota to all towns along its line
west of Hanley Falls, and there sold for a less price than can now
be done, when, without such connection's being made, the demand for
the wood along the line of the road of the plaintiff in error is
nevertheless constantly decreasing, owing to its quality and price?
We think these questions should receive a
Page 179 U. S. 301
negative answer. The interests of the public should not be thus
wholly and, it seems to us, unjustifiably ignored.
Taking the facts which we have already enumerated into
consideration, we think there is no justification furnished for the
argument that the judgment, if enforced, would violate any of the
constitutional rights of the plaintiff in error. In so deciding, we
do not at all mean to hold that under no circumstances could a
judgment enforcing track connections between two railroad
corporations be a violation of the constitutional rights of one or
the other, or possibly of both such corporations. It would depend
upon the facts surrounding the cases in regard to which the
judgment was given. The reasonableness of the judgment with
reference to the facts concerning each case must be a material, if
not a controlling, factor upon the question of its validity. A
statute, or a regulation provided for therein, is frequently valid,
or the reverse, according as the fact may be, whether it is a
reasonable or an unreasonable exercise of legislative power over
the subject matter involved. And in many cases, questions of degree
are the controlling ones by which to determine the validity, or the
reverse, of legislative action.
We think this case is a reasonable exercise of the power of
regulation in favor of the interests and for the accommodation of
the public, and that it does not, regard being had to the facts,
unduly, unfairly, or improperly affect the pecuniary rights or
interests of the plaintiff in error.
As we have said, it is unnecessary in this case to determine the
question of the validity of the whole act with regard to all its
provisions and details. We need express no opinion upon that
subject. We simply here determine that the judgment actually
rendered, directing this track connection to be made and thus
affording track facilities at Hanley Falls, does not violate the
constitutional rights of the plaintiff in error.
The distinction between this case and that of
Lake Shore
&c. Railway Co. v. Smith, 173 U.S.,
supra, is
plain. There, we held that the statute in question was not a
reasonable regulation of the business of the company; that it was
the exercise of a pure, bald, and unmixed power of discrimination
in favor of a
Page 179 U. S. 302
few of the persons having occasion to travel on the road,
permitting them to do so at a less expense than others, provided
they could buy a certain number of tickets at one time. It was not
legislation for the safety, health, or proper convenience of the
public, but an arbitrary enactment in favor of the persons spoken
of, who, in the legislative judgment, should be carried at a less
expense than the other members of the community, and there was no
reasonable ground upon which the legislation could be rested unless
the simple decision of the legislature should be held to constitute
such reason.
In this case, the provision is a manifestly reasonable one,
tending directly to the accommodation of the public, and in a
manner not substantially or unreasonably detrimental to the
ultimate interests of the corporation itself.
Although to carry out the judgment may require the exercise by
the plaintiff in error of the power of eminent domain, and will
also result in some, comparatively speaking, small expense, yet
neither fact furnishes an answer to the application of defendant in
error.
Mayor &c. v. Northwestern Railway, 109 Mass.
112;
People v. Railroad, 58 N.Y. 152, 163;
People v.
Boston &c. Railroad Company, 70 N.Y. 569;
People v.
Railroad Company, 104 N.Y. 58, 67.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Minnesota is therefore
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE and MR. JUSTICE McKENNA dissented.
*
"SEC. 3. (a) That all common carriers subject to the provisions
of this act shall provide at all points of connection, crossing, or
intersection at grade, where it is practicable and necessary for
the interest of traffic, ample facilities by track connections for
transferring any cars used in the regular business of their
respective lines of road from their lines or tracks to those of any
other common carrier whose lines or tracks may connect with, cross,
or intersect their own, and shall provide equal and reasonable
facilities for the interchange of cars and traffic between their
respective lines, and for the receiving, forwarding, and delivering
of passengers, property, and cars to and from their several lines
and those of other common carriers connecting therewith, and shall
not discriminate in their rates or charges between such connecting
lines or on freight coming over such lines; but this shall not be
construed as requiring any common carrier to furnish for another
common carrier its tracks, equipment, or terminal facilities
without reasonable compensation; that each of said connecting lines
shall pay its proportionate share for the building and maintenance
of such tracks and switches as may be necessary to furnish the
transfer facilities required by this act, and in case they cannot
agree on the amount which each line shall pay, then said amount
shall upon application by either party, be determined and adjusted
by the railroad and warehouse commission, and either party shall
have the right to appeal from the order of said commission fixing
the amount so to be paid, to the district court of the county where
said transfer facilities are furnished, by serving a notice in
writing on the adverse party within ten (10) days after the making
and filing of such order by said commission, and upon the service
of such notice there shall be pending in said district court a
civil action for the adjustment and determination of the amount to
be paid by each carrier for the expense of the building and
maintenance of said transfer facilities. Pleadings shall be made
and filed in said action in conformity to those required by law and
rules of practice in said court, and said cause shall be tried in
the manner provided for the trial or civil actions in the district
courts of this state."
