MUTUAL LIFE INS. CO. OF NEW YORK v. HILL, 178 U.S. 347 (1900)
Syllabus
U.S. Supreme Court
MUTUAL LIFE INS. CO. OF NEW YORK v. HILL, 178 U.S. 347 (1900)178 U.S. 347
MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEW
YORK, Petitioner,
v.
GEORGE E. HILL, Ellen Kellogg Hill, Eugene C. Hill, by their
Guardian, Eben Smith, and Eliza Maude Hill, in her own behalf.
No. 453.
Argued March 14, 15, 1900.
Decided May 28, 1900.
Messrs. Julien T. Davies, John B. Allen, Edward Lyman Short, Frederic D. McKenney, and Robert C. Strudwick for petitioner.
Messrs. Stanton Warburton, Harold Preston, and Eben Smith for respondents.
Mr. Justice Brewer delivered the opinion of the court:
This case resembles the last three decided, in that it was an
action against the insurance company on a policy whose premiums had not been paid for some years before the death of the insured. The policy was issued April 29, 1886, to George Dana Hill for the benefit of his wife, if living at the time of his death, and, if not, for the benefit of their children. The insured paid the first annual premium, but none thereafter. He died on December 4, 1890. His wife died before him, and this action was brought in behalf of the children. The answer alleged, among other things--
'That, pursuant to the conditions of
the said policy, there became and was due to the defendant, as a
premium upon said policy of insurance, on the 29th day of April, A.
D. 1887, the sum of eight hundred and fourteen ($814) dollars and
the said George Dana Hill and the said Ellen Kellogg Hill, his
wife, and each and all of the plaintiffs herein failed, neglected,
and refused to pay to the defendant, at the time aforesaid, the
said sum of eight hundred and fourteen ($814) dollars or any part
thereof, and ever since that time and up to the time of the death
of the said George Dana Hill, on the 4th day of December, 1890, the
said George Dana Hill and the said Ellen Kellogg Hill, his wife,
during her lifetime, and each and all of the plaintiffs, neglected
and refused to pay to defendant the said sum or any part thereof,
or any other sum or other thing of value whatever; by reason
whereof the said policy of insurance became and was on the 29th day
of April, A. D. 1887, according to the conditions aforesaid, void
and of no effect.
'That, at a time more than one year
from the time of the issuance of the policy mentioned in the
complaint, and diring the lifetime of the said George Dana Hill
mentioned in the complaint, it was mutually agreed between the
defendant and the said George Dana Hill, that the said contract of
insurance should be waived, abandoned, and rescinded, and the said
George Dana Hill and the defendant then, by mutual consent, waived.
abandoned, and rescinded the same accordingly, and all their mutual
rights and obligations therein and thereunder.
'This defendant alleges that the said
plaintiffs, and each of them, should be, and are, estopped from,
and should not be [178 U.S. 347, 349]
Opinions
v.
GEORGE E. HILL, Ellen Kellogg Hill, Eugene C. Hill, by their Guardian, Eben Smith, and Eliza Maude Hill, in her own behalf.
No. 453.
Argued March 14, 15, 1900.
Decided May 28, 1900.
Messrs. Julien T. Davies, John B. Allen, Edward Lyman Short, Frederic D. McKenney, and Robert C. Strudwick for petitioner. Messrs. Stanton Warburton, Harold Preston, and Eben Smith for respondents. Mr. Justice Brewer delivered the opinion of the court: This case resembles the last three decided, in that it was an Page 178 U.S. 347, 348 action against the insurance company on a policy whose premiums had not been paid for some years before the death of the insured. The policy was issued April 29, 1886, to George Dana Hill for the benefit of his wife, if living at the time of his death, and, if not, for the benefit of their children. The insured paid the first annual premium, but none thereafter. He died on December 4, 1890. His wife died before him, and this action was brought in behalf of the children. The answer alleged, among other things--
U.S. Supreme Court
MUTUAL LIFE INS. CO. OF NEW YORK v. HILL, 178 U.S. 347 (1900) 178 U.S. 347 MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEW YORK, Petitioner,v.
GEORGE E. HILL, Ellen Kellogg Hill, Eugene C. Hill, by their Guardian, Eben Smith, and Eliza Maude Hill, in her own behalf.
No. 453.
Argued March 14, 15, 1900.
Decided May 28, 1900.
Messrs. Julien T. Davies, John B. Allen, Edward Lyman Short, Frederic D. McKenney, and Robert C. Strudwick for petitioner. Messrs. Stanton Warburton, Harold Preston, and Eben Smith for respondents. Mr. Justice Brewer delivered the opinion of the court: This case resembles the last three decided, in that it was an Page 178 U.S. 347, 348 action against the insurance company on a policy whose premiums had not been paid for some years before the death of the insured. The policy was issued April 29, 1886, to George Dana Hill for the benefit of his wife, if living at the time of his death, and, if not, for the benefit of their children. The insured paid the first annual premium, but none thereafter. He died on December 4, 1890. His wife died before him, and this action was brought in behalf of the children. The answer alleged, among other things--
'That, pursuant to the conditions of
the said policy, there became and was due to the defendant, as a
premium upon said policy of insurance, on the 29th day of April, A.