"(b) All railway companies doing business in this state shall,
upon the demand of any person or persons interested, or upon demand
of the railroad and warehouse commission, establish reasonable
joint through rates for the transportation of freight between
points on their respective lines within this state."
"Carload lots shall be transferred without unloading from the
cars in which such shipments were first made, unless such unloading
into other cars shall be done without charge therefor to the
shipper or receiver of such carload lots, and such transfer shall
be made without unreasonable delay, under such contract
arrangements as such connecting companies may make, or under such
rules as the railroad and warehouse commission may prescribe, as
hereafter provided in this act."
"Less than carload lots shall be transferred into the connecting
railway cars at cost, which shall be included in and made a part of
the joint rates adopted by such railway companies, or established
as provided by this act. When shipments of freight to be
transported between different points within this state are required
to be carried by two (2) or more railway companies operating
connecting lines, such railway companies shall transport the same
at reasonable through rates, and shall at all times give the same
facilities and accommodations to local or state traffic as they
give to interstate traffic over their lines of road."
"(c) In the event that said railway companies fail to establish
through joint rates, or fail to establish and charge reasonable
rates for such through shipments, or fail to establish between
themselves the rates and terms upon which cars of one company shall
be transferred in such through shipments from the line of one
company to the other and returned, or fail to provide for the
convenient and prompt transfer of such through freight from the
cars of the receiving company to those of the connecting line, it
shall be the duty of the railroad and warehouse commission of this
state, and said commission is hereby directed, upon the application
of any person or persons interested, to establish reasonable joint
rates for the shipment of freight and cars over any two or more
connecting lines of railroad in this state, and to prescribe the
reasonable rules under which any such cars so transferred shall be
returned, and in establishing, changing, or revising any such rates
they shall take into consideration the average of rates charged by
said railway companies operating such connecting lines for joint
interstate shipments for like distances."
"The rates established by said commission shall go into effect
within ten (10) days after the same are promulgated by said
commission, and from and after that time the schedule of rates so
established shall be
prima facie evidence in all the
courts of this state that such rates are reasonable through rates
for the transportation of freight and cars upon the railroads for
which such schedule has been fixed."
"(d) Before the promulgation of such rates or rules, as above
provided, the railroad and warehouse commission shall notify the
railroad companies interested in the schedule of joint rates fixed
by them, and they shall give said railroad companies a reasonable
time thereafter to agree upon a division of charges provided for in
such schedule, and in the event of the failure of the railway
companies to agree upon such division and to notify the board of
such agreement, said commission shall, after a hearing of the
companies interested, decide the same, taking into consideration
the value of terminal facilities and all the circumstances of the
haul, and the division so determined by the commission shall, in
all controversies or suits between the railroad companies
interested, be
prima facie evidence of the just and
reasonable division of such charges."
"(e) Every unjust and unreasonable charge for the transportation
of freight and cars over two or more railroads in this state is
hereby prohibited and declared to be unlawful, and every company or
person violating the provisions of this section shall be subject to
the penalties prescribed in section twelve (12) of the original act
to which this act is amendatory."
"(f) Nothing herein contained shall be construed as requiring
any railroad company to send its cars over the line of railroad of
another company when its own line of railroad runs to and reaches
the point of destination or the point of connection with another
railroad on which such point of destination is located, or to use
its track or terminal facilities at terminal points for the
handling of cars or traffics of another of competing company:
Provided, That in no case shall the charges for
transportation exceed the established through joint rates between
any two points."
"(g) Whenever any property is received by any common carrier,
subject to the provisions of this act, to be transported from one
place to another within this state, it shall be unlawful for such
common carrier to limit in any way, except as stated in its
classification schedule, hereinafter provided for, the common law
liability with reference to such property, while in its custody as
a common carrier; such liability must include the absolute
responsibility of the common carrier for the acts of its agents in
relation to such property."
"31. All records, arguments, and briefs, printed for the use of
the court, must be in such form and size that they can be
conveniently bound together, so as to make an ordinary octavo
volume, and as well as all quotations contained therein, and the
covers thereof, must be printed in clear type (never smaller than
small pice) and on unglazed paper."