D. 1887, the sum of eight hundred and fourteen ($814) dollars and
the said George Dana Hill and the said Ellen Kellogg Hill, his
wife, and each and all of the plaintiffs herein failed, neglected,
and refused to pay to the defendant, at the time aforesaid, the
said sum of eight hundred and fourteen ($814) dollars or any part
thereof, and ever since that time and up to the time of the death
of the said George Dana Hill, on the 4th day of December, 1890, the
said George Dana Hill and the said Ellen Kellogg Hill, his wife,
during her lifetime, and each and all of the plaintiffs, neglected
and refused to pay to defendant the said sum or any part thereof,
or any other sum or other thing of value whatever; by reason
whereof the said policy of insurance became and was on the 29th day
of April, A. D. 1887, according to the conditions aforesaid, void
and of no effect.
'That, at a time more than one year
from the time of the issuance of the policy mentioned in the
complaint, and diring the lifetime of the said George Dana Hill
mentioned in the complaint, it was mutually agreed between the
defendant and the said George Dana Hill, that the said contract of
insurance should be waived, abandoned, and rescinded, and the said
George Dana Hill and the defendant then, by mutual consent, waived.
abandoned, and rescinded the same accordingly, and all their mutual
rights and obligations therein and thereunder.
'This defendant alleges that the said
plaintiffs, and each of them, should be, and are, estopped from,
and should not be
Page 178 U.S.
347, 349
permitted to allege or prove that defendant did not mail, or
cause to be mailed, or otherwise given, to said George Dana Hill a
notice stating the amount of premium due on said policy on April
29, 1887, or at any other time, with the place where the same
should be paid, the person to whom the same is payable, and stating
that unless the premium then due should be paid to the company or
its agents, within thirty days after the mailing of such notice,
the policy and all payments made thereon should become forfeited,
or any other notice prescribed by any statute or statutes of the
state of New York, or any other notice than that hereinafter in
this paragraph mentioned, for that, shortly prior to and after, and
on said 29th day of April, 1887, this defendant, in writing, and
also personally, notified and informed the said George Dana Hill,
at said city of Seattle, that the premium of $814, necessary to be
paid on said policy for the continuance of said policy of
insurance, was due and payable, and said defendant duly demanded
payment of said premium in said sum, and, at the same time and
place, tendered the receipt of the defendant therefor, duly signed
by its president and secretary; and the said Hill, being fully so
informed and advised in the premises, refused to make payment of
said premium, or any part thereof, and then and there, intending,
and for the purpose of inducing defendant to rely upon the same,
informed defendant that he, the said George Dana Hill, was unable
to pay said premium, and did not intend to make payment thereof, or
of any premium thereafter to accrue upon said policy of insurance,
but, on the contrary, he, the said George Dana Hill, intended to
allow the said policy to lapse and become forfeited for want of
payment of said premium or of any future premium accruing on said
policy; and the said defendant, then and there, and ever since,
relying upon the said representations and conduct on the part of
the said George Dana Hill, was thereby induced to, and did, declare
the said policy and contract of insurance forfeited and abandoned,
and, in good faith, relying upon said conduct and representations
on the part of said George Dana Hill, this defendant was induced
to, and did, fail and abstain from giving or mailing any notice,
whether prescribed by statute or
Page 178 U.S.
347, 350
otherwise, to the said George Dana Hill, or to any person
interested in said policy, concerning the payment of any premium
thereon.'
Here, as in the last two cases, is disclosed a distinct
agreement on the part of the insre d and the company to waive and
abandon the policy and all rights and obligations on the part of
the parties thereto.
But it is said that the insured was not the beneficiary; his
wife, and in case of her death, their children, being named as
such; and that it was not in his power, by nonpayment or waiver or
abandonment, to relinquish or cancel her or their rights in the
policy. It is doubtless an interesting question how far the action
of the insured can affect or bind the beneficiaries in a
life-insurance policy. If the answer in this case contained simply
the allegation in respect to the insured's agreement with the
company, we should be compelled to enter into an examination of
that question; but it is alleged, not only that the insured and the
company agreed to abandon the contract, but also that the
beneficiary, his wife, and the plaintiffs, their children, 'failed,
neglected, and refused' to pay the premium. So we have a case in
which, not only did the insured and the company abandon the
contract, but also the beneficiaries neglected and refused to do
that which was essential to keep the policy in life. The allegation
in the answer does not disclose a mere omission, for it is
'neglected and refused,' and, of course, there can be no refusal
unless with knowledge of the opportunity or duty. A party cannot be
said to refuse to do a thing of which he knows nothing. Refusal
implies demand, knowledge, or notice. The case, therefore, is one
in which the beneficiaries refused to continue the policy, while
the insured and the company abandoned it.
Under those circumstances we think the case falls within the
same rule as the preceding; and the judgments of the Court of
Appeals of the Ninth Circuit and of the Circuit Court of the United
States for the District of Washington are reversed, and the case
remanded to the latter court, with instructions to overrule the
demurrer to defendant's answer.
Mr. Justice Peckham did not sit at the hearing, and took no part
in the decision of this case.
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